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ABSTRACT

The International Media section of the proceedings contains the following 17 papers: "West German Media Coverage of the United States and Soviet Union, 1983-1988" (Jeffrey L. Griffin); "Shakti: The Power of the Mother. The Violent Nurturer in Ancient Indian Text and Modern Commercial Cinema" (Jawahara K. Saidulla); "Telecommunications, Consumerism and Third World Development: The Role of Television in Brazilian Industrialization under Military Rule" (Erik A. Stilling); "The Privatization of TF1, France's Oldest Television Network" (Alvi McWilliams); "Development Journalism, Development Communication and Distance Education: A Clarification of Constructs in Development Research" (Kuldip R. Rampal); "The Impact of International Telecommunications on Developing Countries" (Peng H. Ang); "A Comparison of Televised International and Foreign News according to the Political Prominence of Four Western Countries" (Michel Dupagne); "The Ivoirien State and Cultural Imperialism through Television" (Mitchell Land); "Coverage of Sub-Sahara Africa by Four Soviet Dailies, 1979-1987: A Content Analysis" (Festus Eribo); "New World Information and Communication Order Issues in Latin America" (Bruce Garrison and Michael B. Salwen); "'Frit Danmark' and the Development of Denmark's Resistance Movement" (Nathaniel Hong); "Four East European Broadcasting Systems: The Final Days" (Milton Hollstein); "Information Flows, Power, and a Modest Proposal for Development Communications" (Nancy Brendlinger); "Will All the Censors of Nigerian Press Please Stand Up?" (Chris W. Ogbondah); "'Soviet Life' Magazine and Soviet-American Detente" (Allen W. Palmer and Kai Terri); "The Impact of the Home Video Cassette Recorder on Egyptian Film and Television Consumption Patterns" (Hussein Y. Amin and Douglas A. Boyd); and "Political Issues and Visual Rhetoric: Television Advertising in Hungary's First Free Election" (Shay Sayre). (RS)

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Markham Award paper

WEST GERMAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, 1983-1988

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WEST GERMAN MEDIA COVERAGE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, 1983-1988

INTRODUCTION

West German attitudes toward the United States and the Soviet Union shifted markedly in the 1980s, a decade during which citizens of the Federal Republic increasingly regarded their historical enemy to the east with less fear and their longtime ally as a meddler that interfered with Bonn's sovereignty. Throughout most of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, public opinion polls showed that a majority of West Germans were pro-American, solidly backed NATO, and were mistrustful of the Soviets. But perceptions of the superpowers began to converge in the mid-1980s as a new leadership in the Kremlin called for major arms reductions -- even as the allies in Washington were urging Bonn to rehaul NATO weapon systems.

A series of polls conducted by the SINUS Institute of Munich between 1980 and 1988 indicated that a trend emerged among West German citizens of viewing the superpowers as equivalent. Reflecting that phenomenon, the United States was viewed increasingly negatively, and the Soviet Union was viewed increasingly positively. Although the trend toward viewing the superpowers more or less the same way was clear and pronounced, the data did not confirm any fears that West German citizens had made an about-face, turning their backs on the United States and blindly trusting the Soviets. Rather, the data reflected a steady erosion in confidence in the United States during the Reagan years. Although the image that West Germans held of the Soviet Union also improved steadily from 1980 to 1988, a dramatic acceleration of this occurred between 1986 and 1988, reflecting the Gorbachev factor, as the transformations in Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy stance left a mark on the country's world image.

This study uses as a jumping off point two of those polls, 1983 and 1988, which reflect the sharp shift in opinion that took place over the course of the decade, and looks at how the West German media were covering the Soviet Union and the United States in the months leading up to the polls. This study does not purport to establish any causal links between the media coverage and the public opinion, but rather addresses the useful question of how were West German media covering the two superpowers in this period of volatile public opinion.

Changes in West German attitudes in the 1980s did not happen overnight; rather, West German perceptions about the Soviet Union and the United States changed gradually. The cataclysmic unfolding of events in late 1989 and in 1990, when democratic upheavals moved like falling dominoes throughout Eastern Europe, fundamentally altered the European political map, security questions, and even the course of history. The ramifications of these events on media portrayals of the Soviet Union and the United States, however, are outside the scope of this study.

BACKGROUND

The temperature of the relationship between Washington and Bonn -- always a topic that has sparked intense debate, commentary and speculation among politicians as well as journalists -- became the focus of even more attention in the mid- to late-1980s. Fears of an eastward-looking Federal Republic perceived to be an increasingly shaky pillar of the Western alliance were expressed both publicly and privately by U.S. and European politicians and trumpeted by the media. The more that West German politicians tried to allay the doubts by reaffirming their commitment to NATO, the more the "informed" speculation raged about West Germany being on the verge of steering its own course between the superpowers. What was fanning the flames of fear?

By the 1980s the 200,000 American troops in West Germany had come to be regarded by many as an occupying army, rather than protectors of freedom, and the American missiles came to represent the threat of a nuclear war that could turn both Germanies into a desolate and ravaged symbol of the superpower struggle for world dominance. The close relationship forged in the post-war period between the United States and West Germany was strained at times in the 1980s as the Federal Republic began to pursue a more independent line rather than automatically to follow Washington's lead. West Germans increasingly became concerned with the issue of national sovereignty.

By mid-1988, the public mood about noisy NATO jets, whose 68,000 hours of low-altitude flying a year in West Germany make a shrieking assault on citizens' ears and nerves, had turned defiant. A broad-based coalition that cut across traditional party lines waged an anti-jet campaign that turned the matter into a hot political issue. The campaign was already in full swing when the crash of an Italian stunt plane during a NATO air show at the United States' Ramstein air base killed 70 people. The crash touched off a public furor about limits to the nation's sovereignty when Defense Minister Rupert Scholz immediately announced a ban on aerobatic flights, only to discover that he may have lacked the legal authority to dictate such a prohibition to the allies.

Relations between Washington and Bonn were chilled further by the Libyan affair in late 1988, when U.S. officials confronted the West German government with information it had that West German firms were aiding in the construction of a chemical-weapons plant in Libya. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl initially denied this and called the U.S. ambassador to demand that the United States stop treating West Germany like "a banana republic."

In the same period, Washington was exerting pressure on the Kohl government to agree to a plan to modernize NATO weapon systems, which the public greatly opposed.

This increasing weariness with the U.S. military presence and political leverage was just one configuration in the changing kaleidoscope of relations with the superpowers. Nothing altered the picture more profoundly than the emergence of a new leadership in the Kremlin when Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party on March 11, 1985. Over the next few years, Gorbachev single-handedly altered many Europeans' perceptions of the Soviet Union as he left the West flatfooted with his major arms-reduction proposals and as he pushed through reformist policies on the domestic front. Gorbachev's popularity among West Germans was such that polls in the late 1980s consistently showed him to be better liked than the U.S. president -- something that never happened with another Soviet leader. According to the West German news magazine Spiegel, Gorbachev's popularity could be seen as more than just a reflection of his appeal, but "rather is part of a new image the Germans have of the world power in the East." Part of that new image apparently was a benign Soviet Union -- polls showed that up to 80 percent of West Germans no longer believed there was a military threat from the Eastern bloc (Fialka, 1989).

American political analyst Philip Pilevsky (1989) argued that the Soviet Union has long been engaged in a public relations campaign aimed at effectively manipulating European public opinion, with the intent of encouraging rifts in the Atlantic alliance, by creating the myth of the Soviets as the peacemakers and the Americans as the warmongers. Indeed, this fear was privately expressed by U.S. officials who said Gorbachev's rhetoric was clouding German judgment and eroding the fabric of the Western alliance. Public support in West Germany for defense initiatives shrank steadily in the 1980s. Despite this, public identification with NATO remained strong. There was an ambivalence in German public attitudes -- surveys showed great enthusiasm for Gorbachev, but at the same time a deeply instilled desire to remain in NATO.

Not only public sentiment but also Bonn's active Ostpolitik caused uneasiness in Washington. For example, U.S. officials expressed alarm over a $1.6 billion loan to the Soviet Union arranged by West German banks in 1988 -- the credit was to be used by the Soviets to buy West German machinery to help modernize the Soviet consumer-goods sector. U.S. officials criticized the initiative, claiming that bankrolling the Soviet modernization freed the Kremlin to divert more money into an arms buildup. European leaders rejected this argument outright. Repeated glowing endorsements of Gorbachev by West Germany's foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and his constant urging that the West must reforge its relationship with Moscow raised eyebrows in NATO circles, where the term "Genscherism" came to be derogatorily used to mean a naive enthusiasm for Gorbachev and a rash eagerness to help him.

Could a similar naive enthusiasm for Gorbachev have colored German media coverage of the Soviet Union in this period? Objectivity and neutrality in reporting are values deeply embedded in the American journalistic tradition, but the German press is highly partisan and German reporters perceive their role differently. German journalists are less likely than their counterparts in Anglo-Saxon countries to see themselves as neutral conveyors of information (Köcher, 1986). They typically see themselves as critics of state and society. In a cross-cultural survey that asked journalists what aspects of their job they particularly liked, Köcher found that 42 percent of German journalists liked the chance of championing values and ideas and 29 percent liked having the opportunity to influence political decisions. Similarly, a 1982 study of West German journalists (Kunczik, 1988) found that the possibility of influencing public opinion was one of the things they most appreciated about their job.

Are German journalists successful in their efforts to influence public opinion? Some scholars would answer yes, sometimes.

Noelle-Neumann (1984) argued that through misrepresentative news coverage of the 1972 federal election a consonant and inherently leftist West German media portrayed a climate of opinion different from that perceived directly by citizens. A consequence of this "dual climate of opinion" fostered by the media was that many people, believing that their opinion was in a minority, changed their view in order to conform to what they thought was the majority point of view. In her study, which combined attitudinal data on a microscopic level with macroscopic measures of media content, Noelle-Neumann said this "spiral of silence" -- the tendency to not publicly express an opinion out of the mainstream -- explained last-minute shifts in voter partisanship in the 1972 election leading to a victory by the liberal Social Democratic party.

In a later study in which she analyzed poll results dating back to the 1950s, Noelle-Neumann (1983) concluded that influential German media may have tried to foster anti-Americanism but failed -- as far as basic attitudes. But Noelle-Neumann found the public to be more influenced on attitudes that depended more on what information the media made public and how they presented it. As evidence, Noelle-Neumann cited the increasingly negative opinion that those polled had of President Reagan over the years. She based her conclusion of media influence on evidence that was tenuous, at best. The pollster said that when given a chance to form their own impressions about Reagan, West Germans were favorable toward him, as indicated by a poll conducted just after the June 1982 Reagan visit, which showed that 40 percent had a favorable impression of him. But she said negative media reports took hold once he left, as indicated by a poll late in the year indicating that just 18 percent had a favorable opinion. In general, however, Noelle-Neumann said poll results showed that the pro-American orientation of West German public opinion had remained surprisingly stable in the face of what she claimed was biased media coverage.

Noelle-Neumann's conclusion that media can influence people's opinions on issues outside the realm of personal experience parallels findings of other researchers. Zucker (1978) found that the less direct experience people have with an issue, the more they rely on news media for information and interpretation on that issue. Zucker, who compared changes in both news coverage and opinion for a set of issues over time and, where available, included measures of "reality" for comparison, said that correlations found between news coverage of several unobtrusive issues -- i.e., issues that did not affect people's lives directly -- and public opinion could not be readily explained by the alternate hypotheses of opinion causing coverage, the media giving people what they wanted or "reality" causing both coverage and opinion. However, he concluded that the correlations could be explained as coverage changes causing opinion changes.

Given this dependency on media for information on areas outside of people's experience, some research suggests that not only what the media report in their coverage of international affairs has an effect, but also how much attention they devote to that news. McNelly and Izcaray (1986) found that the volume of news exposure that countries receive in international news coverage is an important factor, simply through familiarity, in the liking that audience members have for the countries and perceptions of them as successful. They speculated that this could be because heavy exposure makes countries seem more human and likeable than they would otherwise appear.

In recent years, media-effects research has moved toward more-sophisticated analyses of how the media can influence the attitudes held by people. Kepplinger et al. (1989) found that trends in West German press coverage of Chancellor Kohl preceded trends in popular opinion about Kohl by several months. In a time-series analysis that compared poll results with print media coverage of Kohl from 1975-84, Kepplinger et al. concluded that trends in press reporting paved the way for later trends in popular opinion. Trends in press reporting more closely related to approval of Kohl as a politician than to views about his personality. The research also indicated that trends in press reporting in most publications followed trends in public opinion, but took the opposite stance, thus providing counterbalance.

In the same vein, Kleinnijenhuis (1987) found some evidence that the world images transmitted by newspapers exert a strong influence on the world images of their readers. Kleinnijenhuis linked cold war images in several Dutch newspapers to survey data of the newspaper readers' basic political attitudes and cold war opinions and found evidence supporting the hypothesis that the newspapers affected reader opinion. Kleinnijenhuis examined the causal nature between the newspapers one reads and the opinions one holds on international affairs. The author concluded that opinions expressed in the newspaper influence the political viewpoints of readers, even though the political principles of readers guide their newspaper choice and also influence their political viewpoints. Kleinnijenhuis asserted that the evidence contradicts the notion that newspapers have little importance in the television age. Although the practical influence of newspapers on readers' world images was found to be limited in comparison with the influence of the readers' basic political principles, Kleinnijenhuis concluded that the effects of press opinion on readers' world images were large enough to change the climate of opinion in a country quite dramatically in the long run.

Another study that demonstrated broader media effects was conducted by Fan (1988), whose research indicates that the press can mold opinion within agenda items. Fan developed an innovative and complicated mathematical model called ideodynamics to calculate the impact of information on the population. The model sprang from the premise that time trends of opinion percentages could be predicted from the relevant messages available to the public. The methodological approach used in ideodynamics is the construction of a non-linear predictive model of the movement over time in the distribution of opinion based on the persuasive influences that are expected to result from changes in the news. The study found that mass media messages could be used to predict the opinion percentages of polls. From a computerized content analysis of Associated Press stories, Fan was able to successfully project opinion for all six issues analyzed. For each issue, the probability that the calculated fit from the ideodynamic projections could have been obtained by random poll points was less than .0001. Therefore, statistically, the ideodynamic projections were better than either projections obtained from no opinion change or a random choice of poll values. Fan recommended turning from the law of minimal effects of the mass media to the concept of cumulative effects of information.

The ideodynamic model was used in a subsequent study by Fan and Tims (1989) to accurately forecast opinion poll results for the

1988 U.S. presidential election. Predictions of public support for Bush and Dukakis during the 1988 presidential campaign were based on favorable and unfavorable messages contained in Associated Press wire stories. The opinion forecast from the computer-scored AP stories was in the range of error of opinion polls.

Altogether, these studies represent the growing body of evidence that over time the media can influence public opinion. Therefore, when there is a marked shift in people's attitudes, such as occurred in West Germany in the 1980s, it becomes important to look at media content and consider whether any trends in coverage match the trends in public opinion.

Research Questions

This review of the literature suggests the following research questions, which will be addressed in this study.

If the media do tell people how to think, as the research of Kepplinger, Kleinnijenhuis and Fan suggested, then we would expect press coverage of the United States and the Soviet Union to be consistent with subsequent public opinion about the superpowers.

If the leftist bias ascribed to the West German media by Noelle-Neumann does in fact exist, when coupled with German journalists' vision of themselves as critics rather than neutral conveyors of information and self-acknowledged pleasure in trying to influence public opinion, then coverage of the United States should become more negative over time, while coverage of the Soviet Union should become more positive.

As Gorbachev's policies of glasnost gave Western media ever more access to report on life in the Soviet Union, the media naturally responded by focusing more attention on the Soviet Union. This is expected to translate into greater balance in the flow of information about the superpowers, marked by an increase in the proportion of Soviet stories. Another consequence of the new Soviet openness should be increased diversity in coverage of the Soviet Union, marked by a wider variety of subject matter.

The research of McNelly and Izcaray supports the notion that sheer volume of coverage relates to liking for a nation. If this is true, we would expect an increase in coverage of the Soviet Union to precede the positive shift in attitudes toward the Soviet Union. In addition, the number of Soviet stories in which the Federal Republic plays a role is expected to increase.

Cross-temporal studies by Noelle-Neumann and others (Rattinger, 1987; Stevenson, 1988) all indicated that West German attitudes toward the United States had been fairly steady and generally positive for three decades, so changes in coverage of the United States are expected to be less dramatic than for the Soviet Union.

METHOD

A content analysis of influential national media was carried out to determine whether there were changes in the volume and scope of news about the United States and the Soviet Union in the West

German press between 1983 and 1988 and to determine whether any changes were consistent with changes in public opinion.

The 1983-88 period was selected because it contained the most dramatic changes in attitudes toward the superpowers.

The series of polls conducted by the SINUS Institute of Munich showed a clear trend between 1980 and 1988 toward viewing the superpowers as equivalent. Underlying that trend, the United States was viewed increasingly negatively, and the Soviet Union was viewed increasingly positively. The polls in the series were linked in that they all, with a few exceptions, gave respondents a set of nine characterizations and asked them whether each characterization applied to the United States only, the Soviet Union only, neither or both.

The shift in attitudes between 1983 and 1988 -- the two years in which this study examined media coverage -- was profound. For example, in response to the statement "a country that has a great interest in disarmament," 17 percent chose U.S. only in 1983 as compared to 9 percent in 1988; 8 percent chose Soviet Union only 1983 as compared to 20 percent in 1988; 30 percent chose both in 1983 as compared to 50 percent in 1988; and 33 percent chose neither in 1983 as compared to 14 percent in 1988. Similarly, on the statement "a country that threatens world peace," 2 percent chose U.S. only in 1983 as compared to 6 percent in 1988; 32 percent chose U.S. only in 1983 as compared to 11 percent in 1988; 34 percent chose both in 1983 as compared to 28 percent in 1988; and 18 percent chose neither in 1983 as compared to 45 percent in

1988.

Logic also governed the choice of which years to examine media coverage. Any attempt to look at changes in how the media covered the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1980s would have to take into account the Gorbachev factor. The polls had been conducted in 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986 and 1988. Choosing 1983 and 1988 enabled us to have a sampling of media content in the period before Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union and a sampling of media content when his popularity was immense.

The choice of media was constrained by the limited availability of West German media to researchers carrying out a study in the United States. These constraints ruled out any analysis of television coverage. In selecting appropriate print media for study, we wanted to choose media that were both national in readership and influential. This led to the selection of three weeklies -- Spiegel, Die Zeit and Stern.

All three are widely read and are considered to be opinion leaders in journalism. Kepplinger's study of media influence in the formation of attitudes about Kohl found that coverage trends in Spiegel and Stern regularly preceded trends in public opinion by three to six months. According to Kepplinger, the three weeklies exert an influence in West Germany on media coverage because they concentrate on long-term topics rather than one-time events. These publications are by no means representative of the full ideological gamut of West German media. Die Zeit is a non-partisan, liberal newspaper favored by the intelligentsia. The illustrated weekly Stern, somewhat sensationalistic in its approach, can be categorized as left-leaning in its political coverage. However, left-right classifications are inadequate in describing Spiegel, which is known in West Germany as a watchdog of democracy, always highly critical of the government. More American in style than other West German publications, Spiegel is renowned for hard-hitting investigative journalism. These three weeklies are also non-representative in that, to a certain extent, they are all three linked financially through the Bertelsmann media empire, although they are editorially independent. (Stern and Die Zeit are published by Grüner + Jahr, a Bertelsmann unit that also has an interest in Spiegel). Furthermore, all three are published in Hamburg. However, since it was impossible to carry out the study on a representative group of West German dailies -- they simply were not available -- the decision was made to carry out the study on weeklies. Using weeklies made sense for other reasons: 1) this made it possible to get a clear picture of how the superpowers were covered by one medium -- Spiegel (1989 circulation of 1.05 million), Die Zeit (1987 circulation of 455,000) and Stern (1989 circulation of 1.31 million) dominate the market for weekly publications with a news orientation, and 2) the greater infrequency of publication made it possible to do an exhaustive study of coverage, rather than to be forced to sample a small percentage of issues.

In order to see whether the tone of media coverage anticipated the tone of public opinion, all issues of the three weeklies in the six months prior to both the 1983 and 1988 SINUS polls were examined. The 1983 poll was conducted Aug. 19-Sept. 9, 1983, and the 1988 poll was conducted July 11-Aug. 5, 1988. All stories that dealt prominently with the United States and/or Americans, the Soviet Union and/or its citizens, or both were coded. Prominence was operationalized as mention in the headline, subhead or the first five paragraphs of the story (the first three paragraphs for Die Zeit, which tends to use much longer paragraphs).

Each story was evaluated in terms of six variables (see Appendix I, the code decision sheet): the publication in which the story appeared; the focus country, i.e., which of the superpowers the story dealt with; whether the story was international or domestic in scope; if it was international, the geographical region that embraced the other country involved; the subject matter of the story; and the impression of the focus country left by the story.

The focus country had to be categorized as either United States, the U.S.S.R. or U.S./U.S.S.R, for stories involving both. For scope, stories were marked as domestic if no other country was prominently mentioned (again with prominence defined in terms of a mention in the headline, subhead or first few paragraphs) and international if one or more other countries prominently entered into the story. When stories were international in scope, the coder selected the region of the other country or countries. There were 10 categories, for the most part corresponding to typical geographical groupings, but also reflecting the special nature of this study. So, while there were categories for Africa, the Middle

East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific, there was also a special category for West Germany. Also the categories for Western Europe and Eastern Europe doubled to embrace their respective political axes. Thus Western Europe and NATO comprised one category, while Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact comprised another. So, for example, Canada, while not a Western European country, fit into this category because of its NATO affiliation. The category U.S./U.S.S.R was for stories focusing on both superpowers -- and therefore automatically international in scope -- but not prominently including any other countries. The supranational category was for stories that dealt prominently with more than one country, from different regions, besides the focus country. So, for example, a story about the Soviet Union's relations with East and West Germany would be coded in this category because East and West Germany represent different regions. The final category, other, was used for stories dealing with one of the focus countries and an international organization such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International or for stories not fitting into one of the other classifications. For example, a story dealing with prewar Germany or a story about Arctic exploration was coded in this category.

There were nine categories for the subject matter variable: politics; military/defense; economy/business; social conditions; culture; accidents/natural disasters; science/environment/ technology; health/medicine; and other. These categories were adapted from those used in a 1979 UNESCO-sponsored study, carried out by the International Association for Mass Communication Research, of foreign news content in the media of 29 countries.

The politics category embraced intragovernmental decision-making and the actions of governmental bodies, the public and private lives of politicians, general relations between governments, political dissent and political violence (terrorism). The military/defense category was used for stories on military conflict, training exercises, defense strategy, defense spending, peace talks, the lives of soldiers and related topics. The economy/business category embraced general business stories, stories on economic indicators, tax stories, stock market stories, international trade stories and the like. Social conditions was used for stories on a wide range of topics including education, religion, crime and the courts, race and gender relations, and labor. The culture category was for stories on arts and entertainment, sports and leisure, basic lifestyles, popular culture and the mass media. The accidents and natural disasters category was for stories on such events as industrial accidents, plane crashes, train wrecks, earthquakes and floods. The category for science/environment/technology included stories on all types of scientific research, space exploration, environmental damage and protection efforts, and technological innovations. The health/medicine category was for all stories dealing with health, fitness and medicine. Stories, such as feature travel pieces, that did not fit into these categories were coded in the "other" category.

For the sixth variable, impression that the story leaves of the focus country, there were three options: positive, negative and neutral/mixed. Generally speaking, stories that showed an improvement or steps toward solving a problem were coded as positive. Conversely, stories that showed decline or degradation were coded as negative. Stories that did not really leave an impression one way or another about the focus country or stories that could be interpreted differently depending on reader point of view were coded as neutral/mixed.

Coding was performed by the author.

To increase reliability, as a first step, the coding scheme was employed on a pretest sample of issues for each publication (several hundred stories). This made it possible to refine the categories and to make the coding guidelines more thorough.

As a formal test of the reliability of the coding, a representative sample of issues was coded by another coder, a native West German who was a graduate student in journalism. This second coder coded all stories in a total of 11 issues of the three publications. Coder reliability scores, derived using Holsti's formula, of greater than 90 percent agreement were obtained for three of the five categories containing subjective decision-making: focus country (98%), scope (96%), and subject area (91%). As would be expected, agreement was lower in the story tone category (80%), but this level of agreement is satisfactory. A similar level of reliability was achieved for the region category (79%). In this category the level of reliability was reduced because this proved to be the easiest category in which to make a coding error. There was also a satisfactory level of agreement on selecting which stories were appropriate for inclusion (85%).

Three-way crosstabulation, with chi-square as the statistic determining probability, was performed on the data gathered in order to compare the coverage in 1983 with the coverage in 1988 for each publication.

FINDINGS

The content analysis found that changes in media coverage from one year to another were consistent with changes in attitudes. The proportion of stories focusing on the Soviet Union increased significantly from 1983 to 1988, while the proportion focusing on the United States or both superpowers declined.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

As can be seen in Table 1, although the overwhelming majority of stories in each publication focused on the United States (two-thirds to three-fourths), there was a definite trend toward more stories focusing on the Soviet Union. This confirms the expectation that stories concentrating on the Soviet Union would rise as glasnost set in. Although both the number and proportion of Soviet stories rose for each magazine, this was not accompanied by an ignoring of the United States. The actual number of stories remained steady from 1983 to 1988 in Spiegel (going from 173 to

174) and Die Zeit (from 188 to 180), and the number in Stern climbed greatly (from 119 to 187).

The table also indicates that there was no significant change from 1983 to 1988 in the overall tone of stories in Spiegel or Stern, but stories regarding the superpowers in Die Zeit were significantly different in 1988 than in 1983 -- positive and mixed/neutral stories were up, and negative stories were down. Of the three, Spiegel had the most negative overall coverage -- not surprising given its reputation for critical, hard-hitting reportage. Stern was the least negative -- just as we would expect given Stern's heavy inclusion of features and entertainment stories.

The subject matter changed significantly in all three publications over the five-year period, as the percentage of stories focusing on politics increased and the percentage focusing on military/defense decreased. This reflects the easing of superpower tensions and increased efforts toward detente. In 1983, the missile debate dominated German coverage of the superpowers, but in 1988, such topics as the U.S. presidential campaign and Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union put politics in the spotlight. Over the period, the data also show that Die Zeit geared down its economics and business coverage, while Stern boosted its cultural coverage of the superpowers.

There was no significant difference in the proportion of international to domestic stories, but the data reflect a trend toward increasing the domestic coverage of the superpowers. As the next level of analysis will corroborate, the effects of glasnost easing coverage by correspondents in the Soviet Union would account for the bulk of change.

When the stories involved countries other than the superpowers, nearly half of the time to two-thirds of the time that country was either West Germany or in the Western Europe/NATO category. Supranational stories -- those involving more than one country, from different regions -- accounted for the next biggest share. Differences from 1983 to 1988 were fairly slight, although there is some indication that West German ethnocentrism -- which would be manifested in this case by focusing on stories in which the Federal Republic was involved -- declined somewhat from 1983 to 1988. This most likely reflects the fact that in 1983 West German media were justifiably obsessed with the missile debate, while the easing of superpower tensions enabled the media to step back somewhat in 1988 and look at the superpowers with more distance.

To sum up, Table 1 shows that the three West German weeklies gave the bulk of their attention the United States, but began to give more attention to the Soviet Union in 1988. Generally coverage involving the superpowers tended to be critical and focus on politics, military/defense and culture. Half to two-thirds c the time, stories involving the superpowers involved at least one other country, but there was a trend toward domestic coverage. When another country was involved, more often than not, it was West Germany or another Western European country.

Each publication's coverage of the United States and the Soviet Union by year was considered next.

Changes in How Each of the Three Weeklies Covered the Superpowers in 1983 and 1988

As Table 2 shows, from 1983 to 1988, there was no statistically significant change in Spiegel's coverage of the United States, although the proportion of negative to positive stories did increase (from roughly 3:1 to 5:1). Coverage of the Soviet Union was significantly more positive in 1988, as was coverage of stories involving both superpowers. This is consistent with what the poll results indicated.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

The breakdown of stories by subject matter shows that Spiegel's coverage of the United States topically fluctuated little from 1983 to 1988, although there was an increase in political stories, as one would expect given the 1988 presidential campaign, and a decline in culture stories. Similarly, Spiegel's coverage of the Soviet Union changed little, but there was an increase in the percentage of political stories, reflecting attention to Gorbachev's reforms. For stories dealing with both superpowers, which almost exclusively were military/defense in 1983, there was more balance in 1988, with an increase in political stories and a drop in military/defense stories.

There was no statistically significant difference in the proportion of domestic to international stories in 1983 and 1988 for either superpower, although the data suggest that coverage of each superpower, particularly the Soviet Union, became more domestic in 1988. Of course, as noted earlier, the international press corps had more recourse to covering the Soviet Union in 1988 than in 1983, and this greater access is surely reflected in the increasing focus on Soviet domestic affairs.

Spiegel's U.S. coverage showed a big drop in the percentage of West Germany or Western Europe/NATO stories, which comprised two-thirds of the total in 1983, but less than half in 1988, when there was an increase in stories on the Middle East and Latin America. Spiegel's Soviet coverage, on the other hand, became increasingly ethnocentric, with the percentage of West Germany stories tripling from 1983 to 1988, while the percentage of Western Europe/NATO stories plummeted. This reflects the increasing emphasis on improving relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union, marked by high-level diplomatic visits. Also the percentage of Soviet stories involving Asia/Pacific nations tripled, moving from sixth place regionally in 1983 to second place in 1988. This reflects the heavy coverage of the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan and the plans that led up to it. For stories in Spiegel involving both superpowers, the biggest change came in the number in which no other countries were involved, increasing from under half in 1983 to two-thirds in 1988.

To reiterate the most important finding, Table 2 indicates that Spiegel's coverage of the United States, already predominantly negative in 1983 had gotten more negative in 1988, while its coverage of the Soviet Union and of the two nations together became more positive.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

As Table 3 shows, there was no statistically significant change in the tone of Die Zeit stories involving the United States or the Soviet Union, but there was a significant change in the tone of stories involving both superpowers. Despite the lack of statistical significance, in line with expectations, the data do show a trend toward more negative coverage of the United States and more positive coverage of the Soviet Union. Stories involving both superpowers became more much more positive.

Die Zeit's U.S. coverage showed a big decline from 1983 to 1988 in the percentage of economics/business stories, which in 1983 had been concerned with the high valuation of the U.S. dollar and the swelling U.S. trade deficit, while by 1988 the dollar had fallen and the trade deficit story was old. There was a slight drop in the percentage of military/defense stories, as we would expect given the 1983 missile debate. Gains were recorded in the categories of health/medicine and culture. Heavy media attention to the AIDS crisis was the main spark behind the increased health/medicine coverage. It is surprising that there wasn't much change in the proportion of political stories for the U.S. given that 1988 was an election year. Die Zeit's Soviet coverage focused less in 1988 than in 1983 on politics, which is a great surprise.

Unlike Spiegel, which heavily monitored political developments in the increasingly turbulent waters of Soviet politics, Die Zeit found a way to actually reduce its emphasis on politics, although numerically, of course, there were more stories. The newspaper slightly increased its focus on military/defense (reflecting Die Zeit's heavy coverage of the Afghanistan pullout and the effects of the war). Just as was the case with Spiegel, Die Zeit's stories involving both superpowers became less absorbed with military/defense topics in 1988 and focused more on politics, reflecting the easing of superpower tensions and waning concern about the arms race.

There was no significant change in the scope of Die Zeit stories for either superpower. Unlike we expected, domestic coverage of the Soviet Union did not increase any, but remained about one-third of the total both years. This probably reflects the fact that Die Zeit is a smaller operation than Spiegel, unable to maintain a heavy presence in the Soviet Union.

Some shifts were evident in the geographical emphasis of the international stories. Die Zeit's U.S. coverage in 1988 dealt less with West Germany than in 1983, when the missile debate caused great attention to U.S.-German relations. The Soviet coverage was less oriented in 1988 than in 1983 toward Western Europe/NATO and supranational stories and more oriented toward Eastern Europe and Asia/Pacific. This reflects a focus on the Soviet Union's changing relationship with its Eastern European allies and, as in Spiegel, heavy coverage of the unfolding Soviet-Afghanistan story. For stories dealing with both the United States and the Soviet Union, there was a marked decline in the percentage of stories involving Western Europe/NATO -- which had been higher in 1983 because of the missile debate -- and supranational stories. There was also a big jump in stories dealing with the two superpowers alone.

To reiterate the most important findings of Table 3, in Die Zeit, just as in Spiegel, there was a shift from 1983 to 1988 toward more negative coverage of the United States and more positive coverage of the Soviet Union and the two together. Contrary to expectations, there was no increase in political coverage of the Soviet Union and proportionally no increase in domestic coverage of the Soviet Union.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Turning to Stern, as Table 4 indicates, the tone of stories focusing on the United States or Soviet Union once again was not statistically different in 1988 than in 1983. However, the table does indicate a trend toward less favorable coverage of the United States and more favorable coverage of the Soviet Union. Coverage dealing with both superpowers was significantly different in 1988 -- more positive, less negative and more mixed/neutral. As the small n's for stories on the Soviet Union and on both nations together indicates, Stern's coverage overwhelmingly focused on the United States. This partly reflects the cultural emphasis of the magazine, whose pages brim with articles on U.S. pop stars, movie stars and novelists, but also indicates a broader fascination with the United States.

We found a noticeable decline in the percentage of Stern stories on the U.S. that dealt with military/defense topics in 1988 and a jump in culture stories. On the other hand, Stern's Soviet coverage dealt a little less in 1988 with culture than in 1983, which was a very surprising finding, given the new openness in the Soviet Union and the intense scrutiny that the media in other Western countries were giving all aspects of Soviet life. There was a big increase in military/defense stories, reflecting more than anything, as in the other publications, interest in the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. For Stern's coverage of stories involving both superpowers, just as in Spiegel and Die Zeit, there was a major decline in the percentage of stories focusing on military/defense and an increase in political stories. There was also a drop in the percentage of culture stories in this category. However, again it is important to point out that these percentages for coverage of the Soviet Union and both superpowers together can be misleading because of the small number of stories represented. Just as we found for Die Zeit, there was the surprising finding of no change in the proportion of domestic to international stories in Stern's coverage of the Soviet Union. Neither was there a change in the scope of U.S. stories, but we didn't expect any. Stern's U.S. coverage was less West Germany-oriented in 1988 than in 1983, again reflecting the 1983 emphasis on the missile debate, and more oriented toward stories involving multiple countries from different regions. Because in 1983 there were only five stories involving the Soviet Union and other countries, it would be meaningless to make comparisons with the 1988 coverage in this category. Differences in Stern's 1983 and 1988 coverage of stories involving both superpowers were minimal.

Comparing the magazines on the magnitude of the change in tone of their stories about the superpowers from 1983 to 1988, we see that the percentage of positive stories involving the United States declined about the same for each publication -- 4 percentage points for Spiegel, 5 for Die Zeit and 7 for Stern. The increase in the percentage of negative stories about the United States was 9 percentage points in Spiegel, 17 in Die Zeit and 8 in Stern. The change in coverage was greater for the Soviet Union. Positive stories about the Soviet Union increased by 22 percentage points in Spiegel, 20 in Die Zeit and 17 in Stern. Negative stories about the Soviet Union fell 23 percentage points in Spiegel, 25 in Die Zeit and 7 in Stern. Change in coverage was clearly more profound for Spiegel and Die Zeit than for Stern.

To sum up the major findings of the content analysis, in each publication the proportion of positive to negative stories focusing on the United States dropped from 1983 to 1988, although this change was not statistically significant for any publication. So while the trend was clear, the change wasn't profound. Similarly each magazine's coverage of the Soviet Union became more positive, although this change was significant only for Spiegel. Again the trend was clear, but the small n's made it difficult to achieve statistical significance. And in each weekly, when they wrote about the two superpowers together, there was a clear and significant shift toward more positive stories, fewer negative stories and more mixed/neutral stories. In general, the content analysis shows that in the six months preceding the 1988 SINUS survey, these media clearly were portraying a more positive Soviet Union and less positive United States than they were five years earlier in the period before the 1983 poll. These findings are consistent with the trends in public opinion.

DISCUSSION

As we have seen, as the 1980s progressed, these three national, influential publications became increasingly less favorable in their coverage of the United States and more favorable in their coverage of the Soviet Union. This is consistent with Noelle-Neumann's assertion that German media exert a gravitational pull to the left on German public opinion. This point must be accompanied by two qualifications. First of all, the media sampled were not representative media. This gravitational pull to the left might not be substantiated in an analysis of other publications, chosen to represent the full ideological spectrum. And secondly, while the data neither confirm nor refute Noelle-Neumann's claim of leftist bias, an issue outside the scope of this research, the scrutiny of these publications created no impression that the West German media response was inappropriate given world events.

The changes in media coverage between 1983 and 1988 parallel the subsequent trends in public opinion. Although the design of this study does not permit any causal inferences about media coverage leading to public opinion, these findings are consistent with the findings of Kepplinger et al. about the tone of West German media being mirrored by later public opinion. Such congruencies of press coverage and subsequent public opinion need to be further explored in time-series studies that can build a causal link.

The finding that an increase in the volume of news about the Soviet Union preceded an improvement in attitudes about the Soviet Union is consistent with McNelly and Izcaray's contention that sheer exposure to international news about countries is a key in people's liking of the country. This intriguing, deceptively simple notion should be tested in a carefully designed, methodologically rigorous study.

Theory aside, this study is also useful because it offers a glimpse into how the media of one of the most important U.S. allies cover the United States, the Soviet Union and the relations between the two. Content analyses are usually much narrower in scope. The study has clear implications about German media attention to this complex triangle of international relationships. At the same time, the study provides a broad view of how German media cover foreign news and, thus, contributes to the vast body of research on foreign news flow.

TABLE 1 . DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SUPERPOWER COVERAGE IN THREE WEEKLIES

	Spiegel		Zeit		Stern	
	1983 (n=239)	1988 (n=259)	1983 (n=270)	1988 (n=293)	1983 (n=151)	1988 (n=243)
Focus country:						
U.S.	72%	67%	70%	61%	79%	77%
U.S.S.R.	18	27	14	27	6	16
Both	10	6	16	11	15	7
	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
	x^2=7.40 df=2 p=.03		x^2=14.70 df=2 p=.00		x^2=12.83 df=2 p=.00	
Impression of Focus country:						
Positive	15%	21%	17%	24%	22%	21%
Negative	62	60	55	38	39	39
Neutral/mixed	23	19	29	39	39	40
	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%
	x^2=3.41 df=2 p=.18		x^2=16.25 df=2 p=.00		x^2=.01 df=2 p=.99	
Subject matter Of stories:						
Politics	17%	27%	18%	23%	7%	13%
Military/defense	24	19	26	18	25	8
Economics/business	10	11	20	9	7	7
Social conditions	5	3	1	3	3	5
Culture	26	22	24	28	43	53
Accidents/disasters	2	3	0	0	0	1
Science/environ./technology	8	6	6	6	7	5
Health/medicine	6	9	4	8	6	7
Other	0	0	2	4	3	1
	98%	100%	101%	99%	101%	100%
	x^2=24.40 df=8 p=.00		x^2=26.83 df=8 p=.00		x^2=26.83 df=8 p=.00	

(continued)

	Spiegel		Zeit		Stern	
	1983	1988	1983	1988	1983	1988
Scope:						
Domestic	42%	50%	30%	37%	34%	37%
International	58	50	70	63	66	63
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	$x^2=2.55$		$x^2=3.28$		$x^2=.40$	
	df=1		df=1		df=1	
	p=.11		p=.07		p=.53	
	(n=138)	(n=131)	(n=190)	(n=184)	(n=100)	(n=152)
Other region When int'l story:						
West Germany	34%	31%	37%	29%	49%	40%
Western Europe	25	12	17	16	16	18
Eastern Europe	1	3	2	8	1	2
U.S./U.S.S.R.	8	8	5	7	5	3
Africa	0	0	0	0	0	1
Middle East	3	9	2	2	1	1
Latin America	6	8	4	5	1	2
Asia/Pacific	7	12	3	8	1	2
Supranational	14	16	29	22	24	29
Other	2	1	2	4	1	2
	99%	100%	101%	101%	99%	100%

TABLE 2 . SPIEGEL COVERAGE OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BY YEAR

	U.S.		Soviet Union		Both	
	1983 (n=173)	1988 (n=174)	1983 (n=39)	1988 (n=80)	1983 (n=24)	1988 (n=16)
Impression of Focus country:						
Positive	17%	13%	14%	36%	4%	44%
Negative	57	68	69	46	88	25
Neutral/mixed	26	19	17	17	8	31
	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
	$x^2=4.20$ df=2 p=.12		$x^2=6.95$ df=2 p=.03		$x^2=16.40$ df=2 p=.00	
Subject matter Of stories*:						
Politics	15%	21%	33%	41%	8%	31%
Military/defense	17	17	19	17	88	50
Economics/business	13	14	2	6	0	0
Social conditions	6	3	7	3	0	0
Culture	30	24	26	23	0	6
Accidents/disasters	2	2	2	4	0	6
Science/environ./technology	9	7	7	3	4	6
Health/medicine	8	13	2	3	0	0
Other	0	1	0	0	0	0
	101%	102%	98%	100%	100%	99%

*Statistics not calculated because n<5 in numerous categories

Scope:				
Domestic	49%	53%	41%	52%
International	51	47	60	48
	100%	100%	101%	100%
	$x^2=.65$ df=1 p=.42		$x^2=1.00$ df=1 p=.32	

(continued)

	U.S.		Soviet Union		Both	
	1983 (n=89)	1988 (n=81)	1983 (n=25)	1988 (n=34)	1983 (n=43)	1988 (n=33)
Other region When int'l*:						
West Germany	43%	31%	12%	35%	25%	19%
Western Europe	26	14	36	6	13	13
Eastern Europe	0	1	4	9	0	0
U.S./U.S.S.R.	0	0	0	0	46	63
Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0
Middle East	1	14	12	3	0	0
Latin America	9	14	0	0	0	0
Asia/Pacific	8	9	8	27	4	0
Supranational	14	17	16	18	13	6
Other	0	1	12	0	0	0
	101%	101%	100%	98%	101%	101%

*Statistics not calculated because n<5 in numerous categories

TABLE 3 . DIE ZEIT COVERAGE OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BY YEAR

	U.S.		Soviet Union		Both	
	1983 (n=188)	1988 (n=180)	1983 (n=39)	1988 (n=80)	1983 (n=43)	1988 (n=33)
Impression of Focus country:						
Positive	18%	13%	15%	35%	12%	49%
Negative	51	68	54	39	72	33
Neutral/Mixed	31	19	31	26	16	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	x^2=4.20 df=2 p=.12		x^2=5.09 df=2 p=.08		x^2=14.29 df=2 p=.00	
Subject matter Of stories*:						
Politics	13%	16%	46%	36%	14%	33%
Military/Defense	17	11	18	24	72	42
Economics/Business	28	11	3	5	0	9
Social Conditions	1	2	3	5	0	0
Culture	27	35	26	21	9	9
Accidents/Disasters	0	1	3	0	0	0
Science/Environment/ Technology	7	7	3	5	2	6
Health/Medicine	5	13	0	0	2	0
Other	3	4	0	4	0	0
	101%	100%	102%	100%	99%	99%

*Statistics not computed because n<5 in numerous categories

	U.S. 1983	U.S. 1988	Soviet Union 1983	Soviet Union 1988
Scope:				
Domestic	35%	44%	36%	36%
International	65	56	64	64
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	x^2=2.97 df=1 p=.08		x^2=.00 df=1 p=1.00	

(continued)

	U.S.		Soviet Union		Both	
	1983	1988	1983	1988	1983	1988
	(n=188)	(n=180)	(n=39)	(n=80)	(n=43)	(n=33)
Other region When int'l *:						
West Germany	43%	32%	32%	29%	23%	18%
Western Europe	14	20	20	10	23	12
Eastern Europe	1	1	8	24	0	3
U.S./U.S.S.R.	0	0	0	2	21	36
Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0
Middle East	3	4	0	0	0	0
Latin America	6	10	0	0	0	0
Asia/Pacific	4	2	4	18	0	9
Supranational	27	28	32	10	33	22
Other	3	3	4	8	0	0
	101%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%

*Statistics not calculated because n<5 in numerous categories

TABLE 4. STERN COVERAGE OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BY YEAR

	U.S.		Soviet Union		Both	
	1983 (n=119)	1988 (n=187)	1983 (n=9)	1988 (n=38)	1983 (n=23)	1988 (n=18)
Impression of Focus country:						
Positive	20%	13%	33%	50%	26%	50%
Negative	35	43	33	26	61	22
Neutral/mixed	45	44	33	24	13	28
	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%
	$x^2=3.67$ df=2 p=.16		$x^2=.83$ df=2 p=.66		$x^2=6.14$ df=2 p=.05	
Subject matter Of stories*:						
Politics	5%	5%	33%	32%	9%	56%
Military/defense	19	6	0	11	61	28
Economics/business	8	6	11	13	0	0
Social conditions	3	6	0	0	4	0
Culture	47	60	44	37	22	11
Accidents/disasters	0	1	0	0	0	0
Science/environ./technology	8	4	0	5	4	6
Health/medicine	8	10	0	0	0	0
Other	3	1	11	3	0	0
	101%	99%	99%	101%	100%	101%

*Statistics not calculated because n<5 in numerous categories

	U.S.		Soviet Union	
	1983	1988	1983	1988
Scope:				
Domestic	40%	41%	44%	40%
International	61	59	56	61
	101%	100%	100%	101%
	$x^2=.01$ df=1 p=.94		$x^2=.00$ df=1 p=1.00	

(continued)

	U.S.		Soviet Union		Both	
	1983 (n=72)	1988 (n=111)	1983 (n=5)	1988 (n=23)	1983 (n=23)	1988 (n=18)
Other region When int'l*:						
West Germany	54%	43%	80%	39%	26%	22%
Western Europe	18	18	0	22	13	17
Eastern Europe	1	1	0	9	0	0
U.S./U.S.S.R.	0	0	0	0	22	22
Africa	0	1	0	0	0	0
Middle East	0	2	0	0	4	0
Latin America	1	3	0	0	0	0
Asia/Pacific	1	0	0	9	4	6
Supranational	24	31	0	22	30	28
Other	0	2	20	0	0	6
	99%	101%	100%	101%	99%	101%

*Statistics not calculated because n<5 in numerous categories

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Shakti: The Power of the Mother. The Violent Nurturer in Ancient Indian text and Modern Commercial Cinema.

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Commission on the Status of Women.

SHAKTI: THE POWER OF THE MOTHER

The violent nurturer in Indian mythology and commercial cinema.

"A woman screams and agonizes the most when she gives birth. Today I am screaming because I am giving birth to your death, Changeza."

(Bijli, the central character of 'Mera Shikaar')

I grew up in India, amidst giant cinema posters and street corners blaring popular film music. In the morning the temple bells clang and the pundits chant, as they worship the statues of the female goddess mother: the destroyer and rejuvenator of the universe. Even as devotees throng to the temples to worship the mother, cinema addicts queue up to box offices to watch celluloid dreams unfold. This marriage of religion and film is a palpable reality in India. Mythology and religion form strong thematic bases for Indian films. Even when the films are not mythological as such, religious imagery often appears in Indian films. I am particularly interested in the images of women portrayed in religious texts and the transfer to the cinema screen. Women are worshipped as powerful goddesses carved in stone while women were stereotyped as silent, self-sacrificing and thus strong creatures. Then a new wave of the new woman invaded the Indian screen. But were they new images or reinterpretations of the old? The violent nurturer, the mother goddess images of the Indian screen are interesting, cathartic , and offer a sharp contrast to their predecessors.

Commercial Indian Cinema.

Indian films have descended from the folk theater, which were traveling troupes performing religious and mythological plays in villages and towns. Naturalism in acting and staging were impossible. The voice had to be raised to be heard, the gesture grand to be seen. This style was transferred directly to films, where it was modified only marginally. Religious and mythological melodrama formed cinematic themes. The most striking contribution of folk theatre was in the frequent interpolation of songs and dances in Indian films (Das Gupta, 1989).

On July 7, 1896, a Times of India advertisement invited Bombay residents to witness "the marvel of the century, the wonder of the world." This was the first film show in India: the cinematograph of the Lumiere brothers of France. Attracted to the revolutionary potential of this mass medium, D.G. Phalke released the first Indian feature film, "Rajah Harishchandra," in 1913 (Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, 1963; 1980). In 1931, "Alam Ara" the first film with sound made by A.M. Irani, was released. Both these films used mythological melodrama to become popular.

India's commercial cinema developed under British colonialism, the only national cinema to do so. It emerged in its classic form as the "all talking, all singing, all dancing 'Bombay talkie." Cinema is one of India's ten largest industries. About two films are made every day (Binford, 1987). Nine hundred odd films are produced annually by this prolific film industry. I have referred constantly to "commercial" cinema. It is distinct from the realistic cinema often referred to as parallel, art, and new cinema. Art film makers are linked by their rejection of commercial cinema values, themes, and stylistic approaches. Examples of the new cinema are 'Salaam Bombay' (Dir: Mira Nair), 'The Chess Players, and the 'Apu Trilogy' (Dir: Satyajit Ray), and 'Ankur' and 'Junoon' (Dir: Shyam Benegal) etc.

Audiences for commercial Indian cinema do not complain if the plots are too improbable or too fantastic. Perhaps that is what they pay for, a temporary escape into a fantasy world, far removed from reality. Economist Tariq Ali (Das Gupta and Hoberman, 1987) says that these "escapist extravaganzas" are reminiscent of the Hollywood musicals during the depression. The difference is that in India there is an almost permanent depression, and thus an unending stream of such films is produced.

In India films are made in 13 languages. The Bombay film industry is the richest, most popular, and prolific and is considered the real national cinema. This industry makes films in Hindi, the national language understood in only 5 northern states. Hindi films are popular throughout India, even though the language may not be understood properly (Singh, 1976; Armes 1987).

Das Gupta and Hoberman (1987) summarized the basic ingredients of a commercial Indian film: dances and songs, cabarets and car chases, rape and mother worship, fights and love scenes (inevitably played in the copious lap of nature), high pitched melodrama with outrageous deus ex machina finales. Thin story lines and sturdy actors connect all the dots. A typical advertisement for a commercial Indian film reads, "A glossy, spectacular human drama with tantalizing songs, nerve-splitting fights, superb suspense and heartbreaking subtle sentiments" (Binford, 1987).

Female Representations.

Mythology and religion have formed the themes directly and insidiously for Indian films. Since religious and mythological themes have been transported to the silver screen, traditional female representations persist. The mother has been venerated in Hindu tradition. In 1928, Ghosha wrote that the essence of womanhood lies in motherhood. The traditional Indo-Aryan attitude is that of 'Ma' or mother, even for her husband. "The idea of all encompassing motherhood as the highest principle was firmly accepted in Vedic times, transmitted to all other periods and has throughout all ages formed the basis of the exceptional degree of reverence paid to the mother." (Das, 1932).

Ancient Indian religion was strangely liberal in its treatment of women. Only later, as civilization developed did the 'Manusmriti' appear to crystallize the fate of Indian womanhood into subordination. Manu, the author of 'Manusmriti' wrote down edicts of behavior for all classes and types of people. His writings have been traced to "the late centuries B.C." (Pinkham, 1967). Monier-Williams (1887) wrote that Manu, the ancient lawgiver was largely responsible for the diminished social status of women. "Manu's code...has had the most negative effects, forging unbreakable shackles on Indian women for countless succeeding generations... . Manu for the first time legally assigned to woman her definite place in the scale of society."

However, even Manu elevated the status of woman as mother. He wrote that a teacher "is ten times more venerable than a sub teacher, the father a hundred times more than the teacher, but the mother a thousand times more than the father" (Das, 1932). Needless to say a woman who is not a mother is worthless, and the only way to gain societal status is to become a mother. The biological mother is nevertheless related to the great cosmic mother, the creator and rejuvenator of the universe, as we shall read later.

For decades commercial Indian cinema has prescribed the roles of the ideal woman as the self-sacrificing, all-forgiving martyr. The, 'crying mother' and 'dewey eyed heroine' were common depictions (Das Gupta, 1985). Vasudeva and Langlet (1983) find that the message for woman in Indian films is that the pinnacle of her ambition is marriage. If she has different desires, if she deviates from it, it is seen as a betrayal of her biological and functional role and she pays for it in humiliation and defeat. Ambition in a woman is portrayed as a bad quality. In a man, however, the same qualities are viewed as prerequisites. Even if the heroine's husband mistreats her or has extra-marital affairs, it is her duty to forgive him, for he is her 'lord.' In films like 'Pati Parmeshwar' (Husband is God, 1988) 'Naseeb Apna Apna'; Different Destinies, 1986) and 'Daasi' (Female Slave, 1981) , this aspect of the martyred traditional wife who wins her man from the 'bad' modern, ambitious woman is celebrated.

Rahman (1988) describes the traditional female characters in Indian films as either "the simple village girl who was content dancing around mustard fields with the poetry spouting hero," or the "devoted city woman who was willing to sacrifice everything for her beloved."

One aspect of Indian womanhood that was unexplored was the dichotomy of the nurturer and destroyer present in the same woman. It was probably inconceivable that the woman who was a tender nurturer could turn violent and bloodthirsty. For centuries women had been told that their strength lay in their quiet servitude, their self sacrifice and their suffering. The image of a woman as a physically dominant being, violent and revengeful, was uncommon. The image of militant women venturing into the violent, if unattractive, exclusive domain of men has always fascinated me, because women are traditionally celebrated as passive, suffering creatures. For centuries people had worshipped the goddess Kali in all her awesome power, while Indian women stood on the fringes of society.

The violent nurturer: the mother goddess

India has recently had a spate of woman-oriented films with a violent, almost bloodthirsty avenging woman as the central focus. Hers is not a senseless violence: violence surfaces when her loved ones are threatened. She is a ferocious nurturer, who does not let anyone harm those she loves. I would conjecture that this woman is but the reinterpretation of ancient goddess images of women. The mother goddess is perceived as **the creator** of the universe. She is the primal energy that created the universe. Baig (1976) quotes a famous tantric prayer, "Only when I am conjoined with thee, O Shakti, have I the power to be absolute Lord, otherwise God would not even be able to move... ." Shakti means power, which is female energy in its purest form. Robinson (1985) wrote that the Hindus believed in the energy of the female. Shakti exists to give power to the powerful male gods in the guise of their female consorts. However, her role is enabling, not merely supportive. The numerous female consorts are manifested in the preeminent goddess herself, "the Devi, as primary embodiment of shakti." Baig (1976), also found that ancient pre-Aryan (2000 B.C. and before), worshipped a female goddess. That is, "Life came from food. Food came from soil, man came from woman, woman gave life. It is not astonishing that God was a woman."

Smart (1989) writes of the powerful Hindu trilogy, of Brahma (the creator), Vishnu (the preserver), and Shiva (the destroyer). Smart (1989), also writes that the consorts of these gods are vital, "conceived as personal manifestations of shakti or creative." In ancient Hindu religion the female is thought of as active, while the male is passive. The male worshiper tends to project his aggressiveness on to a male god. Therefore Shiva's (the violent destroyer) consort is Parvati, the epitome of self-sacrifice and submission, the perfect traditional mother.

All the independent, lower goddesses are fused into her persona. It is ironic and inexplicable that she is also the mythological derivative of the militant goddess. When she is angered by injustice and cruelty she becomes eight-armed Durga who rides on a tiger and fights violent demons. In her most violent form she is Kali-- the demon slayer, who rides a tiger, has eight arms, wears a necklace of skulls, and holds aloft the bloodied head of a slain demon. In 1924 J.M. Macfie wrote this about Shiva's wife, "...there is no more popular picture exposed for sale than that of this deity wife, wearing a necklace of human skulls and drinking blood."

In her benevolent form the goddess is Parvati, Uma, and Sati, who was reborn many times to marry Shiva. When she becomes a destroyer and summons all her powers and the violent forces of nature, she is referred to by many names. Some of these are Durga, Bhavani, Bhairavi, Amba, Jagdamba, and Chandi Mahatmya (Spratt, 1966). Whichever form she takes is pure Shakti (power). Spratt (1966) describes the violent mother goddess further. She fights evil on behalf of the gods. She uses many weapons, including her teeth while blood flows unceasingly. "She is alternately hideous and beautiful, and alternately terrifying and loving." She is again described as having a "hideous face, staring eyes, protruding teeth and bloodstains, skulls, corpses, snakes, etc." Her worshipers offer blood sacrifices. However, even in this form she is loved. I think for her devotees the message is clear; she kills and destroys to protect them and to usher in a new and better world era. She is their mother who wants only good for her children and gets enraged when they are threatened.

Kali is not just a violent destroyer; she is called Kali Ma, i.e. Kali the mother. Bengali author Chatterjee's novel, 'Anandamath', celebrated her not only as a destructor but also as 'a revelation of truth.' (Ratte, 1985). He writes in the same novel, "We own no other mother...we think the land of birth to be no other than our mother herself. We have no mother, no father, no brother, no wife, no child, no hearth or home, we have only got the mother." Ratte (1985) writes that Chatterjee assigned Kali the role of a rejuvenator in a world beset by evil. She is the slayer of demons who inevitably arise in historical cycles, and her role is to restore the social order.

Ratte (1985) examines the imagery of Kali in Chatterjee's novel, as well as in preindependence press stories. Kali was personified in her familiar image, garlanded with skulls and slaying evil. She asks her children to embrace her and sacrifice themselves for a worthy cause (here to fight British imperialism). To quote Chatterjee again, "We have understood that the Mother's seat will not be moved, and Shiva, who is under her feet, will not give up the form of a corpse, unless we can rip up our breast open and offer up streams of blood to the lotus feet of the Mother." This is the first reference to Shiva's activities when his consort goes on a rampage. In this quotation even the destructive god seems subordinate to his powerful mate. He is in fact passive and lifeless until blood offered to his spouse revives him. The actions of the mother here are celebrated as 'shakti'; her actions are not inevitable but cyclical. Cavendish (1980) writes of Durga as being Shiva's energy (shakti). Like him she unites the "opposites of life and death, creation and destruction, love and terror." For her worshipers, her children she is merciful and bountiful, a mother, and she reserves her terrifying wrath for the powers of evil. Despite her similarity with her husband, Shiva, I find it interesting that she is revered as mother, and he is not addressed as a father. Another anomaly is that when Shiva performs the dance of death, 'tandavnritya', the world comes to an end and is totally destroyed. Kali, however does not destroy the whole world; only evil is destroyed. The image is of Kali making the world better, while Shiva destroys the world and its inhabitants. Kali is a rejuvenating force, while Shiva is purely destructive.

Some movies of the mid to late 80's have been based on the Kali aspect of woman. From being referred to as Lakshmi (the goddess of wealth), she is now the goddess of destruction, Kali. Rahman (1988) writes on this subject, "From Lakshmi...the woman was now Kali, from the benefactor she was now the destroyer." Jain (1990) says that these black-clad heroines provide the flip side of the earlier ever-suffering image. She calls them "gun toting Exterminating Angel(s)." She quotes Doshi, a historian and a member of the Indian film censor board; "This is a combination of women's lib and the age old veneration of the mother goddess."

Film director Malhotra notes that "people, including women, don't want soft characters; they don't want to see women suffer. Everybody now wants the heroine to behave like Jhansi ki Rani on the screen." (Rahman, 1988). The last reference is to the young queen of Jhansi, one of the leaders of the Indian mutiny of 1857. She rode to battle against the British and was killed in battle.

Another film director, Chandra finds that the agreement of women's roles is changing. Women, once symbols for peace and silent suffering on screen, now portray images of destruction (Rahman, 1988). Strong images of women have been present for a long time. In the classic 'Mother India' a mother shoots her renegade son to ensure the larger good of her village and thus pays the ultimate sacrifice for India. However, that image evoked sympathy for the woman, while the new violent woman provokes fear and revulsion. The new violent goddess revels in direct physical violence. In 'Pratighat' the female lead hacks the villain to death in a public political meeting; her revenge is more satisfying because of the extreme violence (Rahman, 1988). Scholarly research has failed to research this phenomena. It would have been useful to read other works on this aspect of Indian films, before reviewing the thematic schemes of these movies.

THE MOVIES

Zakhmi Aurat (Wounded Woman)

The heroine is a gutsy police officer (Kiran Dutt), impetuous and brave. She is raped by four men, but they are acquitted due to insufficient evidence. Frustrated by the judicial system, she organizes a group of women as some kind of rape vigilantes. They lure acquitted rapists, and a doctor in their group castrates them. Kiran finally confesses to her crimes and her fiance promises to wait for her if she serves time. The film leaves her in court; the verdict is not yet in. Presumably it is left to the audience's discretion.

Mera Shikaar (My Prey).

The central character is 'Bijli,' a vivacious, talkative village woman. She is the breadwinner of her family which consists of her father and two younger sisters. Unlike her sister who dreams of marriage, Bijli dreams of herself as a hard-fighting female Robin Hood, who beats up men. Her village is often raided by a bandit called 'Changeza.' She antagonizes one of his followers. To teach her a lesson, Changeza rapes her younger sister on her wedding (who commits suicide) and brutally murders her brother-in-law. She vows to avenge them and challenges him to a fight three months later. She trains hard, destroys his hideout and kills him singlehandedly.

Sherni (Lioness).

Durga is a young village woman whose family is massacred and she herself is nearly raped by the village landlord. She manages to escape to her father who is a self-styled Robin-Hood. Her family's last moments haunt her and she leads her band of bandits to avenge them and rid her village of the landlord's dominance.

Khoon Baha Ganga Mein (Blood flows into the Ganges)

Ganga is the central character of this film whose mother is raped and killed, and her father murdered by the village landlord. To eliminate her as a witness she is chased but is rescued by a gang of bandits. She grows up to become the leader of the gang. Her childhood sweetheart (also the landlord's son) is a policeman on her trail. She takes revenge on her enemies. In the end she and her lover are both killed.

Kahani Phoolvati Ki (The Story of Phoolvati)

This is the largely fictionalized version of a female bandit who terrorized villagers in the early 80's. The bare bones of the story in this romanticized film is visible. Phoolan was a poor woman of a low caste. She was rejected by her much older husband. On her return to her parents' village she was gang raped by some men of a high caste. She ran away to the ravines of Chambal, a common hideout for bandits. There she led a group of bandits on to mass murders of men of the same caste who had raped her. In 1983 she surrendered to the police and is currently in prison.

Bhrashtachar (Corruption)

The heroine, Bhavani (another name for Durga), is a fiery journalist and female activist. She works against a powerful politician, who is very corrupt but has an excellent public image. He had raped and murdered a blind girl she had rescued from a brothel, and Bhavani later discovers the politician had murdered her own father. He frames her for a murder when she writes against him, and uses his influence with the police and the judiciary to get her a death sentence. However she is rescued by her boyfriend. Both go underground and surface while the politician is making a direct televised broadcast to his electorate. They beat him up on camera, and make him confess to his varied crimes of murder, rape, corruption, flesh trade, etc. The film ends with a message that the ugly head of corruption will rise periodically and it is up to the people to pay the price for democracy and freedom by being vigilant.

Common Themes

Just looking at the stories of these six films one can see a trend developing. Obviously the escapist, fantasy-ridden Indian film industry has spawned these films as a financially rich investment. Some of these common themes are discussed below.

Gentle and nurturing: In most of these films the female is a mother, central to the story. She is not necessarily a biological mother, but usually her younger siblings are virtually her children, and she is the primary bread-winner and care-taker of her family. Her parents if alive are old and/or feeble. Thus, in 'Mera Shikaar' she looks after her old and ailing father and two younger sisters. She is extremely protective of their welfare, and discharges the traditional Indian roles of breadwinner and protector, and arranges her sister's wedding. In 'Sherni' Durga murders when her family is murdered, and when the atrocities of the evil landlord terrorizes the village. She is protects not only her family but also her village. In 'Khoon Baha Ganga Mein' the heroine avenges all the atrocities she had been unable to prevent as a child. She protects other women from exploitation. She places herself in danger by forcing a greedy father to marry his son to a poor girl. Before leaving she warns him not to harass the girl or if he valued his life. In 'Bhrashtachar,' Bhavani is the primary caretaker of her younger brother, her mentally unstable, mother and the girl she rescues from the red-light district. As a female activist she fights for the rights and freedom of women sold as chattel in the red light areas of the city. In all these films the women take up traditional male roles in India as well as those perpetrated in usual Indian film fare.

A better world: Though the initial motivation is a personal vendetta, the heroine ultimately works for the larger good. In 'Mera Shikaar' Bijli fights the bandit and his cohorts singlehandedly to rid her village of his presence. She tell the villagers that she is fighting Changeza on their behalf. She says, "If I win the whole village will win; but if I lose the defeat is mine." In 'Zakhmi Aurat' she forms the group of rape vigilantes in response to other victims who wrote to her to wipe out the evil of rape. In 'Mother India' she shoots her beloved son to ensure the good of her village. In 'Sherni' the heroine works to eliminate the landlord and make him pay his dues to the village he had terrorized for so long. In 'Khoon Baha Ganga Mein' the heroine is a female Robin Hood, who helps the poor and the oppressed, especially women. In 'Bhrashtachar' Bhavani fights to disclose the reality of prominent power-holders for the benefit of the public. She did have a personal vendetta because of her father's murder and the rape of her protege. However, the main reason was to open the eyes of the people and instruct them to be vigilant of cunning, smooth talking politicians.

Rape: Rape seems to form a common theme in all these films. It spurs the central female character toward a purposeful revenge. All the films dealt with rape, whether it be the rape (attempted or actual) of the heroine or her loved ones. It spurs them to revenge and is a driving force in their lives. In 'Zakhmi Aurat' and 'Kahani Phoolvati Ki,' the character is raped. In 'Sherni,' she is nearly raped, but manages to escape. In 'Mera Shikar,' her sister is publicly raped. In 'Bhrashtachar' her protege rescued from the red light district is raped. The latter's helplessness and innocence are emphasized due to her blindness. In 'Khoon Baha Ganga

Mein,' the woman's mother is raped. The rapes are all extremely violent, hence the intensely violent climax of the movie. If a rape is the angry and violent domination of a woman by a man or men, the woman's revenge almost mimics its violence and anger but without the sexual connotations. That supports the contention that rape is an act of violence and anger. What these militant women carry with them to spur them to violence is the pain, anger, humiliation, frustration, and helplessness of the primal act of rape. All the women are plagued by nightmarish visions of the rape (theirs or someone else's) and are obsessed with these images. In the final showdown they taunt the rapist and remind him of their own helplessness when he begs for mercy.

__Socio-economic__ __status__: Except for Kiran (Zakhmi Aurat) and Bhavani (Bhrashtachar) the female leads in these movies are of a low socio-economic status. In the first part of the films, the women are humble and obsequious. When confronted with evil they beg for mercy, and cry. Their poverty targets them for abuse at the hands of the rich who are usually the villains. In villages,the rich villain is usually personified by the village landlord. He is the major land-holder and traditionally the villagers were his bonded laborers. The landlords are portrayed as debauched, corrupt, lustful, conniving, and greedy. In the city the villain is rich and often is a powerful politician. His power if undisputed and he commands the corrupt administrative, judicial, and police machinery to persecute the heroine.

__Death__: This theme is not seen in 'Zakhmi Aurat'. In the other films the violent deaths of their loved ones adds fire to the quest for revenge. To justify her violent revenge her family members are tortured and brutally killed. Orphaned and totally alone she becomes an outlaw and takes up arms. This is the traditional eternally popular image of the desperado. It is, of course, unusual that the central character is female. She is fully aware of her situation. She knows she cannot return to society. Her vengeance is the only reality in her life. When she kills, she becomes cold eyed, ruthless, and blood-thirsty. In 'Mera Shikar' Bijli's newly wed brother-in-law is murdered publicly, and her sister commits suicide after her rape. In 'Sherni' the heroine's mother and little brothers and sisters are killed in front of her, and her father is killed treacherously by a police informant. In 'Kahani Phoolvati Ki' her lover is killed cruelly while she is baited by the villains' laughter. In 'Bhrashtachar' her she relives her father's painful death and witnesses the burning body of the girl she had rescued. In 'Khoon Baha Ganga Mein' her parents are killed in front of her by the evil landlord.

Unusual characters-- a departure from the traditional: All these female characters are of course diametrically opposed to the traditional perfect wife or perfect mother, who had been epitomized as the ideal, and in fact the only female portrayals. Any deviations from these character portrayals were bad. The traditional Hindi film heroine touts her strengths as her capacity for love, self-sacrifice, submissiveness, and ability to forgive (usually her errant husband). Particularly, the woman worships her husband as a god and would not divorce him even if he abused her and kept mistresses. She would show her strength by worshipping him still, and serving him. Eventually he mends his ways, and she welcomes him back.

Pati Parmeshwar (Husband Is God): A Case Study

The title of this 1988 film means 'husband is god,' and it is a perfect example of the traditional genre of films. A modern, educated and rich woman is conned by an unscrupulous fortune hunter and marries him. He ill-treats her and uses her money to set up a prostitute as his mistress. On learning of this she decides to leave. However, her conscience directs her to stay and win her husband with her suffering and sacrifice. She constantly refers to him as her god, even as he ignores and ill-treats her. She is treated as a servant is his house. Her husband gets a paralytic stroke and is unable to visit his mistress. He misses her and asks for her constantly. Seeing his distress his wife takes him to meet his mistress everyday while she herself sits and waits outside. She does all this while at the same time fasting unto death for his recovery. Everything works out. The mistress leaves impressed by the wife's devotion, her husband gets reformed, and her suffering and servility pay off. She is referred to as a veritable goddess (i.e.

Lakshmi).

A legal battle: Tripathi (1988) writes of the legal controversy spawned by this film. Feminists and the Central Board of Film Censors (CBFC) criticized 'Pati Parmeshwar,' for glorifying "submissiveness of women." The CBFC favored a ban on it because it violates the CBFC guideline 2(iv)(a): "Visuals or words depicting women in ignoble servility as a praiseworthy quality are not to be presented."

The films' maker Nayyar appealed the CBFC decision to the Bombay high court. Justice Pratap ruled in his favor because, as he put it, the woman's character "exemplifies the inner strength of Indian womanhood." However, the tribunal, the final authority in censorship, questioned the court decision and got a stay order. The CBFC said, "No amount of cuts will change or tone down the objectionable impact of the film...." The CBFC contends that the courts have no jurisdiction in this case. The issue is difficult to resolve due to constitutional ambiguity on the subject. The Indian constitution places no great restrictions on the portrayal of women, apart from banning expressions of obscenity referring to women.

The goddess in traditional films: In traditional films the woman is revered and referred to as the house goddess of wealth and prosperity. Conversely if misfortune struck her home she was blamed for it as she was inauspicious. The traditional 'strong woman' was one who could withstand every illtreatment and misfortune, uncomplaining and ready to forgive and forget. The new physically violent woman rebels against injustice, ill treatment, and cruelty. For her, to be passive in misfortune is to be weak; for her predecessor that was strength. In the militant goddess genre of films she is revered and referred to as Durga or Kali and is portrayed as the violent killer of evil. In fact the heroine of 'Sherni' is named Durga. In 'Bhrashtachar' she is called Bhavani, another name for Durga. All the heroines draw strength and inspiration from the persona of the goddess Durga. The heroines are referred to in the films as the incarnation or personification of Durga and Kali. The reference is to the goddess ridding the earth of all evil.

Other common references are to other dangerous and ferocious animals. In 'Sherni' Durga's father appoints her leader of his bandits on his death. He says, "I am proud that I am not leaving behind a weak, helpless woman; but among my trusty followers I leave behind a lioness." The lioness is of course a reference to a common analogy. She kills anyone who threatens her loved ones. Another common analogy is to compare the heroine to a she-cobra. Cobras are supposed to mate for life. If the cobra is killed, his mate goes to any lengths to avenge his death. The overriding connotation is the constant reference to a ferocious, violent goddess.

Unbound hair: I do not know if this is a deliberate decision on the part of the directors or simply a concession to fashion. In folklore and common culture, unbound hair has a particular significance. When the goddess Kali possesses a person (usually a woman), her hair escapes the confines of a braid as she dances in a frenzy. Women are often advised not to visit a Kali temple with open hair so as to escape possession.

In all the films, the women wear braids. When they embark on their mission, their hair is always open. It would be interesting to discover the reason for this conspicuous theme. One interpretation would be the freedom from the conventions imposed on women to braid their hair. By taking up weapons she breaks traditional molds and flaunts it with her unbound hair. Another interpretation would be of course being possessed by the goddess Kali. When Kali goes into battle, her hair is always unbound.

Attire: The central characters are all conspicuous by the similarity of their attire after their transformation into warriors. In addition to the open hair, they dress in black, usually leather and ride a white horse. Kali is usually shown as a dark-skinned deity, dressed in dark and somber colors. Perhaps the attire was derived from that source. The white horse is perhaps a western derivative. From Phantom to Zorro to the Lone Ranger, the white horse seems to represent a crusader for justice in western legend.

Typically she is a " marauding terror dressed all in black and out to take revenge" (Rahman, 1988). Jain (1990) writes that the blackleather-clad heroine singlehandedly defeats the villain.

The men in their lives: The males in these films have changed dramatically from their traditional counterparts. They do not tell the woman to behave like a 'virtuous woman,' as their predecessors would have done. They do not trivialize the woman's revenge or her feelings in any way. In 'Zakhmi Aurat' Kiran's fiance supports her through her rape trauma. In a traditional film he would have either blamed her or killed both her and himself to escape the shame. In fact, in traditional films the major heroine of a movie was never raped; if it was attempted the valiant hero saved her in the nick of time. An expendable character would be raped to egg the hero on to his mission. In 'Zakhmi Aurat' he does not approve of her mode of revenge, but he still supports her and tells her he would wait for her (usually a feminine function) after she serves time.

In 'Mera Shikar' Bijli's lover is also her teacher. He trains her to become a warrior. He is her main support and encourages her to take her revenge. When she weakens, he refuses to help her up, but tells her to get up and finish what she had started.

In 'Kahani Phoolvati Ki' the heroine's lover initiates her into his gang. However, only after he is killed does she become the leader. She has relationships with other male members of her gang. That is a radical departure from the traditional one-man woman stories in films.

In 'Bhrashtachar' the hero fights alongside Bhavani and makes her battle his own. He supports her and never tells her to let him, the big strong man, fight her battles. They are equals and he makes no concessions to her gender. In fact he admires her for her courage and dedication.

In the two other films, the men are supportive in a different way. Both are police officers on her trail and have conflicting interests. They plead with her to surrender to the police and promise her justice at the hands of the law. They seem almost naive in their promises, because, as the women cynically say, they burnt their bridges behind them when they became outlaws. The women also say that they have no faith in the judicial system, as it failed to protect them from persecution. Traditionally the woman listens to the man in her life. In 'Khoon Baha Ganga Mein' and 'Sherni' they defy his wishes and exhibit their independence. In traditional portrayals the woman's duty is to obey and worship her man. In 'Khoon Baha Ganga Mein' Ganga refuses to let her love and emotions for her lover override her prime objective. She has no compunctions in killing her lover's father, and makes no concessions for him. In 'Sherni' the man tries to dissuade Durga from her violent revenge. She refuses him bluntly and only surrenders after her mission is complete.

The whole man-woman relationship has changed in these films. In fact the whole relationship has changed. The woman's mission is paramount in her life, and not even her love alters that. They meet on equal terms. He is no longer her protector, because she can do that herself. I remember older films and some contemporary ones in which a macho hero beats up the bad guys. The heroine would stand aside and look on proudly, as, 'her man' proved himself to her. In all the films I reviewed men stand around while the female protagonist indulges in physical violence. Also, the women are not presented as extraordinary beings. Despite the references to goddess Durga, the women are portrayed as common people, who snap when they are persecuted. In this they are more human than their traditional counterparts whose patience and pain threshold seemed too high to be true.

I thought it would be useful to look at the case of Phoolan Devi. The film, 'Kahani Phoolvati Ki' is loosely based on this female bandit of the early 80's. The film was largely fictionalized, almost romanticized. The bare bones of the story of Phoolan Devi is looked at in the case study on the next page.

The Real Phoolan Devi: A Case Study

"A Bullet for a bullet. You are making heroes of dacoits," protestors chanted at Phoolan Devi's surrender ceremony. Perhaps that is what this modern genre of films is trying to do. Certainly it is a legitimization of violence. Perhaps Phoolan Devi was not an avenging goddess at all but just a common criminal.

Sethi (1983) writes that the legend of Phoolan was more intriguing than the reality. He writes that "the black beauty of the bandit world" was actually a "drab-looking, highly moody, childishly petulant and disastrously short-tempered girl on a rampage."

The police officer who negotiated her surrender described her as "brash, hasty, immature and short tempered." He said that "it was the press who blew her image totally out of proportion." In her own words as to why she became a bandit, she said, "I was bitter. I wanted revenge."

From the 1st of march to the 15th of march of 1981, Phoolan Devi massacred 20 high caste Thakurs in Behmai. Her actual victims were not present, but the atrocities committed that day created a fear psychosis among the high-caste men. That contributed to her legend. For two years she and her gang committed 66 crimes of dacoity, kidnapping, murder, attempted murder, and dacoity (armed robbery) with murder. All this violence perpetrated by a woman added a "bizarre kind of glamour" to her legend.

It is questionable if Phoolan Devi was a goddess image, a woman ridding the earth of evil and evil doers. The question remains: Was she just a desperate woman who took to crime to get empowered and avenge her persecution? Or was she just a common sadistic criminal?

A Short Critique

Clearly this genre of movies has broken the traditional submissive, selfsacrificing, and placid mould. However, it is also clear that these images are also stereotypical images. Despite their cathartic value for suppressed women and their entertainment value, it is doubtful that these movies will change popular perceptions of women. It is clear that these new women are a new type of ideal, as much as their self-sacrificing, submissive predecessors were. That aspect alone ensures that they are not **real** women. Indeed they are goddesses incarnate, ideal and worshipable but so far removed from the flesh and blood woman, as to diminish the latter's status further. They are more real in their emotional reactions to persecution than their silent suffering predecessors. However, their actions are goddesslike, the main premise of this study. They are strong women unwilling to suffer evil but their methods are far removed from most women's reactions. In their defence and the film makers, the women are portrayed as extraordinary as it takes an extraordinary person to fight evil.

Usually the women in these women-oriented films are played by actresses who have a certain box-office draw. Clearly the decision to make these films was determined by the finances. They are formulaic films to ensure that "The cash registers do not stop ringing" (Rahman, 1988). These films have been monetary successes which is not surprising because fantasy and escapism rule the Indian film scene. However, it is heartening that the strong woman genre has not flopped. One prominent film actress Rekha applauds this genre, "Times have changed, thank God" and "For the first time the heroine has emerged as a strong, tough woman willing to fight back, reflecting the Indian woman of today."

Even now discrimination appears even against the actresses who portray this new woman on screen. Says actress Dimple Kapadia (Zakhmi Aurat, and Mera Shikar), "..they make you fight, and they also make you dance, but they don't pay you as much as they pay the hero" (Rahman, 1988).

It is also obvious that the solutions offered in these films are unrealistic and impractical. In their own way these new women are as stereotyped as were the traditional heroines. Also the transformation is tempered by the fact that after these women complete their missions they probably become the perfect wife, any way. Indian feminists find these harridans as unacceptable as the passive beauties of before for this reason (Rahman, 1988).

Which leads us to the big question. Is violence to be legitimized as the panacea of all our problems? Perhaps not. However, the violence that we detest in Rambo and Mera Shikar has a distinct message. Any person (female or male) will take only so much and no more. I do not know enough about American films to comment on them but in Indian films there is a definite reference to the society. These films highlight the lack of law and order, and corruption in India today. The violence provides a wishful, almost vicarious solutions to their problems-- problems which no one else (specially the power structure of an emotionless administration) will help them to solve. This may also explain the monetary success of these films. The weak groups of society, the poor and the low castes feel empowered along with the militant woman on screen, herself a member of a weak societal order as a female.

It is ironic that the land that worships strong mother images and cheers their prototypes on screen, should burn women for dowry, and debase them in countless other ways. In this context Robinson (1985) writes, "Hindus who entrust to a woman the political leadership of India are simultaneously familiar with the history of religious practices which at times consigned women to death."

Despite the shortcomings, the emergence of the strong woman goddess has in some way broken the shackles of the old, self-sacrificing, peaceful, and all-forgiving heroine of before. Perhaps just the breaking of the traditional mold may be the herald of more complex female characters in Indian films. Certainly one message emerges. Do not take woman for granted because while she is the epitome of peace and nurturing she is also pure and cleansing destructive energy: there is only so much she will endure. Woman is also mother and any harm done to her children will enrage her to acts of great violence: born out of a deep and enduring maternal love.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMERISM AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT: The Role of Television in Brazilian Industrialization Under Military Rule

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMERISM AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT: The Role of Television in Brazilian Industrialization under Military Rule

INTRODUCTION

Before the C.I.A.-backed coup d'etat of 1964, there was no master plan for the regulation of the telecommunications industry in Brazil, leaving the industry scattered and poorly organized. There was an unnatural administrative dichotomy between the regulation of the point-to-point media, (such as telephone, telegraph, and radio-supported telephone and telegraph) and the electronic mass media, (television and broadcast radio).

However, the development of both types of media and their subsequent integration into the Brazilian economy and society followed similar patterns. Both types of media began as amusements for the elite, gradually finding a commercial application, and eventually making their way into the living rooms of the middle classes. After the coup d'etat of 1964, it appears that this relationship was recognized by the authoritarian State and that the complementary socio-economic functions of point-to-point and mass media were also recognized.

This paper is intended to expose the role of the media in the post-1964 Brazilian dependent development scheme, (a means of Third World industrialization). The paper pays particular attention to the role of television, illustrating the related emergence of the "Brazilian Economic Miracle," the creation of domestic markets, and the rise of Brazil's TV Globo, (the fourth largest network on Earth, and a global programming syndicator).

METHODOLOGY

The paper begins with an historiographical analysis of the separate, yet parallel, developments of point-to-point media and one-way, mass media. This is done to contrast earlier governments' media policies against the more strategic approach of the post-1964 militarist-industrialist State. The paper then employs a more critical approach, examining the role of telecommunications in the dependent development scheme of the post-1964 State, focusing on television in particular. The author submits that television, through its ability to create demand for new products, supplies a source of capital for industrial development. Therefore, the author proposes that the current theory of dependent development should be revised, placing television among the other three sources of capital in the model of dependent development: State capital, local private capital and the capital of foreing multinational corporations.

The historiographical analysis was completely exploratory, involving books and articles in both English and Portuguese, several of which were primary sources. A collection of pertinent data was extracted from these sources and reorganized into two chronologies: "technical advances" and "politiçs and regulation." The results were far too complex for publication. However, the patterns that appeared in these timelines comprise the body of the historiographical analysis.

This analysis suggested that the Brazilian post-1964 militarist-industrialist governments had a clear conceptualization for the role of telecommunications in their plan for the industrialization of Brazil. The final section of the paper expounds on this conceptualization, and concludes with the incorporation of the media into the Theory of Dependent Development.

I EARLY TELEPHONY

In 1877, Dom Pedro II, the emperor of Brazil, had Brazil's first telephone lines installed, leading from his palace in Rio de Janeiro to various locations in the Rio area, (1). Between 1881 and 1888, lines were extended to several major cities in the empire, mainly in the southern and northeastern regions, (2). Following the elitist Republican coup d'etat of 1889, telephone lines reached into the interior of Brazil, (3). At this time, several independent systems were operated by various companies, including Western Telegraph Company, (4).

For the next sixty years, the telephone industry would slowly refine and consolidate its services, beginning with the merger of the Sao Paulo Telephone Company and the Rio de Janeiro system, forming the Sao Paulo and Rio De Janeiro Telephone Company, (5). After many businesses incorporated this new technology into their operation, telephone companies' profits increased, permitting the expansion of their equipment and service areas. After the development of radio, radiotelephony allowed for international communication. In 1932, radio links connected Rio to New York, Madrid and Buenos Aires, (6). Telephony was still primarily for business use, but telephones were slowly entering the homes of the upper-middle classes.

In 1955, the introduction of coaxial cable made possible the carriage of multiple channels through a single line which greatly facilitated long-distance service within Brazil, providing more service, thus reducing costs, (7). In 1956, the several independent companies were finally consolidated, thanks to the coaxial cable, and Federal Decree 40,439 which established the Companhia Telefonica Brasileira, (Brazilian Telephone Company), or CTB, (8).

Under Dom Pedro II's rule, as well as under the early republican governments, there was little regulation of the telephone industry. The granting of concessions to operate a system was the main form of government intervention until 1931, when Federal Decree 20,859 established that telephony and telegraphy were to be regulated by the Department of Mails and Telegrams, (9). It is significant that in this same year, the codification of Federal Decree 20,047 into law established that radio would be regulated by the Comisao Tecnica de Radio, (Technical Commission of Radio), or CTR, an agency of the Ministry of Education, (10). (The mission of the CTR is analogous to the broadcasting aspects of the North American F.C.C.'s the responsibilities). Clearly, the government viewed the the point-to-point media as being unrelated to the broadcasting industry, with respect to their regulatory policies and economic utilities.

II EARLY BROADCASTING

Although viewed as unrelated to the point-to-point media, the mass media experienced a similar evolution in Brazil. While Brazilian broadcasting underwent explosive growth after 1950, the industry's roots in Brazil extended to the seminal stages of radio technology. In 1904, two years before North America's Reginald Fessenden was credited with the invention of radiotelephony, Brazilian inventor Roberto Landell de Moura received two U.S. patents, one for " a wireless telephone," (11).

For nearly two decades after its invention, radio was considered a point-to-point medium, merely an extension of the telephone, even though the North American inventor Lee De Forest developed a radio-set marketing strategy that used radio-waves for one-way, mass communication, called "broadcasting," (12). This concept was introduced to Brazil in 1922 during a World Exposition-type of event celebrating Brazil's Centennial of Independence from Portugal. Westinghouse provided an exhibition displaying a radio receiver and transmitter, airing popular songs of the day. It was an instant success among the elite spectators. Radio kits sold well almost immediately, but since no Brazilian stations were on the air at that time, only foreign stations were heard, (13).

In 1923, Brazil's first station went on the air under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. Headed by educator, Professor Roquette Pinto, it was called "Radio Ministerio de Educacao," (Ministry of Education Radio), (14). Between 1923 and 1932 numerous stations went on the air funded by the wealthy members of "radio clubs" or "radio societies" from nearly every major city in Brazil, (15). Not yet commercially applied, radio stations functioned mainly as an amusement for radio club members. By 1927, a commercial basis was created for the funding of radio stations by electronics manufacturer Alberto Byington, the owner of station PR-O, (later PR-6), in Sao Paulo, (16).

The period from 1932 to 1950 marked the maturation of the Brazilians radio broadcasting industry, largely due to Byington's profit-seeking approach. As the commercial possibilities increased, new stations went on the air, which diversified programming, attracting a variety of audiences thus increasing commercial possibilities further. By 1948, Radio Bandeirantes, S.A. (Inc.) claimed 18 affiliates, (17).

1948 also marks the importation of Brazil's first television receiver, by radio magnate Francisco de Assis Chateaubriand, (18). In 1950 Brazil's first television station went on the air, Chateaubriand's "TV Tupi" on Channel 3 in Sao Paulo, (19). He inaugurated Brazil's second TV station in 1951, on Channel 6 in Rio, (20). In 1963, he announced plans to cover all of Brazil with a chain of 16 stations. This gives some indication of the intoxicating rate of growth in the television industry starting in 1950.

However, in 1963 there were only 26 stations on the air in all of Brazil. Most notably among them were TV Excelsior, TV Globo, TV Paulista, TV Record, TV Rio and TV Tupi.
Although President Kubitscheck spent astronomical amounts of federal funds on modernization programs, promising "fifty years

progress in five," he did surprisingly little to promote the growth of television. Nor did his successors, Quadros and Goulart. Television entrepreneurs were left to their own devices to promote the industry. In 1962, TV Globo went on the air secretly financed, in part, by the North American Time-Life Corporation, although foreign investment in Brazilian media was illegal at that time, (21).

Federal laws regulating broadcasting were rather scarce until the early 1960s. The earliest radio regulation was Federal Decree 3,296, enacted in 1917. It established federal jurisdiction over telephony, telegraphy and radio, which was seen as an extension of the older point-to-point media, (22). Following the introduction of radio broadcasting in 1922, the State passed Federal Decree 20,047 establishing its jurisdiction over broadcasting by virtue of its educational potential, (23). In 1931, this decree was codified into federal law, and the Technical Commission of Radio was established, as mentioned above, (24). By 1932, the possibilities of television were apparent. The State passed Federal Decree 21,111 establishing that audio-visual radio signals were also to be regulated by the State, and licensing procedures for all broadcast stations were instituted, (25).

For eighteen years, very little developed in the area of television, but from 1950 to 1962 television grew rather quickly, and with so little attention from the State that broadcasters themselves lobbied for more regulation. In 1962 the Brazilian Code of Telecommunication or BCT was adopted by the Senate, (26).

The BCT created the national Council of Telecommunications, or CONTEL, responsible for issuing licenses, supervising contracts between Brazilian broadcasters and foreign vendors and service contractors, and for penalizing broadcasters for non-compliance with the federal regulations, mainly those of the Technical Commission, (27). It is important to note that the Brazilian Code of Telecommunications is distinctly devoid of point-to-point telecommunications regulation. Even as late as 1962, the mass media and the point-to-point media were regarded as unrelated.

III THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1964

In 1964, a group of wealthy industrialists and high ranking military officers staged a military coup d'etat with the guidance of the United States' C.I.A. Most of the industrialists and officers were schooled in the Escola Superior de Guerra, (High War College) or ESG, (28). Among the many civilians involved in this coup were Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Brazil's ambassador in Washington, D.C., (29). Luiz Gonzaga de Nascimento e Silva, who was "connected to Campos," served as Globo's legal advisor during the formation of the illegal contracts with North American TIME-LIFE Broadcasting. De Nascimento e Silva, "in this phase of the development of Globo, is seen [serving] in defense of the interest of Globo with Roberto Campos, then Brazilian ambassador to the [U.S.], (30). Nascimento e Silva was a "member of the Campos Group," (31). It seems that TV Globo was advised to accept an illegal contract with a North American corporation by an attorney connected to the Brazilian ambassador to the U.S., while that ambassador and others were conspiring with the C.I.A. to overthrow the government of Brazilian President Joao Goulart.

Further underscoring the militarist-industrialist government interest in Television, the new government of General Castelo Branco granted Globo and its owner, newspaper publisher Roberto Marinho, a dispensation in 1964, waiving Globo's liability regarding its infraction of the foreign investment law, after the illegal contract with TIME-LIFE was exposed, (32). It also granted Globo a second frequency, for a station in Rio in 1965, (33). This was an administration in which Roberto Campos served as Minister of Planning,(34). Clearly very influential members of this government were interested in communications, and Globo was the beneficiary of that interest.

1965 was a landmark year for government interest in communications. Brazil became a member of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, (Intelsat), a multinational communications cooperative which operates a geosynchronous communications satellite system, (35).

Not only did the militarist-industrialist government recognize the value of satellite communications in the 1960s, it also recognized the need for control over all modes of communication, and for the expansion of its communications facilities, a plan of which satellites were only a small part. The government was also interested in the promotion of its electronics industry. By 1965, the consumer electronics industry was capable of producing a television set for about US $200, and

TABLE 1

Number of TV Stations Licenses,

by Period and President

Period and President(s)	Number of Licenses
1955-1960	
Café Filho:1954-1956	
J. Kubitschek:1956-1961	8 *
1960-1964	
J. Kubitschek:1956-1961	
Janio Quadros:1961	
Joao Goulart :1961-1964	14
1964-1969	
H.A.Castelo Branco:1964-1967	
A.da Costa e Silva:1967-1969	23
1969-1974	
Emilio G. Medici: 1969-1974	20
1974-1979	
Ernesto Geisel: 1974-1979	47
Total	112

Source: SSR/Secretary of Broadcast Services of the Ministry of Communications.

(FROM MATTOS, p. 67)

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* There were already four stations on the air prior to 1955.

costs were declining, (36). This would be important for the entire development of Brazil, as submitted below.

Most importantly, in 1965, the Castelo Branco government acquired the controlling shares of Companhia Telefonica Brasileira, forming the Empresa Brasileira de Telecomunicacaoes, (Brazilian Enterprise of Telecommunications) or EMBRATEL, (37). EMBRATEL had three major objectives: the promotion of the telecommunications infrastructure including telephone, telegraph and microwave links; the promotion of Brazilian involvement in international communications; and the promotion of high-quality telecommunications services including live remote television broadcasts, national and international direct-dialing, long-distance telephone services and data processing systems, (38). This clearly established the post-1964 governments' understanding that point-to-point and broadcast communications are interrelated, and can join forces toward a common end. But t what end? Given these governments' overarching interest in development, it is safe to suggest that the electronic media wer deployed toward the advance of Brazilian industrialization.

Television grew rapidly after the coup of 1964. The number of TV concessions granted under the first two military president was nearly equal to that of the all previous civilian government combined, (See Table 1). With the increasing capacity of the Brazilian consumer electronics industry, (nurtured by the State) the number of TV sets purchased each year rose almost exponentially after 1964, (See Table 2). This increased television's appeal to advertisers, and advertising expenditures

TABLE 2

TV Sets Purchased
in Brazil

Year	Number
1950	200
1951	375
1954	12,000
1958	78,000
1965	3,000,000
1970	4,500,000
1972	6,500,000
1974	9,000,000
1977	10,000,000
1980(*)	20,000,000

* Estimated
Source: *Veja*,no.107(1970); Prado 1973;
Camargo 1975; Sodré 1977.
(FROM MATTOS, p.10)

steadily migrated toward television, at the expense of most other advertising vehicles, (See Table 3). Television stations soon formed networks as the telecommunication infrastructure provided by EMBRATEL facilitated such affiliations. In 1968, the year of Chateaubriand's death, TV Tupi Network had 18 stations, (39). That same year, the government subsidized loans for consumer purchases of TV sets, with low monthly payments, (40). All of this taken together establishes the government's interest in the expansion of the commercial television audience size.

Also in 1968, the government subsidized Roberto Marinho's gradual buy-out of the TIME-LIFE shares of Globo, (41). By 1971, Time-Life was no longer involved with Globo, (42). This was the year that TV Tupi began to experience economic difficulties, (43). The previous year, 1970, TV Excelsior, by that time a powerful network, had all of its licenses revoked by the government, leaving Globo in a most desirable position. However, Globo began losing favor with the government in the coming years. By 1980, TV Tupi would have all its licenses withdrawn, and the frequencies would be divided among two new networks, TV Manchete, and Sistema Brasileira de Televisao, (SBT), formed in 1979 and 1980 respectively, (44). Globo received none of these frequencies. By 1984, Rede Bandeirantes (Bandeirantes Network) claimed over twenty affiliates, (45). But Globo was still the most popular and powerful network in Brazil.

In 1985, in the face of overwhelming public demand for the re-democratization of Brazil, Globo yielded to public pressures and abandoning its pro-government stance, gave its support to the

TABLE 3



DISTRIBUIÇÃO PERCENTUAL DO INVESTIMENTO PUBLICITÁRIO POR VEÍCULO

Ano	*TV*	*Revista*	*Rádio*	*Jornal*	*Out-door*	*Cinema*
1962	24.7	27.1	23.6	18.1	6.4	0.1
1963	32.9	21.9	23.0	16.6	4.6	1.0
1964	36.0	19.5	23.4	16.4	4.1	0.6
1965	32.8	25.6	19.5	18.4	3.4	0.3
1966	39.5	23.3	17.5	15.7	3.7	0.3
1967	43.0	22.0	15.5	14.5	4.4	0.6
1968	44.5	20.2	14.6	15.8	4.3	0.6
1969	43.1	22.9	13.6	15.9	3.9	0.6
1970	39.6	21.9	13.2	21.0	3.8	0.6
1971	39.3	17.0	12.7	24.8	5.3	0.9
1972	46.1	16.3	9.4	21.8	5.1	1.3
1973	46.6	15.6	10.4	20.9	5.1	1.4
1974	51.1	16.0	9.4	18.5	4.0	1.0
1975	53.9	14.1	8.8	19.8	2.7	0.7
1976	51.9	13.7	9.8	21.1	2.9	0.6

Fonte: Thompson (30 Maiores Agências).

(FROM RENATO ORTIZ' "A Moderna Tradicao Brasileira")

movement, (46). In 1989, Globo had the continued support of the public, claiming over 60% of the television audience, while SBT, Manchete and Bandeirantes claimed only 20%, 6%, and 5% of that audience, respectively, (47).

At least until the 1980s, Globo was clearly a preferred network in the eyes of the post-1964 governments. Yet, the policies have been almost contradictory. While the government promoted the expansion of television coverage by promoting the proliferation of transmitters and receivers, at the same time, it instituted censorship.

In 1967, the Brazilian Code of Telecommunications was altered, creating the Ministry of Communications, which absorbed EMBRATEL, further consolidating governmental control over all forms of electronic communications, (48). That same year, the Law of National Security and the Press Law were instituted, which defined electronic media as essential to National Security, and held press personnel criminally liable for any communications deemed subversive, offensive or biased. Obviously, the broadcast systems were to be censored, but in a double-edged fashion, which clears up the apparent contradiction. In the words of Brazilian anthropologist Renato Ortiz: "It is necessary to understand that censure has two faces: one repressive, the other disciplinary... affirming and rewarding a specific type of orientation [of messages]," (49). In 1970, the content of entertainment programming was also scrutinized by the government and the predominance of North American programming led to the conclusion that more programming should be produced in Brazil, (50). By

1976, Globo produced 75% of its programming, and by 1982 it exported programming to over eighty nations, including to the U.S.A., (51). By 1985, Globo sold programming to at least 128 countries, (52).

With almost terroristic laws and political influence on its side, the State was able to intrude on the creative process of television production not only by prohibiting the portrayal of topics it considered obstructive to its purposes, but also by encouraging the portrayal of themes it considered favorable to its interests.

Brazilian telecommunications have evolved in a dichotomous way. Before 1964, the point-to-point media and the electronic mass media were clearly separated, regarding not only the State agencies which controlled them, but also regarding their functions in the Brazilian economy. Nonetheless, they developed in a parallel fashion, although in differing time periods.

Telephones began as elitist toys, until they found a commercial application. As a means of business communication, telephones assisted in the coordination of related enterprises, enhancing the production and distribution processes. As business uses provided the profits to support the streamlining of the telephone technology and service, reducing operating costs, telephones slowly infiltrated the homes of the middle-class. From an economic stance, telephones are still primarily useful for business communication, assisting production and distribution. The point-to-point media do not generally serve as advertising and propaganda vehicles.

The broadcast media likewise, entered the Brazilian society and the economy from the top, as amusements for the elite. Gradually, these media found business applications, mainly as advertising vehicles, stimulating the consumption of goods and services. Eventually, television would also become a household appliance for the middle classes.

With the post-1964 governments, the false dichotomy of the telecommunications industry was ended, and the State incorporated the two types of media into a single, mutually reinforcing industry. This is demonstrated by the State's active support of the television, telephone and radio industries and the creation of the Ministry of Communications, and EMBRATEL to unify all of the electronic media into a single telecommunications industry.

IV Dependent Development and Telecommunications in Brazil

There is little doubt that the so-called "military governments" of the post-1964 era made an effort to integrate all electronic media into their development scheme. A further example of this is the creation of Empresa Brasileira de Radiodifusao, (Brazilian Enterprise of Broadcasting) or RADIOBRAS, in 1975, under the Ministry of Communications, (53). Its responsibilities were to coordinate State-owned stations and to promote the expansion of broadcast services to areas of low population density, (with lower commercial potential), (54). This is to say, the State intended to subsidize the extension of television penetration to areas in which the private enterprises saw little commercial potential. In 1975, Globo was ranked the world's ninth largest network, in audience size, (55). By 1981, Globo's reach had increased to the point that it ranked as the world's fourth largest network, (56). Expecting little profit, the State set out to create a huge telecommunications infrastructure, from which other institutions, such as Globo and its advertisers, reaped the profits.

One reason for the State's interest in creating a telecommunications infrastructure was its interest in attracting foreign capital. The State's behavior can be described as serving as a "handmaiden" for multinational corporations, by providing the necessary infrastructure, such as hydroelectric power and telecommunications, taking up the heavier burden with lower returns in order to attract foreign capital, (57). The steel industry is another example of the State bearing the heavier burden, providing low-cost steel inputs for multinational automobile manufactures in Brazil, (58).

Telecommunications investments by the State were doubly useful for the overall industrialization scheme. Not only did the State subsidize the development of point-to-point communications infrastructures to facilitate production, distribution, and general industrial coordination, but the broadcast media provided the consumer markets, which, by headcount at least, was the fourth largest on Earth in 1981.

The electronics industry is an almost redundant example of this concept. The availability of television signals is the necessary antecedent for the purchase of a receiver, from the perspective of the consumer. In order to promote the sale of television sets, the Brazilian governments after 1964 increased the number of stations in Brazil far more rapidly than previous administrations, while inviting foreign capital to invest in the electronics industry through the Law of Foreign Capital, passed in 1965. In 1968, the government actually sponsored consumer loans for purchases of TV sets. As seen in Table 2, the number of sets purchased grew from 4.5 million in 1970 to 20 million in 1980.

Part of the reason for this increase was the introduction of color television in 1972. The State created the National Department of Telecommunications, (DENTEL) in 1972, with the understanding that it would replace CONTEL while also regulating the electronics manufacturing industry, (59). The government began vertically integrating its regulation of the communications industry. That same year, Brazil rejected all of the existing color video systems, designing its own, as a mix of the North American and West German designs, calling it "PAL-M," (60). This eliminated any competition from imports, while creating obsolescence in the black-and-white sets which had been promoted until 1972.

Television broadcasting was thought to help in the development of Brazil in a two-fold manner. On the one hand, it was thought to assist the electronics industry, while on the other hand, it was thought to modify "Brazilian's behavior through the diffusion of an urban lifestyle throughout the nation, and to promote the necessities of consumption inherent to that lifestyle," (61). By the early 1980s, foreign capital owned

60% of consumer electronics manufacturing, including the manufacture of television sets, (62). So, the State provided the infrastructure of television stations, which offered a two-fold advantage. Not only did it serve as a software input to the electronics industry, (which was dominated by multinationals), but this infrastructure also had the power to create domestic markets for other industries as well. Through its functions as an advertising vehicle and promoter of a mass-consumption lifestyle, the television infrastructure encouraged consumption of Brazilian manufactured goods, which provided the capital needed to stimulate expansion in the manufacturing industries.

The question of intention arises: did the State intend to create consumerism as a Brazilian institution? Clearly, part of Brazil's attractiveness to multinationals is its large population and its large economy, the eighth largest economy on Earth. Could this consumerism be merely the by-product of the military strategy of enhancing the broadcast infrastructure to strengthen its propaganda distribution system? Given the State's dogmatic interest in industrialization, this view is too simplistic, but it is partly correct. Brazilian television's main productions, the telenovelas, (soap operas), have reflected the twin themes of military rule and economic boom, being conspicuously devoid of political content yet riddled with materialism and "laced unfailingly with forward-looking optimism," (63). This is to say that under the militarist-industrialist State which was "geared to generate goods, luxury service and social welfare, [television was] used to promote entertainment, to encourage consumption and

FIGURE 1

CONSUMPTION VS. WAGES
(Percent)



* No wage data available these years

Source: World Tables 1988-89 ed.
(DATA ONLY)

to diffuse Brazil's economic achievements...", (64). To attest to the subtlety and predominance of this promotion of consumption, consider that Globo covers almost one third of the production costs of its telenovelas just by including the use of the sponsor's products within the shows, (65).

It seems clear that the militarist-industrialist regime used television "as an instrument of propaganda to create the so-called 'Brazilian economic miracle' to co-opt the middle-class...". (66). The capstone of this sub-argument regarding the State's intentions is almost a confession by Minister of Finance Delfim Netto of the Costa e Silva administration, head of the economic team at least since 1967. According to Alves Moreira, Netto's 1967 strategy was "primarily geared toward changing the consumption pattern of the upper middle-class, to promote the growth of the durable-goods sector of the economy," (67). (It should be noted that the Brazilian middle-class is roughly analogous to the North American working class.)

The following year, 1968, the government began subsidizing loans for the consumer purchase of television sets. 1968 also marked the start of the "economic miracle". During that period, real wages (adjusted for inflation), decreased for the vast majority of Brazilians. However, in the industrial sector, real wages did increase. Available data show that while only this sector of the middle class experienced a real wage increase, private consumption far exceeded the wage increases, (See Figure 1). Unfortunately, the consumption figures are aggregate measures, not isolating industrial sector private consumption. Most other sectors experienced wage reductions, thus, the comparison of wages and spending may yield a conservative estimate of consumer debt-spending. Nonetheless, the figures are suggestive if not convincing. They suggest consumer debt spending, which may have contributed to the large Brazilian national debt of the 1980's.

If it has been established that the State actually intended to use television to promote consumption in order to support industries dominated by foreign multinationals, the question arises: why would the so-called "military governments" be interested in creating profits for foreign multinational corporations?

To answer this question it is necessary to understand first that these "military governments" were not entirely composed of military men. Secondly, it is necessary to understand the nature of dependent development based on the interaction of foreign, State and local capital.

The dominant philosophy in all of the post-1964 governments can be traced to a doctrine of the High War College, (ESG), the Doctrine of National Security and Development. Many of the post-1964 government officeholders were graduates of the ESG, and nearly half of these were civilian-graduates. About one sixth, or 244, were major industrialists, (68). "Thus, the ESG cemented a military-civilian network that institutionalized and disseminated the Doctrine of National Security and Development," (69). This network "kept in close touch with American officials and was funded by many international and national corporations. It was the nerve center of the destabilization campaign" waged against the populist government of Joao Goulart in 1964, (70).

It is not inconceivable that the industrialists within the "military" governments were interested in more than military security. The Doctrine of National Security and Development includes an economic strategy which is designed to integrate economic development and industrialization into the overall administrative program, (71).

Among the ESG graduates, industrialization was thought to provide national security, as well as national development. To bring about industrialization, foreign capital was needed. In order to attract foreign capital, the State had to provide the infrastructure, low-cost inputs and a consumer market, probably using borrowed or minted money. High taxes or rampant inflation or huge national deficits are the likely outcomes of such a government spending scheme, all of which eventually fall on the shoulders of the middle and lower classes.

Regardless, multinational corporations are initially interested in entering new markets, being able to bring in capital and high technology capable of producing consumer products with high returns, using cheap local labor.

A source of local capital is generally invited into the scheme, directly or indirectly, by the State or the multinational. The multinationals share the control with the local capital for several reasons, none of which have to do with the need for money or technology. Quite often, laws require a local partner, but even if not, a local partner lends legitimacy to the venture in the eyes of the government, (72). This combination of State, local and multinational capital is known as the Tripod of Dependent Development. The post-1964 industrialization of Brazil is a prime example of this concept.

The local capital source generally receives the highest rate of return in these joint ventures. They tend to provide minimal capital and contribute little or no technology nor expertise yet wind up with a disproportionately large share of the profits, (73). From the point of view of the multinational, local capital participation can only be justified in terms of a larger political strategy; the local groups allowed to participate are primarily members of the very largest and most influential capital groups in Brazil, (74).

In Brazil, the Tripod of Dependent Development was founded, to a large degree, on capital expenditures by the State, which is likely come from the pockets of the middle and lower classes eventually. The State justified this by focusing on the long-term goals of establishing Brazil as a major military and industrial world power. "For such primordial and all-important goals, the ESG emphasizes, the sacrifice of successive generations [of Brazilians] may be necessary," (75).

"The multinationals have been given generous incentives and good opportunities for future profits. In return, they share control and returns with a few elite members of the local bourgeoisie," (76). But in military Brazil, there is little difference between the industrial elite and the militarist-industrialist government.

Regardless, the strength of this system relies heavily upon a fourth, under-emphasized leg of this mislabelled tripod, the telecommunications system. Such a system is far more than just an input industry or infrastructure. As an infrastructure, the point-to-point media greatly facilitate coordination of diverse sectors of production and distribution. But the broadcast media, which are the advertisement vehicles, actually induce consumption. This means that the broadcast media, and television in particular, provide yet a fourth --albeit indirect-- source of capital in the system of dependent development.

It is clear that the consumer in this schema provides the profit through his or her labor input and purchase. It is the telecommunications system which creates this consumer market which would be otherwise unavailable to the multinational corporation. The State provides the telecommunications infrastructure to reach the consumer market and it is this consumption which creates the economic growth. Regardless of whether this dependent development schema is considered beneficial to the nation, it is clear that telecommunication plays a vital, and until now, under-emphasized role.

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THE PRIVATIZATION OF TF1,
FRANCE'S OLDEST TELEVISION NETWORK

Second Place Markham Award Paper

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Markham Competition

THE PRIVATIZATION OF TFI, FRANCE'S OLDEST TELEVISION NETWORK

Alvi McWilliams

On May 14, 1986, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's newly elected government surprised the nation when officials announced plans to denationalize the country's first and largest television network, Télévision française 1 (TF1). Although Chirac's conservative party had campaigned on a platform which promised extensive privatization of state holdings and specific plans for putting two of the public television networks in private hands, no one had imagined the government would sell France's oldest and most popular network.

Political forces, and some economic considerations, appear to have shaped the decision to privatize TF1. We shall examine the impact privatization had on TF1 and the other major French networks, including the two remaining public chains, Antenne 2 (A-2) and France Régions 3 (FR3), and the newly created private networks La 5 (La Cinq) and La 6 (La Six).[1]

An historical analysis of the political and economic context in which that decision developed will demonstrate that broadcast policy considerations played little part in the overall privatization plan. I hypothesize that such central issues as audience demand, programming, production and advertising revenue did not receive adequate attention. As a result, the French broadcasting world, TF1 included, emerged transformed, but weakened, from the rapid changes of the 1980s.

This weakness took several forms. On the domestic front, the state demanded that all the networks, both public and private, aim at the same general audience. The French broadcast industry then had to adjust to an abrupt shift to commercial competition, with six networks in pursuit of the same audience. Naturally, such competition made programming a key issue, and the state once again damaged the industry's competitive potential in this area through a significant political and bureaucratic failure: The new government did not denationalize the inefficient and technically inferior Société française de production (SFP). Moreover, it imposed a quota requiring TF1 to continue using this expensive program production source for two years.[2] SFP would also provide programming to the two remaining state networks, A-2 and FR3. This basic production and programming weakness hobbled the major national networks, and it hurt the television industry on other fronts. Chirac's conservative government hoped that market forces would stimulate domestic program production which would meet the competition of imported programs in terms of price and audience interest. Ideally, improved production would create potential for exporting programs; more immediately, producers had to fill the instant programming demand for the nation's burgeoning networks. Providing competitive, quality programming in the face of such appetites posed a daunting challenge which the industry has not yet been able to meet.

Advertising revenue to support the expanded television offerings posed special problems, too. Income for the state networks came from an annual license fee on receivers, but in 1968 an historic shift had occurred when the government allowed advertising to appear on the national networks, TF1 and A-2. Within six years after commercials began appearing on the public networks, both channels relied on advertising for over half their incomes. Privatizing TF1 meant that France's most popular network would compete for more of the advertising pie, a prospect which alarmed many in the print media who feared they would suffer substantial advertising revenue losses.

These problems of audience demand, production, programming, and revenue flawed the French broadcasting world. Failure to resolve them promised to impede progress toward healthy development for TF1 and the other networks, both public and private.

An Historical Background to the Problems of Privatizing TF1

Chirac's conservative party had promised privatization of two state networks, and most people believed that Antenne 2 and FR3 would be the natural candidates for denationalizing. TF1's stature as the nation's first television station contributed to this assumption. Appreciating the network's position in French broadcast history, and particularly the Socialist reforms of 1981-1896, is essential to understanding both the government's decision and public reaction.

TFI began its first broadcasting in 1947, and regularly scheduled programs started in 1948. A part of the theoretically "temporary" Radiodiffusion-Télévision française (RTF) established after the Liberation in November, 1945, TF1 grew slowly and suffered from the RTF's image of being a government mouthpiece. This assessment arose from the tight bond between state and the RTF, with administrative appointments and budget determined by the French cabinet and parliament respectively. In addition, broadcast news directors reported to the RTF director, who in turn reported directly to the cabinet-level Ministry of Information, a hold-over from the Occupation years. Starting in 1948, the head of radio news conferred daily with government ministers on news content, and in the mid-1950s the Ministry of Information held daily conferences with RTF personnel to determine the makeup of all television newscasts. During the Algerian War, public disgust over blatant government news censorship led to RTF reporters occasionally being pelted with rotten fruit.[3]

When General Charles de Gaulle became president in 1958, his political use and abuse of television's potential increased the importance of the medium in France and intensified its image as the government's voice. Between June 1, 1958 and December 31, 1962, President de Gaulle made 1,506 television appearances, a count which did not include his frequent press conferences.[4] All this occurred on TF1,[5] a fact which firmly identified the network with the government, and even more specifically, with the Gaullist party, in power from 1958 to 1974. Tight political control, coupled with a centralized, bloated bureaucracy, bred costly inefficiency. By the 1970s the renamed Organization de Radio-Télévision française (ORTF) drew wide-spread criticism. To distinguish himself from his more conservative Gaullist predecessors, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing responded by breaking the monolithic ORTF into seven independent departments, which included TF1 and A-2 as separate national networks.[6] This also gave the president the opportunity to place carefully selected Giscard supporters in key posts.

Private broadcasting advocates, mostly on the political right, found the continuation of the state broadcasting monopoly disappointing. Even more disappointment lay ahead as the 1974 reform accelerated a trend away from French television production. All three state television networks preferred producing their own programs or buying relatively inexpensive, often American, imports. Criticized as grossly inefficient, the SFP produced programs at three times the cost that private production houses did. Even worse, their products lacked professional polish.[7] Only a government quota requiring all stations to order programs from the SFP kept the department alive.

By creating seven separate bureaucracies, Giscard's reform intensified administrative problems in what remained a centralized and technically inferior broadcast industry. The government did not address the need to improve production and programming capacity, and it continued the post-war tradition of using the broadcast media for political purposes. When the Socialist Party began gaining strength at the end of Giscard's seven-year administration, he used state media extensively for campaigning and blocked his opposition's access to the media. A 1979 incident from this media battle solidified the Socialists' commitment to breaking the state's broadcast monopoly.

The defiant Socialist Party criticized government policies on a pirate radio station, Radio Riposte, operating at the party's headquarters. In swift response, the government jammed the station's signal, blockaded the transmission site, and served arrest papers on Socialist leaders, including presidential hopeful François Mitterrand.[8] This incident, coupled with Giscard's state media campaign excesses, made ending the government monopoly a basic issue for the Socialists. Change lay on the horizon.

The End of the French Government's Broadcast Monopoly

A major political power shift occurred in 1981 when the Socialist Party won presidential and legislative elections. President Mitterrand entered office with the political support to end the state broadcasting monopoly. Having been out of power for over 25 years, the Socialists realized that they had to complete their reform before the political tide turned. In his first year in office, Mitterrand's government acted on a special commission's study and drafted legislation to change the audiovisual landscape.[9] The new law of July 29, 1982 officially liberated the broadcast industry and legalized France's numerous pirate radio stations. It also created a purportedly independent watchdog agency, the High Authority, to license new broadcast operations. Although the special commission had recommended a procedure to minimize the ruling party's potential for putting a political imprint on High Authority appointments, the Socialists' legislation had political bodies -- the president, and the speakers of both the Senate and the National Assembly -- choosing all the members.

The Socialists' broadcast reform combined a rejection of television à l'Américaine with an effort to block right-wing publisher Robert Hersant in his pursuit of electronic media. Article 80 of the July law restricted multimedia diversification by forbidding an enterprise from investing in more than one local commercial cable network company. Under this law private, commercial national networks could not develop, a restriction that ultimately deprived the country of private investment and attendant media development.[10] By blocking the growth of groups large enough to make necessary technological investments and to resist international competition, the July 1982 law guaranteed a crisis for domestic programming and for the French broadcast industry.

Despite politics as usual, the transition to a different broadcasting system had begun. In 1983, a pay-television network, Canal Plus, received its charter and started transmitting the following year. With its stock mostly held by government related conglomerates, particularly the Havas advertising agency, Canal Plus could not be called a true private television network.

Its programming depended heavily on films, especially recent French films, and government conditions required that 25 % of the network's income go to support the French film industry.[11] The prospect of this new, popular programming prompted reactions from both TF1 and A-2: In January 1984, even before Canal Plus went on the air, both state networks lengthened their broadcast day past the usual midnight sign-off and began programming into the early morning.

No further changes came to the television world until late 1985 when legislative elections and another political shift loomed ahead. Mired in the scandal which rippled out from the bombing of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior, Mitterrand's party faced probable defeat in the March 1986 elections. The Socialists hoped to create at least one private television network before losing their legislative majority. This would permit them to find network owners friendly to the Socialist Party. Efforts to secure a transmission site which would guarantee a profitable audience for the new channel met political resistance. Starting in 1985, the Socialist government had been negotiating with the City of Paris for use of the Eiffel Tower as a transmitter. Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac, the conservative party choice for prime minister after the March elections, did not want to lose control of the tower or of the privatization issue. Negotiations moved slowly, and by November, 1985, the Socialists needed to take action in order to get any new private network on the air before the March elections. In mid-November Mitterrand's minister of information introduced legislation at a sparsely attended Friday evening session of the National Assembly. It requisitioned the use of all high edifices, public or private, for television transmitter use. The bill's objective, of course, was the Eiffel Tower and the 10 million viewers within its range.[12]

With this major hurdle crossed, the Socialists announced that the recipients of France's first private network, to be called La 5 (La Cinq), would be a Franco-Italian consortium led by Jérôme Seydoux and Silvio Berlusconi. Seydoux, a prominent French businessman and supporter of Mitterrand, brought capital to the firm, and Berlusconi, an Italian media mogul recommended by the socialist prime minister of Italy, had the production facilities to assure La 5's rapidly impending debut. The choice of Berlusconi, whose commercial networks had been credited with destroying Italian state television and the Italian film industry, generated heated controversy.[13] Critics feared he would introduce the entertainment-heavy programming style of his Italian stations.

In January 1986, a sixth network with a music focus, initially called La 6, went to a politically compatible group headed by the French movie firm, Gaumont. Nicholas Seydoux, brother of Jérôme Seydoux, directed Gaumont, and his partners in La 6 included Publicis, a state controlled ad agency, and NRJ, a private radio station. In addition to Socialist connections, it also had the capacity to launch the new music channel before the elections.[14] Despite tight deadlines, both new networks began broadcasting in February, 1986. With two hastily constructed channels on the air, France had committed itself to private television and the end of direct state monopoly. Not only had Mitterrand's government deprived the conservatives of an important campaign issue, the Socialists had guaranteed that Chirac's government would be politically compelled to honor its campaign pledge to privatize state media. By doing so, the conservatives could award ownership to a politically compatible group of their own. The next round of broadcast reform was about to begin.

Conservatives Regain Power With a Privatization Platform

On March 20, 1986, Jacques Chirac's conservative party gained a narrow legislative victory over the Socialists. New Prime Minister Chirac, the conservative party leader intended to fulfill campaign promises to privatize a broad range of state properties, including two national networks; he also promised to revoke the licenses of both La 5 and La 6. Clearly, the political agenda amounted to undoing what the Socialist's had put in place as well as creating a new economic system.

All the same, privatizing the state broadcast media was part of a larger, ambitious plan to revitalize France by making the French a nation of shareholders and by restricting the economic role of the state.[15] Just seven months after the new government entered office, the privatization program passed the legislature and a set of legal rules to guide it had been implemented. The program had remarkable scope: It affected 66 firms comprising 27 independent groups and some 900,000 employees. Chirac's party had launched the biggest redefining of the public-private sector boundary yet witnessed in the West.[16]

Despite the sweeping nature of the conservative's program, they did not pioneer contemporary denationalization efforts in France. The Socialists had begun it very quietly in 1983, and their privatizations privatization, but instead took a "semi-capitalist" approach such as allowing public companies to raise funds on the stock exchange by selling what amounted to non-voting shares.[17]

In reaction to these Socialist precedents, the conservatives determined not to create such public-private hybrids. Like the Socialists, however, they selected only profitable firms in the competitive sector to privatize, leaving large public service utilities and monopolies in place as well as financial basket cases such as Renault. Despite their push to strengthen market forces through privatization, the conservatives did not relinquish state control: From 1986-1988 in all cases but one -- the sale of TF1 -- the minister of finance chose the purchaser. Now state control extended yet further with the finance minister determining the share structure and even appointing boards of directors. Such moves revealed that even the conservatives distrusted market forces, and ultimately they strengthened the state's hand in determining the new economic order. State intervention continued alive and well under the conservative program.

The Controversial -- And Surprising -- Privatization of TF1

When Chirac's government announced that the state would auction off TF1, public and press reaction was initially negative, but it changed as the government modified its sales plan. Since most people, including Chirac's Minister of Culture and Communication François Léotard,[18] had thought the more profitable and "snappier" Antenne 2 might be put on the auction block, criticism largely focussed on why the government had chosen the venerable, and deficit-ridden, original state channel. One of Chirac's cabinet members, Secretary of

Tourism Jean-Jacques Descamps, explained the government's choice by saying that the government picked TF1 because "TF1 is the [network] the most socialist and the most rotten, economically and socially."[19]

Given this point of departure, battle lines were clearly drawn . The issue immediately became a cause célèbre in two magazines, Télérama and L'Événement du jeudi. In the week following the announcement, they launched a campaign to collect signatures of people opposed to privatizing France's historic network. Télérama described privatizing TF1 as "an unholy scandal" and speculated on the powerful media owners, such as conservative publisher Robert Hersant or multi-media giant Hachette, who might gain control of TF1. With the largest television audience in Western Europe and the most complete transmission network in France, it would be an attractive acquisition for such media gourmands.[20]

Within days, the signature campaign brought in over 150,000 letters to Télérama's offices. On May 21, a week after the state's decision, the network's two broadcast unions held a one-day strike and demonstration. TF1 strikers gathered at the Eiffel Tower and, joined by staff from the two magazines, marched across the Seine to the Prime Minister's offices in Rue Matignon. They deposited their boxes of protest mail on the sidewalk before the ministry where a member of Chirac's cabinet received them.

Such theatrical protest appeared to reflect public opinion of the moment. In mid-May, a poll done by Sondage Ipsos for the news magazine Le Point reported that 56% of the French did not support the idea of privatizing TF1.[21] Not surprisingly the poll showed that twice as many respondents from the political left -- 80% -- opposed the decision as did those from the right -- 40%. A poll by L'Événement du jeudi revealed support for its privatization by 56% of young respondents, 57% of private enterprise employees and 52% of respondents in management positions.[22]

Members of TF1's two unions, fearing staff cuts, opposed the privatization and couched their protest in strong terms. They decried the government's plan to auction off public property belonging to millions of co-owners, the viewers, who had paid decades of annual fees.[23] Télérama writer Jean Belot maintained that commercialization had already seriously hurt TF1 by corrupting production and programming; privatization, he wrote, would further degrade the network. He also pointed out that the government had not explained how it would deal with TF1's $18 million deficit (100 million francs). He speculated that public taxpayers might end up paying that bill rather than TF1's purchasers.

Network staff reaction included significant positive responses to denationalization. Jean-Luc Séguillon, chief of TF1's political service department, observed, "This could be a chance for [TF1] ...If privatization brings us the dynamism of Europe 1 (Europe's most popular radio network, controlled by Hachette), then it's very seductive. If it means we become La 5, then it's heart breaking."[24] Many viewers who participated in Télérama's signature campaign also saw a need to revitalize the network and added comments complaining about the mediocrity of TF1 programs.[25]

Alain Denvers, TF1 news director, supported denationalization and criticized TF1's inefficiency, noting that, "One cannot be against privatization here. It takes four people to do the work two could do.

A long report of 12 minutes costs over three times what a foreign network would charge for a similar report."[26]

Given these hopes for improvement, the shift in public sentiment does not come as a complete surprise. Chirac's government now built on this potential support by modifying its plan. The prime minister and the minister of the economy and finances rejected François Léotard's plan to privatize two state networks and decided to sell only TF1. This reduced the tension at A-2 and FR3 and also probably undercut the solidarity of the networks' movement against media privatization.

Since many TF1 union members had protested that they were being auctioned off as part of the property, the government improved its efforts by dropping plans to have interested buyers bid up the price. In late May, Léotard announced on the TF1 program "Hour of Truth" that the state would set the price.[27] Unlike all other state privatizations, however, the minister of finance would not select the buyer. Instead the commission which had replaced Mitterrand's High Authority, the National Commission on Communication and Liberties (CNCL), would review the proposals of interested buyers and decide the owner. Even more remarkable, CNCL chairman Gabrièle de Broglie had debates on TF1's attribution televised, an act which constituted an historic first in French administrative history.

In June 1986, Chirac's government also offered TF1 employees the opportunity to become stockholders: Ten percent of the shares would be available to TF1 staff; 40% would be sold on the stock exchange with a 25% limit available to any one investor; and a 50% block would be sold to the buyer selected by the CNCL.[28]

Criticism became more muted, and the fact that newspaper groups could become significant shareholders in TF1 undoubtedly quieted some potential detractors. All the same fears that Robert Hersant or Hachette would win TF1 still remained. One moderate National Assembly deputy was alarmed at the prospect of Hersant, then owner of 22 French newspapers and almost 20 other publications, because of the impact the media lord would have on the advertising market. He also pointed out that awarding TF1 to Hachette would create a tremendous concentration of press holdings.[29] The international communication group edited and distributed books, newspapers, television programs, films and computer software. Hachette was the foremost distributer of publications in the world, owned dozens of French publications and controlled France's principal newspaper, magazine and book distribution system.

Hersant did indeed want TF1, but critics charged that Chirac was replacing government power with private power. In the mid-seventies Chirac had played an important role in Hersant's acquisition of two important Paris dailies, Le Figaro and France-Soir, and that fact made awarding a third media plum to the conservative publisher politically excessive. With at least ten deputies in the National Assembly working directly or indirectly in Hersant's empire, and Hersant himself occupying a seat in the assembly, the prime minister was open to charges of conservative party manipulation; he did not dare to support the media mogul's quest for the nation's biggest network. Chirac did not abandon Hersant, however. On February 23, 1987, the publisher won a 25% share of La 5; he became the unlikely partner of Silvio Berlusconi, whose claims to partnership the conservatives had been forced to honor despite breaking the Socialist government's original contract for other original owners.[30]

On the same date Chirac's government awarded La 6, whose contract had also been revoked, to a group led by CLT, a Luxembourg company, and the Compagnie Lyonnaise des Eaux. The Socialist's audiovisual landscape had been redesigned, and now the nation awaited the outcome of the race for TF1.

Hachette remained a candidate for the network, but its director, Jean-Luc Lagardère, had suffered several setbacks with his potential partners. Hachette wanted 25% of the network, and the soon-to-be-privatized Havas advertising agency was to be a 15% partner. SET-Presse, a newspaper group which included Le Monde, would have 10%, and the three groups together would make up the controlling stockholders of TF1. On February 8, 1987 Havas decided the state's price of $818 million (4.5 billion francs) was too high and withdrew from the deal. Lagardère hastily turned up other partners, and among his interested investors was Rupert Murdoch.[31]

Other applicants for TF1 included François Bouygues, head of one of the world's largest construction companies, and Michel Baroin, owner of such disparate companies as GMF insurance and FNAC, a highly successful Paris chain of book and video stores. Bouygues, called the "king of cement," seemed the least likely candidate for the network. His corporate group had no broadcast holdings, but his business skills set him apart. A 1986 poll of 200 heads of companies conducted for France-Inter and Le Monde declared Bouygues "the best boss in France." An annual reader's poll by the business magazine L'Expansion also declared Bouygues number one in management.[32]

Despite this reputation, Bouygues' lack of broadcast background appeared to put him in last place for TF1. An industry poll by

Communication et Business found that 40% of advertisers preferred Hachette, as did 42% of publicity agencies. Only 15% of either group opted for Bouygues.[33]

Lagardère had such great confidence Hachette would win TF1 that he had already signed up several television stars before the award was made. Hachette confidently presented a slate of their TF1 corporate officers and their program director to the CNCL. *Le Monde*, as part of the SET-Presse group, would play an active role in TF1 news. The company's strong position suddenly crumbled when CNCL Chairman de Broglie advised Hachette on how to strengthen its case, an indiscrete act at best. Bouygues protested vigorously. Critics had already made the commission sensitive about adding TF1 to Hachette's already extensive media empire. Now Hachette's aggressiveness and attitude as heir apparent impelled the commission look more seriously at Bouygues.[34]

On April 6, 1987 the CNCL surprised many by its independence when it announced Bouygues as the owner of TF1. Since this was also the pre-campaign opening date for the presidential election, some of the surprise may have been disingenuous. Chirac's commission, or more correctly, presidential candidate Chirac, might have found giving the leftist *Le Monde* a role in TF1's news programming a little unsettling. Bouygues described himself as politically neutral and thus posed less of a problem.

Public sale of TF1 stock followed on July 20, 1987, and 400,000 stockholders bought 7,636,000 shares at $30 each. The turnout was disappointing, drawing the fewest number of stockholders yet in any of the government's privatization efforts.[35]

Even if the public found TF1's stock less attractive than the government's earlier offerings, the network came to Bouygues in better fiscal health than it had enjoyed in years. Hervé Bourges, the president and director at TF1 for four years, reported that the network showed a profit in 1986. After ending 1985 with a $15 million (85 million francs) deficit, it emerged from 1986 with a $25 million (141 million francs) profit.[36] Bourges noted that the profit occurred largely due to the government's having removed a ceiling on ad revenue allowed the network. The 1985 deficit had built up as a result of TF1's heavy investment in new programming, an investment begun in 1984 which could not be covered by the advertising revenue allowed under the earlier restriction.[37] TF1 was alive and well, and now a true commercial venture.

The Impact of the TF1 Privatization

Anticipating a more competitive environment, the government had already begun cutting personnel at TF1, A-2, and FR3 in September 1986 with a law offering an early retirement option for state media staff.[38] Bouygues immediately put his management talents to work on an already leaner TF1 and aimed at cutting costs.

Competition began in earnest now. La 5 made a preemptive strike on TF1 in April 1987, the same month Bouygues became the network's owner; La 5 raided two of TF1's biggest entertainment stars and its head of light entertainment, who had just acquired the French version of "Wheel of Fortune" for TF1 in January 1986. Fears that privatization might limit their creative freedom contributed to their decision to leave the network.[39] The acquisition underscored La 5's commitment to light entertainment.

TF1 lured away Antenne-2's star newscaster shortly after privatization: Christine Ockrent became assistant director general of TF1. Another media luminary, Michèle Cotta, former president of Mitterrand's defunct High Authority, became TF1's news director. TF1 and A-2 had a long-standing rivalry in broadcast journalism, and the newly privatized network intended to remain a serious competitor. Later in 1988, Ockrent returned to A-2 as the star newscaster on the evening news, at a salary which upset the entire broadcast news industry.

This investment did not reassure the TF1 news staff, and during the summer and fall of 1987 almost a quarter of the network's news reporters quit over what they cited as the network's reduced commitment to its news operation. Part of the problem lay in cutting internal program expenditures to combat other rising programming costs. With TF1, A-2, Canal Plus, La 5, and M6[40] all competing for the same sports, films, series and imports, costs rose dramatically. Between 1986 and 1987, TF1 saw an almost seven-fold increase in the cost for transmission rights and production of a football match.[41] Media analysts projected that by 1988 TF1 and A-2 together would spend over $54.5 million (300 million francs) on sports broadcasts.

Programming focussed increasingly on entertainment. Even before privatization, the shift had begun with 39 of the top 1986 television programs comprised of films. Canal Plus, the pay television network, had the heaviest film habit, showing 1,300 films annually. This created a tremendous demand for films, which the French film industry could not meet. Competition for viewers and ad revenue (advertisements hurt the industry. As a result the number of feature-length films fell from 151 in 1985 to 134 and 125 in 1986 and 1987 respectively.[42] Given the limited market and hungry buyers, the film industry could charge more for the rights to broadcast films; in fact, rights to extremely popular films rose with successive rebroadcasts.

By 1989 TF1, La 5 and M6 (the current incarnation of La 6) confronted this problem by doing co-production with French, American and European film or program producers, an arrangement which removed the issue of paying for rebroadcast rights. Programs such as the TF1-CNN production, "The Odyssey of Commander Cousteau," grew out of this approach. The co-production trend appears to be growing: TF1 went from investing over $16 million in such efforts in 1988 to almost $22 million in 1989. La 5 co-produced eight films in 1987, 10 in 1988, and 15 in 1989, while M6 co-produced five films each of those years.[43] Media analysts observe that increased film production for "the little screen" will accelerate the drop in production for "the big screen."

In creating two new networks and moving toward privatizing a third, France tripled the number of broadcast hours between 1983 and 1986. In theory the demand for programming ought to have generated more television production, but the number of program hours produced remained stagnant during this period of rapid media expansion. Senator Jean Cluzel, chairman of a Senate committee on communication and author of many books on television, says France falls into a European pattern on this issue. Increased program broadcast hours do not generate increased production. The scramble for programs to fill those new hours, of course, forced networks to compete as buyers for popular American programs Cluzel points out. A measure of the impact imported programs had immediately after TF1's privatization can be found in the fact that French dubbing enterprises saw their income virtually double in 1987.[44]

National networks in pursuit of programs face another challenge: The government has imposed increasingly stringent quota requirements for French and European programming. By their third year of commercial broadcasting, all networks must have 60% of their programming from the European community. Of that percentage, 50% must be French programming. TF1 met this quota in 1989, but the network abruptly stopped buying any new programs and had to make selective requests to cancel contracts for some American programs. La 5 fared less well: In July 1989 the government levied a fine of over $11 million, which eventually rose to over $14 million, on the smaller network. Only 32.5% of La 5's offerings were French and just 34% had European origin.[45]

Programming constitutes the key problem for all the networks, but advertising revenue continues to be a sensitive issue. TF1, which had no difficulty meeting programming or production obligations in 1987 or 1988, found income from publicity inadequate and launched a campaign against publicity on the state's remaining large national network, A-2. The privatized network asked the government to suppress advertising on all public stations, an act which would most benefit TF1. Since this would leave TF1 as the only true national network, it would permit the channel to raise advertising rates to reach their audience. Not surprisingly, advertisers opposed the idea, and the government, whose stations also need the income, has little enthusiasm for it either.

Advertising revenue growth stabilized in 1988, but the French economy had just come out of a serious slump. Today the media market still suffers from the slow economic recovery. The situation provides France with few resources for financing program development which is the key to improving audience ratings.

TF1 continues to be the strongest of the networks, averaging 41.9% of the market share in 1990 compared to 40.95% in 1989. A-2 had 22.2%, down from 23.4%; FR3 had 11%, compared to 10.2%; Canal Plus had 4.2%, down from 4.4%; La 5 had 11.7% compared to 12.9%; and M6 had 7.2%, up from 6.4%.[46] Analysis of network audiences shows increasing stagnation, especially for La 5 and M6, which have not grown beyond a small core of viewers. The state's regional network, FR3 has suffered a dramatic drop in audience since 1985.[47]

This situation translated to a disastrous year in 1989 with the networks registering a combined deficit of $170 million. Only TF1 made a profit, though a very meager one of $40 million which barely paid stockholders. A-2, La 5, M6 and the Société française de production ended the year in the red. By the end of 1990, La 5's cumulative deficit stood at $440 million (2.2 billion francs), with losses for 1990 alone projected at $100 million (500 million francs. Robert Hersant reduced his share of La 5 from 25 to 10%, and Hachette, still yearning for a French television network, joined Berlusconi as a controlling partner at 25%.[48]

More Dramatic Change to Come?

Privatizing TF1 a year after the launching of La 5 and M6 created a highly unstable environment where the new commercial networks generated a crisis of competition for each other and for at least one state network, FR3. Their proliferation caused a rapid expansion of programming hours which, in turn, fueled intense bidding for domestic, and initially, for any programming. By saddling TF1 with a quota of programs from the state's inept Société française de production, the government handicapped the network. Had TF1, the largest network, been able to order more from private French producers in its first two years, a healthier domestic production industry might have developed.

The government's quota for domestic programming, plus the European community quota, may finally stimulate French television production. It may also simply prompt investment by French television networks in foreign production firms. This would permit co-production arrangements, but would not necessarily lead to more work by French producers. An example of this occurred in 1989 when Canal Plus, once Europe's principal buyer of American films, paid $30 million for a 5% interest in Caralco Pictures, Inc. a Los Angeles firm which distributed "Total Recall." Politicians may make laws, but people will find ways around them.

In their focus on constructing laws to counter each other, French politicians have ignored basic policy questions for the nation's broadcast industry. Mitterrand's initial Socialist reforms set the stage for the current disaster by cobbling up two brand new networks within a six-month period to guarantee they had friendly media owners in place. One analyst observed that the Socialist broadcast reform had "not a single coherent strategy."[19] Their more carefully constructed July 1982 law, designed in part to block Hersant's media expansion, actually had a deleterious effect; its restrictions to prevent formation of private, commercial national networks discouraged the private investment which would have produced essential growth and restructuring of the French broadcast production industry.

Chirac's government compounded those errors by throwing TF1 into the commercial fray -- and revoking the licenses of La 5 and La 6 -- for much the same political reasons. Although the conservatives' privatization efforts with other firms proved to be a remarkable success, their failure to denationalize or reform the SFP suggests Chirac's government was less interested in making the industry more dynamic than in placing a conservative party stamp on a medium which has a long tradition of political manipulation.

TF1, thanks to its long history, healthy size, audience share, and attendant ad revenue, will survive despite the production restrictions placed on it at its commercial rebirth. La 5 may survive with large infusions of cash from Hachette, but the public indifference to the network and its more limited broadcast area suggests the multi-media giant will find this an uphill battle.

French media analysts observe that the nation of 55 million may not be able to sustain all the television networks their politicians have given them. Many believe that audience demand and advertising revenue will support only three "generalist" networks. Low-cost, popular programming will be the key for the survivors, and if French politicians have anything to say about it, French programming will also survive. Ultimately, however, French viewers will decide the outcome of both the networks and their programming.

ENDNOTES

1. La 6 later became M6.

2. Jean Cluzel, La Télévision après six réformes (Paris: JC Lattès et Licet, 1988), p. 146.

3. Donald R. Browne, Comparing Broadcast Systems (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1989), pp. 69-71.

4. Douglas J. Daniels, "Television and/in French Politics," Contemporary French Civilization, Summer/Fall 1989. The Journal Officiel corresponds to the United States' Congressional Record.

5. France launched Antenne 2 in 1964 and FR3 in 1972.

6. The seven separate companies of the "new" ORTF included the two national channels, TF1 and Antenne 2, plus the regional channel, FR3. Télédiffusion de France (TDF) became a separate broadcasting unit, and the Société française de production (SFP) and archives (INA) served the television networks plus Radio France.

7. Browne, op. cit., p. 82.

8. Caroline Pfaff, "Giscard Lowers hammer on Pirate Socialist Station," Advertising Age, September 10, 1979, p. 86.

9. The term paysage audiovisual français -- literally translated as the French audiovisual landscape -- describes the broadcast media environment. It is often simply called "Le Paf."

10. Kenneth Dyson and Peter Humphreys, "Policies for New Media in Western Europe: Deregulation of Broadcasting and Multimedia Diversification," West European Politics, October 1986, pp. 104-105.

11. Pierre Chatenier, "Programmes: la ruée vers l'argent," L'Express, November 9, 1984, p. 75.

12. The Eiffel Tower, located in the densely populated, prosperous Isle de France, became La 5's linchpin transmitter. La 5's broadcast range has grown since then, but is still much more limited than that of TF1 and A-2. From 54 transmitters at its founding, the network has grown to 168 as of February 1989. It can claim only 14% of the national audience. Dominique and Michèle Frémy, eds., Quid 1991, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1990), p. 1182b.

13. Jean-François Lacan, "Les armes de M. Berlusconi," Le Monde, November 20, 1985, p. 10.

14. "The Privatization of Europe," Broadcasting, March 31, 1986, p. 63; Browne, Comparing Broadcast Systems, p. 119.

15. Michel Bauer, "The Politics of State-Directed Privatization: The Case of France, 1986-1988," *West European Politics*, October 1988, p. 49.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 51.

18. "Screen Test," *Economist*, June 21, 1986, pp. 50-51.

19. Jean Belot, "Main basse sur TF1," *Télérama*, May 28, 1986, pp. 10-12; Marianne, Ben-Aîm, "Radio-TV: Attention fragile," *EPP*, April 1, 1987, p. 35. *EPP* is the title of the media journal whose full name is *Echos de la presse et de la publicité*.

20. "Main basse sur TF1," p. 10.

21. Roland Mihaïl and Jacques Bouzerand, "TF1: feuilleton à suivre," *Le Point*, May 26, 1986, p. 30.

22. "Les Français massivement opposés à la privitisation de TF1," *L'Événement du jeudi*, July 17-23, 1986, p. 10.

23. Jean Belot, "Main basse sur TF1," p. 11.

24. Nicole Du Roy, and Thierry Leclere, "Nuageux à couvert sur les 3 chaînes," *Télérama*, May 28, 1986, p. 13.

25. Alain Remond, "Vous allez mieux en le disant," *Télérama*, May 28, 1986, pp.16-17.

26. Michel Georges, "La Bataille de la Une," *L'Express*, May 30, 1986, p. 37.

27. Roland Mihaïl and Jacques Bouzerand, "TF1: feuilleton à suivre," *Le Point*, May 26, 1986, p. 30.

28. Michèle Georges, "La Une a la cote," *L'Express*, June 20, 1986, p. 14.

29. Noël-Jean Bergeroux and Michèle Georges, "La Leçon de TF1," *L'Express*, June 6, 1986, pp. 27-28.

30. "Switch Channels, Same Programme?" *The Economist*, February 28, 1987, p. 80-81. The Socialists had put in place substantial indemnification charges -- $200 million -- to compensate their license recipients in the event the 18-year license agreement was revoked by the conservatives. Berlusconi promised to sue the government and, given the original contracts terms, posed a very serious threat.

31. Ibid.

32. Norbert Bellaiche, "TF1: Bouygues révèle son plan," Médias, November 21, 1986, pp. 76-78.

33. Ibid.

34. Philippe Grumbach, "L'Attribution de TF1 -- les deux stratégies de Bouygues et Lagardère," Figaro, April 6, 1987, pp. 1, 32.

35. Adam Glenn, "France's New Television Order," Broadcasting, August 24, 1987, pp. 46-47; La Télévision après six réformes, p. 72.

36. Philippe Grumbach, "Pour trois milliards de francs..." Figaro, April 6, 1987, p. 32.

37. Marianne Ben-Aïm, "Radio-TV -- Attention fragile," EPP, April 1, 1987, p. 32.

38. Cluzel, La Télévision après six réformes, p. 74.

39. Browne, Comparing Broadcast Systems, p. 109.

40. FR3 has a regional focus, making it less of a competitor among the other national networks. Film showings dominate Canal Plus.

41. Cluzel, La Télévision après six réformes, p. 78.

42. Ibid.,42. p. 79.

43. Ibid., p. 80.

44. Ibid., p. 81.

45. Dominique et Michèle Frémy, eds., Quid 1991, p. 1182b.

46. "Le Bilan de l'audience télévisée en 1990," Figaro, January 11, 1991, p. 11, Fig-Eco.

47. Nathalie Coste-Serdan, "Une Décennie de l'audience des chaines de télévision -- 1979-1989," MédiasPouvoirs, July-August 1990, pp. 169-171.

48. Michael Williams, "Hachette to Honcho Cash-strapped La Cinq," Variety, October 29, 1990, pp. 31, 79.

49. Kenneth Dyson and Peter Humphreys, "Policies for New Media," p. 111.

Development Journalism, Development Communication and Distance Education: A Clarification of Constructs in Development Research

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Development Journalism, Development Communication and Distance Education: A Clarification of Constructs in Development Research

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An increasing amount of study and research in international communication since the 1970s has focused on the rise of what is commonly known as "development journalism" in Third World countries. Although this term is generally understood to mean that carefully-conceived applications of mass media in development schemes can facilitate the process of modernization, little consensus exists in mass communication literature on the conceptualization, definition and operational parameters of this journalistic concept.

As Fair (1988, p. 168) found out, "development journalism" has been used to designate such journalistic activities as covering news pertaining to the primary, secondary and tertiary needs of people; news that satisfies the needs of a country's population and contributes to self-reliance; news that relates to development or to social, economic or political problems; positive or good news; and, even news for neo-literates. Aggarwala (1981, p. 13), on the other hand, says that development journalism is not identical with "good" or "positive" news. "In its treatment," he says, "development news is not, and should not be, any different from regular news or investigative reporting. Sussman (1978, p. 76) says that development journalism has to do with the coverage of scientific and economic issues and relating them to the development needs of the country. Elsewhere, "development journalism" definitions have included activities such as using media to impart formal and non-formal education (Rampal, 1984, p. 11).

These differing and, at times, conflicting definitions of "development journalism" are likely to make the task of applying this journalistic concept into practice relatively difficult. The significance or relevance of results achieved from these varying applications may be suspect for scholars seeking a reliable body of data to further build on the theory of development journalism. Different interpretations of this journalistic concept may also lead to inconsistencies in curriculum planning in this emerging area of study in mass communication in both developing and developed countries.

This paper proposes the thesis that development applications of mass media can be broken down into three distinct categories: "Development journalism," "Development communication" and "Distance education." It is hoped that the proposed constructs would provide a more commonly accepted framework for approaching the practice, research and curricular dimensions of the subject of media use in national development.

A two-dimensional approach is taken here to the discussion of constructs used in the research on development applications of mass media. First, we will trace the theoretical and experiential framework within which the constructs now in use have emerged; and, secondly, we will define and explain the three discrete applications indicated above.

Media Role in Development: The Heritage

Although their applications have been affected by political and socioeconomic considerations, mass media have been used as instruments of socioeconomic development ever since people began to reach others through media. Media applications for facilitating the modernization process have been increasingly advocated in the Third World; however, such applications have not been limited to developing countries.

The publication of books by colonial authorities in 17th-century America for use in schools and colleges was an example of media use in development in the West, as was the prescription of steps by a mercantile newspaper to prospective entrepreneurs on how to set up a small business in 18th century America. Even in the 1990s, one can see examples of educational uses of mass media in the United States and other Western countries. The Learning Channel on cable television in the U.S., for example, is replete with such programming. Its step-by-step lessons on spring gardening, for example, is a good example of using media for non-formal education. The use of television in the U.S., Britain and Japan, among other advanced countries, to impart higher education to people unable to attend colleges or universities in the traditional classroom setting is an example of the use of a mass medium for formal education. Campaigns in the Soviet mass media to boost agricultural or industrial productivity also serve as examples of media use in the development process.

It is obvious, therefore, that the practice of using media as instruments of development is not ideologically motivated. Indeed, such a use has historically cut across political ideologies and economic structures. Socioeconomic rather than political factors have clearly had a stronger influence in promoting media applications in the development process. The more developed a country socioeconomically, the less emphasis its media are likely to place on their developmental function. Conversely, the lesser the socioeconomic development in a given country, the greater the emphasis on using media for developmental purposes. That explains why the practice of using mass media for facilitating development has gathered momentum primarily in the Third World since the 1970s.

Media Role in Development: A Theoretical Framework

The impetus for promoting media use to achieve development objectives has come from a variety of sources since the 1950s. They include the evolving objectives of the nonaligned movement, research on the use of communication technology in the modernization process and UNESCO-sponsored work in this area. For the purposes of this paper, "development" is defined as the process of evolution of a society from traditional, primarily agrarian stage through socioeconomic, educational and political advancements to an urban and modern stage.

Nonaligned Movement: A formal association of Third World countries since 1955, the nonaligned movement was designed to serve as a buffer between the West and the Soviet bloc. Its member nations were not politically or militarily associated with either of these blocs, although that operating philosophy later lost some of its meaning. Another feature of the movement is to promote the political and economic interests of its members. The movement has supported efforts to remove colonial rule and stood behind the U.N. General Assembly's 1974 Declaration on the New International Economic Order. The declaration called for replacing the existing order, which was said to be characterized by "inequality, domination, dependence, narrow self-interest and segmentation," with a new order based on "equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among States irrespective of their economic and social systems" (U.N. Resolution, May 1974). Michael Todaro, an economist, supported the nonaligned group's claim that poor nations continued to be disadvantaged by the international economic order established by the Western industrialized societies, adding that "a new international economic order is not only possible, it is essential" (Todaro, 1981, pp. 501-507).

The nonaligned movement's campaign for a new economic order also focused on the quality of these countries' information and communication systems with the conviction that mass media are an essential factor in the independence and development of peoples and countries. In fact, the new economic order movement was preceded by the nonaligned bloc's concerns about international information flow. Its primary concern was that although physical colonization was ending around the world, the West continued to maintain "cultural imperialism" through its dominant position as supplier of news, information and cultural fare to the developing world. The merits of the "cultural imperialism" argument were heavily debated in the West, with the primary Western position being that the Third World did not have the infrastructures to be self-reliant in the information area. There was little doubt, however, that the Third World was heavily dependant on Western news agencies for news and information about the world and even about itself. In the early 1980s, the Big Four Western news agencies -- AP, UPI, Reuters and Agence France Presse -- were supplying about 32.9 million words a day to Third World media as opposed to 1.3 million words per day supplied by developing countries' own news agencies (Sussman, 1982, p. 3). This meant, to the chagrin of Third World policymakers and journalists, that developing countries were forced to see practically all the issues, including themselves, through Western eyes.

Linked to this issue of Western information monopoly was the Third World concern that the flow of information between the West and the Third World was heavily imbalanced, with information moving predominantly from advanced Western countries to developing countries, as opposed to a more equitable flow of information between them. A third concern was that what little coverage the Third World did receive in the Western media was often tainted by stereotypical portrayals of developing countries. Shashi Tharoor, an Indian writer, noted that "cultural, economic and political progress is steadily underreported and indeed undermined by concentration on wars, pestilence, murders and other catastrophes (Tharoor, 1977, p. 32). He went on to say that many Third World countries fear that adherence to such journalistic values will actually impede national development.

This view was shared by some Western authors (Schiller, 1978; Hester, 1990) and by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, also known as the MacBride Commission, appointed in 1976 by UNESCO to conduct a study of world communication problems (1980, pp. 37-38).

Alarmed by what it perceived were the negative effects of the imbalance in international information flow on developing countries, the nonaligned movement began to push for corrective action. It adopted a draft declaration in 1976 which called for a "new world information order" (MacBride Commission, p. 38). Mustapha Masmoudi, the Tunisian information minister, was the key architect of the proposed new world information order (NWIO). In a paper to MacBride Commission in 1978, he made the following recommendations to achieve the proposed order:

--Communication should henceforth be regarded as a social goal and a cultural product, and not as a material commodity;

--The right of those receiving information should be regulated to ensure free and balanced flow of information;

-- There must be regulation of the right to information by preventing abusive uses of the right of access to information;

--Appropriate criteria should be established to govern truly objective news selections;

--There should be a regulation of the collection, processing and transmission of news and data across national frontiers (Masmoudi, Document No. 31).

The proposed NWIO was extensively discussed by the 16-member MacBride Commission, whose members came from all ideologies and parts of the world. Its report, Many Voices, One World, published in 1980, acknowledged the Third World concerns about international information flow, but came short of endorsing the Masmoudi solution calling for governmental involvement in mass media and regulation of journalistic activity. The commission report endorsed the traditional Western values of free flow of information and freedom of speech and press. Its 82 recommendations for improving communication structures did include the ones providing for the establishment of national communication policies, preference for noncommercial over commercial broadcasting, and use of media in national development schemes (MacBride Commission, pp. 254-272).

Although the clamor for an NWIO appeared to have run its course by the early 1980s, it was clear that the issue of role media should play in national development had acquired a new significance out of the NWIO debate. Increasingly, Third World countries came to believe that transformations in their communications systems were necessary to accomplish the goals of the new economic order, particularly the one promoting self-reliance. A carefully planned communication strategy was seen as a prerequisite to all developmental activity.

This developmental culture into media activity was further infused through communication policies enunciated by a number of developing countries starting in the late 1970s. Sixteen countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America and even Europe had issued communication policy studies by 1980 under the sponsorship of UNESCO. The policy studies included a section on the use of media in national development. A statement typical of media role envisioned by several developing countries in national development is noted here from the policy study of the Indian media. Desai (1977, p. 79) said, "The communicators' engagement with problems of poverty, disease, ignorance and deprivation has to become real. To remove them is not the job just of a planning commission or government. Desai was clearly suggesting that development applications could take place within the framework of press freedom.

In Nigeria, on the other hand, where broadcasting and all but two of the major newspapers are government owned, the communication policy study puts the responsibility of using media for development on the government. Ugboajah (1980, p. 31) indicated that the government's goal was to provide the country with "strong and efficient information" to mobilize public support for national development. In Kenya, where print media have been brought increasingly under government control, the policy study recognizes the government's right to set the tone of development journalism. Mwaura (1980, p. 92) says, "The government realizes that if the rural population is to be mobilized effectively . . . for national development, a network of community newspapers that are relevant to their lives and the needs of their community must be developed."

Other countries' communication policies have similarly strived to promote the need for using media as instruments of national development, thus at least theoretically addressing in part the new economic order and "cultural imperialism" concerns.

Research on Media Role in Development: Another incentive for using media to achieve modernization objectives has come from the findings of communication research since the 1950s, which has evolved from the assertion that there is a causal relationship between communication and development to the position that the relationship between communication and development is more complex than had been thought earlier. Lerner (1958, p. 56) in his landmark study of the modernizing process had asserted that "a communication system is both index and agent of change in a total system" and that an "empathic" personality, facilitated by education and mass communication, was a prerequisite to modernization. "Empathy" was defined by Lerner as acquiring the ability to see oneself in another person's situation, preferably the one the empathic individual would like to emulate, to further acquire the motivation for progress. Mass media, said Lerner, provided the experiences to build empathy: "The mass media opened to the large masses of mankind the infinite vicarious universe. Many more millions of persons in the world were to be affected directly, and perhaps more profoundly, by the communication media than by the transportation agencies" (p. 53).

Wilbur Schramm, whose 1964 book Mass Media and National Development virtually served as a bible for advocates of media use in modernization schemes, had said that:

> the mass media, the great multipliers, are a nation's best hope of filling in some of its informational lags, and keeping (so far as information can help to keep) its timetables for national development. Therefore, a developing country needs to look hard and carefully at the use it is making of these tools of modern communication (p. 254).

Two years later, Rao (1966), in a study of two villages in India found that mass communication was important in smoothing development. Like Lerner, Rao established a "constant and cumulative" interactions between mass media and national development, creating the proper environment for modernization. Rogers (1969, p. 99) lent further support to such findings on media's role in national development. He claimed that "a small but growing body of research in less developed nations . . . indicates the crucial, integral role of mass media in modernization." He noted, however, that governments had not fully utilized the media for accomplishing developmental objectives.

> National development planners have . . . tended to neglect the potential of the mass media, even though these communication channels may well be one of the sharpest tools in

> the developer's kit. Few (noncommunist) developing countries have given much emphasis to mass communication in the past decade (p. 99).

Such claims of the benefits mass media could bring in the modernization process in Third World countries provided compelling reasons to these countries to push the integration of mass media in development schemes. Although subsequent research downgraded the level of benefits available from media application in socioeconomic development schemes (Schramm, 1976) or at least established that the relationship was more complex than thought earlier (McAnany, 1980; Mowlana 1984), Third World media planners appeared to be convinced that the case for achieving modernization objectives through media applications was a strong one. Indeed, the communication policy studies' proposals for media application in development schemes, mentioned earlier, often found their support in the positive findings of scholars on communication and national development.

UNESCO Initiatives: Long before the United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) got involved in the New World Economic Order and New World Information Order debates, it had taken interest in finding out how mass media could help Third World countries in their modernization efforts. Its activities in this area have been generally guided by the U.N. General Assembly resolution of 1962 that "information media have an important part to play in education and in economic and social progress generally and that new techniques of communication offer special opportunities for acceleration of the education process" (Schramm, 1964, p. vii). Indeed, Schramm's Mass Media and National Development, mentioned earlier, was commissioned by UNESCO to determine what tangible role, if any, mass media could play in developmental processes. The optimistic view on the subject in the works of Schramm, Lerner and other scholars and the findings of some UNESCO-sponsored projects had laid the groundwork in the 1950s and '60s for an increasing application of media in modernization projects.

Key among the early UNESCO projects on media use in education and development was the one called Radio Rural Forums, sponsored by the organization in India, Ghana and Costa Rica (Hornik, 1988, p. 78). The forums were intended to expose rural listeners to innovative techniques toward socioeconomic progress and encourage their adoption. The effectiveness of such forums in India and Ghana was measured by independent social science researchers. Bordenave (1977, p. 41) says that in India "forum members learned a good deal more than non-forum members. . . . In amount of knowledge gained, non-literates did just as well as literates, indicating that the forum is an effective means of teaching non-literates." A UNESCO monograph on the Ghana experience said that "the project in Ghana may be considered successful when evaluated in terms of its stated purpose of transmitting information and stimulating rural people towards increased self-help activities" (No. 51, p. 47). Results in Costa Rica were also favorable (Hornik, 1988, p. 79).

The success stories of a number of other developmental projects with media participation in Asia, Africa and Latin America were cited in a book published by UNESCO in 1977 called Communication and Rural Development. The positive experiences of these projects, scholarly research on the possible benefits of diffusion of innovations through mass media and the pressures of the new economic and information orders have clearly paved the way for greater media applications in modernization projects in the Third World.

The increasing legitimacy gained by the development communication movement through scholarly research and international debate has helped it become the subject of ongoing academic study at some educational institutions. Prominent among these have been the East-West Communication Institute in Hawaii and the Indian Institute of Mass Communication in New Delhi, India, which attract students and journalists from developing countries to pursue studies in communication and development. In addition, the Manila-based Press Foundation of Asia and the Philippines Press Institute regard education and training in media use in development as their major functions. The U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program are among the several international agencies which sponsor projects in development communications (Mowlana and Wilson, 1990, pp. 195-198).

Media Role in Development: The Applications

It is within the context of the foregoing theoretical and experiential considerations that the issue of media applications in modernization schemes is being given a serious attention in developing countries. India and Indonesia, for example, have invested millions of dollars in communication satellite technology to strive to speed up the process of modernization. Indeed, many developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have used mass media to carry out a variety of developmental and educational projects. Media applications have ranged from performing a strictly journalistic function -- for example, writing news stories on the experience of development projects -- to imparting lessons in formal and non-formal education. Yet, these varied applications have generally been lumped under the phrase "development journalism" or "developmental journalism" by both practitioners and researchers (Sussman, 1978; Guneratne, 1980; Fair, 1988).

Since the constructs have been quite loose, research has not, as a general rule, focused on investigating the experience of specific type of media applications in development projects. Very little can be found, for example, on the experience of "development journalism" in mass communication research if we were to survey the research with the understanding that such journalism focuses on critically reporting and examining development projects. Instead, one is likely to find a discussion of "development communication" activities -- for example, instructions through media on how to obtain better crop yields -- in research articles intended to focus on "development journalism." Constructs get further muddled when the term "development journalism" or "development communication" is also used to encompass the use of media to impart formal education, a practice known far more accurately in other disciplines as "distance education."

A common understanding of the meaning of constructs is a critical prerequisite to establishing the relevance and utility of research in a given area. It is proposed, therefore, that the emerging research field of studying media applications in the modernization process should be classified along the following three distinct categories: "development journalism," "development communication" and "distance education." It is also proposed that although the common denominator of these three endeavors is that they are directed at facilitating the modernization process, media are used in each of the three applications for achieving a distinct and unique objective and, therefore, the three categories are mutually exclusive. A detailed discussion of the three is given below.

Development Journalism: This journalistic practice means that reporters and editors working within the parameters of press freedom concentrate their efforts on critically examining the relevance and success of policies and projects aimed at socioeconomic development. A definition that comes closest to reflecting the views of a number of development journalists in the Third World on this concept is given by Narinder Aggarwala, an Indian journalist working with the U.N. Development Program:

> Development news is not identical with 'good' or 'positive' news . . . Development news is not an official PR handout, issued by Third World countries concerned with image-building. In its treatment, development news is not, and should not be, any different from regular news or investigative reporting (1981, p. 13).

Aggarwala adds that in covering the development newsbeat, a journalist can and should critically examine, evaluate and report (1) the relevance of a development project to national, and, most importantly, to local needs; (2) the difference between a planned scheme and its actual implementation; and (3) the difference between its impact on people as claimed by government officials and as it actually is. Thus conceived, a development news story will be markedly different from a government handout (p. 359).

Development journalism, therefore, is process-oriented, with its commitment being to examining the merits of the processes of social, educational and economic development in the Third World. The agenda-setting effects of such journalistic activity hopefully will spur vigorous debates on the quality and direction of such developmental programs and result in necessary improvements. Reporting of successful socioeconomic development experiences, or "good news," is not antithetical to the purpose of development journalism. But when "good news" is not journalistically legitimate or is given to the exclusion of objective coverage of development experiences, then it may be more appropriately classified as "propaganda."

In its pure form, then, development journalism simply calls for a greater attention to covering modernization policies and projects without necessarily discarding the existing news values, which center primarily around urban issues. An excellent delineation of the aims of development journalism was compiled by Shah (1988, p. 427), who noted that development news should "compare the subject with original goals and with government claims," "discuss the impact of projects, plans, policies and problems or issues on people," "discuss the relevance of development projects, plans, policies, problems or issues to national, regional or local needs," "contain, when needed, content critical of development projects, plans, policies, problems or issues."

Media critics in Third World say that existing news values have been inherited, by and large, either from colonial times or from journalistic acculturation acquired through education in the West. While Western news values serve highly advanced countries well, they may not be adequate toward providing a comprehensive coverage of all relevant news issues in developing countries. Since the Third World is faced with the pressures of poverty, illiteracy and related modernization problems, the most compelling news issues in these countries are related to socioeconomic development. So it is not just the Third World governments (whose calls for development journalism frequently appear to be suspect from Western point of view), but sociologists, economists, media scholars and even many journalists in these countries are campaigning for a greater focus on development journalism.

An example of development journalism comes from the Hindustan Times, a major English-language newspaper published in New Delhi. In 1969, its editor assigned a team of reporters to write periodically about the people, the problems, and the development prospects of a small Indian village. Aggarwala (1981, p. 13) says that the editor thus introduced a new form of development journalism at the national level in India. This was done within the framework of quite strong freedom enjoyed by the Indian print media. In his study of development news in three newspapers in India, Shah (1990, pp. 45-46) found that sources for such news were primarily members of the government-military-industrial complex. He proposed that development news coverage should more frequently include the views of non-government development experts, social workers, extension workers, laborers, farmers, peasants and others.

Development Communication: Whereas "development journalism" is aimed at providing objective news and analysis of modernization plans, policies, projects and procedures, "development communication" is intended to mobilize people to participate in socioeconomic development projects through non-formal education. Also, whereas "development journalism" may be impossible to practice in countries without press freedom, "development communication" can be carried out in countries with or without press freedom in view of the primarily didactic or informational nature of such communication. As McAnany (1980, p. 10) says, development communication attempts to use traditional media and networks to introduce new information and behavioral change in agriculture, health, family and community development, among other things.

Since media operating under press freedoms give priority to their "watchdog" role, their preference is bound to be for "development journalism" over "development communication" if they were asked to make a choice. They may still choose to run "development communication" type of material, but most likely it would be relegated to "features," "lifestyles" or similar sections of the media, as one finds in the West. It is because of the didactic and informational, as opposed to inquiring and critical, nature of "development communication" that it has had a far greater appeal in countries without press freedom because such countries do not allow much of critical inquiry into government plans, policies and actions. Even in free press countries, such as India, government-controlled broadcasting shows a preference for "development communication" over "development journalism" (Rampal, 1984, p. 12). Interestingly, and to further support the point, the country's print media, which operate under press freedom guarantees, have clearly shown a preference for "development journalism" over "development communication" (Rampal, 1984, pp. 10-11).

It should be noted also that as a country changes from a democracy to one-party or military rule, as has been the case in Kenya, for example, since 1982, any "development journalism" function of the media will be shifted to "development communication" function. Kenyan print journalists, who had enjoyed considerable press freedom until 1982 when President Daniel T. Moi consolidated control over media, had spoken their preference for covering development news with an inquiring and critical spirit as opposed to purveying only the government viewpoint on development issues (Wilcox, 1982, pp. 574-575). As the Moi government rejected the democratic system, it not only tightened its control on print media (broadcasting was already under government control), it also began to publish community newspapers for development communication. In an interview on the BBC World Service in early 1990, a Kenyan government minister asserted that continued control of mass media was necessary to use them appropriately in the development process, in other words to ensure their "development communication" function.

Examples of "development communication" projects -- often referred to by the terms "developmental journalism" or "development support communication" -- abound in research studies on media applications in modernization projects. A typical example of a "development communication" project comes from a variety of civic improvement campaigns launched by Radio Tanzania since 1970 (Bordenave, 1977, pp. 60-66). Jamison and McAnany (1978, p. 33) indicate that as a result of a health campaign, a 47 percent gain on a knowledge test from pretest to posttest was reported among the health study groups in Tanzania. In terms of action, 750,000 latrines were constructed in the country and other public health measures such as boiling water or clearing away mosquito breeding areas were adopted. Another example of behavioral change as a result of development communication comes from a small town in the northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan. As a result of a radio campaign involving discussions by local doctors, administrators and community members, people were successfully encouraged to draw their drinking water from water pumps rather than from wells. The campaign noted that barefooted villagers descending the stone-steps on the inside walls of the wells to reach water had polluted the water, leading to infection caused by guineaworm (Shinde, 1990, p. 20).

The author of this paper proposes that "development communication" is a more accurate term to denote the use of media for mobilizing people to participate in socioeconomic development. There is at least a two-fold problem with the term "developmental journalism" to denote such activity. First, the word "journalism" is commonly understood to mean the process of gathering and disseminating news. The term "developmental journalism" implies that it is built around journalistic activity, when in fact, as noted earlier, it has been used to mean a deliberate use of mass media to accomplish socioeconomic development objectives. Secondly, Leonard Sussman, who coined the term "developmental journalism," has defined it as government control and use of mass media for socioeconomic development (Sussman, 1978, p. 77), although, to further complicate constructs, one author (Guneratne, 1990, p. 352) has found this term fully compatible with a "free and responsible press." Sussman's definition of this term, however, is more commonly used. The term "developmental journalism" is inappropriate in view of the fact that deliberate use of mass media for socioeconomic development, although primarily found in controlled-press countries, is not restricted to such countries. In Canada, for example, a development communication project using film and video tapes proved to be a catalyst in making the underdeveloped Fogo Islands economically viable (Bordenave, 1977, pp. 67-71).

The other term, "development support communication," appears to be more closer in suggesting the development applications of mass media rather than the term "developmental journalism." A closer examination of the former term indicates, however, that the word "support" in it may imply that media are outside observers and supporters of development projects, perhaps through editorials and analyses, as opposed to having an integral part in the development strategy. It is proposed, therefore, that the term "development communication" is more accurate to describe development applications of mass media, indeed any medium.

Distance Education: Another application of mass media to achieve modernization objectives is called "distance education," meaning providing formal education to people who cannot attend traditional schools or colleges. With a history of at least 50 years around the world (Croft, et al, 1990, p. 7), distance education has evolved from the early correspondence schools in Australia, Canada and the United States to large-scale higher education institutions in a number of developing and developed countries. Commonly known as open universities, such institutions offer complete curriculum through a variety of distance education means -- correspondence, radio, television, video tapes, computer networks, computer conferencing and teleconferencing, among others (ICDE Report, 1990; Croft, et al, 1990).

A variety of factors have contributed to the rise of the distance education movement around the world, especially in developing countries. They include shortage of teachers, lack of schools and related educational facilities, lack of educational facilities to train teachers, the increasing need of employed adults to attain further education to improve employment credentials, and housewives wanting to further their education, among others. Distance education, therefore, becomes a source for such individuals to obtain education from primary level to higher education level. Mass media become critical instruments of distance education because they help educators leapfrog these barriers and use their limited educational resources to provide education to a maximum number of people. Direct face-to-face contact between teachers and pupils, therefore, is practically nonexistent in fully developed distance education programs.

Projects in distance education have been under way in every continent of the globe. It is a particularly strong movement in developing countries, with a number of them having what are commonly known as "open universities." Such universities are in operation in China, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam and Venezuela. Many other developing countries have a variety of distance education programs (ICDE Report, 1990). Britain's Open University has served as a model since 1971, which has offered a complete university curriculum by a combination of television, radio, correspondence study and tutorial opportunities. Thousands of students have graduated with the university's bachelor of arts degree (Seligman, 1978, p. 23).

Neither "development journalism" nor "development communication" is an appropriate term to denote application of mass media to impart formal education, although these terms have occasionally encompassed media use for formal education (Bordenave, 1977, pp. 72-77; Agrawal, 1981, pp. 60-64; Rampal, 1984, pp. 11-19; Stevenson, 1988, pp. 59-63; Mowlana and Wilson, 1990, pp. 156-158). "Development journalism" in no way suggests a formal education function of mass media. "Development communication" may suggest that function, but only loosely so in view of the primary association of this term with media use in socioeconomic development.

"Distance education" is not only a more precise term to denote media use to impart formal education, it has also been a standard term in the academic discipline of education at least since the early 1970s (Moore, 1990, p. 10). Distance education is a highly interdisciplinary endeavor in that it has brought together educators in every academic discipline to discuss trends, strategies and developments in this field. Such information is exchanged at the biennial conferences of an organization called the International Council for Distance Education. ICDE, with its headquarters in Oslo, Norway, has a two-fold objective: 1) to promote knowledge of, and improvement in, distance education throughout the world; 2) to act as the co-ordinating body for international distance education (Sewart, 1990, p. 2). ICDE operates in conjunction with various U.N. and other international development organizations (Carr, 1990, p. 21).

As the author of this paper observed at ICDE's 15th World Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, in November 1990, it is a truly professional international organization which coordinates significant developments in distance education. About 1,800 delegates from around the world attended the conference to share ideas and research in the field of distance education. A survey of the book including papers presented at this conference indicated, however, that most were presented by people in the field of education (Croft, et al, 1990). It is ironical that mass communication scholars have not taken a stronger interest in the important emerging field of distance education, which is predicated considerably on the use of mass media to accomplish its objectives. Perhaps it is so because development research in mass communication is still centered around the old, questionable constructs of "developmental journalism" and "development support communication." The adoption of the term "distance education" is likely to give mass communication scholars a more focused involvement in research in this highly important field and also facilitate the exchange of such research with their counterparts in a host of other disciplines.

Conclusion

This paper has taken the position that the subject of media applications to facilitate national development has acquired an important and significant place in mass communication research in developed and developing countries. The theoretical predicates for such applications can be found in the new economic and information order movements of developing countries, a strong body of research in media role in development and in the experiences of projects sponsored by international organizations, such as UNESCO.

The primarily applied nature of research on media role in national development makes it particularly important to countries around the world, especially developing countries, which are constantly looking for ways to improve their development strategies. Interest in such research is evident from the large number of papers presented at the week-long ICDE conference by educators, education administrators, and development planners both in private and government sectors, among others, from around the world. Further testimony of the importance attached to research in media role in development comes from the support of such research by various U.N., governmental and private groups.

Yet, in mass communication research, the constructs around which such research is built are quite loose and frequently confusing. As this paper has shown, constructs have been used since the 1970s either without a consensus on their exact meanings or on the scope of activities within them. The meaning of "development journalism" has not been limited to an inquiring and objective examination of the relevance and experience of development projects. "Developmental journalism" has been found to carry meanings of governmental use of media for development by some scholars and use of free and private media for such purpose by others. This concept has been further muddled by bringing various, albeit distinct, development applications within its fold, not to mention it being interchangeable with "development support communication." The inclusion of the word "support" in the latter makes it also subject to misinterpretation.

In the interest of promoting consistency in the names and meanings of constructs used in the critical area of development research, this author has proposed three distinct constructs: "Development Journalism," "Development Communication" and "Distance

Education." It is hoped that the use of these constructs within the framework of their meanings and applications discussed in this paper would further consolidate the theory of development research. Research carried out within the framework of the proposed constructs hopefully would also be found more relevant by scholars, educators and practitioners interested in studying a discrete area from a variety of media applications in development.

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The Impact Of International Telecommunications On Developing Countries

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Abstract

The positive contributions of a good domestic telecommunications system to a developing country has been well-documented. This paper attempts to sketch out the impact of the other half of a country's telecommunications--the international dimension. In many telecommunications authority in the Third World, international telecommunications service is a cash cow.

Emphasis is given to Asia and in particular, Singapore and Hong Kong because they are the leading edge among developing countries.

Contextual factors are used to explain the unequal benefits countries and regions derive from international telecommunications.

The threats and opportunities arising from the changing policy toward international telecommunications are then analyzed. Among the biggest threats is the trend to liberalization, which includes reduced cross-subsidy of residential telephone service and privatization. It is argued that liberalization in international telecommunications may hinder a country's domestic telecommunications.

Finally, a broad range of policy recommendations are made for developing countries.

Introduction

International telecommunications is knitting the world closer into the long talked about "global village." Today, it is indispensable for data-service businesses such as the banking, credit-card, insurance and air transport industries. However, how does this affect Third World countries?

This paper looks into some of the impacts of international telecommunications services on Third World countries, with emphasis on Asia and Singapore in particular. Primarily, the subject encompasses voice, data and video transmissions but excludes broadcasting. The distinction is not easy to make. There is little physical difference between video transmissions for business, such as full-motion video-conferencing, and a motion picture broadcast over satellite. With signals being digitized, it is impossible to distinguish signals electronically. The division, however, is necessary because of different policy implications.

Literature Review

The best statement of the expected benefits of international telecommunications is summed up in "The Missing Link" report of Sir Donald Maitland:

> An expanded world telecommunications network would benefit both developing and industrialised countries. The process of improving and expanding networks in developing countries will create a major market for telecommunications equipment. A more comprehensive world system will increase international

> traffic to the advantage of the operators. Where information flows so does commerce. More world trade and other contacts will increase understanding. An expanded telecommunications network will make the world a better and safer place.[1]

The report urged an accelerated development of telecommunications as a prerequisite for social and economic development.

To understand how trade can benefit the development of a nation, one has to go back to David Ricardo. Building on the foundation laid by Adam Smith, Ricardo showed that the "wealth of the nations" would be increased if every country produced goods where it had a comparative advantage. Even if a country had no absolute comparative advantage, it would still be better for the world economy if it produced goods where it was less comparatively disadvantaged.

There have been questions whether the theory of comparative advantage applies to services in the same manner as it applies to goods. Feketekuty suggest that "the normative conclusions that can be drawn from international trade theory are as valid for shoes and oranges as for insurance and engineering."[2] However, he also points out that there is as yet no research to confirm that the conditions specified in the theory are met in the real world.[3]

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1 Donald Maitland, The Missing Link, Report of the Independent Commission for World Wide Telecommunications Development, (ITU: Geneva, 1984). Note 4.

2 Geza Feketekuty, International Trade In Services: An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988). 124.

3 Ibid.

Admittedly, the kind of development envisaged is economic. However, the evidence is strong that a more open outlook to trade will improve the economic well-being of a nation.[4]

In a similar vein, Hudson and York suggest that investment in international telecommunications could pay back in foreign exchange earnings since those making international telecommunications would be very likely engaged in some business activity.[5] By their own admission, however, their findings based on a study of the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) inter-bank funds transfer system was tentative.

Another advantage, usually cited in passing, is the cross-subsidy of residential telephone. Conventional wisdom in the telecommunications community is that long-distance telephone calls have subsidized local telephone calls. Hence long-distance rates fell after the breakup of AT&T. With satellite technology, costs are no longer distance-sensitive. Rates, however, have not changed to reflect this. The price charged for an international call is still much higher than that for a domestic long-distance call even for the same distance. Profit margins of an international telephone call is said to be in the order of 80 to 90 percent. This cross-subsidy is particular attractive for the Third World.

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4 For a succinct treatment on this subject, see The Economist, September 23 1989, survey "The Third World: Trial and Error."

5 Heather E. Hudson and Lynn C. York, "The Potential of Telecommunications Investments," Telecommunications Policy (September 1988), 277.

According to an international telecommunications executive, to meet all the costs of service to an urban subscriber, average annual revenue would have to be about a third of the capital cost per subscriber, which in 1979 added up to US$3,000.[5] Cross-subsidy, however, is being whittled away as deregulation is sweeping the telecommunications world. A fuller analysis of this issue is discussed below.

The Impact On Selected Third World Regions And Countries

International telecommunications services has an extremely skewed market. It is generally expected that about five percent of users account for 80 to 90 percent of the business. Therefore international services are not used by most telephone subscribers.

This skewness is reflected among countries. In 1984, international telecommunications service was $30 billion. The United States is a major player, accounting for $4.5 billion or some 15%.[6]

Just seven countries account for 85 per cent of traffic between US and Pacific rim. Of that, 50 per cent is accounted for by Japan, Australia and the Philippines. The rest is accounted for by Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.[7]

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[5] Sir Eric Sharp, "Telecommunications and Economic Development," Telephony (May 6 1985) 198. He is chairman and chief executive officer of Cable and Wireless plc, London.

[6] Peter Cowhey, "International Trade and Telecommunications," in Telecommunications: A Strategic Perspective on Regional Economic and Business Development, ed. Maurice F. Estabrooks and Rodolphe H. Lamarche, (Canada: Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, 1987), 168.

by Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.[8]

Japan is the largest financial center in Asia. Australia is the connecting point for some traffic between Asia and the United States. The newly industrializing countries trade with the United States. The large amount of Philippine traffic may be because of military activities in the air and naval bases.

This means that if there is any direct benefit from international telecommunications, it is limited to a few countries

Benefits to Regions

It is possible for countries close to those that are heavy users of international telecommunications to derive indirect benefits. Most visible is the sale of telecommunications equipment, made obsolete by the necessity to upgrade to newer equipment, at a low price to neighboring countries. For example, Hong Kong sells its used equipment to Guangdong (Canton) while Singapore sells hers to Indonesia. Such sales, however, are occasional.

A longer-term benefit is derived when the country using international telecommunications develops into a resource for the neighbors. This is admittedly a special case and is evidenced by Singapore and Hong Kong.

For geographical and historical reasons, Singapore has developed into a major financial center in Asia. Financial centers serve several purposes. They perform a medium-of-exchange function and an interspatial store-of-value function. Specialized functions of international payments and foreign lending or borrowing are best performed at one central place.[9]

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[8] Dennis Elliott, "Teleports and Other Pacific Asian Economy," in Teleports and Regional Economic Development, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988) 169.

This means that for most financial transactions in South East Asia, Singapore is a convenient center. Some bankers have expressed the view that those who want to deal with countries in the region have to come to Singapore.[10] The importance of financial centers is unlikely to diminish even though postal and telecommunication services enables transactions to be conducted without meeting.

Hong Kong acts as a similar transactions center for China and, particularly, Guangdong. In fact, Hong Kong has often been called a gateway to China. International business firms have established offices in Hong Kong so as to be able to transact in China while maintaining communication links with other parts of the world.

Daniels has offered an information diffusion explanation for the importance of the central place. He suggests that "the location of economic activity is determined by the availability of information, the way it is obtained, interpreted and used by entrepreneurs, corporate decision-makers and central government

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9 Charles Kindleberger, Economic Response: Comparative Studies In Trade, Finance and Growth, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 71.

10 Interview with Singapore merchant bankers in April 1987.

agencies."[11] Information diffusion takes place most rapidly, he says, in systems that are well-connected among themselves and to the "wider world."[12]

The hypothesis works very well for Hong Kong and Singapore.

Disparate Benefits Among Sectors And Classes

International telecommunications has had the greatest impact on the financial sector. Financial institutions want transactions to be conducted accurately, speedily and safely. Hence the rise of SWIFT and intrabank global networks. It has been estimated that in 1986, $87 trillion was moved electronically.[13]

It is also interesting to note that the major international telecommunications players in Asia are Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore--all with major financial centers.

In his half-century-old book discussing the competition among London, Paris and New York in the financial market, Einzig listed seven factors that he considered the most important in determining the rise of a financial center. Among them was good cable and mail connections with other foreign centers.[14]

Another group of beneficiaries of better international telecommunications are multinational corporations. The ability to

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11 P.W. Daniels, Service Industries: A Geographic Appraisal, (New York: Methuen, 1985), 122.

12 Ibid.

13 Edmund G. Brown Jr, "Teleports and Their Impact on a Changing World," in Teleports and Regional Economic Development, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988), 23.

14 P. Einzig, The Fight For Financial Supremacy, (New York:

transmit and receive information around the world has been important for MNCs. Sauvant captures the benefits in a nutshell:

> "It [international telecommunications] is a tool that MNCs are coming to rely on to bring greater cohesion to the management of their geographically far-flung and functionally disparate operations. It is a tool they are counting on in ever greater numbers to gain a competitive edge, or merely to maintain their ability to compete. For many,. . . it is opening up new business opportunities."[15]

A good illustration both of the drive by financial institutions and MNCs to use international telecommunications is the case of San Francisco-based Bank of America. According to one of its executives, "The [Bank of America] has been examining since 1983 how it could take advantage of . . . global wholesale financial marketplace. We came to realize that, although we are a US-based corporation, many of our customers are US-based multinational corporations and most of these customers do business with other foreign corporations on a multi-corporation basis. Therefore, a full wholesale banking products and services should be offered on a global network basis to customers."[16] The Bank of

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Macmillan, 1931), 67.

15 Karl P. Sauvant, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). 57, citing Transborder Data Flow: Issues, Barriers and Corporate Responses (New York: Business International, 1983), 8.

16 John P. Marci, "Teleports and International Banking," Teleports and Regional Economic Development, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988), 127.

America has wholesale banking centers in England, Hong Kong and San Francisco.

An implicit question in the benefit to MNCs is whether foreign corporations are favored over domestic ones. Domestic businesses that do not have direct international links of course do not benefit directly. However, the benefit accruing to foreign corporations flows over to domestic ones too. For instance, MNCs always need local support services. To the extent that international telecommunications increases the demand for goods and services that local businesses can supply, there is benefit to the local economy.

One area of concern is whether international telecommunications, in fact just telecommunications in general, increases the importance of the information sector at the expense of the manufacturing sector. If so, countries with a large manufacturing sector will be left behind in development.

The debate, however, really boils down to the extent of services in manufacturing.[17] Indeed there is some evidence that a poor infrastructure can impede manufacturing. Recently, Seagate, a major American hard-disk drive manufacturer attempted to relocate some of its operations from Singapore, where it was the largest private employer, to Thailand. Poor communications and transportation, however, made shipments unreliable. Seagate therefore slowed down and pulled back from some of its original plans. The same reasons were cited by Matsushita for a slowdown in investment in Thailand.

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[17] This is one of the themes of Geza Feketekuty's International Trade in Services, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988).

Manufacturing therefore can benefit from international telecommunications especially if it is export-oriented.

Contextual Differences

For all the benefits of international telecommunications, Third World countries need not hop on the international telecommunications bandwagon immediately. Telecommunications as a whole makes up only a small part of the even the developed countries' economy. It is estimated, for instance, that telecommunications makes up 3 to 5 % of the developed world's economy--$115 billion or 5% in the United State, $65 billion or 3% in Europe and $25 billion or 3% in Japan.[18]

The small percentage suggests that telecommunications plays a relatively minor role in the overall scheme of things. Its most important function is as a supporting service in the infrastructure. In the case of financial centers, international telecommunications allows investors to move funds quickly. However, there must be investors and funds first. Such centers have arisen for a variety of historical and locational factors some of which are unique to each center. These factors, more than international telecommunications, explain better the rise of Hong must have adequate infrastructure before they can tap into international data transactions. This entails many things This means there must be good domestic telecommunications service, at least in the urban areas. The NICs, Japan and Australia have much better developed domestic telecommunications services compared with the rest of Asia. But it also means that the business community must be speak the lingua franca of the international trading community, which is, essentially, English.

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[18] Edward Blakeley, "Teleports and Telecommunications in National and Regional Development", Teleports and Regional Economic Development, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988), 216.

The NICs are a group of more developed Third World countries. This raises the issue of whether there is a threshold level of economic development necessary for the benefits of international telecommunications to be realized. There is, as yet, no research on this point.

Finally, one factor common to all the countries using international telecommunications heavily is their openness to transborder information flows. In the case of South Korea and Taiwan, the drive to export has made them opened up the borders to such international information flows.

Threats and Opportunities in International Telecommunications

The benefits of international telecommunications, however, does have its prices. A table below summarizes the threats and opportunities for Third World countries.

One of the threats is the multinational corporation itself. Sussman suggests that transnational corporation participation in telecommunications in the Philippines has done it more harm than good.[19] However, he points out that net result of an MNC's intervention depends more on government control. He suggests that bribery, extant already in the mid-70s, may be the real factor behind the harm.

Another threat are the plethora of issues arising from transborder data flows. Among the issues are those of privacy, cultural preservation, sovereignty, and national security. In sum, Third World countries fear that TBDF can undermine personal privacy, hurt native culture, and erode national sovereignty and security. To avoid these adverse results, Brazil requires a copy of all databases be kept there. TBDF issues in international telecommunications service have not commanded as much attention as that arising from television programs and motion pictures. Part of the reason is that much of the information transmitted and received relate to intrafirm business data. Further, with digitization of information, it is difficult to distinguish between different kinds of sensitive data. There are no answers to some of the issues raised. The erosion of national sovereignty, may be a price to be paid to be linked into the world economy.

For example, countries which want to encourage MNCs to establish offices should be prepared to liberalize their telecommunications system. MNCs want their telecommunications

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[19] Gerald Sussman, "Telecommunications Technology: Transnationalizing the New Philippine Information Order," Media, Culture and Society (1982): 377.

telecommunications authorities that are more amenable to their wishes. One example is the location of one of Bank of America's wholesale centers to Hong Kong: the telecommunications authority there was more amenable to the demands of Bank of America than Singapore's.

Another threat to a Third World nation is that of the contagion of deregulation. Led by the United States, Britain and Japan, telecommunications system the world over are being deregulated and liberalized. In many cases, deregulation and competition has been introduced into the long-distance and international telecommunications market. The benefit of deregulation as evidenced in those three countries has gone to big corporate users. For Third World countries, this threatens to wipe out the cross-subsidy of residential telecommunications.

Some other threats and opportunities are summed up in the table overleaf:[18]

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[18] Adapted from Andrew Gillespie and Mark Hepworth in "Telecommunications and Regional Development in The Network Economy," in Telecommunications: A Strategic Perspective on Regional Economic and Business Development, ed. Maurice F. Estabrooks and Rodolphe H. Lamarche, (Canada: Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, 1987): 124.

Threat	Opportunities
Ending up only importing or consuming information services	Developing the capability to produce and export information services. This creates jobs and boosts economic growth.
Foreign competition with global reach undermining previously protected local financial and business services	Extends global reach of local industry.
Centralization of decision-making in other countries	Decentralized decision-making
Technology reducing job opportunities	New job opportunities previously fixed at locations.
Being by-passed	Creation of new access points to international network market-place. Increased accessibility, greater attractiveness for investors.
Widening gap between haves and have-nots.	Decentralized access to informa tion, jobs, etc. Positive distributional impacts.
Development of tele-colonies	Springboard into other data services.
Erosion of national sovereignty	

In many countries, MNCs are already cutting telecommunications costs through using bypass or leaselines. In ome survey, almost half of the firms with telecommunications budget of more than $1 million were using bypass to save costs, to stabilize prices, to enter new markets such as electronic banking, or to use the communications network as a strategic weapon.[21]

Snow has found in his study of the telecommunications sector in the Pacific Rim that "as development proceeds, there is a parallel evolution from government-owned, monopolistic firms outside the influence of economic competition to privately owned firms subjected to competition."[22] Snow adopts the suggestion by Ito that regulation gives way to deregulation "as technological advance transforms scarcity into abundance."[23] Snow therefore views the argument for monopoly more cogent in the case of Third World countries. The disadvantage that he does not point out, however, is that it makes Third World countries less attractive from the telecommunications viewpoint.

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[21] Jay Misra and Byron Belitsos, Business Telecommunications, (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1987), 219.

This suggests that international telecommunications is unlikely to close the gap between the haves and have-nots. Moss comes to the same conclusion from another approach. He argues that firms cannot merely rely on telecommunications to decentralize operations. They require a corporate headquarters to coordinate the activities. Such headquarters require "advanced producer services" predominantly situated in the business districts of large cities. In the end, there will be "a small number of principal world cities provide the sophisticated financial and information services that allow a firm to operate globally."[24]

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[22] Marcellus Snow, "Regulation to Deregulation: the Telecommunications Sector and Industrialization," Telecommunications Policy (December 1985): 281.

[23] Ibid at 290, citing Youichi Ito, "Telecommunications and Industrial Policy in Japan: Recent Developments," in Telecommunications Regulation and Deregulation in Industrialized Democracies, ed. Marcellus Snow, (New York: Longman, 1985).

[24] Mitchell Moss, "Urban Development in a Global Economy," in Telecommunications: A Strategic Perspective on Regional Economic and Business Development, ed. Maurice F. Estabrooks and Rodolphe

Another threat is that of dependency on foreign powers. This is perhaps clearest in the island states of Singapore and Hong Kong. Without natural resources, both countries have managed to turn in high economic growth for the better part of the last two decades. It is true that both countries are greatly dependent on other nations for their growth and survival. Singapore, for instance, has the dubious distinction of having the largest number of MNCs--more than 600 at last count in 1987--in a city. One of the reasons is political--with more MNCs, it becomes more difficult for a hostile nation to take over.

Opportunities

There are of course, silver linings in the cloud. Perhaps the biggest contribution of international telecommunications to any Third World country is to extend the global reach of local industry. Up-to-date information on the style and quality of goods can make them more marketable.

International telecommunications also give Third World countries the capability to produce and export information services. One area is data-entry. Although this is menial labor and it does not look as if it will continue in the long term because of more sophisticated software that can capture data, in the short-term, it does create jobs.

Another more promising area is software programming. Third World countries have pockets of highly-trained engineers who are

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H. Lamarche, (Canada: Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, 1987), 129-130.

as good as those anywhere in the world. As costs in the Third World are lower, they can write software cheaper. The software codes can then be transmitted to the parent companies anywhere in the world. However, these engineers have generally been found in a few countries with high English literacy. Examples are India, Philippines, and Singapore.

Constraints

Even if Third World countries are ready and willing to invest in international telecommunications services, there are constraints. First, telecommunications in the Third World are often inefficient because they are run by government monopolies. These monopolies lack service performance objectives and monitoring and are not responsive to public demands. Private and foreign investments directly or indirectly in international telecommunications are therefore discouraged if not barred. For example, in India, Chase Manhattan had trouble getting international lines. So it decided to install its own dedicated line. In part because the Indian authority was not familiar with the equipment, it took two years for the installation to be approved.[25]

Another constraint is inadequate policy planning. Because of a backlog in demand, there tends to be little long-range planning.

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[25] Mary Petrosky, "Global Net Users Face Odd Perils" Network World (March 1987): 1.

For example, forecasting use is needed so that equipment does not become overburdened or underutilized.

A third constraint is the lack of foreign exchange to purchase the hardware from foreign manufacturers. The lack of hard currency means that Third World countries will have to give international telecommunications a low priority.

Policy Recommendations For Third World Countries

From the foregoing analysis, Third World countries must first decide if they want to tap into the international data transactions. The evidence is strong that links with the international economy increases economic growth and hence the development of the country. This decision is not just economic but also political. International telecommunications requires Third World countries to be open to transborder data flows. There are varying degrees of openness to this question.

If the country decides to enter the international economy, it has to develop its internal infrastructure. This means that Third World countries wishing to export agricultural products, raw materials or manufactured goods, must build a good transport and internal communications network.

Third World states with a fairly good infrastructure have to be prepared to liberalize their domestic telecommunications system. There are various degrees of liberalization, starting with equipment and going on to services. Those countries in a relatively more advanced stage of economic development, have to be relatively more advanced stage of economic development, have to be prepared to liberalize their telecommunications system even more, especially in international telecommunications. Countries that have liberalized their international telecommunications, started the liberalization process domestically first.

Conclusion

With the ever-increasing importance of the information economy has emerged the parallel importance of telecommunications. This emergence is taking place globally, hence the growth of international telecommunications.

Third World countries, however, should not hope to leapfrog into development by the mere use of international telecommunications. The infrastructure must be set right first. When that is accomplished, there is likelihood that a well-planned and well-executed telecommunications plan can raise the economic well-being of Third World countries. The evidence of countries such as the NICs is suggestive that there is hope yet.

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A COMPARISON OF TELEVISED INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN NEWS ACCORDING TO THE POLITICAL PROMINENCE OF FOUR WESTERN COUNTRIES

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A COMPARISON OF TELEVISED INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN NEWS ACCORDING TO THE POLITICAL PROMINENCE OF FOUR WESTERN COUNTRIES

For four decades, television has exposed viewers to a panorama of domestic and international events, ranging from trivial human interest stories to regional conflicts with worldwide repercussions. Since the mid-1970s, individuals have increasingly used television as their primary news source. In the 1986 Roper survey, 66% of Americans cited television as the main medium for news coverage (Roper Organization, 1987). Likewise, an overwhelming majority of Australian and UK respondents referred to television as their principal source of news (Blood, 1989; Svennevig, 1989).

Because television represents such an influential source of information, researchers have analyzed the content of television newscasts to assess news patterns and determine gatekeepers' biases. Since the 1970s, a sizable amount of research has focused on the international flow of news in the context of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) (see Mowlana, 1985). This body of literature has revealed significant imbalances in news flow between developing and developed countries.

On the other hand, substantially less research has been done to compare television coverage of nondomestic news among developed countries, notably, Western Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia.[1] For instance, Hur (1984) notes a shortage of studies on international news flow between European countries and the United States.

In the last three decades, communication scholars have tried to identify the factors that influence the process of news selection as well as the one-way news flow from developed to developing countries (e.g., Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987; Hester, 1973; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Ostgaard, 1965). In doing so, they have tested a series of propositions, such as geographical proximity and cultural affinity. This paper revisits the possible impact of the hierarchy of nations hypothesis on television coverage of international and foreign news in four Western countries. The concept of political prominence has a direct influence on viewers because TV stations in countries with great power may not offer the same diversity of nondomestic news to their audiences as TV stations in countries with small power. Depending on the country's political status, viewers may receive more or less international and foreign news.

This present study examines whether evening TV newscasts of four Western countries, viewed politically as great, middle, or small powers, differ in their amount, topics, and origin of international and foreign news. In this paper, international news refers to any news story that reports an event involving the home country and one or several foreign countries while foreign news designates any news story that reports an event in which the home country has no involvement. Selected nations consist of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Mathisen (1971) quantified states in three categories: (1) great powers which include superpowers (U.S.A. and Soviet Union) and potential great powers (China); (2) middle powers, such as France and the United Kingdom; and (3) small powers, such as Scandinavian and Central American countries. While various indexes of national power have been developed to calculate power rankings using demographic, industrial, and military indicators (see Merritt & Zinnes, 1989), Mathisen's categorization has still face validity.[2] The 1989 Gulf Crisis illustrated well the relative political standing of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium in world affairs. We will therefore use this classification in this study.

It is well documented that the political prominence or notoriety of a nation (i.e., eliteness) affects the coverage of international and foreign news (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harris, 1974; Hester, 1973; Hicks & Gordon, 1974; Kariel & Rosenvall, 1984; Ostgaard, 1965; Peterson, 1979). In normal situations, great powers attract more attention than small powers and, therefore, receive considerably more news coverage.

However, the present research is concerned with the political prominence of the countries in which TV networks operate rather than with the coverage or identification of politically prominent nations in the news. Several studies found that minor nations devote more coverage to other countries than major nations (Guttinger, 1939; Kline, 1981; Saarloos, Schut, & Willemsen, 1971). For instance, Saarloos et al. (1971) found that newscasts aired on the Dutch NOS contained more foreign news than those aired on the British BBC, the German ARD, and the Austrian ORF. The authors suggest that the smaller the TV station operations, the higher the percentage of foreign news.

This hierarchy of nations concept may be influenced by other social and cultural values, such as geographic distance (e.g., Chang et al., 1987; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Hester, 1973) and cultural affinity (e.g., Ostgaard, 1965; Peterson, 1979).

Because the United States tops the hierarchy of nations as a political elite, followed by the United Kingdom and France as middle powers and Belgium as a low-ranked world power, significant variations in the coverage of international and foreign news among the four Western countries are expected. This study provides a test of three hypotheses, which are developed in the review of the literature below.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

Definitional issues

Providing a synthesis of the literature is difficult because there is a great diversity of definitions of televised international and foreign news. Since the definition of international and foreign news varies from study to study, the following literature review presents heterogeneous, ad hoc results concerning the amount and content of those news. First, several researchers refer to foreign news as a news story reported outside the home country (Hester, 1978; Weaver, Porter, & Evans, 1984). Chen (1989) distinguishes international-foreign news abroad from international-home news abroad, but aggregated both definitions in the data analysis. She defines international news as any news from, about or originating in locations outside the home country (Chen, 1989). Hester's definition somewhat underestimates the number of nondomestic news because it does not take into account the international involvement among nations.

Others conceptualize international news as news stories that mention a country other than the home country regardless of the thematic context (Kitatani, 1981; Larson, 1979, 1982, 1984; Larson & Hardy, 1977). While Larson's definition is easy to operationalize, it somewhat inflates the proportion of international news. According to Larson, if a news story mentions a foreign country in passing, it would be an international news story.

A third group of scholars classify nondomestic news in three categories: foreign news abroad, home news abroad, and foreign news at home (Golding & Elliott, 1979; Haisman, 1970; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984; UNESCO, 1985). Unfortunately, the UNESCO researchers aggregated all categories in later analyses. To respond to NWICO's demands, they decided to consider all nondomestic news items as international news.

Finally, some researchers divide nondomestic news into international and foreign news and keep these categories distinct throughout the study (Almaney, 1970; Kawatake, 1982). According to Almaney (1970), international news designates a news story that actively involves the home country and a foreign country; foreign news refers to a news story which does not display such involvement. With the scheme, clear-cut distinctions between domestic and foreign news are eliminated because we have now three categories. Yet, this dual system reflects more accurately the reality of news seeing that a significant number of events take place between nations. Kawatake's study (1982) exemplifies the benefits of the dichotomous method. The author found that CBS broadcast a considerable amount of overseas stories which involved the United States (44%), but aired few overseas stories unrelated to the United States (9%). Of the nine stations sampled, CBS aired the lowest percentage of "true" foreign news. In this study, we will define international and foreign news according to Almaney's categories for the reasons articulated above.

Amount of international and foreign news

In general, U.S. networks broadcast less international and foreign news than their European and Canadian counterparts. An early study revealed that the Canadian CBC and the British BBC devoted significantly more time to foreign news than U.S. networks (Smith, 1968). Similarly, Scheer and Eiler (1972) found that the Canadian CBC expended 26% of its newscast to non-war international news, while CBS averaged only 9%. U.S. networks spent less time on international news than the

British stations, but more than the Japanese stations (Kitatani, 1981; see also Chen, 1989). Kline (1981) found that NBC allocated the same amount of coverage to foreign news as the British stations (24%), but less than the Canadian stations (44%). In the UNESCO study, international news represented 17% of all news on the German ARD, 19% on CBS, 36% on the Finnish YLE, and 53% on the Dutch NOS (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984). Swedish Channel 2 spent more time on foreign news than CBS and BBC (Wallis & Baran, 1990). Golding and Elliott (1979) found that the Irish RTE and the Swedish SR devoted 70% and 51% to foreign news, respectively. In May 1981, KPTV, a local American commercial station in Portland, Oregon, offered more overseas news than TVW-7, a local Australian station in Perth (Robertson, 1986).

Despite definite differences in methodology, we observe two recurrent patterns. First, U.S. networks tend to spend less time on international and foreign news than European and Canadian stations, but more than Japanese stations. Second, these results suggest that TV stations in small nations tend to air a higher percentage of nondomestic news than do TV stations in major nations.

Given the international status of the selected countries, we anticipate that the U.S. network will devote more time to international news and less time to foreign news than the European stations. Powerful states are more likely to interact in world politics (Jenkins, 1970). Being at the low end of the power spectrum, the Belgian station will be more likely to air more foreign news and less international news. French and British TV stations are expected to air fewer international news than the U.S. network and fewer foreign news than the Belgian station.

Hypothesis 1: While the U.S. network will air significantly more international news but less foreign news than the European stations, the Belgian station will air more foreign news than the French and British stations.

Topics of international and foreign news

Typically, TV stations in Western nations diverge in their emphasis given to the major topics, if not on the type of topics, covered in international and foreign news. For instance, Kitatani (1981) found that American, British and Japanese networks differed somewhat in their treatment of foreign news subject matters. While U.S. networks placed more emphasis on politics, crime, armed conflict, and economics, the British stations focused their foreign news coverage more on politics, crime, economics, and human interest. Wallis and Baran (1990) found that CBS reported more disaster-related foreign stories than the British BBC and the Swedish SR; on the other hand, BBC aired more crime stories than CBS and SR. The UNESCO team (1985) reported that the United States and Western European countries covered similar topics, but varied in their emphasis attributed to each topic.

The literature suggests that TV stations in developed countries place different emphases on the topics of international and foreign news. Typically, small nations, such as Belgium, are more involved in export activities than major countries, which can rely on a large domestic market. In addition, if the Belgian station airs more foreign news items, one would expect that it would cover a wider range of topics as well. Based on past research, we also hypothesize that ABC will broadcast more international news regarding diplomacy and military activities than the three European stations.

Hypothesis 2: While the U.S. network will air more diplomatic and military international news stories than the European stations, the Belgian station will provide a wider topical coverage of foreign news than the other three networks.

Origin of international and foreign news

While TV stations in industrialized countries air international and foreign news from or about similar locations, they seem to give more weight to countries with which they maintain close political, cultural, or economic ties (e.g., Golding & Elliott, 1979; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984). For instance, the Canadian CBC devotes a significant portion of their international news to U.S. events, while it is not true vice versa (Scheer & Eiler, 1972). The UNESCO researchers found that while CBS focused predominantly on North America, Western Europe, and Middle East, European TV stations devoted more attention to Western Europe (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984). According to Wallis and Baran

(1990), three-fourths of BBC and the Swedish SR's foreign news originate from the United States and Western Europe. However, Golding and Elliott (1979) found that the Irish RTE and the Swedish SR differed in their geographic coverage of foreign news. RTE broadcast most of its foreign news about Western Europe (75%), followed by Asia (8%) and the United States (3%), while SR focused less on Western Europe (40%), but more on Asia (20%), and Eastern Europe (8%).

In view of the past research on geographical proximity (e.g., Chang et al., 1987), it is expected that ABC will air more news stories related to North America and Latin America than the European stations. European stations are more likely to concentrate on European-related news. However, if the Belgian RTBF airs more foreign news content, one would assume that this station would also cover more geographic areas. In addition, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom might also differ in their geographic coverage of international and foreign news based on social and economic ties with former colonies.

Hypothesis 3: While the U.S. network will air more international news and foreign news about North America and Latin America but less about Western Europe than the European stations, the Belgian station will cover more geographic areas than the other three networks.

METHODOLOGY

Sampling

Data for this study were collected from two samples of five weekdays.[3] In both cases, the sample frame comprised all early evening newscasts on four Western countries' television networks for three weeks (period 1: February 12 to March 4, 1990; period 2: July 23 to August 12, 1990). For each three-week period, five weekdays were randomly selected to form a composite week. Weekends were excluded from the sample because newscasts on Saturday and Sunday tend to carry more "soft" stories than those on weekdays (Lichty & Bailey, 1978).

Four networks[4] were included in the study: Belgium's RTBF, France's TF1, the United

Kingdom's BBC, and the United States' ABC. In general, the three major U.S. networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, do not differ significantly in quantity and content of news coverage (see Almaney, 1970; Hester; 1978; Larson & Hardy; 1978; Lemert, 1974; Riffe, Ellis, Rogers, Van Ommeren, & Woodman, 1986; Stempel, 1988) although each network may emphasize certain types or topics of news (e.g., Haisman, 1970; Larson, 1982).

These four broadcasting entities were selected because their early evening newscast secured the highest ratings in December 1989. World News Tonight airs on American Broadcasting Company (ABC) at 6:30 pm EST every night. Unlike the newscasts of the three European stations, ABC's World News Tonight include commercials. Because ABC's newscast contains only about 22 minutes of commercial-free content in the half-hour segment, the three European stations have significantly longer newsholes than ABC.

In the United Kingdom, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the noncommercial public service broadcasting system, airs its televised newscast, News at Six, at 6:00 pm every night. This newscast contains a 30-second top story recap in the middle of the program. Because of a machine malfunction, a sixth BBC newscast was selected from the first sample frame for replacement. Télévision Française 1 (TF1), the former French public TV station, became a private station in 1987. It broadcasts the TF1 20 Heures at 8:00 pm every day. Finally, the Radio-Télévision Belge de la Communauté Française (RTBF), the French-speaking public service station, airs daily its evening national news program, Journal Télévisé, at 7:30 pm.

Coding

Coders actively participated in the pretesting and the refinement of the coding form. After this training period, they viewed and coded the 40 newscasts using the following definitions of the coding scheme. The unit of analysis was the individual news story. For each news story, coders recorded (1) the story length; (2) the type of news; (2) the topic of international and foreign news; and (4) the origin of international and foreign news by country. These variables were operationally defined as follows:

1. A news story is defined as a single story which follows one of the typical five formats: (1) the anchor plus video; (2) the anchor plus video plus the anchor; (3) the anchor only; (4) the anchor plus video plus commentary; and (5) two-way conversation between the anchor the correspondent and/or the guest. News stories are differentiated by themes, events, actors, or interruptions.

2. Newshole is defined as the total time in seconds devoted to news during the newscast, excluding commercials, billboards, recaps, opening and closing statements.

3. Type of news: Domestic news refers to any news story that reports an event involving exclusively the home country. In this study, international news differs from foreign news. International news refers to any news story that reports an event involving the home country and one or several foreign countries. Operationally, a story has an international scope whenever another country is actively involved in a news story by expressing a response, reacting to an event, or showing an action that relates to the home country. International news includes home news abroad (e.g., Bush's visit in Rome) and foreign news at home (e.g., Pope's visit in New York). A story on Irangate will be domestic if Iran is only mentioned in passing because it does not imply a relationship between the two countries. Foreign news designates any news story that reports an event in which the home country has no involvement.

4. Topics of international and foreign news: The 18 categories of news topics derive from the UNESCO study on foreign news (UNESCO, 1985). The same categories have been used in subsequent studies. The topic to be coded is the main focus or theme of the story.

5. Origin of international and foreign news: Using the most recent UN statistical yearbook (United Nations, 1988), 216 countries and territories were categorized under eight geographical areas. Two countries, Taiwan and Cambodia, and a category for international organizations were added to the coding form. The origin of international news is defined as

the primary location of the news. Only one country or organization was coded per news story.

Using Holsti's method, intercoder reliability was obtained by dividing the number of agreed coding decisions by the total number of coding decisions for each variable. Intercoder reliability was computed for the following variables: story length, .91; type of news, .93; topic of international news, .91; topic of foreign news, .89; origin of international news, .94; and origin of foreign news, .91.

RESULTS

Of the four networks, TF1 reported the greatest number of stories (Table 1). The average story length was strikingly similar for all networks but BCC: ABC (M=88 seconds), BBC (M=108 seconds), TF1 (M=89 seconds), and RTBF (M=90 seconds). On average, TF1 had the highest newshole (M=30.19 min), followed by BBC (M=27.01 min), RTBF (M=26.22 min), and ABC (M=20.45 min). A one-way ANOVA confirms that networks differ based on story length ($F(3, 665)=3.02$, $p<.05$).[5] The Newman-Keuls procedure indicates that BBC's story length was significantly longer than TF1 and RTBF's. Furthermore, the same post-hoc test shows that foreign news were significantly shorter than domestic and international news ($F(2, 666)=13.35$, $p<.001$).

Insert Table 1 about here

Amount of international and foreign news

If we base the analysis on the number of stories, we observe some significant differences across networks (chi-square(6, N=669)=25.43, $p<.001$). ABC and BBC reported more domestic news than TF1 and RTBF (Table 1). The Belgian station had the lowest number of domestic stories (36%). Although all networks aired a similar amount of international news, European stations reported slightly more international news than ABC. Both the Belgian RTBF and the French TF1 had proportionately a greater number of foreign news than ABC and BBC.

While the number of stories is sometimes used in comparative content analyses for calculating percentages of news type, this sort of analysis may only reveal part of the picture. If we sum the total amount of time devoted to each type of news, the data show that duration of stories (i.e., proportion of time in seconds) somewhat differs from the number of stories.[6] It is especially evident in the case of RTBF, which airs long domestic stories and short foreign stories (Table 1). On RTBF, the number of foreign news is extremely high (45%), although the actual time expended to this type of news is considerably lower (27%). Interestingly, RTBF devoted 30% more time to international news than ABC. For the other networks, number of stories and duration appear to be comparable. A two-way ANOVA reveals a significant interaction between type of news and networks based on story length ($\underline{F}(6, 657)=3.42$, $\underline{p}<.01$). Based on average story length, the four networks allocate a different amount of time to domestic, international, and foreign news (Table 1).

Due to some unexpected results (e.g., ABC's low level of international news), hypothesis 1 is only partially supported. The Belgian RTBF aired more foreign news items than the other networks. On the other hand, RTBF devoted less time to foreign news than the French TF1.

Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here

Topics of international and foreign news

Overall, the topics that predominated international news include international politics (21%), economics (19%), and crime (14%). The data reveal distinct patterns of topical coverage across networks (Table 2). ABC and BBC aired more stories related to international politics than TF1 and RTBF. On the other hand, TF1 and RTBF reported more economics news. Typically, U.S. networks do not air sports news, which fall under the responsibility of local broadcasters. Both BBC and RTBF, however, emphasized international sports. More than any other network, ABC devoted more stories and time to military matters. The French station proportionately broadcast more cultural news than the other networks. Unlike TF1 and RTBF, ABC and BBC reported no news about international aid. A crosstabs analysis using the seven most frequently topics of international news indicates that topical differences across networks are statistically significant (chi-square(21,n=127)=45.26, p<.01). If we break down the data by the number of seconds rather than the number of stories devoted to international topics, we observe similar topical patterns.

As to foreign news, differences for the seven most frequently encountered topics are not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. All networks aired a similar number of international politics, domestic politics, and economics stories (Table 3). Yet, BBC proportionately reported more crime stories. Both TF1 and RTBF aired a greater number of cultural stories than ABC and BBC. If we base the analysis on duration, we observed some disparities between the number of stories and seconds, such as BBC's crime stories, TF1's military stories and crime stories, and RTBF's economics stories. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed in regard to international news, but not foreign news.

Insert Table 4 and 5 about here

Origin of international and foreign news

Since three of the networks are European, a majority of international news (53%) originated from Western Europe. Table 4 confirms that countries in which the three European stations operate entertain privileged relationships with their Western European neighbors, while the United States maintain similar ties with Canada and Latin American countries. These results give additional support to the geographical proximity hypothesis. Differences in origin of international news across networks are statistically significant (chi-square(21, n=127)=67.67, p<.001). In most cases, the number of stories coincides with their duration.

In contrast, networks do not significantly differ in the origin of foreign news. Nonetheless, we note some interesting insights. TF1 and RTBF aired more news from Western Europe while ABC and BBC reported more news from Africa. The U.S. network tends to cover Latin America and Asia more than the European stations. Of all the four networks, TF1 had the greater number of stories from the North American region. The origin of foreign news reflects world events at the time of data collection, that is Nelson Mandela's release, the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, and the changes in Eastern European political structures. For instance, coverage of South Africa, Lebanon, and USSR accounted for 28% of all foreign news items. Consistent with past studies, politically prominent nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, still maintain a strong presence in foreign news coverage. Number of stories and time are in relative accord despite some discrepancies (e.g., TF1's stories from Eastern Europe and BBC and TF1's stories from Africa).

Hypothesis 3 is partially supported. While the four networks differ in the geographic coverage of international news, they tend to air foreign news from or about similar locations. ABC airs more international stories about Latin America, but fewer Western European stories than other three stations. However, RTBF does not allocate significantly more foreign new items and time to traditionally neglected regions. More than two-thirds of its international news and one-quarter of its foreign news concern Western Europe.

DISCUSSION

The main purpose of this study was to determine whether four Western television networks differ in their amount, topics, and origin of international and foreign news. It was hypothesized that, based on the hierarchy of nations concept, there would be significant differences between TV networks operating in a country with great power (ABC in the United States), middle power (BBC in the United Kingdom and TF1 in France), and small power (RTBF in Belgium).

Overall, the results give only partial credence to the concept of political prominence. Differences between nations are not as clear as expected. The study suggests that networks in great, middle, and small Western powers differ in their amount of nondomestic news rather than in content. For example, based on the number of stories, the Belgian RTBF broadcasts more foreign news items than the other networks. However, RTBF devotes less time to foreign news than the French TF1. The study shows significant differences in topical and geographic coverage of international across networks. Content of foreign news, however, tends to remain uniform across networks. Likewise, Gaunt (1990) observes that the content of foreign news in regional French, British and U.S. newspapers is highly comparable. From a viewer's perspective, RTBF offers more information, albeit short, about foreign events, but does not necessarily cover non-Western areas in greater depth.

In addition, BBC, TF1, and RTBF are members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and receive three to five times a day telecast foreign news via EBU's exchange news services (Eurovision News Exchange). One could speculate that while European stations would broadcast foreign news with the same content, stations in smaller countries might opt to air a greater quantity of foreign news. Furthermore, this study indicates that we cannot aggregate international and foreign news because each type of news has its own characteristics. Indeed, international and foreign news deal with different topical and geographical foci.

Some unexpected results deserve further development. The networks differ significantly in their amount of international news, but in a direction contrary to the expectations. The European stations tend to air more international news than ABC. The U.S. network's low level of international news is surprising. Given the political status of the United States, one would have anticipated a proportionately greater number of international news on ABC than on the other stations. Provided that the U.S. network had the least amount of nondomestic news time-wise, a low quantity of international news is a logical outcome. Yet, the proposition should not be completely rejected. ABC, while devoting less time to international news, reports significantly more international news stories with a focus on international politics than RTBF and TF1.

Even more puzzling is BBC's televised coverage of international news and foreign news . BBC was expected to air more nondomestic news than ABC, but less than RTBF. While the British station had the greatest number of international news (20%), it also had the lowest amount of foreign news. Given the fact that BBC news services are often perceived by viewers and broadcasters as a model of thoroughness, this result is startling. It appears that BBC, at least as the early evening newscast is concerned, devotes significantly less time to foreign news and more time to domestic news than the other Western networks.

Perhaps a concept more important than political prominence in world affairs is cultural affinity. The results tend to support this assertion. One notes the strikingly similar coverage of nondomestic news between ABC and BBC and between TF1 and RTBF. While the literature has examined the cultural affinity hypothesis, little research has been done to explore how stations in countries with strong cultural and political ties report international and foreign TV news. Historically, the United States and the United Kingdom have cultivated special cultural bonds, facilitated by a common language. The concept of cultural affinity applies to the French-speaking part of Belgium and France as well.

Additional analyses support the cultural affinity hypothesis in part, showing that ABC and BBC only differ significantly in their topical coverage and geographical coverage of international news. On the other hand, RTBF airs significantly more foreign news items than TF1. News aired on RTBF and TF1 vary significantly in their story length. However, the two stations do not differ significantly in topical and geographical coverage of international and foreign news.

This study also demonstrates that number of stories and duration do not always coincide. To compare coverage of nondomestic news across countries, it is necessary to report both the number of stories and the proportion of time in the analysis (see Wallis & Baran, 1990).

Further research should attempt to replicate this study using a larger sample and greater number of stations and controlling for political status and cultural affinity. Specifically, a larger sample is needed to determine whether this sample is representative of the networks' newscasts. In doing so, the study could be modified to a longitudinal one, bringing even more variety into the sample.

NOTES

1. The reviewed literature dealing with comparative television coverage of international and foreign news include 13 publications (see Chen, 1989; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Kawatake, 1982; Kitatani, 1981; Kline, 1981; Robertson, 1986; Saarloos, Schut, & Willemsen, 1971; Scheer & Eiler, 1972; Smith, 1968; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984; Straubhaar, Heeter, Ferreira, Wicks, Lau, & Greenberg, 1986; Surlin, Romanow, & Soderlund, 1988; Wallis & Baran, 1990). Seventeen additional studies analyze newspaper coverage of foreign and international news (see Gaunt, 1990; Gerbner & Marvanyi, 1977; Guttinger, 1939; Hart, 1963; Hart, 1966; International Press Institute, 1972; Kayser & Tannenbaum, 1962; Pride, 1972; Robinson, 1983; Robinson & Sparkes, 1976; Selin, 1977; Schramm, 1959; Sparkes, 1978; Sparkes, 1980; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984; Thomas, 1982; Wilke, 1986).

2. Sivard's *World Military and Social Expenditures* (1985, 1989) shows how Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States rank on major power variables. All these summational data originate from 1986 except population (1982). These indicators of national power corroborate Mathisen's classification regarding the international status of the four Western countries. The concept of power is frequently defined in terms of probability: "how probable it is that X can exert d amount of influence over Y with respect to issue g" (Merritt & Zinnes, 1989, p. 12).

Indicator	Country			
	US	France	UK	Belgium
Population	4	17	15	65
Area	4	45	72	117
GNP	1	5	6	22
GNP per capita	2	17	22	21
Armed forces	3	11	20	46

3.Crosstabulation analysis points out the February and July samples did not differ significantly in the type of news aired on the networks. However, the two samples significantly varied on topics of international news (chi-square(6, n=106)=21.61, p<.01), topics of foreign news (chi-square(6, n=181)=19.46, p<.01), and origin of international news (chi-square(7, n=127)=20.31, p<.01). No statistically significant difference was found between samples for the origin of foreign news.

4.Technically, only ABC is a network; BBC, TF1, and RTBF are national TV stations. In this paper, the term "network" is used to refer to ABC or to a combination of broadcasting entities which includes ABC.

5.Because the test for homogeneity of variances was significant, this assumption was violated. In addition, story length was not normally distributed for all networks. Despite these violations, we proceed because the F ratio is robust (see Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972).

6.Since we use total time devoted to each type of news, i.e., a single value rather than a distribution of values for each network and type of news, we cannot test for statistical significance across networks.

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Table 1

Type of news stories across networks
(N=669)

Number of stories

	ABC	BBC	TF1	RTBF	Total
Domestic	81 (57.0%)	85 (57.4%)	102 (50.0%)	63 (36.0%)	331 (49.5%)
International	25 (17.6%)	30 (20.3%)	38 (18.6%)	34 (19.4%)	127 (19.0%)
Foreign	36 (25.4%)	33 (22.3%)	64 (31.4%)	78 (44.6%)	211 (31.5%)
Total	142 (21.2%)	148 (22.1%)	204 (30.5%)	175 (26.2%)	669 (100%)

Number of seconds

	ABC	BBC	TF1	RTBF	Total
Domestic	7338 (58.9%)	9429 (58.8%)	8944 (49.3%)	7748 (49.1%)	33459 (53.6%)
International	2311 (18.6%)	3331 (20.8%)	4019 (22.2%)	3828 (24.2%)	13489 (19.3%)
Foreign	2802 (22.5%)	3284 (20.5%)	5166 (28.5%)	4208 (26.7%)	15460 (24.8%)
Total	12451 (19.9%)	16044 (25.7%)	18129 (29.0%)	15784 (25.3%)	62408 (100%)

Average story length in seconds

	ABC	BBC	TF1	RTBF	Total
Domestic	91	111	88	123	101
International	92	111	106	113	106
Foreign	78	99	81	54	76
Total	88	108	89	90	93

Table 2

Topic of international news across networks
(number of stories and seconds)*
(n=127)

Network Topic	ABC	BBC	TF1	RTBF	Total
Inter. politics	8 (32.0%) 490 (21.2%)	10 (33.3%) 1141 (34.2%)	4 (10.5%) 354 (8.8%)	5 (14.7%) 486 (12.7%)	27 (21.3%) 2471 (18.3%)
Economics	3 (12.0%) 564 (24.4%)	3 (10.0%) 404 (12.1%)	10 (26.3%) 1007 (25.1%)	8 (23.5%) 890 (23.2%)	24 (18.9%) 2607 (19.3%)
Crime-legal	4 (16.0%) 302 (13.1%)	5 (16.7%) 631 (18.9%)	7 (18.4%) 703 (17.5%)	2 (5.9%) 318 (8.3%)	18 (14.2%) 1954 (14.5%)
Sports	0	7 (23.3%) 621 (18.6%)	0	6 (17.6%) 451 (11.8%)	13 (10.2%) 1072 (7.9%)
Military	6 (24.0%) 556 (24.1%)	0	1 (2.6%) 421 (10.5%)	3 (8.8%) 333 (8.7%)	10 (7.9%) 933 (6.9%)
Culture-entert.	1 (4.0%) 185 (8.0%)	1 (3.3%) 127 (3.8%)	4 (10.5%) 537 (13.4%)	2 (5.9%) 215 (5.6%)	8 (6.3%) 1064 (7.9%)
Inter. aid	0	0	4 (10.5%) 345 (8.6%)	2 (5.9%) 292 (7.6%)	6 (4.7%) 637 (4.7%)
Accidents	1 (4.0%) 12 (0.5%)	1 (3.3%) 80 (2.4%)	2 (5.3%) 260 (6.5%)	1 (2.9%) 133 (3.5%)	5 (3.9%) 485 (3.6%)
Scientific-tech.	1 (4.0%) 183 (7.9%)	0	1 (2.6%) 170 (4.2%)	2 (5.9%) 205 (5.3%)	4 (3.1%) 558 (4.1%)
Other**	1 (4.0%) 19 (0.8%)	3 (10.0%) 327 (9.8%)	5 (13.2%) 222 (5.5%)	3 (25.0%) 505 (13.2%)	12 (9.4%) 1073 (7.9%)
Total	25 (19.7%) 2311 (17.1%)	30 (23.6%) 3331 (24.7%)	38 (29.9%) 4019 (29.8%)	34 (26.8%) 3828 (28.4%)	127 (100%) 13489 (100%)

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*The first line reports the number and the percentage of stories devoted to international news topics across networks. The second line presents the total number of seconds and the percentage of time for each topical category across networks. Tables 2 to 5 follow the same reporting procedures.

**Includes six topics: personalities (3 stories), natural disasters (3), domestic politics (2), human interest (2), student matters (1), and ecology (1).

Table 3

Topic of foreign news across networks
(number of stories and seconds)
(n=211)

Network Topic	ABC	BBC	TF1	RTBF	Total
Domestic Politics	13 (36.1%) 1129 (40.3%)	13 (39.4%) 1322 (40.3%)	20 (31.4%) 1681 (32.5%)	28 (35.9%) 1463 (34.8%)	74 (35.1%) 5595 (36.2%)
Military	2 (5.6%) 117 (4.2%)	7 (21.2%) 767 (23.4%)	9 (14.1%) 981 (19.0%)	11 (14.1%) 476 (11.3%)	29 (13.7%) 2341 (15.1%)
Economics	5 (13.9%) 396 (14.1%)	5 (15.2%) 469 (14.3%)	5 (7.8%) 425 (8.2%)	8 (10.3%) 653 (15.5%)	23 (10.9%) 1943 (12.6%)
Inter. Politics	4 (11.1%) 227 (8.1%)	2 (6.1%) 232 (7.1%)	7 (10.9%) 397 (7.7%)	7 (9.0%) 382 (9.1%)	20 (9.5%) 1238 (8.0%)
Crime-Legal	1 (2.8%) 13 (0.5%)	1 (6.3%) 33 (1.0%)	11 (17.2%) 702 (13.6%)	7 (9.0%) 329 (7.8%)	20 (9.5%) 1077 (7.0%)
Culture-Entert.	1 (2.8%) 156 (5.6%)	0	4 (6.3%) 371 (7.2%)	4 (5.1%) 189 (4.5%)	9 (4.3%) 716 (4.6%)
Personalities	2 (5.6%) 148 (5.3%)	0	0	4 (5.1%) 127 (3.0%)	6 (2.8%) 275 (1.8%)
Sports	0	2 (6.1%) 135 (4.1%)	2 (3.1%) 215 (4.2%)	1(1.3%) 117 (2.8%)	5 (2.4%) 467 (3.0%)
Social Services	3 (8.3%) 447 (15.9%)	0	0	1 (1.3%) 103 (2.4%)	4 (1.9%) 550 (3.6%)
Scientific-Tech.	2 (5.6%) 27 (1.0%)	1 (3.0%) 121 (3.7%)	1 (1.6%) 38 (0.7%)	0	4 (1.9) 186 (1.2%)
Human Interest	0	0	1 (1.6%) 18 (0.3%)	3 (3.8%) 95 (2.2%)	4 (1.9%) 113 (0.7%)
Natural Disasters	1 (2.8%) 15 (0.5%)	0	2 (3.1%) 108 (2.1%)	1 (1.3%) 103 (2.4%)	4 (1.9%) 226 (1.5%)
Accidents	1 (2.8%) 19 (0.7%)	1 (3.0%) 80 (2.4%)	1 (1.6%) 111 (2.1%)	1 (1.3) 15 (0.4%)	4 (1.9%) 225 (1.4%)

Table 3 (continued)

Other*	1 (2.8%) 108 (3.8%)	1 (3.0%) 125 (3.8%)	1 (1.6%) 119 (2.3%)	2 (2.6%) 156 (3.7%)	5 (2.4) 508 (3.3%)
Total	36 (17.1%) 2802 (18.1%)	33 (15.6%) 3284 (21.2%)	64 (30.4%) 5166 (33.4%)	78 (37.0%) 4208 (27.2%)	211 (100%) 15460 (100%)

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*Includes three topics: international aid (3 stories), religion (1), and ecology (1).

Table 4

Origin of international news across networks
(number of stories and seconds)
(n=127)

Network Origin	ABC	BBC	TF1	RTBF	Total
Western Europe	1 (4.0%) 19 (0.8%)	16 (53.3%) 1799 (54.0%)	26 (68.4%) 2840 (70.7%)	24 (70.6%) 2586 (67.5%)	67 (52.8%) 7244 (53.7%)
Latin America	8 (32.0%) 733 (31.7%)	4 (13.3%) 384 (11.5%)	1 (2.6%) 134 (3.3%)	1 (2.9%) 133 (3.5%)	14 (11.0%) 1384 (10.3%)
North America	7 (28.0%) 773 (33.4%)	0	4 (10.5%) 484 (12.0%)	2 (5.9%) 133 (3.5%)	13 (10.2%) 1390 (10.3%)
Asia	5 (20.0%) 343 (14.8%)	5 (16.7%) 423 (12.7%)	3 (7.9%) 205 (5.1%)	0	13 (10.2%) 971 (7.2%)
Eastern Europe	3 (12.0%) 321 (13.9%)	0	1 (2.6%) 103 (2.6%)	0	4 (3.1%) 288 (2.1%)
Africa	1 (4.0%) 122 (5.3%)	2 (6.7%) 444 (13.3%)	0	1 (2.9%) 122 (3.2%)	4 (3.1%) 688 (5.1%)
Middle East	0	0	2 (5.3%) 233 (5.8%)	1 (2.9%) 195 (5.1%)	3 (2.4%) 428 (3.2%)
International Organizations	0	3 (10.0%) 281 (8.4%)	1 (2.6%) 20 (0.5%)	5 (14.7%) 659 (17.2%)	9 (7.1%) 960 (7.1%)
Total	25 (19.7%) 2311 (17.1%)	30 (23.6%) 3331 (24.7%)	38 (29.9%) 4019 (29.8%)	34 (26.8%) 3828 (28.4%)	127 (100%) 13489 (100%)

Table 5

Origin of foreign news across networks
(number of stories and seconds)
(n=210)

Network Origin	ABC	BBC	TF1	RTBF	Total
Western Europe	7 (19.4%) 532 (19.0%)	4 (12.1%) 295 (9.0%)	17 (26.6%) 1258 (24.3%)	20 (26.0%) 1194 (28.5%)	48 (22.9%) 3279 (21.2%)
Eastern Europe	8 (22.2%) 728 (26.0%)	5 (15.2%) 533 (16.2%)	13 (20.3%) 639 (12.4%)	18 (23.4%) 597 (14.2%)	44 (21.0%) 2547 (16.5%)
Africa	9 (25.0%) 776 (27.7%)	9 (27.3%) 1132 (34.5%)	10 (15.6%) 1261 (24.4%)	8 (10.4%) 528 (12.6%)	36 (17.1%) 3697 (24.0%)
Middle East	1 (2.8%) 17 (0.6%)	6 (18.2%) 634 (19.3%)	7 (10.9%) 644 (12.5%)	13 (16.9%) 707 (16.9%)	27 (12.9%) 2002 (13.0%)
Latin America	5 (13.9%) 385 (13.7%)	3 (9.1%) 284 (8.6%)	5 (7.8%) 190 (3.7%)	7(9.1%) 508 (12.1%)	20 (9.5%) 1367 (8.8%)
North America	1 (2.8%) 108 (3.8%)	2 (6.1%) 220 (6.7%)	8 (12.5%) 659 (12.8%)	4 (5.2%) 248 (5.9%)	15 (7.1%) 1235 (8.0%)
Asia	4 (11.1%) 233 (8.3%)	2 (6.1%) 52 (1.6%)	3 (4.7%) 438 (8.5%)	4 (5.2%) 200 (4.8%)	13 (6.2%) 923 (6.0%)
International Organizations	1 (2.8%) 23 (0.8%)	2 (6.1%) 134 (4.1%)	1 (1.6%) 77 (1.5%)	3 (3.9%) 211 (5.0%)	7 (3.3%) 445 (2.9%)
Total	36 (17.1%) 2802 (18.1%)	33 (15.7%) 4284 (21.3%)	64 (30.5%) 5166 (33.4%)	77 (36.7%) 4193 (27.1%)	210 (100%) 15445 (100%)

The Ivoirien State and Cultural Imperialism through Television

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The role of the Ivoirien State in Cultural Imperialism through Television

by Mitchell Land, Ph.D.

Deep in the bush of Côte d'Ivoire,[1] animal-skin drums still thunder through the dark night convoking villagers to join in the funeral rites of a tribal leader or a common peasant. Pulsating rhythms break the stillness of dusk to remind each one that death--though feared, avoided and revered--is not an individual journey, but one shared collectively and across eternity. Such drums also resound in urban areas inviting neighbors to join the community wake of the deceased. While the tam-tams continue their relentless pounding, young and old file into concentric circles to dance on paved streets, under street lights in front of high rise apartments, crowded tenements or one-room shanties sandwiched together in compounds with too many families. Competing with the drums, another episode of "Dallas" or "Dynasty" blares from the neighbors' television sets, enticing their hooked viewers to another J.R. conspiracy against Bobby Ewing or one more sultry scene with Alexis and another boy lover. The synthesized sounds of Super Star Michael Jackson, showcased on television's MTV format, follow the viewers' favorite series seeming to invite them to more titillating death rites with the song, "Thriller." Here, the dead not only rise from their graves in macabre exaggeration to taunt the living, but gyrate in modern rhythms that challenge the best of the ritual death dances of the Ivoirien past. The Jackson dancers' crisp and snappy rock movements seem to mock the swaying women with babies sleeping on their backs and the undulating men who dance around the swaddled corpse of the deceased in the next compound. These contrasting images hypostatize the cultural dialectic Ivoiriens live daily as they attempt to hold on to their traditions while admiring and embracing the temptations of Western culture.

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[1] Although Côte d'Ivoire is still better known in English as the Ivory Coast, I use this designation throughout because of a formal request by the Ivoirien government that the country's name not be translated into other languages. This means that the adjectival form changes from Ivorian to Ivoirien, without attempt for gender agreement with English nouns.

The electronic media compete with these ancient rituals of communion, communication and collective solidarity threatening to make them obsolete. The African tam-tam may indeed be destined for extinction like the traditional modes of communication in the West--smoke signals, homing pigeons, the pony express and the telegraph. However, communication technologies evolved relatively slowly in the West by comparison, allowing time for cultural practices to catch up with the new media such as print, film, radio and television. But Western communication technologies exported to Africa arrive fully developed along with their slick Western software that challenges the very cultures that produced the African drum.

The worldwide glut of this software, especially television programs exported mainly from the United States, has been the concern of a number of researchers since the uproar occasioned by the New World Information and Communication Order movement in the 1970s and early 1980s. There is no question that the powerful economic position of First World nations has thrust them into a lead position in the exportation of media hardware and software to the international marketplace, posing formidable challenges to the cultural integrity of the rest of the world. In fact, Emile McAnany noted that the preponderance of these products has raised concerns even in nations within the First World itself.[2] But the international flow of cultural goods is no longer exclusively one way from center to periphery. Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva has noted a horizontal transfer as some Latin American nations, which formerly consumed heavy doses of U. S. television imports, are now importing far less and exporting their own cultural products such as television programs, films and records to other Third World countries and to the Spanish-speaking populations in the United States.[3] Therefore, the United States no longer holds the absolute franchise on so-called cultural imperialism.

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[2] Emile G. McAnany, "The Logic of Cultural Industries in Latin America: The Television Industry in Brazil." In Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasco (Eds.), Critical Communications Review, Vol. 2, pp. 185-208. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1984, p. 20. See also Paul Audley,. Canada's Cultural Industries. Toronto: Lorimer, 1983.

Nevertheless television screens in most developing nations, especially in economically depressed Africa, are saturated with cultural content from North America and Western Europe, while only a small amount of cultural imports from countries like Brazil and Mexico appear on Western TV sets. Angola imports 90 percent of its television programs from the United States and Brazil. Djibouti television receives 95 percent of its programs from France. Television imports are 60 percent in Sénégal, 60 percent in Gabon and 45 percent in Côte d'Ivoire. Even Nigerian television with its 23 channels, 34 stations and 47 transmitters, imports more than half of its programs from the United States, Brazil and Great Britain.[4] The author's content analysis of Ivoirien television programming revealed that during prime-time in 1987 32 percent of programs comprised imports while 28 percent consisted of so-called local programs that included heavy doses of foreign material for a total of 60 percent. A follow-up study a year later showed an increase to 74 percent.[5] The results of this study confirms McAnany's 1980 prediction that any immediate increase in local production of television programs would be unlikely for a variety of complex economic, political and cultural reasons.[6] Certainly, the low cost and clever marketing of U. S. television programs discourage heavy investment of state funds into local production when revenue is desperately needed elsewhere in struggling economies. In addition, both state monopoly of mass media systems for political reasons and the inability of the private sector to fully support these media through advertising preclude significant production of local programs as well as limit the influence of the private sector. Also, increasing expansion of national television signals to remote rural areas as well as to growing urban populations and the proliferation of imported software via new technologies like home video, cable and satellites will assure a pervasive presence of Western culture in the lives of indigenous populations for years to come.

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[3] Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, "Transnational Communication and Brazilian Culture," in Rita Atwood and Emile G. McAnany, (Eds.), in Communication and Latin American Society, The University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1986, pp. 94-95.

[4] Rachid N'Diaye, "Le tour d'Afrique du petit écran," Africa International, No. 225, March 1990, p. 56

[5] This paper is derived from the author's field study of Ivoirien television conducted between September 1987 and June 1989 for a period of about 19 months. In addition to an extensive program analysis to assess the changes in program schedules over time and archival research of Ivoirien political and cultural policy, a qualitative in-depth survey was conducted with Ivoirien people to understand what they think about their television system. Structured interviews were conducted with television personnel, Ivoirien scholars and other professionals involved or interested in the production of Ivoirien culture, Ivoirien performers, newspaper journalists and 100 television viewers. For a complete account of this research, see Mitchell Land, "Television, Culture and the State in Côte d'Ivoire: A field

Critical researchers like Cees Hamelink, Herb Schiller and Jeremy Tunstall have claimed that developing countries are the victims of Western culture industries driven by the principles of capitalism.[7] However, too little attention has been given to specific countries, especially to those that own and operate their television systems, to discover why they choose or choose not to allow imported programs. Following a discussion of theoretical issues regarding the state and culture, this paper focuses on one such country in Sub-Saharan Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, and posits that massive doses of Western television programs on Ivoirien TV can be explained by the

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study of Ivoirien systems," dissertation, the University of Texas at Austin, 1990.

[6] Emile G. McAnany, "Cultural Industries in International Perspective: Convergence or Conflict?" in Brenda Dervin and Melvin J. Voigt, (Eds.), Progress in Communication Sciences, Vol. VII, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1980, p. 24.

[7] Cees Hamelink, Cultural Autonomy in Global Communications. New York & London: Longman, 1983. Herb Schiller, Communication and Cultural Domination. White Plains, N. Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976. Jeremy Tunstall, The Media Are American. London: Constable, 1976.

politicization of television by the nation's president and the imposition of a cultural policy that favors the importation of Western culture.

Theoretical Issues Regarding the State

Scholars, investigating cultural phenomena in a strict Marxist perspective, minimized the role of the state in the production of culture by focusing on the obvious and immediate industrial producers of culture in First World nations and their inexorable drive to disseminate cultural products throughout the rest of the world. States, then, which were considered to be primarily shaped through class struggles, function mainly to protect and perpetuate modes of production and consumption for the sake of perpetual capital accumulation. Therefore, everyone involved in the cultural production loop--from the authors to the production line laborers to the distributors to the consumers--ultimately dance to industry piping. The state is considered a mere facilitator of class interests rather than an actor with its own political and social agendas; it is simply the instrument of the ruling classes to achieve their objectives of domination. The monopolistic culture industries of the developed world, then, control the means of cultural production, directly intervene in the production of cultural products and practices and, with state collusion, vigorously export the ideologically embedded artifacts to the world marketplace. The mass media in this perspective become instruments of ideological mystification and class domination. As a result, the same capitalist socio-economic phenomena were generalized to all countries in the world regardless of their individual histories and cultures. In short, the Western social sciences avoided the explanatory centrality of states as dynamic and potentially autonomous organizational actors.[8]

Raquel Salinas and Leena Paldran do attempt a more flexible Marxist interpretation of culture and dependence, but they present an ambiguous discussion of the state. On the one hand, they define the state as the site of encounter of dominant class interests--a society-based approach--yet on the other, they acknowledge the relative independent behavior of nation-states that includes nationalization of enterprises and implementation of state cultural policies and practices to build political legitimacy and national identity. Although Salinas and Paldran recognize that these strategies weaken the power of the "imperialist centers," they do a double take by declaring (of course) that state autonomy is always "contingent on the support of powerful groups..."[9] The problem is, autonomous state action is ruled out by definition. According to Stuart Hall, even Gramsci's discussions of the state are replete with ambiguities between the state and the civil society it presumably governs.[10] As a result, despite a more flexible Marxist recasting, all states with a mode of production and position in the world capitalist system are lumped together conceptually at the outset, resulting in little or no possibility to account for variations in state structures and practices across different nations for vastly different reasons.[11] Additionally, Salinas and Paldan see in state goals of "national and cultural identity" the potential for resisting the structures of internal and international domination. However, they do not consider that "national and cultural identity" in themselves may act as ideologies which, according to their local interpretation and implementation, could strengthen cultural domination both internally and externally and serve to legitimize and maintain those in political power (which currently reflects the status quo in Côte d'Ivoire), while perhaps creating a real or imaginary sense of national solidarity in the process.[12]

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[8] Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the state back in: Strategies of analysis in current research." In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1985, pp. 4-6.

[9] Raquel Salinas and Leena Paldan, "Culture in the Process of Dependent Development: Theoretical Perspectives." In K. Nordenstreng and H. I. Schiller (Eds.) National Sovereignty and International Communication, pp. 87-88.

[10] Stuart Hall, "Popular Culture and the State," in Tony Bennett, Colin Mercer and Janet Woollacott, (Eds.), Popular Culture and Social Relations. Open University Press: Milton Keynes, 1986, p. 22.

Paul Brass rejected assumptions of the state that hold that it is simply an instrument of class struggles rooted in economic determinism or that the state is merely a distributor of privileges or promoter of justice and equality among groups. Also, the notion that the state is an impartial arena for conflict resolution or an occasional intervenor in societal conflicts must be qualified. In reality, the state is a relatively autonomous entity that tends both to favor some classes and ethnic groups at particular historical junctures and to work with elites within various communities to serve state interests that include social control, administrative convenience and distribution of privileges unequally or equally in support of its goals.[13]

Still Latin American scholars, assessing the role of culture and communication in their own regions, warned against assuming a definitive role for the state when in reality elites continue to exert control and influence through so-called autonomous state actions. For example, Lins da Silva and Reyes Matta noted that to explain state autonomy on the basis of nationalization of industries, is to ignore the continuation of class domination through locally-controlled industries owned by local elites.[14] But Nestor Garcia Canclini rejected overt economic determinism because it holds that the initiative is always possessed by the dominant class.[15] Citing Juan Carlos Tedesco, Canclini questions what he calls the Marxist "reproductionist view" because it reduces relations between dominant and dominated sectors of society to economic determinations and assumes the unfettered imposition of a cultural order (through overt "reproductionism") and thus fails to account for the formation of national states and their desire for achievement of cultural homogeneity; national cultural policy, for example, may necessitate direct state intervention to achieve cultural homogeneity. Thus, the quest for such a goal indicates that the state, if it chooses, can be a most dynamic actor. Entrepreneurs and the industrial bourgeoisie or any other "private" sectors of society do not possess exclusivity with regard to autonomous action.[16] Nationalism, national identity, national unity, religious fanaticism, political domination and so on may also motivate state actions that affect social practice and shape social and cultural reality. Although these concepts may simply provide the ideological rationale for the state to forge a consensus that may inevitably empower, legitimize and perpetuate class domination, they are worthy of empirical investigation to explain how and why autonomous state actions ultimately facilitate or frustrate the logic of culture or other industries for that matter.

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[11] Skocpol, op., cit., p. 5.

[12] Salinas and Paldan, op., cit., p. 97.

[13] Paul R. Brass, "Ethnic Groups and the State." In Paul R. Brass (Ed.), Ethnic Groups and the State. Barnes & Noble Books: Totowa, N.J., 1985, pp. 1-56.

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[14] Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, "Transnational Communication and Brazilian Culture'." Communication and Latin American Society. Rita Atwood and Emile G. McAnany (Eds). Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986, pp. 94-95. See also, Fernando Reyes Matta, "The Concept of News in Latin America: Dominant Values and Perspectives of Change," News Values and Principles of Cross-Cultural Communication. UNESCO: Paris, 1980, quoted in Lins da Silva, p. 94.

[15] Nestor Garcia Canclini, "Culture and Power: the State of Research," Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 10. Sage: London, 1988, p. 37.

[16] Juan Carlos Tedesco, "Critica al reproductivismo educativo." Cuadernos Politicos, 1983. Cited in Canclini, op., cit., p. 37.

The Autonomous State, Nationalism and Cultural Practices

Canclini has shown how traditional cultures are incorporated into modern capitalist modes of production without losing their identities entirely. He noted that in the case of Mexico, the state makes use of traditional artistry to reify national identity, to make it visible, as a locus in which traditions common to all classes are revitalized. The same occurs with indigenous festivals.[17] Also, nationalism is a convenient ideological banner to rally populations to support their continued rule by elites in power.

It goes almost without saying that international contexts are influential as states participate in geopolitical relations, economic patterns of trade, relations of international domination and competition and as they encounter ideas and other models from these interactions. Indeed, the autonomous state is conditioned by its relationship with other autonomous states; it may learn from other states and base some of its policies on models it perceives as successful as it pursues fundamental goals. For example, the promotion of nationalism in developing states, suggests Crawford Young, attempts to mirror a particular model of another and usually more modern state. Thus nationalism is the manufacture of national unity, based on external models, to create the idealized modern "nation."[18] Evans et al emphasize the importance of nation and nationalism in world historical contexts that include relations with other nation-states. These relations include more than interstate alliances, market flows and the international economic division of labor; they also include patterns of intellectual communication and **cultural modeling** across national boundaries.[19]

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[17] Canclini, op., cit., p. 485.

[18] Crawford Young, "Ethnicity and the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa," in Paul R. Brass, (Ed.), Ethnic Groups and the State, op., cit., pp. 59-61.

Therefore, the state may act as broker and legitimizer of cultural models as it pursues its political and economic goals. The political task of creating a national consciousness among the diverse tribal groupings in the newly independent countries of Africa illustrate the use of economic and cultural models from former colonial masters. The state engages in state cultural practices like celebrating national unity and legitimizing its own integrity by making use of foreign cultural models as well as traditional cultures and festivals.

Promotion of national unity and identity may be perceived to help the state achieve a minimum basis of popular support both for attaining economic objectives like modernization and industrialization and for maintaining and reinforcing present political legitimacy. Thus, nationalism as an ideological strategy, justifies modernization that is often portrayed through patterns of cultural modeling across national boundaries and at the same time reinforces state political legitimacy.

The State as Facilitator of Elite Power

The building of the nation-states in the newly independent regions of Africa beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s provides a rich terrain for the examination of the autonomous nature of the state with regard to ethnicity and nationalism. Political and cultural justification for European domination of Africa was obtained through the historic Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. At this time, the territorial frontiers of the new European possessions in Africa were determined. In its task of administering these possessions, the Europeans considered these domains as prolongations of the European state system. Thus, the state, a European political construct, was superimposed upon subjugated African societies regardless of their ethnic pluralities and manifest distinctions.

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[19] Evans et al., op., cit., p. 350 (Emphases mine).

Lins da Silva and other Latin American researchers have raised an important issue that merits investigation in other Third World nations that have yet to attain the same level of capitalist development as countries in Latin America: The role of elites. For example, Lins da Silva notes that attributing economic and cultural imperialism to outside forces like transnational corporations (TNCs) alone obscures the role of local elites who are only too happy to wrest the means of production and distribution from the TNCs. These same elites enter into collaborative arrangements with international elites to continue their exploitation of local markets. State policies, therefore, include those made according to the perceptions of controlling elites. Thus, the center-periphery problematic continues to operate through elites in power.[20] Alfred Stepan and Ellen Trimberger noted extreme instances of autonomous state action in Peru when strategic elites used military force to take control of an entire national state and, through the bureaucratic structures of the state, enforced reformist or revolutionary changes from the top down. These elites used state power to implement socio-economic reforms while encouraging national industrialization in order to improve their international standing in the modern world.[21] To the designation of "strategic elites," I would add that of the supreme or super elite personality--the authoritarian government leader who, through his circle of strategic elite supporters, controls the state and its infrastructures.

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[20] Lins da Silva, op., cit., p. 94.

[21] Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J., 1978. Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru. Transaction Books: New Brunswick, N.J., 1978.

In French territories, Africans or "métis" obtained leading roles in the colonial state apparatus only by accepting assimilated status. In other words, they were required to incorporate French culture in all of its expressions: Education, language, dress, customs and etiquette.[22] Thus, these individuals began to constitute the African elite class that acquired the new social and cultural patterns identified with "civilization." The core-periphery typology took root immediately and "naturally" during imperialistic expansion into Africa. The centralized notion of the state, characteristic of French colonial hegemony, was intolerant of indigenous cultural and political diversity.[23] French cultural hegemony and thus, the core-periphery ideology, according to sociologist Abdou Touré, has continued during the construction of the newly independent state of Côte d'Ivoire.[24] Examples of elitist governing personalities are found in African dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and most recently in Iraq's Saddam Hussein. These men rule their respective countries absolutely and, in some cases, have profited handsomely from both economic aid from First World benefactors and their extensive personal involvement in local capitalist industries--mining, agriculture, the service industries and so on. As the nation's supreme or super elite, Third World dictators like Mobutu and Hussein virtually control the state and continue the relations of dependency and economic exploitation in the name of the state but at great economic cost to the very countries they lead under the ideological banners of nationalism, national unity, national identity and national security. These maneuvers are also conducted in the name of development toward modernization. While states may indeed act as autonomous entities in international and national relations, their effective control by dictatorial leaders illustrate that they also act in their leaders' interests that may include intimate involvement with international elites who own and/or manage TNCs. Thus, as documented in the cases of well developed culture industries in Latin America, standardization of culture in other developing countries may continue to perpetuate the hegemonic ideology of these super elites. To see nationalization of cultural production, then, as a positive move away from cultural imperialism is to ignore the overt activities of local elites, acting within autonomous state apparatuses.[25] Moreover, to maintain a kind of "tunnel vision" that insists on either an unconscious or conspiratorial economic domination through the logic of Western or local culture industries whereby cultures in developing nations are polluted, transformed and standardized is to neglect the responsibility and participation of the state in this process. Therefore, although states may indeed act with autonomy in national and international affairs, their domination by the supreme elite must not be ignored, and the conditions of this domination are worthy of further study.

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[22] Abdou Touré, Civilisation Quotidienne en Côte d'Ivoire, Procès d'Occidentalisation, Editions Karthala: Paris, 1981. Touré gives an extensive account of this process.

[23] Young, op., cit., p. 70.

[24] Touré, op., cit.

After independence, the new African countries continued the nation-state structure. This structure was reinforced by the perceived imperative of modernization. In Young's words:

> African independence coincided with what now appears in retrospect as a historical peak of the nation-state as a triumphant mode of organization whose supremacy swept the globe. **Melting pots around the world simmered away cultural pluralism in the elixir of modernization.** National integration was a

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[25] Lins da Silva, op., cit., p. 95.

> categorical imperative ...national integration was simply a crisis of political adolescence, which had to be overcome.[26]

The new nation-states of Africa have had the political task of building national identities based on their arbitrary political borders. As a result, states actively engage in the ideological quest of creating a spirit of nationalism for both modernization and political self preservation. In addition, most of these states comprise diverse ethnic groups with their own built-in loyalties that had to be transferred to the new "nation." According to Brass, then, one of the most important sites of struggle has been located between the autonomous state and the many divergent ethnic groups that inhabit its juridical space. Success in this relationship is crucial to the state in constructing the "supra-ethnic group," the new nation. Thus, struggle between the state and its ethnic populations is waged for the maintenance and extension of state sovereignty embodied in the new modernizing nation. While the notion of cultural pluralism within one state is perhaps a laudable and even ideological goal, it may not be the ultimate objective of state policy. More likely, the state-sponsored drive for modern development may project a hierarchy of cultural models that places Western culture at the summit.

In addition, the modernizing state often poses a threat to the traditional controllers of symbols and values that differ from those encouraged by the state. For example, the values of modernized elites are often literally or symbolically favored by the state while the values of traditional societies are either not encouraged (or only nominally encouraged) or effectively eclipsed through literal and/or symbolic practices. Therefore, symbolic resources become indispensable elements to be tapped in achieving state hegemony.[27] The Ivoirien state's emphasis on openness to cultural influences from the preferred Western models delegitimates traditional values of the ethnic cultures. Ideological strategies of the state, therefore, involve the control, manipulation and cooptation of symbolic resources; indeed, strategies may include the effective suppression of specific ethnic symbolic resources by encouraging cultural synthesis based on a hierarchy of cultural models and state-orchestrated cultural strategies. As Young observes, the official ideology of the culturally plural nation-state stands in contrast to the desired social reality of a modern state fashioned on a Western cultural model.[28] African states had to foster a strategy of nation-building and the promotion of the ideological unitary doctrines of "one nation, one people, one party, one leader." These strategies in turn legitimized the one-party monopolistic form of government that continues to be prevalent in most African nation-states.[29]

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[26] Young, op., cit., p. 83. (Emphases mine.)

[27] Brass, op., cit., p. 26-30.

The state also intervenes in already established cultural practices. Raymond Williams posits that generally the state exercises two functions with regard to culture. It acts as patron of cultural practices and promoter of an active cultural policy. At the same time, the state engages in its own reproduction and legitimation by using the arts and culture for its decoration and imagery, often at the expense of the arts themselves. Thus, the state is not only the central organ of power in organized societies, but also the central organ of elaborate display.[30] Thus, the state behaves not only as autonomous actor in national and international economic transactions as noted above, but it also intervenes into the cultural life of the nation for self-preservation.

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[28] Ibid, p. 61.

[29] Ibid, p. 84.

[30] Raymond Williams, "State Culture and Beyond," in Lisa Appignanesi (Ed.), Culture and the State. Institute for Contemporary Arts: London, 1984, pp. 3-5.

The Autonomous State and Popular Culture

Despite Gramsci's vague definition of the state, he did discuss the centrality of culture and popular culture in state activities. In fact, his explanation of the purpose of state intervention in popular culture is of use to the present explanation of what is taking place in Côte d'Ivoire. Referring to the modern democratic state, Gramsci explained that the state was fundamentally interested in adapting the "civilization" of the popular masses to the imperative of continuous development of the economic apparatus of production.[31] Williams elaborated on Gramsci's point: The state is a site of permanent struggle to conform the "whole complex of social relations, including those of civil society, to the imperatives of development in a social formation."[32] Although not as overt as in authoritarian states, the British state, observed Williams, has acted decisively throughout its history to conform popular culture to the dominant culture.

State intervention in popular culture, particularly in developing nations, to equate it with national culture is especially advantageous to reinforce state integrity and legitimacy while at the same time ensuring that popular discourse does not undermine political authority. Wai-Teng Leong discussed how the state of Singapore marketed images of multiculturalism to sell tourism and to contribute to a new nation-state by building a national identity that takes in diverse ethnic groups living harmoniously within its territory.[33] Indeed, state policies in other countries are responsible for the upsurge of ethnic consciousness for this purpose. While Singapore's cultural policy and practice encourage multiculturalism as opposed to the melting pot model, other state policies attempt to minimize ethnic differences for the purpose of forging a common national identity as in the case of Côte d'Ivoire whose official policy supports and justifies a preferred culture model--that of the West in all its forms: Architecture, dress, television programs, style, fashion, music, art, language, popular music and so on.

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[31] Antonio Gramsci, Selections from The Prison Notebooks, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (Eds.), Lawrence & Wishart and International Publishers: London, New York, p. 242., quoted in Hall, p. 22.

[32] Williams (1980), op., cit., p. 22.

Ivoirien Television and the State

Background

Côte d'Ivoire's particular relationship to its colonial master has shaped the ways in which the state culture intervenes in popular culture. Côte d'Ivoire's French colonial history, officially established at the Berlin Conference of 1885, included French cultural hegemony as the people were encouraged to discard their ethnic traditions and languages to accede to the superior French culture. Cultural practices, operating particularly in the educational system, delegitimized Ivoirien traditional languages and cultural values. When school children were caught using their vernacular with their ethnic cousins during recess or in class, they were forced to wear an ornament suspended from the neck to distinguish them from the rest of the class whose members did not violate the rule to speak only French during the school day. An excellent working knowledge of the French language was imperative for accession to the growing government bureaucracy during colonial expansion and after independence. Learning was only possible through the French language. Indeed, French was the only legitimate window available that opened up to the modern world.

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[33] Wai-Teng Leong, "Culture and the State: Manufacturing Traditions for Tourism," Critical Studies in Mass Communication, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1989, p. 373.

The importance of the Ivoirien television system, established in 1963, is indicated by its growing presence in Ivoirien society. A second channel was added in 1985. The television's staff numbered 750 persons country-wide in 1989. At this time, according to Pierre Lorn, the director of transmissions for Ivoirien television, the country boasted 13 transmitting centers, 24 relay stations and 7 delayed broadcasting centers transmitting over 85 percent of the land surface and reaching potentially 90 percent of the population.[34] After South Africa and Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire has the largest number of televisions per capita in Africa with five per 100 population.[35]

Ivoirien television is a state institution. As in most countries in black Africa, the state alone is responsible for its administration and financial support. The state determines the location and power of its transmitters and negotiates agreements with other states and foreign entities for the support of its infrastructures. The state hires and pays television personnel and finances the day-to-day operations out of the national budget. Although it claims to inform, educate and entertain--traditional roles ascribed to media the world over--it does so in terms of the dominant political will.

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[34] Pierre Lorn, directeur de la Diffusion (Director of Transmissions) Television Ivoirienne. Interview March 24, 1988.

[35] The U. S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration reported in 1981 that Cote d'Ivoire had 650,000 radio receivers, about 30 percent with FM capability and around 160,000 domestic television receivers (Country Market Survey: Communications Equipment, Ivory Coast. U. S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, April 1981.) In July 1986, the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Statistical Office reported that in 1982, there were an estimated 1,100,000 radio receivers and 350,000 television receivers in use. However, Ivoirien television reported 600,000 television sets in the country (La Television Ivoirienne, un quart de siecle, Ministry of Information, Abidjan, December 1988, p. 10) The population was officially estimated at 8,262,300 in 1980.

As far as the Ivoirien government is concerned, television's primary role, therefore, is political: To speak for the ruling political party, the Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI, translated the Democratic Party of the Côte d'Ivoire), personified in the Ivoirien head of state, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, legitimizing both party and president on a continuing basis. State monopoly of television is rationalized on the need to accomplish two broad goals: National unity and development toward modernization. The primary cultural role of television, assigned to it by the head of state, is to provide a "window onto the world" showing the new Ivoirien man and woman the way to modernization. Its secondary role is to provide a mirror of Ivoirien culture, primarily in the singular and one that refracts its images in the light of the dominant political party, thus precluding contradictory or challenging ideas and images.

Political Role of Television

National Unity

The need to consolidate national unity in 1960 within the newly established state of Côte d'Ivoire, whose borders were set by colonial masters rather than by a process of natural political evolution, led to the nexus between political authority and the information infrastructures. Delegates from eight new African nations, including the Côte d'Ivoire, assembled in Dakar, Sénégal in 1960 to discuss the press and press freedom in Africa. At this meeting the representatives declared their unanimous interpretation of the role national information infrastructures should play in the newly independent states.[36] Senator Doudou Guéyé of Sénégal defended the state's need for total control of information systems by declaring that in the interest of national construction, destructive criticism would not be allowed to waste national resources. The Ivoirien minister of information, Matthieu Ekra, supported this interpretation calling it the necessary "wall of silence."[37] Thus, just as the colonial master used radio to propagate his culture and to disseminate his policy of domination, declared the general director of Radio-Mali, Racine Kané, the African states would do the same.[38]

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[36] A.-J. Tudesq, La Radio en Afrique Noire. Editions A. Pédone: Paris, 1983, p. 93. (Unless otherwise noted, I am responsible for all translations of French text quoted in this paper.)

Those in power in West Africa govern what they consider to be fragile states that continue to face the task of consolidating public consciousness behind national political objectives. Philippe-Grégoire Yacé, president of the economic and social council of the Côte d'Ivoire, recently reaffirmed the priority of national unity in his speech to the council at the opening of its second ordinary session: "The idea of national unity and a union of our destinies remains an important political goal in the fullest sense of the term."[39] Until these African governments decide they can trust their populations to be in tune with their policies and until a national cohesiveness is achieved, government control is likely to remain.[40] Perhaps when democratic principles become part of the culture of power so that if a majority disagrees it can, through electoral or other processes, change those policies.

Thus, the formidable task facing the new Ivoirien president and his political party at independence was the creation of a national consensus out of the more than 60 tribal groups, each with its distinct language and unique customs. Creating a national consensus from peoples as diverse as urban elites, bureaucrats, rural dwellers and distinct tribes, whose members stretched across arbitrary political boundaries of Europe's making, presented a major challenge to the new government. The government determined to meet the challenge unopposed. Shaping the Ivoirien nationality became the responsibility of the one political party to the exclusion of all other alternatives. Other political options that were flourishing at independence were systematically suppressed.

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[37] Ibid., quoted from Fraternité-Matin, May 25, 1971.

[38] Tudesq, op., cit., p. 93.

[39] Philippe-Grégoire Yacé, "La Côte d'Ivoire face à la crise," Ivoire Dimanche, No. 921, October 2, 1988, p. 19.

[40] Batilloi I. Warritay, executive coordinator for the African Council on Communication, University of Kenya, Nairobi. Interview February 6, 1988.

National Development

Government control of the information infrastructures was also rationalized on the need to promote economic development, a convenient motive for maintaining political power, according to one current observer and scholar:

> [the needs] arise from the necessity of mobilizing the people for development in view of channeling this people to assure the political longevity of those who hold the reins of the state.[41]

Development was thus perceived as the responsibility of the political system, and the political system for the vast majority of African states is based upon one-party rule with the concentration of power in the chief of state. The information infrastructures, vital to assuring adequate development, are considered to be as strategically important to political authorities as the military establishment. Also, broadcasting is regarded as both a political and diplomatic weapon, the most direct and sure link between the national metropoles and the rural sectors for propaganda purposes and for its potential for conserving (or recasting) the multitudinous cultural identities by providing a venue for their expression.[42]

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[41] Hugues Koné, "Les radios et les télévisions africaines à l'aube du 21e siècle," paper presented at the workshop on "la planification et la gestion des systèmes de radiodiffusion dans les pays non-anglophones de la région de l'Afrique australe et de l'Afrique centrale," Brazzaville, May 10-17, 1989. Workshop sponsored by Union internationale des télécommunications and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Hugues Koné is professor of communication studies at the Université nationale de la Côte d'Ivoire. (Brackets mine.)

State Institution Vs. Watch Dog Function

Thus, the historical development of information infrastructures in Côte d'Ivoire, according to official perception, precluded the notion of the media as a counterbalance to the powers of the state. Quite to the contrary, explains one official record, Ivoirien information systems are considered direct participants in the consolidation of the Ivoirien state and in the shaping of public opinion in the state's image. Information structures exist as state apparatuses on the same level with other government infrastructures such as roads and railways.[43] It is true that press freedom is guaranteed in the Côte d'Ivoire's constitution, but a 1959 law for the purpose of strengthening the protection of public order justifies direct government intervention including the confiscation or banning of any publication which, intentionally or not, "brings about a disregard of the laws of the country, or injures the morals of the population, or casts discredit on the political institutions or their population, or casts discredit on the political institutions or their working," or has content "as to make these consequences likely."[44] The information sector, therefore, may not stand aloof in an objective posture outside the process of development because it is an integral actor in the development process:

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[42] Tudesq, op., cit., p. 92. (parentheses mine.)

[43] "La mise en place des moyens d'information." L'Encyclopédie Générale de la Côte d'Ivoire. Nouvelles Editions Africaines: Paris, 1978, pp. 814-17.

[44] U. S. Information Agency, "The Ivory Coast: A Communications Fact Book," 1963, p. 12. This material is quoted and referenced in William A. Hachten, Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa. The Iowa State University Press: Ames, Iowa, 1971, p. 192.

> Information is not indifferent to development: it does not comment on development as if on the outside but is one of its major supporters.[45]

To comment critically, according to official perception, presents an unwarranted obstacle to the nation's on-going process of development. Criticism of the country, the president or the government is considered anti-development. Western philosophical assumptions about the freedom of information are thus relativized for the sake of development. At best, such assumptions are postponed for the day when development has been achieved, or they are entirely discarded as inappropriate Western phenomena. This policy covers more than just news and information; it includes all mass media content. Thus, in practice, producers, show hosts, talent and others do not function without first anticipating or considering the political implications of their work. Self-censorship is taken for granted. Television personnel know that everything recorded for broadcast is subject to review. Indeed, egregious censorship is rarely necessary because most workers know their limitations and learn to work within them.[46] Thus, it is understood that Ivoirien television must function according to presidential expectations.[47] In fact, television employees often take the initiative to interpret presidential will. Moreover, television may also be called upon to satisfy less than political objectives for the president. Specific examples of the privileging of political concerns through programming have been documented.[48]

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[45] "La mise en place des moyens d'information," op., cit., p. 817.

[46] Zébi Grokrou, television producer. Interview May 30, 1989.

[47] Gérard Dupuy, French adviser to the television director. Interview June 17, 1989.

[48] Land, op., cit., Chapter VI.

Ivoirien television's political obligations were reiterated at its 10th anniversary in 1973 with the release of excerpts from television's official statutes:

> Education of the masses must take place in terms of the Party's orders and the country's needs, because if it is necessary to please the public, it must be done by imposing on that public cultural necessities. There is no censorship per se, but rather a point of view. Information is not yet well done, but it is complete. It aims to shape opinion according to the government's wishes; that is, one must not fall into the trap of sensationalism (For example, coups d'état require much prudence). Nothing negative should be presented, but we should encourage positive reflection while taking care to present the facts in a balanced way.[49]

The minister of culture, Duon Sadia, reminded his audience recently at the annual awards presentations of the Ivoire Dimanche Grand Prix des Arts et des Lettres (ID's Grand Prize for the Arts and Letters) of the importance of portraying the proper **image** when celebrating Ivoirien culture:

> The merit of 'Ivoire Dimanche' [awards] is having understood that the difficult task in Côte d'Ivoire's constant struggle is to offer to Africa and to the world the **image** of a peaceful community, made of dialogue, of real freedoms, of harmony and generous brotherhood. These hopes cannot be the exclusive domain of unique governmental agencies, even less from outside institutions. In its socio-professional diversity, the Côte d'Ivoire had to create its own prizes [and] honorable distinctions which are no more than the natural extensions of our national efforts.[50]

Cultural policy is thus served well, one might infer from this statement, by the annual awarding of prizes to those whose work exemplifies a **positive image** of the country. Presumably, artistic work that would challenge the social, political and cultural contradictions of Ivoirien society would be deemed unfit for consideration. Indeed, television's program director, Koffi Yobouet, explained to journalist Lucien Houédanou, one reason why variety shows abound on television and negative ideas are not broadcast: "In this time of [economic] crisis, people have so many problems that on top of all this we should not create for them an atmosphere of sadness..."[51]

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[49] "Télévision," Agence Ivoirienne de Presse, special supplement, June 7, 1973, Abidjan, p. 37. At the occasion of television's 10th anniversary, the Ivoirien press agency (AIP) released this information, extracted from the official statutes of television. (Parenthetical phrase was part of the official text.)

[50] Duon Sadia, "Des distinctions à haute portée politique," Ivoire Dimanche, No. 958, June 18, 1989, pp. 47-48. (Emphases and brackets mine.)

By the same token, Ivoirien television is not permitted to function on the basis of ideals often evoked in perceptions of the Western press. For example, assumptions of objectivity and neutrality are not operative:

> The second function of television is to express and to crystallize opinion. In the face of the events and facts it reports, television cannot remain neutral. Journalists, political and administrative authorities express their opinions, and these shape the public's reactions which may have been indecisive.[52]

Television bears the social responsibility of portraying a positive **image** of the country and its political system. Material that challenges official interpretations of the Ivoirien condition is absolutely rejected. And although censorship may not be formally institutionalized, it is a matter of state policy:

> Sensationalism is proscribed, and all information is verified before broadcast. Moreover, editorials are avoided as well as an excessive personalization of the media.[53]

Accordingly, newsworthy events, especially those of the unexpected variety, are not automatically reported by the Ivoirien news media, whether print or broadcast. In May 1989, a truck driver was attacked by a policeman in the suburb of Abobo. The attack set off a strike of truck and taxi drivers who protested violently against police brutality, leaving a trail of vandalism in their wake. The public knew, by the proverbial grapevine (or "Radio Treichville" as it is known in Côte d'Ivoire), that something eventful had taken place in Abobo and, later, the story was reported by Radio France Internationale. The Ivoir'Soir, Abidjan's afternoon daily, wanted to cover the story but had to obtain special approval from the authorities. The story was eventually written, but significantly altered by the time it was printed.[54] Truth is thus relative to political priorities.

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[51] Lucien Houédanou, "Télévision: des ambitions à concrétiser," Ivoire Dimanche, No. 655, August 28, 1983, p. 42. (Brackets mine.)

[52] Koné Adama, "La télévision ivoirienne: quelle mission?" Fraternité Matin, August 7, 1985.

[53] "La Diffusion," L'Encyclopédie générale de la Côte d'Ivoire, op., cit., p. 834.

Even media coverage of less eventful occasions is subject to gatekeeping through the ministry of information. Although the public is free to assemble, celebrate, worship, entertain and otherwise express itself--as long as such expression does not challenge political authority--the Ivoirien media cover only those events authorized by the ministry of information. For example, when an organization, performer or other entity desires media coverage, a formal written request, complete with details, is submitted to the ministry. If approved, the ministry issues a directive to the information sector which proceeds to cover events according to their political priority.

Veteran Ivoirien singer and television performer, François Lougah, affectionately called the "Papa national" of the Ivoirien song by the media and public, went personally to see the minister of information to request media coverage of his public concert in May 1989. When the concert was cancelled because of inclement weather, Lougah returned to the ministry to submit a second request for coverage on an alternate date. The media would not have publicized nor reported the concert without this formal request accompanied by written approval from the ministry.[55] Well publicized public concerts are the bread and butter of Ivoirien performers who must depend on the information sectors to attract large audiences. Therefore, the official gatekeeper of Ivoirien public cultural displays, the minister of information, exercises considerable economic and control over the artistic community. Performers become dependent on state information apparatuses for the exercise of their profession which impacts on the possibility of making a living from their art. Accordingly, politically and socially sensitive content is subject to prior restraint by the Houphouët-Boigny government.

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[54] Michel Man, journalist with Ivoir'Soir. Interview May 28, 1989.

Certainly, all artistic expression is not required to address all political issues overtly. Much is produced on television and in live concerts that may be considered politically neutral. After all, Ivoirien performers also sing of romance, heartbreak and loneliness. But, they are expected to be loyal to the government, on occasion to sing praises to its policies and leader and to sing of peace and prosperity in Côte d'Ivoire. And such expectations are not difficult to obtain since the performers' primary channels of communication to the mass audience are government controlled.

Executive Privilege

The personification of power in the chief of state is a given in African political reality. As an African proverb states, "There's room for only one crocodile in the swamp." And, according to Tudesq, television, even more than radio, lends itself to the personification of power with its advantage of both sound and image. Television's only major limitation is its limited availability to the mass publics in most of Africa.[56] Television is in the domain of executive privilege. The directors of African information infrastructures routinely proclaim unconditional loyalty to their chiefs of state whose daily activities often comprise the centerpiece of news broadcasts and whose political will informs daily operations. Indeed, the fear of displeasing the political leader influences the way news is presented about him or even about other African heads of state. Information is further refracted by the deluge of facts and activities (accurate or otherwise) reported on these heads of state by their broadcast media.[57] As with radio, Ivoirien television exemplifies this rule of thumb.

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[55] François Lougah, Ivoirien singing star. Interview May 29, 1989.

[56] Tudesq, op., cit., p. 95. Tudesq's book deals primarily with radio because he did not consider television as important to most African countries as radio.

In addition to its focus on Houphouët-Boigny, Ivoirien television must communicate the government's will to the nation's viewers. And the will of the government is synonymous with the will of President Houphouët-Boigny. Although the president does not direct the day-to-day operations of Ivoirien television, and rarely intervenes in programming, television exists and functions under his watchful eye. And though television's written statutes do not explicitly articulate this intimate relationship, it goes without saying. It exists and everyone knows, understands and acts accordingly. The former minister of information, Laurent Dona-Fologo, underscored this inseparable relationship in a special edition of the party's political magazine, Fraternité Hebdo, devoted entirely to articles extolling the Ivoirien chief of state:

> ... transmitting the directives and orders of the Party as well as the instructions of the government, television has succeeded, despite its many vicissitudes and imperfections, at working for national construction and this, thanks to the constant interest that the government, headed by the visionary Houphouët-Boigny, has shown it.[58]

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Laurent Dona-Fologo, "Le défi des technologies," Fraternité Hebdo, N° 1571, June 8, 1989, p. 19.

Thus, television exists for the president, rationalized philosophically and politically through his mandate to construct and develop modern Ivoirien society. Television personnel readily state that this principle underlies much of what happens or does not happen at the television center. Program Director Koffi Yobouet said that political priorities always take precedence in program schedules. It is not uncommon, for example, to disrupt the television schedule to broadcast an unexpected presidential event or documentary on the president.[59] Indeed, such political priorities often preempt preparation of regularly scheduled programs that compete for scarce production space, equipment and competent personnel.[60]

Cultural Role of Television

Television's political responsibility to speak directly for and in favor of the government and its president includes dual cultural obligations. First, it is expected to function as window onto the world, showing the new Ivoirien man and woman the way to modernization. Second, television is expected to mirror Ivoirien culture, but primarily in the singular. And the objectives of television's political and cultural roles remain the forging of national unity and achieving development that will lead to complete modernization. Television's cultural responsibilities have been articulated in written cultural policy and presidential discourse on culture.

National Identity

The president's call for a higher profile for indigenous culture includes a summons for a singular culture ever open to outside influences:

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[59] Koffi Yobouet, program director. Interview January 19, 1988.

[60] Specific examples recounted by television personnel are reported in Mitchell Land, op., cit., ch. VI.

> The economy is not the only measure of man. It is, therefore, indispensable to give a new dimension to our development by paying much more attention to culture, **a culture** that must not be rarefied nor solitary and which knows how to affirm itself and develop from re-discovered and preserved sources of our most authentic traditions and values, while being open to outside currents, to that which is the most vivifying... **a culture** that is permanent dialogue and rendezvous of 'give and take'... **a culture**, not imposed and disseminated, but proposed and participative, not of the elite, but for the collective benefit.[61]

The president's broad cultural policy, which calls for openness to the outside world, is to construct the Ivoirien individual, to mold out of the more than 60 different ethnic groups Ivoiriens who reflect the national identity, an identity fashioned in a modern image and unfettered by obsolete traditions. His primary purpose is not to build Baoulé or Bété man, but **national** man.[62] He envisions a nation that is "more **Ivoirien** in its structures of production and ways of life, more conscious of itself and of its cultural personality ...through the affirmation of its own **national** culture."[63]

According to the official record, the promotion of the diverse ethnic cultures in Côte d'Ivoire is not in contradiction to this goal, it is secondary. While affirming respect for the many ethnic expressions, the written cultural policy declares that national cultural identity will not be founded on a return to the past, but must affirm itself in a new cultural reality engaged in the march to progress. The purpose is to bring about a synthesis between the heritage of the past and the advantages of the present.[64] This facet of official cultural policy was rearticulated in 1989 by the minister of culture, Duon Sadia, at the occasion of the annual awards presentations in the arts and letters. The minister rejected false notions of cultural authenticity, blaming so-called ethnologists who would have Africans remain in sectarian and backward isolation, forever trapped in folkloric bliss to contemplate their indigence in a modern world:

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[61] Abdou Touré, "Paysans et fonctionnaires devant la culture et l'Etat," in Y.-A. Faure and J.-F. Médard, Etat et Bourgeoisie en Côte d'Ivoire. Editions Karthala: Paris, 1982, p. 250-251. Touré quoted Houphouët-Boigny's speech recorded in Anthologie, tome III p. 1359, "Message à la Nation" August 7, 1972. (Emphases mine.)

[62] The term "man" is in direct translation from the French which takes man to signify both genders.

[63] Félix Houphouet-Boigny, Propos Sur la Culture, excerpts from speeches, 1959-1980, Editions CEDA: Abidjan, 1980, p. 19. (Emphases mine.)

> For what good is our identity and our authentic African personality if they force us to fall again head long like old animal skins on the robust shoulders of authentic Negroid cave men unconscious of the problems of their times? We must, therefore, renounce the sectarian principle of returning to the individual confines of our 60 cultural sources; we must transcend the gregarious particularities to seize through them...a unification that will bring us to a dynamic multifarious synthesis that will be true **Ivoirien culture.**[65]

The minister's words resonate well with similar views voiced by leading Ivoirien intellectuals who object to remaining forever locked in a traditional cultural sanctuary that precludes change and transformation. But the alternative proposed by the minister and which reflects official cultural policy, is **unqualified** openness to foreign influences that are expected to inhabit this "synthesis" of the modern Ivoirien person:

> Thus, dynamic Ivoirien culture and development will be the sum of all the cultures of our indigenous peoples to which will be joined all of the positive external advantages of people living in our national territory as well as all the complementary **adaptations of the modern world via the media**. Seen in this way, our culture is the principle instrument of our global development...[66]

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[64] Le Plan Quinquennal de Développement Economique, Social et Culturel, 1976-1980. The Ministry of Culture, p.526. This is the five-year plan and cultural policy. Chapters 16 and 17 focus on culture and information respectively.

[65] Sadia, op., cit., p. 48. (Emphases mine.)

[66] Ibid. (Emphases mine.)

Indeed, the purpose of officially sponsored cultural activities, like the National Festival of Scholastic and University Theater, "Vacances-Culture" and television's "Variétoscope," is in keeping with this primary goal--creation of the Ivoirien individual. The minister of public works, Jean-Jacques Béchio, elaborated on the president's cultural priority in his speech of 1988 at the opening of the seventh edition of the "Vacances-Culture" competitions sponsored by the ministry of culture. He called the communal competitions a forum of reference for the promotion, artistic creation and affirmation of the national cultural identity.[67]

Former Ivoirien minister of education and current member of Unesco's executive council, Paul Akoto Yao, linked the promotion of culture to the building of nationhood, two inseparable concepts, according to him. He called on the diverse ethnic, linguistic, social and political elements of the country to join the president's quest for **a national identity**. In his words, "the feeling of belonging to a nation must characterize all Ivoiriens."[68]

Officially then, Ivoirienness and nationhood are evoked in the singular and must remain open to the influence of the First World for the sake of arriving at the full measure of modernity. The Ivoirien individual must be molded in the image of that world. S/he must be conscious of more than immediate cultural context. S/he is connected to community, continent and, most important, world:

> ...the finished product of our political action will be man, Ivoirien man, African man, community man, freer, richer, happier, brother of all men, lover of peace

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[67] K.K. Man Jusu, "L'affirmation de l'identité culturelle nationale," Fraternité-Matin, September 12, 1988, p. 22.

[68] Mory-Frey Touré, "Place de la culture dans la nation ivoirienne", Fraternité Hebdo, No. 1532, September 8, 1988, p. 34.

> and progress, proud citizen of a great community of free and equal peoples, called to serve as an example to the entire world.[69]

To achieve this collective ideal of a national identity in terms of the world context, the president's policy reads like a precarious high-wire cultural balancing act. On the one hand he calls for preserving cultural authenticity, knowing how to retain some values while rejecting others,

> We must favor a collective consciousness of the need to call into question the past, without introducing disorder or helplessness.[70]

while on the other, he calls for pursuing a policy of openness to outside influences for the sake of development at every level according to the model of the most developed countries:

> We will continue to align ourselves with the promotion of a society that knows how to keep its traditions, but resolutely open to the currents of thoughts and influences of progress from the **modern world**...[71]

> ... it is important to achieve two apparently contradictory demands: the will to preserve and promote the national cultural heritage and the legitimate hope to integrate positive **external** advantages.[72]

The Ivoirien mass media frequently allude to the value of outside influences, for example, in shaping and enriching traditional music. Journalist Sanogo Abdoul-Bakary, commenting on the naming of the artist of the year for 1989 wrote,

> Ivoirien music is not a museum piece. It evolves in time and space. Its preoccupation should not be to fossilize or else its death would be sure. **It must avail itself of that which is the most essential in traditional rhythms while opening itself up more than ever to international sounds**, in taking care to

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[69] Houphouët-Boigny, Propos sur la culture, op., cit., p. 6.

[70] Ibid, p. 16.

[71] Houphouët-Boigny, Anthologie, op., cit., p. 1907. (Emphases mine.)

[72] Ibid. (Emphases mine.)

> demand the best technical quality because this music should be able to compete in the international orbit.[73]

In his assessment of Côte d'Ivoire's cultural climate in the mid-1970s, Unesco consultant, Bernard Faivre d'Arcier noted that there was no absence of creativity or lack of artistic expression in the country and, indeed, the traditions evident in the rural zones were abundant. However, he observed, Côte d'Ivoire was experiencing a unique form of "culture shock" not found in any other black African country on the continent: Its openness to outside influences. Such cultural openness, he explained, begun during the colonial period, had become a national policy which audaciously attempted to bring tradition and modernity together "to gamble on a rapid evolution, open to the exterior, that would foster a kind of natural selection in the play of values and behaviors between the old and the new."[74] The goal sought is rapid modernization fueled by cultural as well as economic infusion:

> What is, then, the legitimate ambition of every young state on our continent? It's to achieve economic and social equality with the most developed countries of the world."[75]

Modernization, industrialization and economic parity with the First World--these are the ultimate objectives, and whatever cultural adaptations promise to facilitate these goals are welcomed by presidential decree.

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[73] Sanogo Abdoul-Bakary, "Aujourd'hui et Demain," Ivoir'Soir, Wednesday, January 4, 1989, p. 11. (Emphases mine.) The words in boldface are almost exactly those from Houphouët-Boigny's speech in, Anthologie, op., cit., p. 1907 and Anthologie, tome III p. 1359, "Message à la Nation" August 7, 1972, op., cit. Media personnel frequently parrot such articulations from the president's speeches.

[74] Bernard Faivre d'Arcier, "Politique Culturelle," Technical Report conducted under the direction of Unesco, Paris, 1978. Series No. FMR/CC/CD/78/126, p. 25.

[75] Houphouët-Boigny, Anthologie, op., cit., p. 1165.

Cultural Modernization

The media play a vital role in the promotion of the president's concept of culture. They are considered to be indispensable links between the industrialized world and Côte d'Ivoire. Speaking at the Eighth Congress of the International Union of Journalists and the French Language Press, the president called on the information sector to cooperate with his open approach, expediting Côte d'Ivoire's quest to catch up to the modern world as conceptualized in the West:

> This cooperation, which must increase as much as possible facilitating the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge without restriction whether in agriculture or industry and **by spreading culture**, is the only means of allowing for the true progress of humanity.[76]

The policy of openness fully expects "the spreading of culture," indeed welcomes it, in the anticipation of furthering the quest for modernity. The president's goal of achieving economic modernization includes cultural modernization. Culture is seen as an instrument of economic modernization. If there is any intrinsic, bed-rock value in culture in the president's view, it is not obvious in his policy speeches. Again, the president warns against clinging to the traditional past at the expense of failing to adapt to a modern world in constant change:

> ...it would be just as vain to want to make of tradition one's only refuge and of the past one's only reference under the pretext of preserving our eminently respectable values from the permanent upheaval of our times.[77]

Thus, in the president's view, any tradition must be willing to submit to change and influence from the demands of modern living; former values are expected to evolve and even submit to **humanization** by exogenous contact:

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[76] Ibid, p. 1908. (Emphases mine.)

[77] Houphouët-Boigny, Propos sur la culture, op., cit., p. 15.

> These values will not maintain their reason for existing and will not truly be prolonged unless confronted with the realities of the world that enrich, evolve and sometimes **humanize** them through contact.[78]

Again, commenting on the 1977 Abidjan conference on culture, d'Arcier quoted a young Ivoirien reporter who explained the dichotomous cultural policy in terms of the mass media:

> There exists on the one side a culture inherited from colonization which is the prerogative of literacy, abundantly diffused by the mass media and the educational system and on the other, a culture more or less traditional lived by most Ivoiriens and whose ethnic languages provide the vehicle for that culture.[79]

René Babi, director of tourism for the western regions of Côte d'Ivoire, illustrated more bluntly the frustrating position this puts Ivoiriens in:

> We have our feet in the Stone Age, while our heads spin in the atoms--we haven't found our bodies yet.[80]

Radio and television are thus considered crucial to the shaping of national culture as they keep Ivoirien society open to outside influences. "Now," d'Arcier added, "television is the primary vehicle of the urban and Western cultural model."[81] Quoting the minister of information, Abdou Touré emphasized the official cultural role of the mass media, stressing its reception and connection to economic goals:

> ...We are of those who believe that the costs of radio and television are not unproductive expenses, because they are veritable **cultural investments** that

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[78] Ibid., p. 15. (Emphases mine.)

[79] D'Arcier, op., cit., p. 7.

[80] Michael and Aubine Kirtley, "The Ivory Coast--African Success Story," National Geographic, Vol. 162, No. 1, July 1982, p. 100.

[81] D'Arcier, op., cit., p. 19.

> augment the general potential of receptiveness of Ivoirien society and as a result, its capacity to produce and consume.[82]

In a speech at the 1989 conference of ministers of information in Paris, the Ivoirien minister of information joined the affirmation of the president's policy of openness, rationalizing it on the inevitability of interdependence:

> A withdrawing into oneself at a time when interdependence is the **only** way out to the people, at a time when solidarity resounds as a hymn to survival, a withdrawal into oneself is suicidal. And to profit from the advantages of being a world citizen, the Ivoirien must see himself as interdependent with that world **and its models of development**.[83]

The president's cultural policy of openness to Western influences was concretely reiterated with the installation of new technological capabilities to allow satellite reception of French programs on a daily basis. At a cost of 73 million francs Cfa ($234,000), the French Cooperation sent French technicians to install and maintain a satellite dish and related equipment that permits the reception of 1400 hours of programming from France a year. The broadcasts originate from the French television channels and are transmitted from Paris via Intelsat to the 4.5-by 6-meters satellite reception dish located on the premises of television's Cocody location in Abidjan. In anticipation of potential criticism for continuing such a blatant openness to exterior influences, Fraternité-Matin proudly reported the installation beginning with a defensive statement from Information Minister Dona-Fologo:

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[82] Touré, in Toure, Abdou. "Paysans et fonctionnaires devant la culture de l'Etat," in Y.-A. Faure and J.-F. Medard, Etat et Bourgeoisie en Cote d'Ivoire, Paris: Editions Karthala, 1982. Quotes the minister's speech reported in Fraternité-Matin, October 4, 1968, p. 4. (Emphases mine.)

[83] Laurent Dona-Fologo at the Paris Conference on Communication. "Pour une coopération respectant la souveraineté et les différences", Fraternité-Matin, Thursday, April 13, 1989, page 28. (Emphases mine.)

> Africa has refused to be the garbage can of toxic wastes, she must refuse as long as she can to be the trash can of toxic images.[84]

This bold political statement suggesting cultural resistance had already been rendered vacuous by previous statements made by the minister that conceded the inevitability of satellite communication with which, he suggested, Africa was forced to come to terms: "If we must be 'eaten' at least let it be by friends..." Dona-Fologo casually acknowledged that every nation would finally be "eaten" anyway because "information today is television; it's television without frontiers."[85] The government posits that **interdependence** is the only option left to it. But interdependence means dependence on others, not their mutual dependence on each other. The very best the Côte d'Ivoire can hope for, then, is to be interdependent with friends. Thus political will, officially articulated in public discourse, is resigned not only to the inevitability, but also to the utility of economic and cultural integration with the modern First World.

Social Control through Cultural Practices

The rhetorical and written pronouncements of cultural policy are accompanied by official cultural activities that take place with socio-political purpose. Communal cultural competitions like "Vacances-Cultures," "Théâtre Scolaire," sponsored by the ministry of culture and radio-television programs like "Radio-Vacances," "Piedéstal," "Podium" and "Variétoscope," sponsored by the ministry of information, are events designed with dual objectives: 1). to contribute to development while promoting the national cultural identity 2). and to mobilize and direct the creative energies of the youth toward social responsibility (and by implication, away from unauthorized political activities), especially during idle vacation time. Cultural events are aimed at social control and maintenance.

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[84] Benita Ahossy, "Canal France International: 1,400 heures d'Emission par An à Exploiter pour notre TV." Fraternité-Matin, Thursday June 8, 1989, p. 2.

[85] Yao Noël, "Conférence France-Afrique Sur l'Information: Priorité à la Formation", Fraternité-Matin, Friday, March 31, 1989, p. 24.

Guie Toilehie, section chief for cultural activities at the ministry of culture, affirmed the social function underlying the government's promotion of cultural events among Ivoirien young people, those in or out of school: "to occupy the youth in healthy activities, to initiate them into their culture, to determine the best among them." The purpose is to assure social control while promoting national cultural identity.[86] Calling "Vacances-Culture 1988" a forum of reference for the promotion of the national cultural identity, Minister of Public Works Jean-Jacques Béchio said at the closing ceremonies that the purpose underlying the events was "to wholesomely occupy the youth."[87] He was joined by the mayor of Divo, Konian Kodjo, who warned that the absence of such inter-communal cultural encounters would have constituted a void for the youth during the vacation period and indeed, "the peace would have been dangerously threatened in our cities and towns."[88] Even the media praised the participants of "Vacances Culture 1988" for resounding official themes that promoted social control--non-violence, dialogue, return to the earth and reforestation:

> One thing that can please Ivoirien political authorities, who have undertaken a policy of sensitization of the population around the mottos,...is that all of these mottos were resounded in the works of the young people during Vacances-Culture

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[86] Guie Toilehie, section chief for cultural activities at the ministry of culture. Interview June 7, 1989.

[87] K.K. Man Jusu, "L'affirmation de l'identité culturelle nationale," Fraternité-Matin, September 12, 1988, p. 22.

[88] Noutoua Youdé, "La messe est dite", Ivoire Dimanche, No. 920, September 25, 1988, pp.47-49.

> 88...In sum, these young people are to be commended for taking to heart the current concerns of the authorities in this country.[89]

These events, therefore, were not spontaneous expressions of a people's ethos, concerns, dreams or an effort to resolve social contradictions through cultural practices, but rather they appear to have been designed to please the political authorities, perhaps in view of winning the competitions. Such government-sponsored activities intend not only to keep young people out of trouble, but to promote official themes that reinforce the notions of unity, dialogue, cooperation--in brief, social stability.

Antoine Kakou acknowledged the upsurge of public interest in indigenous cultural expressions, particularly evident since the mid-1970s, and credited it to deliberate action on the part of the government to give cultural activities a high profile.[90] Abdou Touré confirmed that during the 1980s there was more evidence of indigenous cultural expressions than ever before because of political support.[91] Yacouba Konaté documents the flurry of Ivoirien cultural practice through popular music, especially that which was broadcast on television during the 1970s and early 1980s, but credits the upsurge primarily to the government's particular attention to culture for political purposes:

> ...And the orchestra [the television band], this institutional infrastructure, becomes the primordial matrix and tool of prospection for national artists. Television, queen and mistress of the cultural industry, looks for young talent year after year and organizes band competitions each year among young people for whom the rewards offered by the Father of the Nation become more and more inticing...The gracious gifts of the Chief of State and the Ministry of Information

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[89] K. K. Man Jusu, "Les Jeunes de la Non-Violence," Fraternité Matin, Friday, September 23, 1988, p. 6.

[90] Antoine Kakou, director of the Institut National des Arts (INA), Abidjan. Interview September 22, 1988.

[91] Abdou Touré, sociologist and author; adviser to the ministry of primary education. Interview February 10, 1989.

> constitute an excellent means of encouraging nationalism and militantism among the artists who...seek to be more and more alert in making their works coincide with [political] reality.[92]

Ivoirien journalist, Sanogo Abdoul-Bakary, commenting on the many cultural manifestations during the 1988 vacation period, compared them to light posts leading the youth to return to the earth--the major political message in Côte d'Ivoire in 1989. Quoted in the same article was Tambla Vagbéman, chairman of the Mankono Student's Union, who described the functional purpose of cultural manifestations as channels "to allow us to communicate our messages of sensitization."[93] There were no visible signs of student unrest or political opposition during these broadcasts. Laurent Gbagbo had recently "reconciled" with the president on national television and the teachers' union movement had been silenced through Gbagbo's exile and the imprisonment of several activists.[94] The situation, however, returned to chaos in 1990 when students rioted in Abidjan and all public schools were closed for the year in April, and Laurent Gbagbo was placed under house arrest.

Undoubtedly, cultural events seem to play an important role in promoting and encouraging indigenous cultural expressions, but they do so without admitting the contradictions because they are planned and controlled by the state. As indicated above, they provide cultural opportunities for animating political will. "Vacances-Culture 1988," which brought together cultural groups from 11 communes of Côte d'Ivoire, featured performances that reinforced the political themes of the day.

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[92] Yacouba Konaté, Alpha Blondy: Reggae et société en Afrique Noire, Karthala: Paris, 1987, p. 163. Konaté's book never alludes to the flourishing of cultural production in Côte d'Ivoire as an effort to counterbalance Western cultural influence. On the contrary, Western cultural influence is portrayed as ubiquitous and accepted by the Ivoirien government and society in general.

[93] Sanogo Abdoul-Bakary, "Journées culturelles: On sort des sentiers battus" Ivoir'Soir, August 3, 1988, p. 10.

[94] Personal observation. Interestingly, one of the jailed activists was the Ivoirien wife of the American elementary principal of the International Community School of Abidjan, a Mr. Walbridge.

Although television's most popular program,"Variétoscope," was not created by political initiative, both the show's producer and primary host said that its first objective is to keep young people out of trouble. The annual show, first produced in 1985, provides the venue for amateur dance and theatrical competitions for young people who interpret recorded music from a variety of sources, including local music. The amateur variety contest, which begins at the communal level, lasts for six weeks and is broadcast on five lengthy programs during the scholastic vacation period between June and September. It is designed to occupy a large number of people in cultural activities that do not require unusual performance skills that would limit participation. The nature of the broadcast keeps viewers returning every week to watch the unfolding competitive events, and so lends itself to this occupying function. Its secondary purpose is didactic, to teach participants about their culture and traditions.[95] Again, however, the show allows no space for contradictions. The historical sketches performed by competing groups in "Variétoscope 1988" dramatized the positive contributions of Africa's leading political figures of the past. Not surprisingly, no group chose to portray the more notorious African leaders who have emerged since independence.

Conclusion

The role of Côte d'Ivoire's information infrastructures in general and Ivoirien television in particular is to serve the Ivoirien state as conceptualized and articulated by its president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Contrary to Western assumptions that information infrastructures, usually privately owned, should permit the unfettered circulation of ideas in the bustle of social and cultural intercourse, information exists primarily to assist the state in achieving its goals: National unity and identity, political consensus and modern development. In light of these compelling national obligations, the state precludes libertarian functions of its media. The media are charged with portraying a positive image of the nation, not with treating the political, social and cultural contradictions of Ivoirien society. Indeed, the free unrestricted flow of information is discouraged within the borders of the Ivoirien state; information's greater vocation--serving national interests as interpreted by the Party--must yield to such frivolous ventures.

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[95] Valérie Djira, television producer and Barthélemy Inabo, television producer and host. Interview May 12, 1989. Djira produced "Variétoscope," hosted by Inabo and Serge Fattoh.

Pursuant to these goals, television provides not only the indispensable channel of communication between the one-party government and its people, but serves as a vital link between the modern world and a struggling and developing Côte d'Ivoire that aspires to the model of that world. Television is, therefore, expected to support the official cultural policy: To construct the Ivoirien nation by forging an Ivoirien cultural identity through openness and interdependence. Television's primary cultural role, therefore, is window onto the outside world, and only secondarily is it the mirror of Ivoirien cultures. And while television, as mirror, sometimes reflects multiple Ivoirien cultures, the latter are expected to acquiesce to a singular national culture in the image of the Party which is also synonymous with a Western cultural image. Moreover, these cultures must also give in to those influences from the First World that promise to invigorate and indeed, humanize them for the sake of achieving cultural modernization. Accordingly, traditions and values must be purified and transformed by exogenous contact and thus open the way for rapid modernization. The cultural priority is openness for the sake of modernization in the quest of the Ivoirien national identity.

It is true that Ivoirien television celebrates national culture and sometimes even resembles a public cultural forum permitting Ivoiriens to collectively ritualize national holidays, participate in state funerals (for economic and political elites only) and gather around a simulated village square to hear folktales from the past and dance to the rhythms that still animate village cultures. Celebration is always going on somewhere in the public place, and television is the premiere public place. Indeed, eminent occasions inspire regional leaders to go to great lengths to obtain television coverage. Even modern Ivoirien popular music has flourished through television's many variety shows, bolstered by particular political attention. Cultural practice, especially through television, therefore, is astutely monitored and often controlled by the state to assure its loyalty to the government and to use it as a vehicle for political and social purposes.

Still, television fails to replace the "talking tree" or "Arbre à Palabre" of traditional village life where, under a baobab or mango tree, villagers would congregate not only to celebrate festivals, learn of glorious ancestors and share in the folkways of the tribal group, but to iron out problems and collectively seek solutions.[96] State television is not available to resolve political, social or economic problems in a forum of open debate. Celebration is permitted, but not confrontation.[97] Thus, state cultural policy becomes political policy for the added purpose of social control. Television personnel and artists are ever conscious of the possibility that their superiors, or worse, the president is watching and thus are compelled to tailor their commentary and performances accordingly.

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[96] Youssouf Djira, television producer. Interview May 3, 1988.

[97] Yacouba Konaté, Ivoirien sociologist and author. Interview October 4, 1988.

There is no question that importing low-cost television programs from the West not only satisfies the medium's insatiable appetite for content and does so economically, but it is also an accepted practice politically. Indeed, rather than taking measures to resist or lessen the cultural impact of exogenous material, the Ivoirien government encourages the practice by providing both the material means and the philosophical rationale. And while the world economic structure and the powerful culture industries may bear some of the blame for flooding the market with culture products, governments--particularly those in full control of their media systems--bear the responsibility of accepting, rejecting or mediating the flow through policy and practice.

COVERAGE OF SUB-SAHARA AFRICA BY FOUR SOVIET DAILIES, 1979-1987: A CONTENT ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

COVERAGE OF SUB-SAHARA AFRICA BY FOUR SOVIET DAILIES, 1979-1987: A CONTENT ANALYSIS

This study used a content analysis to examine the coverage of sub-Sahara Africa by four Soviet dailies -- Pravda, Izvestia, Trud and Selskaya Zhizn -- between 1979 and 1987. The study found that beyond ideological prejudice in favor of Pro-Soviet countries, political and crisis news were prominent in the coverage of the region. The dailies scored highly in the amount of favorable news published.

COVERAGE OF SUB-SAHARA AFRICA BY FOUR SOVIET DAILIES, 1979-1987: A CONTENT ANALYSIS

The issues in the debate on the New World Information and Communication Order included the imbalances and distortions in foreign news reporting and the call by Mustapha Masmoudi for improving the images of Third World nations in international communication. The avalanche of studies generated by the debate may have thoroughly examined Western media because of their domination of world communication but Soviet media were largely ignored in most scholarship on the debate. And in particular, little has been written about Soviet media coverage of Black Africa. This study attempts to fill that void by examining the coverage of sub-Sahara Africa or Africa South of the Sahara by four Soviet dailies -- Pravda, Izvestia, Trud and Selskaya Zhizn -- between 1979 and 1987.

One objective of the study focuses on the valence of coverage in terms of favorable, unfavorable, and neutral news published about Sub-Sahara Africa in the four Soviet dailies. A second goal is the examination of the topic categories of Sub-Sahara African reporting, such as political, development, crisis and cultural news appearing in the dailies in this study. The third objective deals with political or ideological bias -- an examination of pro-Soviet and non-proSoviet countries and the type of coverage given to each group.

Previous studies of international communication and foreign news in various national dailies suggest that the criteria governing the selection of news are based on the political and economic interests of the nation whose media report international news. The 1984 study of the pattern of foreign news by Stevenson and Cole revealed that Soviet media gave more attention to ideology or communism (Stevenson and Cole, 1984, pp. 50- 52).

Charles, Shore and Todd (1979, pp. 150-157) found that trade is a predictor of media attention in international news coverage. Other variables that influence how the media cover the activities in other nations include political and cultural ties.1

The total print-run of the dailies involved in this study has risen from 36.7 million copies in 1982 to 41.5 million copies in 1990. All the papers are nationally distributed from Moscow. Pravda, established in 1912 by V.I. Lenin, is the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Izvestia, established in 1917 is an organ of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Trud, founded four years later is an organ of the Trade Union while Selskaya Zhizn, established in 1960, is an organ of the USSR's Central Committee of the Communist Party.

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1. This paper is further informed by scholarship on Soviet media and international coverage by Hopkins (1970), Bogdanov and Viazemski (1971), Okorokov (1974), Gerbner and Marvanyi (1977), Merrill and Fisher (1980), Richstad and Anderson (1981, p. 68), Mickiewicz (1981), Zassoursky and Losev (1981), Stevenson and Shaw (1984), Nordenstreng (1984), Varis (1986), Asoyan (1987), Eribo, Vaughn and Oshagan (1990), Merrill (1991) and others.

Method

The content analysis examined the images of sub-Sahara African countries as conveyed in these four papers in 1979, 1983, and 1987, and how each of these four national dailies in the USSR reported favorable, unfavorable, and neutral news about the region. The study also examined the topic categories of political, development, crisis, and culture news reported during the period. In addition, the study considered how the newspapers divided coverage among the pro-Soviet countries and nations that were not pro-Soviet. The method consisted of sample selection, coding, and analysis of the results.

Sample Selection

The population of this study consisted of Pravda, Izvestia, Trud and Selskaya Zhizn, covering January to December 1979, 1983, and 1987. A stratified random sample of fourteen issues of Pravda, Izvestia, Trud and Selskaya Zhizn was selected in two stages. The first was a continuous week while the second stage was a constructed week. The author analyzed 168 issues.

The first stage involved randomly selecting one continuous week (Sunday to Saturday) from all the weeks in the 1979, 1983, and 1987 samples. For the 1979 samples, the 17th week, that is the period between April 29 (Sunday) to May 5, 1979, was selected. For 1983 samples, the 17th week covering between April 24 (Sunday) to April 30 (Saturday) 1983 was chosen. Similarly, for the 1987 samples, the 17th week covering April

26 (Sunday) to May 2 (Saturday), was selected. At the first stage of the continuous week, all the four newspapers were uniformly sampled on the days stated above.

At the second stage, seven days were randomly selected to build a constructed week, that is, a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday were randomly selected from the years' Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursday, Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. By random selection, the following days were chosen in 1979 -- Monday July 2, Tuesday November 13, Wednesday May 30, Thursday January 18, Friday October 5, Saturday October 20 and Sunday October 7. By the same random selection the following days were chosen in 1983 -- Monday July 4, Tuesday November 8, Wednesday May 25, Thursday January 20, Friday October 7, Saturday October 22 and Sunday October 9. Similarly, the constructed week for 1987 was randomly selected and the following days were chosen -- Monday July 6, Tuesday November 10, Wednesday May 27, Thursday January 22, Friday October 2, Saturday October 17 and Sunday October 4. The author examined all four papers on the dates stated for the constructed weeks in 1979, 1983 and 1987.

All the news stories about sub-Sahara Africa published by Pravda, Izvestia, Trud and Selskaya Zhizn were coded from the original Russian text by the author for topic categories, locality, valence of coverage, and story length. The news story was the unit of analysis and measured in column inches.

The method used in this study borrowed extensively from the methodology used in the final report of the "Foreign Images" study undertaken for the UNESCO by the International Association for Mass

Communication Research in 1985.

Topic Categories

This study developed four major topic categories:

1. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY -- News about political events, socialism, communism, and capitalism, including criticisms or evaluations of the above.
2. DEVELOPMENT -- news about developmental projects, programs, campaigns and other related activities in sub-Saharan Africa reflecting the efforts by the region to improve life (e.g. public health programs, construction of dams and irrigation, agricultural or food programs). Also coded under this category are news about education, business (including industry, commerce, banking and trade).
3. CRISIS -- news about the difficulties and afflictions in the region, for example, hunger, poverty, drought, debts, armed and political conflicts, earthquakes, coups, bio-chemical mishap, forest fire, volcanic eruptions, invasion by locust and wild animals, flood and disease.
4. CULTURE -- news about culture, literature, fine arts, painting, craft, drama, films, festivals, and cultural conferences.

Locality

Locality is a simple measure of the nation which was the focus of the news coverage.

Valence of Coverage

The valence of coverage was evaluated on a three point scale: favorable, neutral, and unfavorable. Favorability was determined by news reflecting social cohesion, co-operation, political and economic stability and strength. Unfavorability was determined by news reflecting social conflicts, disorganization, political and economic instability and weakness. Neutrality was determined by news reflecting neither favorable nor unfavorable conditions because of its focus on non-controversial material or events.

Pro-Soviet Countries

The division of sub-Saharan African (as defined by the World Bank, 1984) nations into pro-Soviet and non-proSoviet as of 1979, 1983 and 1987, was made by the author based on his knowledge of Soviet relations in Africa and on recent political histories of each country by Hoffman, 1986; Martin, 1985.

Reliability

To determine the coding reliability, a cross cultural check was conducted with the assistance of two doctoral candidates of mass communication, an African and an American. Both participants were given the coding instructions used in the topic categories and valence of coverage by the first coder and verbally instructed to comply with the written instructions. They were given the direct English translation of the Russian texts of the news stories. The reliability score for the two coders put together was 85%.

A pretesting conducted with a cosmopolitan Soviet citizen who had visited sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and North America resulted in 100% agreement with the first coder who has a similar travel experience. The degree of reliability of the coding is considered reasonably high in view of the cross-cultural peculiarities and procedural rigors (See Budd et al., 1967) .

RESULTS

The four dailies' coverage included 1289 column inches and 210 news stories in the 1979, 1983 and 1987 samples. The breakdown of the amount of coverage in column inches shows Pravda with 49 percent, Izvestia 36 percent, Trud 6 percent, and Selskaya Zhizn 9 percent while the breakdown of the news stories in the analysis shows Izvestia with 40 percent, Pravda 38 percent, Selskaya Zhizn 13 percent and Trud 9 percent.

Number of Countries Covered

All the pro-Soviet countries and 89 percent of the non-proSoviet countries were covered by the four dailies in the three years of samples. The pro-Soviet countries covered are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The non-proSoviet countries covered are Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius and Niger. Others are Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. The three non-proSoviet countries omitted in the coverage are Cameroon, Malawi and Swaziland.

Samples for 1979 showed that 14 sub-Saharan African countries received coverage in _Pravda_ compared to 21 nations in _Izvestia_. _Selskaya Zhizn_ covered six sub-Saharan African countries while _Trud_ reported on only two.

Izvestia still led in 1983 with 12 countries, followed by _Pravda_ with eight, _Trud_ with the coverage of seven nations, and _Selskaya Zhizn_ with four. In 1987, _Izvestia_ covered 21 countries while _Pravda_ reported 13. _Selskaya Zhizn_ increased its coverage to nine. _Trud_ was in the fourth place reporting on only five countries during the period. Clearly, _Izvestia_ was the leader in the number of sub-Saharan African countries covered throughout the three years sampled.

Valence of Coverage

Of the 210 stories reported in this study, 63.8 percent (or 134 stories) were favorable, 22.9 percent (or 48 stories) were neutral and only 13.3 percent (or 28 stories) were unfavorable (See Figure 1).

Figure 1 About Here

Pravda covered sub-Saharan Africa during 1979, 1983, and 1987 in basically a favorable way. The samples from the three years revealed that *Pravda* published 79 news stories on sub-Saharan Africa. Sixty-eight percent were favorable compared to 6 percent unfavorable and 25 percent neutral. The corresponding figures for *Izvestia* during the same period were 85 news stories including 58 percent favorable, 9 percent negative, and 33 percent neutral stories. For *Trud*, there were 19 stories reflecting 53 percent favorable, 47 percent unfavorable, zero percent neutral. *Selskaya Zhizn* had 27 stories with 78 percent favorable items, 22 percent unfavorable and zero percent neutral news stories. *Trud's* 47 percent unfavorable stories made it the most negative in reporting about sub-Saharan Africa throughout the three-year period. *Pravda* had the least number of unfavorable news stories with the 6 percent of such stories recorded.

Topical Analysis

Political or ideological news dominated the coverage of sub-Saharan Africa by the papers examined in this study. As much as 59.5 percent (or 125 news stories) of the reports were about political or ideological events in the region. Crisis news were responsible for 24 percent (or 51 stories) of the reports while 12.8 percent (or 27 stories) and 3 percent (or 7 stories) of the news reports were about development and cultural events respectively.

Significantly but perhaps not surprisingly, coverage of sub-Saharan Africa was highly political. Although crisis news did not dominate coverage, it was a notable part of the Soviet media's work, indicating that "bad news" was not the sole domain of the Western press in its coverage of the Third World (Stevenson and Gaddy, 1984). News about development and culture in sub-Saharan Africa trailed behind political and crisis news indicating that Soviet media cannot be fully absolved of the criticisms and accusations faced by Western media in the debate on the New World Information Order (See Figure 2)

Figure 2 About Here

Amount of Coverage To Political Divisions

Political bias affected Soviet media coverage of sub-Sahara Africa significantly. The pro-Soviet countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which account for 31 percent of the region's population, received 73 percent of the total column inches. Although the non-proSoviet nations account for 69 percent of the population of the region, they received 27 percent of the coverage in column inches. This disproportionate coverage may be attributed to ideological bias.

Of the 134 favorable stories published, the pro-Soviet countries received 81 percent of the favorable news items while the non-proSoviet states received 19 percent such news. The pro-Soviet countries received 43 percent of the unfavorable news while the non-proSoviet countries received the larger share of such news amounting to 57 percent of the unfavorable reports. There was a total of 28 unfavorable news. The pro-Soviet countries accounted for 44 percent of the neutral news while 56 percent of such news went to the non-proSoviet countries out of a total of 48 neutral news stories.

The pro-Soviet countries received 68 percent of the political news stories leaving the non-proSoviet states with 32 percent political news out of a total of 125 such news. Interestingly, pro-Soviet nations received a substantial amount of crisis news coverage. Of the 51 crisis stories published, fifty-nine percent were about pro-Soviet countries while the non-pro-Soviet countries received only 41 percent. The probable reason for the high amount of crisis news for the pro-Soviet countries is the conflict between Angola and UNITA/South Africa, the conflict in Mozambique, and the pre-independence conflict in Zimbabwe.

Seventy-eight percent of the development news was given to the pro-Soviet countries while the non-proSoviet countries received 22 percent of similar news. There were 27 development news stories in all the samples.

In view of the high volume of positive reports given to pro-Soviet countries, 85.7 percent of the cultural news given to those areas should come as no surprise.. The non-proSoviet countries received but 14.3 percent of the cultural news coverage out of only seven such reports. (See Figure 3).

Figure 3 About Here

Synopsis of Coverage by the Four Dailies

The following news story on the Republic of Niger published in Pravda on October 7, 1983 is typical of what the Soviet dailies report about sub-Sahara Africa.

> "Attempted Coup. Paris, 6 (TASS). On the night from 5 to 6 of October, in Niger Republic there was an attempted coup, reported by Agence France Presse from Niamey, from the announcement by Umaru Mamane, the Prime Minister of this West African country. A group of military personnel, he announced in an address to the nation, attempted to use the absence of the Head of State Seyni Kountche now in France, to take power. However, this attempt was crushed."

This story on a non proSoviet sub-Sahara African country, for example, was treated under the unfavorable and crisis news categories in the coding in this study.

Among the stories on Ethiopia, a pro-Soviet country, was this account about appointments in the country, published by Selskaya Zhizn on April 24, 1983:

> Addis Ababa. The military government of Ethiopia announced a number of appointments into its body and also the appointment of military commissioners in all the provinces in the country. Appointed as the Minister of Agriculture is a member of the Central Committee for the organization of the Workers Party of the Supreme Council of the Peoples' revolutionary campaign for development and central planning."

This news story which reflects political strength and stability was coded as a favorable story as well as a political piece.

Some reports on the departure of foreign officials to their countries after a visit to Moscow on the occasion of the USSR's national day were published under "departure announcements" in one short sentence without any comment on the officials or their activities while in Moscow. For example, Izvestia reported on November 10, 1987, that "The Sudanese representative departed Moscow for home." This neutral departure report is understandably political because of the diplomatic significance of visits by foreign officials. No further information is given to consider it as a favorable or unfavorable news report.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of coverage of sub-Sahara Africa by the four newspapers examined in the content analysis revealed that a disproportionate amount of news was allocated to the pro-Soviet countries in the region. Not only were the non-proSoviet countries sparsely covered but the Soviet media emphasized negative news about them.

The findings of this study support the reports by Stevenson and Cole (1984) that Soviet media emphasized ideology or politics in their coverage. Political news followed in the second place by crisis news was prominent in the coverage given to sub-Sahara Africa by the four newspapers in this analysis. Implicit in this finding is that the Soviet press was guilty of reporting "bad news" like the Western media. Beyond apparent ideological prejudice and prominence to crisis news, the meager coverage given to news about the art and culture of the region may amount to distortion of the true image of sub-Sahara Africa -- a region known for the art of Benin, Cameroon, and Ife.

One area in which the Soviet dailies in this study scored highly in their coverage of sub-Sahara Africa was the amount of favorable news. Clearly, favorable news about sub-Sahara Africa dominated the coverage in this study. It may be argued that the biased coverage given to the pro-Soviet countries may be responsible for the lead position occupied by favorable reports. There were very few unfavorable news reports and when they did appear, the non-proSoviet countries in the region were the most likely recipients of such news.

In the light of the findings in this study, the debate on a New World Information and Communication Order to this point cannot be seen as either fair or comprehensive in view of the narrow focus of the accusations and counter-accusations which single out the media of the Western nations for the lion's share of the criticism. Clearly, more research on Soviet media, both before and after the introduction of glasnost, is needed in order to fully understand the nature of their coverage of events in the Third World, and to redress the imbalance in both research and criticism of the major media of the world.

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Figure 1



Valence of Coverage of Sub-Sahara Africa By Four Soviet Dailies In 1979, 1983 & 1987

Figure 2



Topical Analysis of News Coverage of Sub-Sahara Africa By Four Soviet Dailies in 1979, 1983 & 1987

Figure 3


Political Bias in The Coverage of Sub-Sahara Africa By Four Soviet Dailies in 1979, 1983 & 1987

NEW WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

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and

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Paper presented to the International Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, annual convention, Boston, August 1991.

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NEW WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

Formal proposals for what would come be known as a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) started being discussed in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during the 1960s and 1970s. In one form or another, UNESCO regarded improvement in world communication issues one of its major responsibilities since its inception. Since the mid-1970s, however, the debate over communication issues became political and contentious.

In 1980, the McBride Commission was created by UNESCO to deal with continuing problems related to the NWICO. The McBride Commission report, the most important document to come from UNESCO on the NWICO, recognized communication as a basic human right as well as a collective right of societies (Munoz, 1983). However, as many observers have noted, the origins of the NWICO pre-date even the 1978 declaration by four years when UNESCO adopted a Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO called for structural improvements in the worldwide distribution of wealth. To Western critics of the NWICO, the very term "information order" conjures up Orwellian images of media manipulation by governments.

The NWICO has no clear definition, nor represents any single idea. Instead, it is an amalgam of ideas and demands expressed in a number of UNESCO declarations and resolutions over the years aimed at correcting the uneven flow of communication between and within nations.

This paper discusses the NWICO in Latin America, tracing development of the proposal in the region and interpreting literature on its impact in the region. Although examples are difficult to document because of the region's tradition of news media independence, this paper will discuss NWICO ideas attempted or now in practice in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Guyana.

The UNESCO resolutions and declarations that involve the NWICO have to satisfy a number of constituencies which comprise, quite literally, the entire world. As a result, many UNESCO documents are so ambiguous that they mean different things to different people. As one observer wrote of the NWICO: "The New World Information and Communication order means sharply different things to different people . . . . It seems clear that the term NWICO has become a symbol around which or against the varying sides to the controversy have rallied. As a symbol, the NWICO is now associated with a movement or cause, rather than a specific entity" (Shea, 1984, p. 4).

The NWICO has come to encompass such matters as media production and distribution methods, content decisions, the social role of news, journalism education and training, communication research, and the economic operations of media. UNESCO declarations and resolutions are often phrased in such general terms that supporters and critics of the NWICO not only debate, for instance, whether journalists should be licensed to practice their craft, but also whether the declarations and resolutions even say that journalists should be licensed. The words "license" and "licensing" may not be used, but critics charge the the resolutions and declarations in effect mandate the licensing of journalists. Debates also rage about whether journalists should be critical or actively support their governments' policies. The "licensing" and criticisms/support debates have been among the most contentious NWICO debates in UNESCO.

Beyond the perfunctory rhetoric of calling for more a equitable international news flow, calls for a NWICO have also embraced solutions for correcting news flow problems such as the creation of national and regional news agencies and the establishment of journalism training and education programs in developing countries. These have usually been among the least contentious debates. Many Western news organizations, ordinarily critics of the NWICO, have not only endorsed but have wholeheartedly embraced the concept of journalism training programs. But once Latin American governments got involved in this issue and mandated journalism education, in the form of a university degree, as a prerequisite to practice journalism, a debate emerged around this issue as well.

Although much of the debate over the NWICO has quelled in recent years, the topic is far from dead. Despite the ambiguity concerning the NWICO, it has proven to be a valuable concept for analyzing mass media in developing nations. The analyses have also contributed a decidedly and much needed Third World point of view to the debate. Among the more controversial solutions offered by some supporters of the NWICO have been increased involvement by states in regulating the information flow within their nations.

Partly as a result of what the Western nations regard as dangerous solutions offered by UNESCO to rectify world communication problems, the United States and Great Britain withdrew from the organization in 1984 (followed later by Singapore). William Harley (1984), a media consultant to the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO in the Department of State, claims the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO because it did not want to be seen as supporting "a kind of Good Housekeeping seal of approval to anti-free press behavior . . . . Though it is true that any number of resolutions may be passed by UNESCO, no nation can be forced to comply with them. However, sanction by UNESCO of the kind of restrictions on the media which are constantly being proposed in that forum could lend respectability to actions by authoritarian regimes" (p. 20).

Much that has come from the NWICO has involved a good deal of rhetoric. Bolivian scholar Luis Ramiero Beltran (1978), a supporter of the NWICO, agrees that too often the supporters of the NWICO engage in "catchy slogans" that are "meant to elicit prompt and uniform--- and almost instinctive--- reactions of a given nature . . . (which) function as agents of emotion and dogmatic preconception, banning sensible dialogue in favor of aggressive monologues" (p. 183).

THE ROOTS OF THE NWICO

Calls for a NWICO came after general disappointment with Western researchers' attempts to facilitate modernization in developing nations with the aid of mass media during the 1950s and 1960s. These researchers, with Daniel Lerner, Wilbur Schramm, Lucian Pye, and Everette Rogers the most prominent among them, believed mass media played a complex, but significant, role in the interrelationships among a number of development-related variables, including literacy, per capita economic growth, and political participation (Fair, 1989; Stevenson, 1988).

These researchers believed that mass media could contribute to accelerating the pace of a nation's economic development by preparing peoples in developing nations for modernization and stimulating a positive disposition toward development. They viewed the media as diffusers of innovations, mobilizers, and innovators. In addition, it was believed that if economic development could be achieved, social and political development would follow, leading eventually to a thriving democracy. National development was seen to involve a mode of thinking which mass media could encourage (Stevenson, 1988).

By 1963, Lerner conceded weaknesses with these views which would latter be known as "the dominant paradigm." He maintained that the press in developing nations may have worked against the cause of national development by fostering unrealistic possibilities of the rate of economic development, thereby creating "rising expectations" and "rising frustrations." Other U.S. researchers claimed that not merely the amount of mass media in developing nations, but press freedom in the form of an independent press, was correlated with desirable development-related outcomes (Gardner, 1963; Nixon, 1960).

By the late 1970s, Rogers (1976) claimed a "new paradigm of development" was approaching. The problem with the old paradigm, or the "dominant paradigm" of economic development, was the central focus on overall economic growth and capital-intensive technologies. Measures such as per capita income came to be viewed as indicators of "quality of life."

The dominant paradigm was seen to have "Western bias" that viewed national development in terms of economic growth. It overlooked such important matters as the equitable distribution of wealth and the importance of maintaining traditional cultures. The rapid rush for national development in developing nations followed a "growth-first-and-let-equality-come-later mentality" (Rogers, 1976; 1980). The new paradigm that was developing, Rogers asserted, would involve the popular participation of all sectors of society, the equitable distribution of social wealth, self-development strategies, and the integration of traditional values with modern technologies.

Scholars from the political left were among the first to outline the form they believed this news paradigm would take. In addition to outlining a new paradigm, they spent much of their time castigating the old one. Atwood (1986) charged that the early Western development researchers' narrow focus of press freedom, "cognitive modernity," and "diffusion of innovations" supported the contentions of "ethnocentric rigidity, mercantile or imperialistic motives, and methodological inadequacy" (p. 13).

LATIN AMERICA AND THE NWICO

Latin American scholars during the 1950s and 1960s put forward the notion of "dependency theory." The theory grew from their frustrations with Latin American nations' seeming inability to become economically self-sufficient despite considerable economic advancement. According to this theory, nations in the political Core (e.g., the United States and other Western European nations) kept nations in the political Periphery (e.g., Latin America) perpetually dependent upon upon the core nations (Cardoso & Falleto, 1979). This political and economic theory serves as the theoretical framework for "media imperialism" and "cultural imperialism," central terms in much of the NWICO debate. According to these two forms of imperialism, mass media exported from the core to the periphery maintain modern-day imperialism through subversion and propaganda rather than military force (Beltran, 1978).

While even some of the more conservative media scholars in the United States agree that that there exists a primarily "one-way" flow of information coming from the developed nations to Latin America, they do not concede the immediate dangers of this imbalance. Further, they see nothing nefarious in the uneven flow (Merrill, 1981). Most Western scholars maintain that the uneven flow is the result of the economies of scale enjoyed by the industrialized nations in media production (Hoskins, Mirus, & Rozeboom, 1989). Some scholars from the political left, however, assert that the uneven flow has nothing to do with economies of scale. Instead, they argue, the uneven flow is the result of a "conspiracy" to keep developing nations forever dependent upon the industrialized nations (Schiller, 1976). Ramiero Beltran (1978) summarized this conspiracy view, writing "cultural imperialism through communication is not an occasional and fortuitous event . . . (I)t is a vital process for 'imperial' countries to secure and maintain economic domination and political hegemony over others" (p. 185).

These scholars from the political left in Latin America and elsewhere have advocated government involvement in communication policies as a means of correcting the uneven flow. According to these scholars, the government is seen as a benevolent force concerned with people's needs. In addition, the government can also serve as a counterveiling power to the dangers of wealthy private media owners who export foreign cultures into their nations in order to earn profits. In fact, these scholars criticize the laissez-faire policies of Latin American governments as failures of governments to work on behalf of their citizens. As one Latin American supporter of this view wrote: "The existence of the state presupposes the existence of (state) policies. The absence of explicit policies merely indicates that policy-making has been moved from government agencies to the boardrooms of corporations" (Roncagliolo, 1986, p. 169).

Representatives from developed nations and their respective media organizations view government involvement in "national communication policies" as the worse possible solution because governments may attempt to control the press to maintain favorable coverage.

From the outset, discussions about a NWICO were pitted as political debates between developed and developing nations. Many developing nations looked favorably on the NWICO because they viewed it as a means of breaking from their colonialist pasts and restoring traditional cultures. But many Latin American media organizations reacted coolly, if not hostilely, to the NWICO. Unlike most developing nations in Africa and Asia, which were former European colonies, most Latin America nations have a long histories of independence. Most Latin American nations achieved their independence during the early 19th Century. In addition, the concept of privately owned mass media, including broadcast media, is well established in Latin America and the region has a relatively large number of well-developed media outlets.

GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED COMMUNICATION POLICIES

Latin American scholars of the political left, such as Mexican scholar Fernando Reyes Matta (1981), endorse the NWICO as a "social view of communication." Reyes Matta endorsed four fundamental roles for communication in society that he claimed should be incorporated into NWICO policies:

(1) Making information a public service, which rejects the notion that communication should be a "commodity" for industries to monopolize, purchase, and sell communication content;

(2) developing a new area of social right, which encompasses the "democratization" of mass media so that communication is seen as an individual right rather than as a corporate or governmental right;

(3) promoting effective participation in communications, in which all sectors of society can have access to mass communications; and

(4) humanizing technology, so new communication technologies can be used by the people for social good rather than governments and industries.

These general recommendations for the role of the mass media that came from Latin American scholars seemed harmless enough. Though few would argue with the goal of "democratizing" the media, the debate often centered on whether these recommendations should be ethical norms that media should follow or requirements. And if they were to be requirements, who would have the power to enforce them. Given the presumed "power" of the mass media by many supporters of NWICO policies, it seemed logical that the state was the only sector that could enforce these requirements.

Despite Latin America's long experience with the concept of private ownership of the media, Latin America was one of the first regions where UNESCO's "experts" concentrated attempted to practice NWICO policies. The UNESCO-sponsored First Inter-governmental Conference on National Communication Policies held in San Jose in 1976, attended by twenty Latin American nations, unanimously recommended the establishment of government-controlled communication policies. One of the few recommendations to come from the conference that was eventually eventually implemented was the establishment of an inter-government information service, ASIN (Association of National Government Information Systems), and a regional Latin American feature news service, ALASEI (Latin American Feature News Service).

The San Jose conference marked the first time that nations in a developing region met to address communication problems such as reliance on media imports, lack of regional news exchanges, and shortages of trained professionals. The Declaration of the San Jose conference called on governments in the region to enact national communication policies to support economic and social development (Fox, 1988a). The declaration was staunchly condemned by many Western participants and Latin American publishers and broadcasters who maintained that UNESCO solutions were guided by "statist" policies, which were nothing more than thinly disguised rationalizations for governments to regulate the press (O'Brien, 1980).

In a UNESCO meeting in Bogota two years after the San Jose conference, the members clearly indicated their distaste with private media and their hope that national governments could correct the excesses associated with private media:

> (T)he formation and execution of national communications policy should be the exclusive concern of the State: commercially owned media, by providing the people 'with amusement and means of escaping from reality which tend to deaden their critical faculties and stultify their potential for action to bring about social change' fail to promote development (O'Brien, 1980, p. 7).

While U.S. media organizations were concerned about UNESCO declarations, the U.S. government seemed imperturbable. During the Bogota meeting, the Inter American

Press Association (IAPA) expressed "deep concern and dismay" at the absence of a U.S. government observer at the meeting. A minor State Department official told the IAPA that UNESCO declarations were not very important: "We think the conference has very limited significance . . . . The recommendations have no force beyond what the nomenclature signifies . . . . Recommendations of regional conferences are not binding upon member states even when they are adopted by the General Assembly" (Gonzalez, 1978, p. 82).

A U.S. newspaper industry publication, Editor & Publisher, charged that the State Department had taken a naive view toward UNESCO press policies. The publication asserted that many governments take UNESCO declarations very seriously, and often use them to legitimize repressive measures against the press. The chairman of the World Press Freedom Committee, who attended the Bogota meeting, agreed with the assessment of Editor & Publisher: "Some fifteen non-regional nations had registered with their ambassadors and they were seated at long tables with signs indicating each country. I was distressed to find the U.S. unrepresented. I inquired of the Embassy and was told that they had received no instructions from Washington to attend. And in fact, they didn't know of the meeting until they read it in the Bogota press, they said" (Gonzalez, 1978, p. 82).

Several years later, however, as UNESCO took a more active role in devising communication policies, the United States government no longer saw UNESCO declarations as irrelevant. The United States withdrew from UNESCO for a host of reasons, including allegations of inept financing. But communication issues was one of the factors for the withdrawal.

Supporters of the NWICO order in Latin America, mostly the intellectuals, point to Western media organizations, particularly the "Big Four" international news agencies (Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agences France Presse), for Latin America's continual--- and they would say perpetual--- "dependency" upon Western news media. The AP, because of its worldwide dominance, probably takes the brunt of these criticisms. However, in Latin America, where the UPI is predominant, the UPI takes its share of criticism.

Hester (1974) studied AP news coverage of Latin America in the United States. He quoted a former AP Latin American bureau chief of portraying Latin America and Latin Americans in stereotyped terms:

> Latin American news must fit certain preconceived notions of readers and editors before it has much of a chance for use. Earthquake stories are almost always used, as are other natural disasters, accidents and revolutions and coups. Then there's the 'dancing bear' type of human interest story which tickles the readers' fancies. They like to say, 'Oh, look how interesting and quaint those little brown-skinned people are!" (p. 95).

Beltran, among others, asserts that Latin Americans are being overwhelmed with information from an an "alien culture," and as a result are losing their cultural heritage. Some leaders in the region see more immediate dangers from their news media's dependency upon foreign news than long-term cultural loss (Hosein, 1976; Johnson-Hill, 1976). Former Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga appeared before the Inter American Press Association and accused the North American news media of exaggerating the dangers in Jamaica after two days of upheaval during January 1984. Seaga asserted that there were no "riots," only "demonstrations." He also claimed that Jamaica suffered $30 million in lost tourism revenue within five months after the upheaval (Anon., presstime, 1985, p. 41; Cuthbert & Sparkes, 1978).

IMPACT OF NORTH AMERICAN JOURNALISM MODEL

In addition to the influence of Western news media in Latin America, even the local media are viewed as having been influenced by Western news values. There is little doubt that American journalism has made an impact on Latin America.

During the height of the "yellow press" in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading Latin American editors and publishers journeyed to the United States to study the practices of the likes of William Randolph Hearst, Joseph Pulitzer, and others.

Agustin Edwards Ross, who purchased the prestigious El Mercurio of Santiago, Chile, studied the practices of James Gordon Bennett, Jr., while in the United States (Knudson, 1987). Lent (1987) dates U.S. influence in the region even further. He notes that Benjamin Franklin helped set up Antigua's first newspaper, The Antigua Gazette. Lent described Franklin's press arrangement in the Caribbean as "the first international media combine" and one of the first instances of "media imperialism" (p. 245).

Researchers have sought to empirically demonstrate Latin America's state of dependency and victimization under media imperialism. Typical among such studies that examined the "quantity" of the flow, Reyes Matta (1978) analyzed sixteen daily newspapers in fourteen Latin American countries and reported that more than 80 percent of the foreign news originated from the "Big Four" international news agencies.

In another study that examined the "quality" of the flow, Reyes Matta (1979) analyzed South American newspaper coverage of Suriname's independence on November 26, 1975. He examined sixteen leading South and Central American newspapers from November 24-27. Although the birth of a new independent nation on the continent was a major regional story, not one of the newspapers sent a correspondent to cover the story or gave the story front-page coverage. What coverage Suriname's independence received in the Latin American press originated from news agency reports, mostly

United Press International. The UPI report, Reyes Matta observed, stressed Suriname's strategic importance as a bauxite exporter to the United States, a fact of little consequence to Latin Americans.

During the period of Suriname independence, most of the major newspapers in South America reported the major international news stories in Europe and the Middle East, the same stories important to U.S. and European readers. Reyes Matta argued that this lack of news coverage in Latin America about what should have been a major Latin American news story was the result of the continent's dependency on the international news agencies for world news. Since the international news agencies did not treat Suriname independence as an important story, neither did the Latin American newspapers. In other words, the agencies set the Latin American agenda.

Reyes Matta reported that during the week of Suriname's independence, 60 percent of the 1,308 international stories originated from UPI (39 percent) and AP (21 percent) combined. Reyes Matta added, however, that that this was considerable progress from 80 percent dependence on UPI and AP since the 1960s. But Reyes Matta's (1979) hardly yielded overwhelming support for Latin American dependency on the foreign agencies in determining news values. Reyes Matta presented data on cities most widely reported in the newspapers. Madrid and Lisbon led the list, respectively. Although Reyes Matta argued that the coronation of Juan

Carlos may have contributed to Madrid's importance that week, the event was of no greater importance than the many other occurrences in the news during a given week.

The fact that a Spanish-speaking European nation received the most coverage in a continent where Spanish is the dominant language, and a Portuguese-speaking European nation received second most coverage where Portuguese-speaking Brazil is a dominant regional power, tended to refute Reyes Matta's own assertions. The Latin American gatekeepers may have been selecting stories about cities from the news agencies' files that reflected local cultures and interests. In addition, some Latin American cities such as Buenos Aires and Santiago received considerable coverage.

Nevertheless, Reyes Matta claimed the findings supported dependency theory (in what he referred to a "information inertia"). He argued that economic difficulties among Latin America's mass media alone could not account for this finding of Latin American dependency on Western news media because, unlike many developing regions, Latin American media organizations in some nations such as Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil have the economic wherewithal to gather and distribute their own news in Latin America. Reyes Matta maintained that dependence on the Western news agencies accounted for the state of Latin American journalism.

A comparative content analysis of prestigious North American and South American newspaper coverage of El

Salvador's civil war supports the contention that Latin America's newspapers reflect conservative views. Sodurlund and Schmitt (1986) analyzed the coverage of Argentina's La Nacion and La Prensa and Chile's El Mercurio and La Tercera during a sample period in 1981. The results were compared to the coverage of The New York Times and The Washington Post in the United States and the Toronto Globe and Mail and Ottawa Citizen in Canada.

The South American newspapers portrayed the military-led junta accused of numerous human rights abuses in mixed or neutral terms while the North American newspapers gave negative coverage of the junta. While the South American newspapers reported the Salvadoran rebels and Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement in the war in negative terms, the North American newspapers portrayed the matters in neutral terms. The South American newspapers even portrayed U.S. involvement in the civil war in far more positive terms than the U.S. newspapers. A caveat is needed that the study was conducted at a time when brutal military dictatorships existed in both South American nations which may have accounted for the findings.

DEVELOPMENT JOURNALISM

The concept of development journalism is closely associated with the NWICO. The concept, however, is as vague and ambiguous as the NWICO. Development journalism is closely associated with "nation-building." It is unclear, however, whether it involves only "good news" or whether it also includes critical news (Ogan, Fair & Shah, 1984; Salwen & Garrison, 1989). Hachten (1981) described development journalism as "an amorphous and curious mixture of ideas, rhetoric, influences, and grievances." In some instances, it represents "aspects straight out of Lenin and the Communist concept of the press" (p. 81).

Perhaps journalists and Western media scholars can be accused of making too much about press freedom, in the form of an independent, unencumbered press. Other freedoms are important too. Supporters of "development journalism," who focus on the active role of the press in addressing long-standing social and economic problems, claim that too often the banner of press freedom is waved by wealthy media owners who simply want to be left alone to rake in profits. This has particularly been true in Latin America, where many media owners have sided with conservative, and even reactionary, elements who foot the media's advertising bills. Beltran (1988) summed up this view:

> The state is not the only enemy of democratic freedom in modern Latin America. Conservative and exploitative interests, native and from outside the region, have built a private and commercial mass communication system that, on several counts, falls short of being democratic" (Beltran, 1988, p. 1).

If supporters of a free and unencumbered press put too much faith in private ownership of the press, some supporters of "benign" government intervention in the news media tend to overlook the possibility for governments to extend and abuse their powers. A freedom-of-the-press analysis rests on the assumption that in an unfettered media marketplace, where anyone may publish or broadcast whatever he or she pleases, a number of different views about all issues will be publicly aired and considered. For instance, Alisky (1981) observed that freedom of the press in Latin America is important because it precedes most other freedoms: "Press freedom in Latin America does not guarantee that problems will be solved, but the converse holds that when press freedom is lacking both leaders and citizens do not face problems openly or solve them in ways that are equitable for all citizens" (p. 4).

THE NWICO IN PRACTICE

Despite all the discussion about the role of the press and journalists in NWICO debates, few examples exist that clearly illustrate NWICO policies in practice in Latin America. All we can do is point to examples that illustrate various aspects of what might represent NWICO policies in practice. To some extent, media policies under Argentine dictator Juan Domingo Peron could be viewed as illustrating NWICO policies.

On June 4, 1943, a military junta seized power in Argentina. Although General Pedro P. Ramirez was president (June 7, 1943 to March 9, 1944), it was clear that Gen.

Peron, the vice president, was the real power. In 1946, the charismatic Peron was elected president until he was ousted by a military coup in 1955. Peron returned from exile to take power again in a 1973 election, in which his third wife, Isabelita, became vice president.

The Peron dictatorship, unlike many others in the region, was marked by active government involvement in media affairs rather than simply cracking down on daring media. Peron, a sympathizer with fascist Germany and Italy, emulated Hitler's and particularly Mussolini's ideas to use the media to support national policies. In addition, Peron sought to actively use the media to promote national development. In 1973, just a few months before Peron's death, a presidential decree ordered newspapers to carry 50 percent news about Argentina and 30 percent about news elsewhere in Latin American. The decree was never enforced because of the impracticability of allocating news content by regions (Alisky, 1981).

Did Peron's press policies represent development journalism? It certainly contained at least some aspects of what some supporters of development journalism contend development journalism is all about. The government took an active role in media policy making, and it claimed to promote educational and cultural development. Other supporters of developmental journalism, however, would argue that that development journalism involves media exposure of social problems, in the form of Western-style investigative journalism. The case of Colombia's Garcia Marquez being a case in point (Aggarwala, 1978, 1979).

The military dictatorship that ran Brazil from 1964 to 1985 also illustrates aspects of developmental journalism. The Brazilian dictatorship actively sought to use the media to stimulate the economic growth of the nation. The dictatorship achieved rapid economic development, the so-called "economic miracle." However, it was achieved at a heavy cost to Brazilian society, and the economic advancements were hardly equitable (Mattos, 1982). The media also witnessed rapid growth during the period of the dictatorship, particularly the broadcast media, in the form of the Globo television network.

A reform-minded Peruvian military that came to power in 1968 during a coup also illustrated aspects of the developmental journalism. From July 1974 to March 1976, the leading daily newspaper El Comercio of Lima as well as other newspapers were nationalized and handed over to peasant organizations. It was part of a mass media policy promulgated by the Peruvian leader, Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75).

The Velasco government undertook plans for nationalizing Peru's mass media, owned by some of the nation's most prominent and wealthy families. Unlike nationalization of the mass media elsewhere, the government hoped to turn the media over to the people through "organized sectors of society" such as farming organizations and worker communes. The first major attempt to nationalize a leading newspaper took place in 1970, when the Ministry of the Interior announced plans to expropriate two Lima dailies, Expreso and Extra. The newspapers were turned over to boards representing the journalists and printers. Later that year, the government expropriated La Cronica and its radio station, Radio Cronica. But the government waited several years before expropriating the nation's two most prestigious dailies, La Prensa and El Comercio (Alisky, 1976).

The government ordered La Prensa publisher Pedro Beltran to sell his stock to his employees after he violated a section of the 1970 press statute. The statute prohibited a publisher from leaving the nation for more than six months during a one-year period. The newspaper became an organ for industrial workers. In 1974, El Comercio was expropriated and became an organ of peasant organizations.

Under peasant leadership, El Comercio made special efforts to carry the views of local artists and writers and present a variety of views. In the area of news, efforts were made to provide in-depth news about the region instead of relying exclusively or primarily on the foreign news agencies. Newspaper employees were guaranteed space to vent their criticisms against their employers in the newspaper which could not be edited by management (Cardenas, 1980).

However, as a result of bureaucratic fighting within the government, the government never fully completed its plans to nationalize and distribute all the nation's newspapers. Many members of the government feared turning the newspapers over to organizations that they could not control (Gargurevich & Fox, 1988). Many of the private newspapers that were not nationalized, as well as many that were nationalized, became increasingly critical of government policies. Criticized for its policies, the government increasing turned to authoritarian tactics to achieve its goals.

In 1975, Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez ousted Velasco in a coup and was soon afterwards named president. Morales (1975-80) allowed closed publications to re-open and exiled journalists to return. He promised to ease government control over the media but vowed that reform would continue. By 1980, Fernando Belaunde Terry (1980-85) won the presidency for the second time (he also served from 1963-68) and started phasing out government control over the mass media by transferring majority ownership back to the original owners.

The "Chilean Experiment" during the rule of elected Marxist President Salvador Allende, like the Peruvian experiment, also failed to take the extreme step of Cuba and nationalize all media (Schiller & Smythe, 1972). As a result, the conservative private media that were permitted to operate with various degrees of government control were often among the most vitriolic critics of the Allende regime (Fagen, 1974).

A similar situation appears to be taking place in Nicaragua. Though the Sandinistas insist their revolution involves "socialist orientation," they have not imposed all-encompassing, centralized state control of the economy. Their media policies attest to that. The Sandinistas maintain a government-owned media with goals of promoting social justice while permitting opposition media to co-exist as a check on government power. But the leading opposition newspaper, La Prensa, apparently took its opposition role too seriously for the Sandinista government. The government has used heavy-handed measures to silence it, including violence, censorship, and prior restraint.

The "Cuban experiment" deserves attention, if only for its longevity. During the 1960s and 1970s, Fidel Castro's Cuba was lauded as an alternative model for how a small nation could assert its independence and achieve progress. Cuba's revolutionary rhetoric has lost much of its appeal in Latin America during the 1980s.

Cuba's political policies in fact changed very little during the 1980s from previous years. Part of the Cuba's problem during the 1980s stemmed from greater attention to Cuba's human rights abuses, exposed exaggerations of its economic successes, its dependency upon the Soviet Union, and its military adventures abroad. But Castro's main public relations problem was an inability to change with the times.

This defect in the Cuban model was especially apparent in comparison with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to show "the human side of Socialism" through glasnost (openness). Gorbachev's glasnost policies created a rift between Cuba and its Soviet ally (Bryan, 1989). Castro remains firmly committed to central planning and strengthening the authority of the Communist Party. In a number of speeches and interviews, Castro describes his commitment to Marxist policies as "a sacred international mission," and sees himself as a defender of communism "when it is having international difficulties" (Treaster, 1989).

The rift between Havana and Moscow became apparent when, for the first time since Castro came to power, Cuba banned two leading Soviet magazines. In 1989, the Communist Party newspaper Granma announced that the weekly Moscow News and the monthly Sputnik would no longer be available in Cuba. In unusually harsh terms, the party organ accused the Soviet magazines of "justifying bourgeois democracy as the highest form of popular participation" (Anon., "Two Soviet publications banned," August 9, 1989, p. 5).

The Communist Party's ban of the Soviet publications did not mean that Cubans were not receiving news about reforms in other communist nations. Rather, the Cuban government did not want the positive coverage of reforms portrayed in the Soviet publications. With Cuban university students returning from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and news about reforms coming from the U.S.-based propaganda station Radio Marti, it was impossible to totally silence news about reforms. In fact, Cuban newspapers, television, and radio reported about the reforms, albeit with a negative angle. The Cuban media stories often included Castro's attacks on the reforms. Much of the news about the reforms were also apparently meant to warn the Cuban people of difficult economic times ahead with the Soviets withdrawing economic aid and Eastern European nations demanding fair market prices for their consumer goods exported to Cuba (Whitefield, December 17, 1989).

GUYANA'S NEW INFORMATION ORDER EXPERIMENT

The very ambiguity of developmental news makes it difficult to assess how well these examples fit the guidelines of developmental journalism outlined by NWICO theorists and advocates of developmental journalism. The nation of Guyana is perhaps the best example of the NWICO in action, not because the example of Guyana fits the model any better than other cases, but because the government actively claimed to implement a local version of the NWICO.

The nation of Guyana, about the size of the state of Idaho, has a population of 800,000. It is the only English-speaking nation in South America and is an unfamiliar place to most Americans. East Indians are the dominant group numerically (about 51 percent), but Afro-Guyanese (43 percent) hold most of the political power. The rest of the population is comprised of Chinese, Europeans, and indigenous natives. Guyana's claim to fame among the American public was that in 1978 a U.S. congressman from

California was murdered at an airport in its jungle by followers of cult leader the Rev. Jim Jones, leading to the suicide-deaths of 910 of Jones' followers.

Since its independence from Britain in 1966, Guyana's leaders have advocated policies that presaged UNESCO's New World Information and Communication Order debate. Even before Guyana gained its independence from Great Britain, former Prime Minister Dr. Cheddie Jagan and his American-born wife planned a Marxist-Leninist government with the goal of destroying all vestiges of the nation's colonialist past. Jagan so frightened President John Kennedy with his Marxist rhetoric during a White House visit in 1961 that Kennedy asked Great Britain to do something about Jagan. The British reacted by revamping Guyana's electoral system to provide proportional representation. Jagan's party, however, received a plurality 46.5 percent of the vote during the 1964 election (Steif, 1988).

After independence, most of the Guyana's industries, including the mass media, were nationalized. The government started to purchase a number of newspapers and radio stations during the early 1970s. The government has successfully monopolized both radio stations and the only daily newspaper. The government recalled how the British colonialists controlled the radio airwaves and catered to the wealthy European sugar producers (Thomas, 1987). Now, Guyana's leaders proclaimed, the mass media would cater to the Guyanese people by promoting "national development." In

1974, Kit Nascimento, Minister of State, said, "As much as we might like, we cannot simply import the libertarian ideas of and concepts of press freedom first voiced by men like Descartes, Locke and Milton, into countries such as ours without examination . . ." (Anon., Caribbean Contact, December, 1974, p. 14).

The nation became committed to a policy of Development Support Communication (DSC) which mirrored many of the goals expressed UNESCO's News World Information and Communication Order declarations. To ensure that Guyanese journalists were trained to communicate news about DSC, they received intensive ideological training through a government-subsidized, two-year public communication program at the University of Guyana.

During 1974, Guyana was the site of a UNESCO conference on development communication. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham insisted before conference members that Guyana's media policies did not constitute simple authoritarian control of the press, but instead his policies reflected the spirit of the NWICO. He noted that Guyana's policy was not to tell the nation's mass media what not to print or broadcast, but instead to specifically direct it as to what to print and broadcast. He told conference members the government:

> has a right to own sections of the media and the government has a right, as a final arbiter of things national, to formulate a policy for the media so that the media can play a much more important part than it

has played in the past in mobilizing the people of the country for the development of the country (Lent, 1979, p. 4).

Under Burnham, the media were not only used to promote "national development" within Guyana, but Burnham's personal ambitions. His ambitions extended well beyond Guyana's borders. Burnham sought to take an active role in having Guyana under his leadership become the "undisputed leader" of the Caribbean region. As one observer noted, "It was common knowledge that, from childhood on, Forbes Burnham had nurtured a dream of becoming the first Caribbean prime minister" (Brotherson, 1989, p. 19).

Ten years after the election that brought Jagan to power, Jagan found himself as the leader of the opposition. In this position, Jagan questioned Burnham's sincerity in purchasing the nation's daily newspapers and radio stations to stimulate development communication.

The government's primary tools in implementing development policies through the mass media are The Guyanese (radio) Broadcasting Corp., the Guyana News Agency, and the government's daily newspaper, The Daily Chronicle. The GNA was created in 1981 and charged with implementing "Development Support Communication" policies (also called the "New Local Information order") by increasing the news flow in the nation's rural regions and distributing daily bulletins for foreign correspondents.

The Chronicle, an eight-page tabloid with an estimated circulation of about 40,000, is the government's principal development vehicle. News about political matters in The Chronicle rarely veer from the party line, although there have been occasions when the newspaper has carried a multiplicity of views and has stimulated debate (Brotherson, 1989). Important milestones in the lives of Marx and Lenin receive wide attention, and the policies of North Korean president Kim Il Sung, sometimes viewed as a model for Guyana's development, are praised.

In addition to purchasing media, the government also imposed a number of harsh controls on opposition media, especially the opposition-owned weekly Mirror. The former daily was reduced to occasional publications in 1985 and eventually became a Sunday newspaper. The government restricted the availability of imported newsprint and technical equipment to the Mirror and even resorted to illegal searches and prior restraint orders issued by the prime minister himself.

The Catholic Standard, a weekly Jesuit publication with a circulation of about 10,000, was not nationalized. During a July 10, 1978, political referendum that would aggregate the president's powers, The Standard called for a boycott of the referendum, which was eventually approved (in an election plagued by widespread vote rigging). The Standard, however, may have contributed to the worldwide interpretation of the election as a defeat for President Burnham because only 15 percent of the eligible voters turned out (Chandisingh, 1983). As a result of government pressure to silence The Standard, the newspaper was unable to obtain newsprint, and it was printed on bond paper instead. During July 1979, when Father Andrew Morrison, the editor, was out of the country in the Barbados, government thugs brutally beat the acting editor and another Jesuit, who died of a bayonet wound.

Guyana was one of the last nations in Latin America to officially adopt television in 1988. Before the official adoption of television, Guyanese could sometimes receive TV broadcasts from neighboring Suriname. There was, and still is, a large market for VCR tapes brought back by returning Guyanese from New York City, Toronto, and Miami. Limited-access subscription-type television was instituted in the capital in 1983.

Government approval of the two television stations stipulated that the stations could not broadcast news programs. The stations are also required to broadcast 15-minute government news summaries each day which are produced in government studios and praises government policies (Obermayer, 1989).

Guyana's late adoption of television resulted from the government's stated interest to hold off adopting the medium until it was determined that television could be used for national development. Ironically, however, the television stations are licensed to pirate American programming, in violation of international copyright laws, to which Guyana is a signatory. Hoyte justifies this policy by saying that "America should be paying the Guyanese to distribute its world events perspective" (Obermayer, 1989, p. 44). According to a study of television programs in Guyana during 1988, the fare contains a heavy dose of U.S. programming such as "Dallas," "The Newlywed Game," "The Flintstones," "CNN News," and "The Jeffersons" (Sidel, 1988).

Since the death of President Burnham in 1985, a less hostile press-government relationship has emerged and the government has appeared to take a less hard-line, anti-imperialist approach in its politics. Several opposition newspapers exist. In 1986, the bi-weekly Stabroek News began publication with the promise of no government interference. On several occasions, however, the newspaper claimed it was restricted from obtaining information from the public sector (Sidel, 1989). The opposition Mirror is distributed through workers' unions and is partly financed by the Soviet Union. The Catholic Standard, edited by Morrison, remains the government's strongest media critic. It is financially supported by overseas religious groups.

Still, the press can hardly be described as free and vibrant. Frank Pilgrim, who became editor-in-chief of The Chronicle in July 1987, believed that as a result of the relatively more open atmosphere created by President Hugh Desmond Hoyte, Guyana was ready for a government publication that would offer "constructive criticism" of government policies. On the nation's celebration of Republic Day, February 23, 1988, the newspaper featured an exchange of opinions about Mass Games celebration, in which thousands of school children displayed their gymnastic prowess. The celebration was modeled on games in North Korea.

A commentator in The Chronicle charged that the games strained the nation's economy, overworked the children, and interrupted their studies. The organ of People's National Congress (PNC) called The Chronicle's remark's "brass-faced quaking" and "blind class prejudice." The controversy subsided after the author of the article, still refusing to recant, welcomed the "constructive suggestions."

Controversy stirred again in December and cost Pilgrim his job. The Chronicle called on the government to permit greater freedom of expression. The newspaper singled out problems with access to public information and particularly access to information information about police brutality. President Hoyte was so enraged by the allegations that he publicly called the allegations "faceless and gutless" (Anon., "Controversy in Guyana," January 1989).

Overall, Guyana's attempts to implement a new information order have been a failure. Sidel (1984) argued that Guyana's attempt to free itself from its colonialist past trapped the nation's leaders in a "downward spiral" that led to economic stagnation and reduced media credibility. Another sympathetic treatment by Thomas (1982) claims that Guyana has never developed clear communication policies. For instance, while the government wants the mass media to report favorable news about national development, government journalists have been so obsequious and favorable in their reporting that the mass media enjoy little credibility. As a result, the Ministry of Information has had to advise journalists to also report some negative stories about the government.

A less sympathetic analysis of Guyana's experiment comes from Ken Gordon, managing director of the Trinidad Express and the chairman of the Caribbean News Agency (CANA), a Third World agency developed with UNESCO support. In an interview, Gordon described Guyana's experiment with a new information order as a failure that other Caribbean nations should avoid: "If you look at Guyana today you find a country that is spiritually and financially bankrupt" (Anon., "Pressure," October/November 1983, p. 8).

As the 1980s drew to a close, the nation's per capita income was declining, power shortages occurred daily, street crime was rampant, basic social services were not being provided, and the nation's best and brightest were leaving for jobs in the Caribbean and the United States. Ironically, it has been suggested that Guyana's economic woes may have actually contributed to greater freedom of expression since there has been a clear loosening on government restrictions over the press (Cambridge & Hazzard, 1988; Sidel, 1988). William Steif (1988), a columnist for the Virgin Islands Daily News, wrote that as a result of the nation's $1.7 billion foreign debt, in which not a penny has been paid on the principal since 1981, the human rights situation has improved in Guyana. Steif claims that President Hoyte can not afford to offend his creditors with human rights violations and is "down on his knees, begging the United States, Britain, Japan and multinational agencies for funds to bail out his nearly bankrupt nation" (p. 24).

CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of more than a the decade of discussion about the role of the press and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean in light of the New World Information and Communication Order debates, the literature contains few clear-cut illustrations of NWICO policies in practice in the region. This paper has only been able to point to a handful of cases that demonstrate different aspects of what might represent NWICO policies in practice. Situations in Argentina, Peru, Chile, and most significantly perhaps, Guyana, show efforts documented in the literature.

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Frit Danmark and the Development of Denmark's Resistance Movement

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Freedom of expression is said to be vital to the individual value of self-fulfillment or self-actualization and to the democratic social values of advancing knowledge, to participation in public life and to the evolution of the public mind and policy. Denmark's occupation experience during World War II affords a rich and complex test of these assertions. Danish journalism endured German control of official sources of news and the Danish government censored the output of the legal press while itself following a policy of accommodation toward the occupation power. The result was the smothering of legal public debate on the moral, political and military aspects of the most critical issues facing Denmark: What were the real consequences of German occupation and what was the appropriate response to it?

An illegal press did arise to pose these questions and argue for active opposition to German intrusions into Denmark's internal affairs and to the official policy of appeasement. This illegal press developed into an extensive and intricate communication system with a central news bureau (Information), a number of mass circulation monthly periodicals that reached into every corner of the country (for example, Land og Folk, Frit Danmark, De Frie Danske, Studenternes Efterretningstjeneste), and even a daily newspaper during the last year of occupation. According to the Danish Resistance historian Jørgen Hæstrup, this illegal press, along with the Danish-language broadcast service of the B.B.C. ultimately achieved a near monopoly on providing news,information and a forum for pubic debate for the Danish people. These journalistic efforts have been credited with creating popular understanding and support for the campaign of sabotage of war-related business and infrastructure in Denmark that characterized the final two years of the war.

This paper is largely a narrative history of the organization and political approach of Frit Danmark, an early and influential illegal periodical, during the period of official government cooperation with the German occupiers (April, 1940 - August, 1943). Particular attention is given to the character of the periodical as a united-front type project with the somewhat anomalous task of being an organ of subversion directed towards the nationalistic middle class. Frit Danmark was a conscious effort to incite a broad mobilization of the population against the expedient policy of government collaboration and was part of the social process that helped fashion a community of resistance and the necessary popular understanding to support it.

In the beginning

The participants in the Frit Danmark's groundlaying discussions would have been improbable partners in any other circumstance. During occupation, however, German pressure and the large mainstream center parties' overriding policy concern for surviving the war/occupation with the minimum internal disruption and destruction translated into the disapproval and repression of both nationalistic right-wing and "internationalist" left-wing groups in Danish politics. These groups had less power and privilege to defend and were ideologically disposed against Nazism for a variety of reasons including patriotism, fealty or friendship to an Allied power, traditional anti-German sentiment, Marxism-Leninism, individualism, etc.

The four large center parties formed a government of national cooperation shortly after occupation and called upon the Danish people to maintain law and order.[1] The King requested that Danes conduct themselves with the utmost propriety toward the occupation troops.[2] These official demands for a correct etiquette of subordination must be understood in the context of the generally consensual and law-abiding character of Danish society.[3] The overwhelming majority of Danes heeded the appeal for passive acquiescence and those that did not [4] were characterized by the people in the government as "chauvinist and communist circles." [5]

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[1] The Four parties were Socialdemokratiet, Det Radikale Ventre og Retsforbundet [Radical Liberals], Venstre [Agrarian Liberals], and Det Konservative Folkeparti [Conservatives]. The Social Democrats and Radical Liberals governed Denmark with a coalition government from 1929 to 1940, with Social Democrats dominating with over 40% representation in Parliament.

[2] The King urged the following in his April 9th, 1940 occupation proclamation: "...it is the duty of the population to refrain from any resistance to these [German] troops... Order and calm must characterize the land and loyal behavior must be observed to all those exercising authority... Under these circumstances, which are so serious for our Fatherland, I call on everyone in the cities and in the country to maintain completely correct and dignified behavior, as any untoward action or expression can have the most serious consequences." Reprinted in Danmark Besat og Befriet, eds. Hartvig Frisch, V. Buhl, Hedtoft Hansen & Ejler Jensen, København, Forlaget "FREMAD", 1945, p. 52.

[3] Denmark is a very homogeneous society and Danes, despite having the most "Mediterranean spirit" of the Scandinavian populations, generally still wait for the walk signal to cross streets completely devoid of traffic.

A consequence of this situation was that the Danish Resistance movement, contrary to the popular myth of its spontaneous rising up as a grass roots mass movement, was actually initiated and maintained by the leadership of sectarian anti-system groups who had been forced out of the regular political process. The two political leaders who discussed the founding of the periodical Frit Danmark during the winter of 1941-42 illustrate this quite clearly. Aksel Larsen, party Secretary and former Member of Parliament (MP) of the now illegal Dansk Kommunistisk Parti (Danish Communist Party: DKP) was on the lam from both Danish and German authorities and Christmas Møller, MP from the rightwing Folkeparti had been sequentially forced, by the Danish government under German pressure, out of the cabinet, Parliament, and finally his position as general-secretary of the conservative party . [6]

The common ground, for the right and left represented by Larsen and Møller, was opposition to the politics of accommodation which they themselves had fallen victim to. For the DKP, the periodical was an effort to reach beyond their usual working-class constituency and agitate among a broader readership. Aksel Larsen described the setting up of Frit Danmark this way to the German authorities at a December 3, 1942 interrogation:

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[4] On the right these included people in and associated with Dansk Samling, an anti-parliamentary group established in the 1930's to initiate "social renewal by rousing the population to taking personal democratic responsibility." Besættelsens Hvem-Hvad-Hvor, København, Politikens Forlag, 1966, p. 177. On the left the Dansk Kommunistisk Parti [DKP] represented the main opposition tendency, but only after June, 1941. Until that time it toed the Comintern line, which observed the Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact and described the war as involving competing imperialist powers. The DKP did anticipate illegality during the first year of occupation and set up safe houses, stashed away duplicators and supplies, etc. and proved numerically and technically superior to any other group in the Danish Resistance after moving to open opposition after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 21, 1941. See Hans Kirchhoff's chapter "Hvem var Modstandbevægelsen?" [Who was the Resistance Movement?] in Kamp eller tilpasning: Politikerne og modstanden 1940-45, København, Gyldendal, 1987, pp. 64-73.

[5] This is Alsing Andersen's (Social Democrat Minister from 1935-1942 and the Social Democratic Party's business manager from 1941-1945) characterization in a memorandum circulated in government circles Sept. 2, 1943. Frit Danmarks Hvidbog, København, Thanning & Appels Forlag, 1945, vol. 1, p. 153.

[6]. See "Fjernelse af forskellige Personer fra det politiske liv, presse, etc." in Frit Danmarks Hvidbog, vol. 1, pp. 295-296 for an account of Christmas Møller's experience. For the criminalization of the DKP and it official justification see "Kommunistloven", pp. 262-275 in the same volume.

> Regarding the organization "Frit Danmark", in general I would say that the thought was to create a smaller kind of peoples' front movement to curtail the German control of Denmark and simultaneously to create an opposition against the government's compliant policy. This organization was to eventually develop into a kind of central organization for all the active currents and circles. Among these circles there was a great deal of disagreement about internal policy, but under the current situation they could unite in a common struggle.... The practical tasks for the organization were agitation and educational work, first and foremost in the bourgeois and intellectual circles along with the farmers. From the beginning there was very little weight given to agitation in working-class circles, because the party could effectively carry out agitation among workers. [7]

This approach is in line with internal instructions issued to underground cadres by the DKP's party leadership at the beginning of 1942 announcing that the primary task now was to inaugurate cooperation "with everyone who has the same conception of the main problem as us in the current situation. Their party membership plays no role." [8] The creation of a broad underground opposition front remained problematic, however, due to the policies of the national government of cooperation, strong traditional party loyalty in Danish politics, a party press system that cleaved to the government's line for reasons quite apart from official censorship, a population which was generally satisfied trying to slip through the war unscathed and suspicion of communists stemming from the Hitler-Stalin Pact and Russia's 1939-40 winter war against Finland. [9] The center of Danish politics, represented by the four mainstream parties in the national government of cooperation, retained the support of most Danes and was a very heavy keel in the political balance throughout the occupation, but especially up until August, 1943. This heavy centrist keel precluded broad political representation on Frit Danmark's first editorial board [10] and highlighted one of the first tasks for the paper itself: to persistently try to peel away support for the accommodation policy of the government of cooperation until there was enough accumulated weight to tip it over. [11]

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[7]. Reprinted in Tage Revsgaard Andersen's *En studie i Rødt, Hvidt og Blåt*. København, Forlaget ZAC, 1981, p. 166.

[8]. Quoted by Hans Snitker in *Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen*, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 13.

[9]. Cooperation was further complicated by the caution that often accompanies the mantle of power in the case of the Social Democrats and their acrimonious relationship with the Danish Communist Party (DKP) through the late 1920s and 30s, when Comintern policy went from an "ultra-leftist" critique of social democrats as "social fascists," to calling for a united front with social democrats against real fascism and finally to Stalin signing a non-aggression pact with Hitler in August, 1939 which lasted until June of 1941. (See Robert Paxton's chapter "The European Left in the Popular Front Era, 1934-1939" in *Europe in the 20th Century*, New York et al, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, pp. 385-411.) This history remained a stumbling block to cooperation on the left during German occupation.

In fact, the composition of Frit Danmark's organization was even narrower in practical terms than its editorial board makes it appear at first glance. The non-DKP personalities participation in the newspaper represented individual action and these men had no organizational or party backing behind them. Snitker describes the newborn opposition organization as "ten men and the Communist Party." [12]

The first issue of Frit Danmark appeared on April 22, 1942 in an uncommonly large inaugural edition of over 5 ,000 duplicated copies. [13] The lead article was written by Christmas Møller and it described the anonymous publishers and their purpose this way:

> We are a small circle of people who earlier have had very opposing viewpoints and who might disagree again when conditions in Denmark allow us to speak as freely and openly as the old days. Today we are bound together to issue Frit Danmark to maintain the Danish position, to give our countrymen open and honest information on what is happening and to speak so that it is clear what 99 percent of the population is thinking in the midst

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[10] The first board included Aksel Larsen, Børge Houmann, Mogens Fog and Karl V. Jensen aligned with the DKP; Christmas Møller and Nationaltidende editor Ole Kiilerich aligned with the conservatives; Ole Chievitz - nationalist professor of medicine; Rud Prytz - with connections to Christian circles, and library director Thomas Døssing. Snitker describes the last two as basically Social Democrats, but neither appear to have been close to centers of party power.

[11] "...to force the Danish 'puppet government' out" was Hal Koch's disapproving characterization of Aksel Larsen's discussion with him trying to get his support and participation in Frit Danmark's work. Quoted by Hans Snitker in Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 19.

[12] Hans Snitker, Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 22.

[13] Elias Bredsdorff puts the first edition at 10,000 copies in "Frit Danmark" in Fem Aar: Indtryk og Oplevelser, 29 August 1943-5 Maj 1945, vol. 2, eds. Cristian Refslund and Max Schmidt, København, H. Hagerup/Slesvigsk Forlag, 1946. p. 209. Hans Snitker uses Børge Houmann's figure of 5,000. Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 22. Whatever the number, it was a considerable achievement. Most were sent out through the mail.

> of oppression.
>
> Our program is first and foremost education....[14]

The first issue was quite moderate in tone, even to the extent of entertaining the possibility - even suggesting the necessity - of getting the government to wake up to its duty to lead the Resistance to German occupation. The paper announced that it would try to "express what all true Danes feel and think. We will be the domestic Danish voice during a time when oppression, violence and assault rule." This moderation and conjuring up of a common Danish voice that in fact didn't exist on a practical, political level[15] are indicative of a central tension the paper had to maintain between trying to lead middle-class Danish public opinion without getting too far ahead of it and "losing touch with those they wanted to influence."[16] The ideological counterweight of the rightwing within the editorial committee guaranteed that certain resonances (patriotism and nationalism, for example) would be present in the paper's "voice." The balance also ensured a certain level of moderation or to put it another way - led to the pruning of distinctive (and thus exclusionary and off-putting) politics from the pages of the paper.[17]

There was no indication of DKP participation in the paper's content, though at this time the communists dominated the organizational aspects of the paper's production and distribution.[18] The anonymity of the publishers of Frit Danmark was stripped away with the arrest of the paper's printer and part of the editorial committee by Danish authorities in the fall of 1942.

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[14] Frit Danmark, April, 1942.

[15] It can be argued that a "Danish voice" existed on a cultural level as evidenced by an outpouring of interest in Danish history and the phenomenon of mass meetings (Alsang) to sing old, familiar patriotic songs that swept the country in the year following occupation. Frit Danmark may have been trying to claim this valuable emotive and symbolic turf as its own.

[16] Hans Snitker, Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 25.

[17] Debate did occur within the editorial committee on the appropriateness of particular subjects, articles and language within articles. The first issue contained an article attacking the Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius which Christmas Møller considered premature. The editorial process became more deliberate, so that Mogens Fog could describe an August, 1943 article about the postwar situation as the "the draft was mine, but it was pared down (partly) before it won approval from all sides." Christmas Møllers Londonbreve, ed. Jørgen Hæstrup, København, Gyldendal, 1974, p. 74.

[18] The first issues of the paper were largely produced and paid for by the DKP. Snitker writes that the Party undertook financing the paper to the tune of 7,590 kroner for the first two issues. p. 41. The DKP also had the capability and experience to produce an illegal national publication. Its own paper Politiske Maanedsbreve (later changed to Land og Folk) began underground publication in October, 1941 and this first issue was already reproduced by 14 different groups (7 provincial and 7 in Copenhagen).

This represented something of a turning point in the development of the resistance movement in Denmark. [19] The event also highlighted the growing chasm between the government's and the fledgling resistance movement's orientation to the occupation. The arrests and subsequent handling of the prisoners led to mutual recrimination and deepened suspicion.

Danish police arrested Aksel Larsen, secretary of the DKP and one of the initiators of Frit Danmark, on November 5, 1942. He was handed over to the German occupation power the next day on the charge of promoting sabotage actions against the German Wehrmacht's supplies. Larsen at first deflected the questions of his interrogators by leading them into wide ranging political discussion. [20] But he soon began naming names and by the end of November, Larsen had given ample evidence implicating the leadership of Frit Danmark.

Through a contact in the Danish police, editorial committee members knew a day or two in advance that they were to be arrested. Rud. Prytz, an appellate attorney and Ole Chievitz, professor of surgery at the University of Copenhagen decided to allow themselves to be arrested in the hopes that it "would attract attention and make people think." [21] They were turned over to German custody and interrogation - an action which begged the question of the independence of the Danish government administering the country's internal affairs. Professor Mogens Fog and Ole Kiilerich decided to go underground.

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[19] Which coincided with the turning point of the Allied war effort. Jørgen Hæstrup describes the period in The Secret Alliance: A Study of the Danish Resistance Movement 1940-45, vol. 1, Odense, Odense University Press, 1976, p. 172, "One of the many strange features of the Second World War is the clearness and simplicity which characterize the curve of its course. Measured by the external military events, the period up to November 1942 marks up an almost constant advance for the Axis Powers. Then the curve turns. The Russian counter-offensive around Stalingrad and the great battles of the Western Allies in Africa portend just as constant a retreat for the Axis Powers. From then on, the black clouds of defeat rise, relentlessly threatening, over horizons which were still far off in 1942, but now were closing in without pause, around Berlin, Rome and Tokio (sic). Defeats followed each other in quick succession, and a psychological turn in the tide, in the warring and occupied countries, followed in the wake of the altered war situation."

[20] Tage Revsgård Andersen's en studie i Rødt, Hvidt og Blåt , København, Forlaget Zac, 1981 includes over 60 single spaced large format pages (pp. 130-191) of transcripts from Larsen's interrogation by the Germans. There is reason to accept them with caution. For example, R. Prytz, who was arrested the following month reproduces a transcript from his interrogation and alleges that it is inaccurate and that his signature was forged to it. (See pp. 33-35 in Min Fængselsbog: 45 Dage i Vestre Fængsels tyske Afdeling, København, Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, 1945.) But, rumors circulated at the time that Larsen had "sung" and the subsequent arrests and line of questioning, for example of R. Prytz, parallel information in Larsen's supposed interrogation statements. The lineage of Tage Andersen's Larsen interrogation text is through the three main academic historians of this period (Hans Kirchhoff, Hans Snitker and Jørgen Hæstrup).

Professor Chievitz achieved his hoped for effect. [22] News of his arrest spread quickly and was difficult for people to digest. Chievitz was well known and had many connections from his long-standing surgical practice, his leadership in Red Cross assistance to Finland during two wars (1918 and 1939-40) and his teaching duties at the University of Copenhagen. [23] His arrest caused a stir and in the month that followed, the Ministry of Justice received petitions protesting his incarceration, including one from 364 doctors serving in Copenhagen hospitals calling for the "release of their colleagues who were inmates in German prisons." [24]

The Danish government felt compelled to justify itself by commenting on the case and released the following version of the events, which appeared in the legal daily press on December 11, 1942:

> Professor Chievitz and Others Arrested
>
> A Series of Arrests in Connection with the Publication of the Paper FRIT DANMARK

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[21] H.C. Hagedorn, "Ole Chievitz og hans Deltagelse i Danmarks Frihedskamp" in Ole Chievitz, København, Nordisk Boghandel, 1956, p. 20. In a letter to Christmas Møller in England dated 5/11/43 Chievitz gave this and two additional reasons for allowing himself to be arrested: to avoid revealing their source in the police and to keep the escape routes free for younger and more compromised people. Christmas Møllers Londonbreve, ed. Jørgen Hæstrup, København, Gyldendal, 1974, p. 70. Prytz wondered "And wouldn't one do Denmark the biggest service by remaining [to be arrested] than by trying to disappear?" Min Fængselsdagbog: 45 Dage i Vestre Fængsels tyske Afdeling, København, Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, 1945, p. 9.

[22]. Jørgen Røjel in "Fra Frihedskampen" in Ole Chievitz, København, Nordisk Boghandel, 1956, p. 84 writes "Chievitz' arrest naturally aroused an enormous stir. A feeling of resentment grew against the government and the Germans and a strong sympathy for him, especially among students."

[23]. H.C. Hagedorn on p. 25 of Ole Chievitz, København, Nordisk Boghandel, 1956 notes that "To fathom the meaning of Chievitz decision to allow himself to be arrested one must remember what his position was. Among his colleagues he enjoyed a reputation that few others had. His long-standing as a surgeon had brought him in touch with and made friendships within all stratum of Danish society. He was also deeply appreciated as a teacher. For students, he was a man whose word held weight in wide circles and he was one of Danish culture's prominent people."

[24]. Quoted by Børge Outze in vol. 25 of Danmark Under den Anden Verdenskrig, København, Hasselbach, serial publication 1962-1968, p. 22 Petitions also came in from 2,000 university students and from the Journalistforbundet (Journalist Federation) complaining of the German intrusion into Danish jurisdiction.

Official Statement on the Grounds for Undertaking the Arrests

Officially Reported:

In the last months the increasing activity of illegal communist groups in Denmark, their encouragement of sabotage activity and the fact that individual acts of violence have been carried out has necessitated an intensified fight against this movement. In the beginning of November the Kommunistisk Parti (DKP) secretary Aksel Larsen was arrested, along with a number of other people involved in communist activity. These people, above all else, have participated in issuing illegal publications, among them the paper FRIT DANMARK, which passes itself off as politically neutral.

In connection with this, arrests took place of some communist and non-communist persons who had joined together with the goal of pitting large portions of the Danish population against the government. These people attempted to achieve this by supporting the movement which has been articulated in the newspaper FRIT DANMARK.

Professor Ole Chievitz is among those arrested and has given a deposition to the Danish police about his connection to this movement. It appears from this deposition that the professor - even though he is not a communist - has cooperated with the illegal communism here in our country to oppose the government's policies. Their goal, which also appears in the paper FRIT DANMARK, is to organize resistance to the German occupation troops.

During this collaboration, Professor Chievitz has met with the above named Aksel Larsen, former MP Christmas Møller and others, sometimes in his own house. After discussion with them there was activity to raise funds for the illegal movement

With his action supporting that movement Professor Chievitz was directly guilty of breaking the applicable law and will now be held responsible for it through legal proceedings in the Danish courts. [25]

In a move that produced further ill-will, the government also proceeded to issue descriptions of Fog and Kiileriich and offered a reward for their capture. [26]

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[25] FRIT DANMARKS Hvidbog:Besættestiden i Dokumenter og Kommentar, København, Thaning og Appels Forlag, 1946, p. 143.

[26] The Resistance viewed this as an official invitation for Danes to become informers for the Nazis, because it was clear that Fog and Kiileriich would be turned over to the Germans for interrogation and incarceration. See appendix, Doc. # 1 for the text. The Minister of Justice even spoke admiringly of how

Professor Fog also took the opportunity to justify his actions on behalf of Frit Danmark and going underground. He penned an open letter to friends and acquaintances which gained wide circulation and the powerful, moving, text helped establish Fog as a central character in the Danish resistance movement. [27] Fog's letter aimed at the reader's heart to combat the moral paralysis fostered by the official policy of accommodation and cultivated by the occupation power. [28] He called for unity of purpose across political lines and he invited people to act in whatever way they could:

> Do not think we can avoid the nightmare under Nazi tyranny by being compliant. There is only one way, the primitive one - to resist.
>
> In this [resistance] work, remember, the individual cannot distinguish between the large and small . Spurn the small and one does not achieve the large. If one refuses to be a means one has also denied the end. [29]

The Frit Danmark arrests were one of series of setbacks for the extremely small community of active resistance participants in the autumn of 1942. But in retrospect, the cases might be regarded as a vehicle for new interest and participation in Resistance work. The government's characterization of active opposition as purely communist-based was proven false and a group of very socially respectable people (professors, doctors and a library director [30]) were observed publicly taking risks and making

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"the Germans were better at producing evidence [from Danish prisoners] with their methods" which, he assured the cabinet, did not involve violence or threats "apart from the threat to remove them to Germany." Quoted by Børge Outze in vol. 25 of Danmark Under den Anden Verdenskrig, København, Hasselbach, serial publication 1962-1968, p. 22.

[27]. "Only a few days after going underground, Fog published his first letter to to his friends, and this was the literary work which, more than any other, added fuel to the first flames of the Resistance beacon, and which at one stroke made Fog the central figure in the Danish Resistance struggle." Jørgen Hæstrup, The Secret Alliance, Odense, Odense UNiversity Press, 1976, p. 165. The letter was published in Frit Danmark's December, 1942 issue. See Document # 2 in Appendix for full text of the letter.

[28]. Rev. Harald Sandbæk remembered Fog's letter this way: "Dr. Mogens Fog's letter from December, 1942 when he went underground made a particular impression. I remember that very clearly. It was a liberating sensation that other reasonable people felt exactly as you yourself felt - without regard to what was said or written from the official side." Harald Sandbæk, Erindringer: Præst/Sabotør flygtningearbejder, København, Samlerens Forlag, 1983, pp. 55-56.

[29] Mogens Fog, Efterskrift 1904-45, København, Gyldendal, 1976, p. 100.

[30]. Thomas Døssing, national director of the Danish library system from 1920 until his arrest. Døssing is described by Hans Kirchhoff as a "pillar of society" and responsible for creating Denmark's populist library system that was central to democratization in Denmark during the early 20th century. "Here lies his life's work, which will be remembered when his Resistance contributions are forgotten." Kamp eller tilpasning: Politikerne og modstanden 1940-45, København, Gyldendal, 1987, p. 147.

sacrifices. The end of the anonymity of Frit Danmark's leadership, the social standing of its members in the community, their articulation of why they chose to act as they did [31] and the external war situation made resistance appear a more plausible response to occupation.

Growth and Functioning of the *Frit Danmark* Organization and Newspaper

Already in the summer of 1942 Frit Danmark began to develop a system of organization, borrowing heavily from the DKP's membership, structure and experience.[32] Two decades of repression liberal democracy-style and and a year of illegality following mass arrests in June, 1941 had taught the party something about surviving under duress. It had worked out the techniques of keeping the various parts of an underground organization in contact with each other in order to function effectively while limiting personal knowledge and familiarity to compartmentalize the organization in the event security was breached. The operative principle here was that one could not divulge what one didn't know when caught.

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[31]. Chievitz' trial and sentencing also produced some moving oratory. At the trial he called upon the judge to give back the rights that had been eaten away by the politics of accommodation:

> "These two points - the Danish and Scandinavian conception of civil rights and of democratic rights - brings us to the crux of the logic of this case.
>
> Every day these two points are written and spoken about as the primary foundation of the Danish and Scandinavian vision of society. But my examples [including the arrest of Frit Danmark participants and their custody in German prison], which are based on naked facts, show how these rights have fared in practice in Denmark and show how it scares [the government] that we began to understand that our country's time-honored and inalienble values are slowly being buried.
>
> It is these lost rights that we wanted to defend. This development [erosion of rights] was cause for fear. As it began and its increasing tempo became clearer and clearer we wanted to raise a protest against it. I cannot see that by doing so we violated any Danish law." Quoted in Ole Chievitz, København, Nordisk Boghandel, 1956, p. 24.

At sentencing he recited the Norwegian patriot poet Nordahl Grieg's poem "17 Maj" to a hushed courtroom:

> Today the flagpole's staff stands
> among Eidsvoll's budding trees,
> But it is precisely at this hour
> that we know what freedom is.
>
> A song arises over the land
> its sound victorious
> despite being whispered through compressed lips
> under the foreigner's yoke.

Quoted in Ole Chievitz, København, Nordisk Boghandel, 1956, p. 85

[32]. "When one takes the early point of establishment [of Frit Danmark] and the fact that only the communists were knowledgeable about illegal work, it is no wonder that in many ways it was they that became leaders in formulating the paper's policy on the one hand and developing the organization of groups

The key figures in Frit Danmark's organizational apparatus were the travelling secretaries who acted as conduits for communication and financial dealings between the leadership group based in Copenhagen and the provincial and professional groups scattered across the country. Frit Danmark divided Denmark into three sections, Sjælland; Fyn and Southern Jylland; and Mid- and Northern Jylland. Each was covered by a travelling secretary. Mogens Fog notes that all the travelling secretaries were "communists or sympathizers", not by design he claims, but because they volunteered when others did not. [33] By June, 1943 Fog could write to Christmas Møller that "The groups in the provinces now were visited regularly by travelling secretaries." [34]

The rank and file membership of Frit Danmark was organized by locality in the provinces and along occupational lines in Copenhagen. Doctors, students and lawyers had established Frit Danmark groups by January, 1943. Engineers, civil servants, architects, business/office workers, teachers, graduate students proceeded to do so in the spring of 1943. These groups received the monthly issue of Frit Danmark and produced and distributed it within their respective area or group. In turn, the groups sent along intelligence, news and occasional articles about what was happening in their domain.

Editions of Frit Danmark were edited by a central group, but produced by affiliate groups throughout Denmark. Records indicating size of editions and which groups produced and distributed what proportion of them are sporadic but do provide snapshots

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to distribute the paper.

Frit Danmark's organizational development imitated the communist's apparatus with its central leadership which planned out propaganda and directed the work of the groups. Frit Danmark quickly functioned very effectively thanks to the communists taking command to the degree required to get as many papers produced so that one could believe that the agitation had effect." Det Illegale Frit Danmark; bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 162.

[33] Mogens Fog Efterskrift 1904- 1945, København, Gyldendal, 1976, p. 120. "The travelling secretaries were communists or communist sympathizers. This was not the free choice of the leadership (of FD), but dictated by circumstances in that attempts to find suitable and willing people from among Konservativ Ungdoms membership, for example, were fruitless." There is a certain logic to the situation, in that DKP members were illegal by definition after June, 1941 where as others had to choose to become so.

[34] Christmas Møllers Londonbreve, ed. Jørgen Hæstrup, København, Gyldendal, 1974, p. 72.

of the paper's growth. Snitker includes this set of numbers:

1942 (Copenhagen edition figures only)	
April	5,000
May	5,000
June	10,600
July	12,400
August	11,550
September	12,950
October	10,550
November	9,000
1943 (Combined national figures)	
April	29,000
June	45-50,000
August	63,000
December	71,000
1944	
November	113,500
1945	
April	140,000 [35]

The 1942 Copenhagen editions were produced in one main printrun and up to four smaller runs by trade groups that included lawyers, laborers, students, medical doctors and office workers. By November, 1944, the Copenhagen edition (60,200) was produced and distributed through a main edition and 12 trade groups that by now included agricultural interests, veterinarians, foresters, judges, teachers, two engineer's groups and civil servants. Another 50,000-plus copies of the November edition were distributed in provincial towns: 22 in Sjælland, 19 Fyn and South Jylland, and 29 in Mid- and Northern Jylland. [36]

To put these figures in some perspective, in 1942 Frit Danmark produced 1/3 of the total output of Denmark's illegal press. Although the newspaper's editions climbed steadily to a final occupation edition of 140,000, its proportion of the illegal press declined as time went on to 1/5 in 1943; 1/10 in 1944 and 1/20 during the final five months of occupation in 1945 due to the appearance of additional illegal periodicals.[37] The significance of the illegal press as a whole may also have declined, or at least was superceded by the requirements of "active" resistance (sabotage, liquidation of informers, creation of an underground army for a possible Allied invasion and the transitional period after liberation) during the last year and a half of occupation. So in 1942 -1943 Frit Danmark was not only a big player among the illegal press - that press garnered more interest. Snitker notes that during this early period "Illegal papers were rare and reader intensity high among people who shared that position [of resistance] as well as those who opposed it or were doubtful of it. An illegal paper left no one cold. At the end of the occupation Frit Danmark, notwithstanding its progress, was only one among many papers and general interest in illegal papers had waned."[38]

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[35] 1942 figures (Understated as only Copenhagen numbers known/no provincial editions included): p. 41 ; 1943: p. 67; 1944 & '45: p. 129. Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977.

[36] Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, pp. 40 and 131-133.

The routine operation of the monthly edition of Frit Danmark from the latter part of the occupation is detailed in the following description:

> Let us follow a random issue of the illegal Frit Danmark from its conception until the readers - that is to say the whole Danish people - receive it across the land.
>
> Frit Danmark's leadership is assembled at a meeting in a spacious basement dining-room in Professor Engelbreth-Holm's villa on a quiet sidestreet in Gentofte. Professor Mogens Fog ("From" [alias]) sits at the head of the table and chairs the meeting. At the previous meeting the last issue had been discussed and agreement reached on which articles the next issue should contain. Several of the committee's members have written or elicited the articles. All the articles are read and discussed. After a business-like and thorough debate the issue is given its final editing. After this the committee debates various practical and organizational questions and reports on the work in the groups.
>
> Then the committee meeting transcribes the manuscript on a

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[37] Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 130. The illegal press published the following number of copies: 1940: 1,200; 1941: 40,000; 1942: 301,000; 1943: 2,600,000; 1944: 10,935,000; 1945 [4 months]: 10,131,000. Besættelsestidens Illegale Blader og Bøger, eds. Leo Buschardt, Albert Fabritius and Helge Tønnesen, København, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, 1954.

[38] Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 130.

typewriter using 10-12 carbons onto ten or so tightly written sheets. These are sent to to the out-of-town addresses by mail and to the in-town addresses by courier as quickly as the manuscript is transcribed.

To protect the recipients as much as possible "make a copy and pass along" is put on the front of the manuscript so it looks like a copy rather than a manuscript. These all arrive at cover addresses, but from these cover addresses they are immediately conveyed along to the illegal typesetting or duplication spots. This time the paper will be printed in 4 different printshops: one in Aarhus, one in Haarby on Fyn and two in Copenhagen. Beyond this, it is promptly duplicated various places and from some of these places the paper spreads quickly to other duplicating spots.

But let us follow one of the manuscripts that went by mail to the provinces. It was addressed to a fake address in Riisskov, but the postmaster is clued in and sends it along to the right man. In Aarhus the Frit Danmark group has its own secret typesetting operation with enough type to do one issue. The typesetting was installed in teacher's apartment in a modern housing complex where the Germans had requisitioned the apartments below. Søhnlein, Kaj Munk's murderer, among others, lived here. Two typesetters worked several days running to set the paper. The conditions are primitive and it takes a long time to set all the characters by hand. When the type is ready it fills 4 pages - but this is large format and there is a lot on the 4 pages. The type is put in boxes and transported to a printshop in Frederiksbjerg. This has to be done at night for only the printer and Frit Danmark's representative know what transpires. Small electric machines print the paper through the night, 3,000 copies an hour are pumped out. In the morning when the typographers gather for work the whole edition has been removed and all trace of the evening's print job is gone. The completed paper is brought in large suitcases to a tailor's workshop which functions as a distribution center. About 20,000 copies of the paper are here now and will be divided into bundles according to a distribution list, wrapped in corrugated cardboard, brown wrapping paper and strong twine. During the course of the afternoon these are brought to the post office and bus station to send to 25 north and mid-Jutland towns where others await the paper's arrival and are ready to distribute it further.

At the same time a legal printer in a rural Fyn town and two illegal printshops in Copenhagen put out another 90,000 copies of the same paper.[39] A series of duplicators around the country gradually churn out another 30,000 nice copies of the same manuscript with a well-practiced technique.

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[39] The typesetting operation for this edition was maintained in a dentist's office in Odense. See De så det Ske Under Besættelsen, eds. Per Eilstrup and Lars Lindeberg, København, Forlaget Union, 1969, p. 265.

> And there is a precise distribution plan whether the printrun is large or small it is quickly distributed to the usual "customers" who in turn have their sub-distributors or address lists that the paper goes out to. The trade groups take care of their colleagues across the land while the local groups organize the distribution by district. [40]

Frit Danmark's publishing efforts also included one-time editions of books, a concerted effort to distribute and popularize the Resistance Freedom Council's essay of its vision of postwar Denmark [41] and a news bulletin, Frit Danmark's Nyhedstjeneste. Book publishing had the dual purpose of education/propaganda and fundraising. For example, a December 1943 Frit Danmark book on the events surrounding the collapse of the Danish government (29 August 1943: Hvad der gik forud, - hvad der fulgte efter, 128 pp.) detailed the civil disturbances (folkestrejker) that swept Fyn and Jutland in early August, the internal conflicts of German military and diplomatic approaches to the problem, German demands on and negotiations with the Danish government, the largely successful attempt by the Danish navy to scuttle itself or escape to Sweden [42] and the state of emergency and attempt to round up and deport Jews in Denmark that followed the German assumption of direct rule of the country. The book form allowed in-depth treatment (with information suppressed in the legal press) of this watershed development and was sold for 10 kroner (half retained by local groups) to raise money for the organization.

The inability of the Frit Danmark's monthly format to bring timely news to readers lay behind the establishment of the three times-monthly Nyhedstjeneste [News Service]. [43] The editorial committee bridled a bit at criticism from the work groups over the dearth of news items in the monthly publication and responded in a memorandum to the groups in August:

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[40] Det Illegale Frit Danmark, København, Gyldendal, 1946, pp. 12-14.

[41] They published 8 editions of "Når Danmark atter er frit" - When Denmark is free once again. See Document # 3 in the Appendix for a list of Frit Danmark's non-periodical publications.

[42] Which had significant symbolism for Danes, as it made up somewhat for their military unpreparedness and lack of response during the April 9, 1940 German invasion. Denmark's largest illegal book publishing group, Frit Nordisk Forlag issued a book following the events entitled Æren Reddet [Honor Saved] which included 9 half-tone photographs of various half-submerged Danish navy vessels.

[43] The fourth week groups would devote to producing/distributing the monthly publication.

> The reason for this situation [lack of news items] is partly because the paper's distribution methods delay its coming out so that news ages before it reaches readers and partly because of a conscious inclination on the part of the editorial group: We place more weight on the political and principled treatment problems, less on sensation.
>
> However, the editors recognize that there is also an important task in keeping the population informed of events inside and outside the country in as effective a manner as possible. [44]

Mogens Fog edited the almost-weekly using material from the legal newspaper Politiken's, internal news-bulletin, the news-bulletins of Information - a professional underground news service created in August, 1943 and from reports sent in by Frit Danmark groups. The Frit Danmarks Nyhedstjeneste tended to concentrate on domestic news because Danes turned to the B.B.C.'s Danish-language broadcast and Swedish radio for general war news.

The important task of keeping the population informed became critical during periods of crisis. During the popular uprising in Copenhagen against German and domestic Nazi provocations in June 26-July 3, 1944 Frit Danmark's student group produced and distributed the Freedom Council's announcements to the city's population. [45] While the German and Danish politicians tried to break the strike with appeals to return to work and normal conditions through the legal press and radio [46], the students helped keep the strike movement going by spreading 35,000 copies of the Council's first announcement, 30,000 of its second and 12,000 of the the last one.[47] The authority of the Freedom Council was enhanced by its formulating and articulating the demands of the strike movement (which had occurred rather spontaneously) and by being able to maintain popular solidarity until the Germans agreed to call off the curfew and remove Danish Nazi para-militarists from Copenhagen. Timely and widespread communication in this situation, especially during the confusing period of Danish politicians calling for a return to work, was vital to the success of the strike.

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[44] Quoted in Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 84.

[45] In 1944 German authorities and their Danish Nazi assistants began a campaign of reprisals for Resistance actions. Prominent civilians were assassinated and culturally significant landmarks were destroyed by bombing or arson. German authorities imposed an 8 pm curfew in Copenhagen in late June following a daring daylight attack by 60 saboteurs that destroyed Riffelsyndikatet (a machinegun factory) and Danish Nazis retaliating by bombing parts of Tivoli and the Royal Danish Porcelain workshop. Copenhageners resented losing their long summer evenings and the continuing provocations of domestic paramilitary Nazis. They walked off their jobs, shut down transportation and built bonfires and barricades in the streets. The Germans cut off water, electricity and gas to the city and unleashed roving squads of soldiers who fired randomly at citizens.

Copenhagen's civil authorities and the "shadow government" of the four major parties attempted to subvert the "folkestrejke" by calling for a return to work before people's demands had been clarified, much less met.

[46] And through a proclamation at the very start of the strike, which Frode Jacobsen (maverick Social Democratic member of the Freedom Council) described as "an offer of pointless capitulation by the authorities before the fight had even really begun. One hundred twenty thousand copies of the [authorities'] proclamation were already printed Friday evening." I Danmarks Frihedsråd, København, Gyldendal, 1975, vol. 1, p. 190.

Frihedsraadet or the Freedom Council was established shortly after the fall of the Danish government in August, 1943. It was set up to provide a common leadership and direction for the Resistance movement and exercised real political power during the final period of the occupation. [48]

Mogens Fog of Frit Danmark was instrumental in the negotiations that established the Council and he played an influential role in formulating policy. [49] The Council was the realization of Fog's earlier call for a broad united front and was established with representatives of the four major Resistance groups: Frit Danmark, DKP, Dansk Samling and Ringen - Social Democrat Frode Jacobsen's group and two early pioneers in the Resistance community. [50]

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[47]. Frit Danmark's Copenhagen groups also issued a special 16,000 copy edition of the paper at the end of the strike. Hans Snitker, Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 141.

[48]. An April 25, 1985 Berlingske Tidende's Søndags Magasinet, (in a rough way the Danish equivalent of the NY Times Sunday Magazine) retrospective piece on the Freedom Council described its members: "They were once the Kingdom's most powerful men. More powerful than most Danish governments in our recent history... They were not the Kingdom's most powerful men when they met that September day [1943] on Nørrebrogade, but they were committed to become that and they did. More powerful than the country's administration and more powerful than the country's armed forces. In the end, more powerful than the country's enemies."

[49]. Frode Jacobsen describes Fog's role in the Council: "His strength first and foremost was his ability to articulate what all of us thought. He formulated our proclamations more quickly and maybe more clearly than the rest of us could. When something had to be quickly composed right at the meetings it was more frequently he than anyone else that authored the proclamations...

But Fog also had a verbal gift that enabled him to easily become a prominent figure. Not least when we opposed the politicians. He had an air of assurance, naturalness and charm that made him an appropriate external spokesman for the rest of us... It was therefore natural that Fog's primary area became the illegal papers and propaganda as a whole." I Danmarks Friheds Råd, København, Gyldendal, 1975, vol. 1, p.74.

[50]. The last two were Erling Foss and Aage Schoch. See chapter "Frihedsraadets mænd", pp. 73-79 in I Danmarks Friheds Råd, København, Gyldendal, 1975, vol. 1.

An early and very important articulation of the Council's role and intentions was the postwar program "Når Danmark Atter er Frit" [When Denmark is Free Once Again] and it had the stamp of Fog's personality. It signalled the Council's commitment to democratic procedures, including Parliamentary elections as soon as possible after the war. This pledged the DKP and its participants in Frit Danmark to forgo efforts to gain political advantage through violence, a step necessary for the wide acceptance of a Council with significant communist participation. [51] The question of how postwar power would be handled was clarified in wartime Denmark as in few other occupied countries.

While Frit Danmark's leadership had a significant influence within the Freedom Council, the paper and organization also did much to make it and its aims known throughout Denmark. The task of making this self-appointed, partially anonymous group of men legitimate fell upon the illegal press and Frit Danmark became the leading mouthpiece for the Council.

Frit Danmark's Analysis of Denmark's Occupation Problems and Its Resistance Propaganda

Frit Danmark really had two quite different tasks during the occupation years. Initially, during the period leading up to the August 29, 1943 fall of the Danish government, the paper's primary objectives were to influence public opinion against official appeasement and collaboration for ideological reasons or for private gain; to move people toward resistance and an understanding of sabotage as the weapon of the powerless and an instrument for Danes to join the Allied cause; and to expose the systematic, if not entirely voluntary, support the Danish economy was giving the German war effort.

The difficulty of influencing public opinion when the paper first began publishing revolved around the relative comfort of Denmark's situation. While Germany's April 9th invasion promise to "ensure the Danish people's freedom and the country's future independence" was more than a little cynical, it presaged a Nazi occupation policy that at first was much less ruthless than other overrun countries endured. [52] The semblance of "normalcy" militated against resistance and had to be punctured. With the exception of the DKP, Danes weren't forced by "objective" circumstance to resist, but had to choose that position.

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[51] The DKP's devotion to democratic principles cannot quite be taken at face value. Statements regarding the postwar fate of Eastern Europe were always couched in democratic terms while the reality was quite the opposite. Frode Jacobsen, fellow Council leader said that "...I thought the communist's position would be determined by whom came first - the Russians or the western allies....But the internal political program [of the Council] was viewed as a platform with democratic elections. No one thought otherwise." Jyllands Postens Morgenavisen, Jan. 12, 1983, p. 11.

[52] The German promise was contained in the German April 9, 1940 "Proclamation to Denmark's Soldiers

In the lead article of Frit Danmark's first issue Christmas Møller described Denmark's peculiar situation this way:

> The milder treatment is closely connected to two facts: first that we unfortunately were the only country (except Siam) that caved in when overrun and were voluntarily subjugated and second, that Germany determined that it is in Germany's well-defined interests to give us milder treatment. In this way Germany gets more goods, more workers, more of anything they want to get than if Norwegian, Belgian, Dutch or Balkan conditions prevailed here in this country. [53]

The paper used several areas of Danish life to show how abnormal things had become under German occupation.

German Intrusion in Danish Economic Life

Germany's drain on the Danish economy was masked by the international trade accounting procedure known as clearing, in which the imports and exports of two countries are balanced against each other. In the occupied countries, Germany used the process to "import goods without paying at all" by forcing the clearing departments of occupied nations to pay domestic exporters to Germany without German imports of comparable worth to compensate for it. [54] The occupied countries were also forced to pay the considerable "costs" of German occupation.

Denmark's economic losses were an early target of Frit Danmark. Under the headline

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and Denmark's People" reprinted in De Fem Lange Aar, eds. Johannes Brønsted and Knud Gedde, København, Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1946, vol.1, p. 74. The difference in Nazi occupation policy can be seen, for example, in the Germans extracting about 22% of Denmark's gross national product compared to 52% of Belgium's and 67% of Norway's. Danish diets only decreased by 10% measured in calories and food rationing was more generous in Denmark than in Germany itself. Hans Kirchhoff, Kamp eller Tilpasning: Politikerne og Modstanden 1940-1945, København, Gyldendal, 1987, p. 187.

[53]. Frit Danmark, April 1942.

[54]. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944, p. 59. Lemkin goes on to say that "The main exploitation of Denmark is carried out through the institution of clearing.." p. 162.

"The German Looting of Denmark" in its second issue (May, 1942) it claimed German debits to the country's clearing department had reached 948 million kroner and that occupation costs of 914 million kroner had been assessed. [55] The article complained of the official "looting" paid for with "bad checks" and the widespread behavior of individual German soldiers who purchased goods to send to family members in Germany. It called for Danes to only trade with other Danes and suggested that "we Danes have to teach our businessmen that now they must choose between us and the Germans." [56]

The Danish government publicly chose the Germans by announcing "in economic concerns Germany plays a central role. Denmark has shown its willingness to work at solving the practical problems involved and remain ready to participate in a loyal and positive cooperation in this area." [57] The actual consequences of economic cooperation with Germany were kept secret, causing Frit Danmark to charge that

> Naturally the Danish people must not find out how intensely the Germans are looting us. The figures that disclose this plundering are meticulously hidden. Only the members of the government and a very few high officials in the ministries get to know them, while on the other hand Parliament is kept ignorant of the fact that in just two years the Germans stole about 2 billion Kroner in Denmark. [58]

Trade with Germany continued to be criticized in paper. It reported that one hundred tons of meat was demanded by the Germans in its February, 1943 issue and worried about the consequences for Danish diets. The May, 1943 issue reported that the Wehrmacht was demanding an additional 180 million kroner for the summer to employ 25,000 people to build bunkers.

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[55] Frit Danmark, May, 1942. This may even be somewhat understated. Besættelsestidens Fakta: Dokumentarisk Haandbog, ed. Niels Alkil, København, J.H. Schultz Forlag, 1945-46. In its chapter on the financial dealings of Denmark's National Bank includes a table of payments for maintaining German troops and police. It shows expenditures of 962 million kroner through the first quarter (March) of 1942. Vol.2, p. 970.

[56] Frit Danmark, May, 1942.

[57] Ibid., June, 1942.

[58] Ibid., Sept., 1942.

German Intrusion Into the Danish Judicial Process

Another area Frit Danmark concentrated on to highlight how abnormal life had become under occupation was the restriction of civil and legal rights. An article in the second issue (May, 1942) entitled " 'The Judicial System' and the La Cour Case" examined the German intrusion into the Danish legal process and the failure of the judicial system to follow the rule of law. La Cour's case revolved around a series of standing-room only lectures across the Denmark on the topic of the erosion of Denmark's independence in foreign policy and in its internal affairs, which later appeared as pamphlets. [59] Danish authorities had banned his pamphlets and arrested and sentenced him to 80 days in jail in 1941 for the provocative character of his critique, but upon his release he resumed his activities. In early 1942 he was again arrested, this time at the German's behest, and turned over to German custody. La Cour's case crystalized the contradictions of trying to maintain judicial processes under the weight of an armed occupation power. The law had become a tool to dampen speech and behavior that offended the occupation power to such a degree that it amounted to a hemorrhage of the Danish constitution.

Frit Danmark described La Cour's case as "so typical of the time, such a complete rebellion against the Danish concept of justice that it is worth emphasizing." [60] This case, the paper pointed out, made it clear that the occupation power could initiate legal action, could suggest sentences, threaten to make prisoners serve their sentences in German penal institutions, etc. and that Danish courts had in effect become German pawns.

The Supreme Court president, Troels Jørgensen, was attacked in the July, 1942 issue. Frit Danmark faulted him for being overly -talkative, being unable to refrain from participating in current debates and especially his premature public defense of the anti-communist law that passed in August, 1941 to justify the mass arrest and interning of DKP members. [61] Jørgensen, the article noted, had published an article in the Juristforbundet only a week after the law's passage arguing that it did not violate the constitution. The paper charged that "This is no doubt the first time that a President of our courts has expressed himself on a case's disposition even before it has begun." [62] After describing a series of cases in which the Supreme Court had been solicitous of German desires (including intensifying La Cour's sentence) the article contrasted this to Norway's judiciary:

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[59] One essay was entitled "Med Lov skal Land Bygges" [The Country is Built with Law]. Vilhelm La Cour was a lecturer, a veteran of the World War 1 political struggle over the border between Germany and Denmark in Slesvig-Holstein and was a Conservative Party member who withdrew (after Christmas Møller's removal from political life) and then joined Dansk Samling. La Cour published a book after the war about his second arrest and trial. For Dansk Domstol Under Besættelsen, København, Samlerens Forlag, 1945. He was sentenced to 7 months prison time and removed from his job - a sentence the Danish Supreme Court increased from a lower court sentence of 4 months and hoped was strong enough to mollify German authorities. Ditlev Tamm, Retsopgøret efter Besættelsen, København, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1985, vol.1, p. 47.

[60] Frit Danmark, May, 1942.

> The Norwegian Supreme Court judges unanimously stepped down to protest the Germans and the Quislings - the Danish Supreme Court, obedient and servile, follows the government and the Germans despite all the German encroachments! It is a disgrace which will be remembered the day the Danish people reckon with traitors. [63]

The paper continued to highlight increasing German intrusion into domestic legal processes and the acquiescence if not cooperation of Danish authorities to this development. The August, 1942 issue reported the unintentionally ironic statement of the Interior Minister that "The law is the law and law shall be maintained - when conditions allow us to." [64] The November issue carried an article entitled "Now the Terror Begins" about mass arrests (400) undertaken jointly by the Gestapo and Danish police in early November. The article claims many were turned over to the Germans and that "Today no one is safe in lawless Denmark." [65]

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[61] The law made an undefined "communist activity and agitation" illegal, dissolved existing communist organizations and gave the Ministry of Justice the power to anticipate and arrest a person for likelihood to engage in future communist activity that would "endanger the state or relations with a foreign power." FRIT DANMARKS Hvidbog: Besættelsestiden i Dokumenter og Kommentarer, København, Thaning & Appels Forlag, 1946, vol. 1, p. 280.

[62] Frit Danmark, July, 1942. Troels Jørgensen's quick justification of the law "as legislation completely independent of the constitution" because of the extraordinary situation was not unconnected to the fact that he had a large role in writing it. Ditlev Tamm, Retsopgøret efter Besættelsen, København, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1985, vol.1, pp. 55-58.

[63] Jørgensen and virtually all prominent figures who took compromised positions during the occupation avoided post-war inquiries, much less punishment. Ditlev Tamm, in a Berlinske Søndag. (December 9, 1984, p. 2) interview described the postwar reckoning this way: "The politicians took over, placed themselves outside of the judicial reckoning, so that in a large sense it only affected a smaller group of low-level collaborators. A top-to-bottom purge to "clean up society' was not carried out."

[64] Frit Danmark, August, 1942.

[65] Ibid. November, 1942.

The arrest of part of Frit Danmark's editorial board in December was described as part of the ongoing pattern of Danish institutions carrying out German demands. As in La Cour's case, German incarceration of Danish citizens who were subjected to interrogation by the occupation power accentuated the growing powerlessness of the Danish judiciary to operate without being an adjunct of the Germans. Fog's first letter from the underground reprinted in the December issue spells this out:

> Everyone should know that today the German police gets permission to arrest any Danish citizen they chose. They do not ask in advance whom they may come down on. One or two Danish officers have the opportunity to be present at the arrest. After that the sacrifice is not viewed by any Danes... Any anti-Nazi conduct or agitation can bring Gestapo violence down on people. [66]

In a different article in the same issue the paper reported that severe sentences (5 and 10 years) had been handed down to Danish citizens by a German court martial - with no pretext of Danish court jurisdiction. Furthermore, "A report has been received that the next anticipated step the German 'administration of justice' will take - the introduction of the death penalty." [67]

Under the headline "Sentenced for National Activity" the February, 1943 issue reported that secret Danish legal proceedings had been taken against ten people for helping house English Special Operation Executive parachutists. They received sentences of up to 10 years.

The March, 1943 issue included a direct attack on the personnel of the Danish judicial system in an interview with a "prominent, older man with experience in domestic and foreign public affairs." After commenting that the number of Danish "renegades, gamblers and traitors" are comparable to other European populations and that one needn't be surprised by some level of untoward behavior by a few people in each profession, this man of experience expresses mortification over the Danish courts:

> ...which through changing political regimes had kept the people's respect and confidence in spite of singular (in reality unavoidable) bad luck - that it now so frequently and so conspicuously has failed, that is my deepest disappointment and sorrow.
>
> Sentences are handed down behind closed doors which insult justice, shock the Danish concept of justice. The law is not just twisted and turned, but it is advanced in the service of a foreign master to punish Danish

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[66] Ibid. December, 1942.

[67] Ibid.

> citizens. Principles of the administration of justice which recently had been brandished as sacred are trampled underfoot and swept into the garbage. Law and order, society's organizing pillar is toppled....
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> That not a single Danish judge has refused to follow the foreign bayonets, that none have had the courage and will to put themselves on our countrymen's side in the struggle against foreign injustice but have quietly slunk away from their responsibility for justice and honor - that in my eyes is this time's deepest shame, sorrow and disappointment. [68]

The lead article in the May, 1943 issue announced that a German court martial had handed down the first death sentence - only days after Parliament had proclaimed "the government had succeeded in protecting the judicial process as 'a Danish affair.' " [69] After charging the governing cooperating parties with unmitigated hypocrisy the article asserted

> And here we see the essence of the case. This death sentence is the logical result of the compliant politics which has been the distinguishing mark of the various governments' during the entire occupation and which has reached its progressive culmination under Scavenius' rule. [70]

The combination of compliant politics and what was terribly wrong with Danish occupation justice was epitomized by an interview given by Thune Jacobsen, Denmark's Minister of Justice, in July, 1943 to a Swedish newspaper which drew bitter, sarcastic barbs from Frit Danmark. The interview was given prominent attention on the July, 1943 issue's front page, including Jacobsen's bald assertion that " one can certainly say that the Danes are quite clear that the German war power has behaved very well" which caused the paper to exclaim:

> It would have been understandable if Dr. Werner Best or another of the bandit leaders in Gau Dänemark had expressed himself about Danes as Thune Jacobsen did about the Germans. Certainly these foreign gentlemen would have good reason to contend "that we Germans are quite clear that most of the Danish authorities, with the Ministers in the lead, have behaved themselves very well. [71]

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[68] Ibid. March, 1943.

[69] Ibid., May, 1943.

[70] Ibid..

[71] Ibid., July, 1943.

Regarding sabotage, Jacobsen had declared that it is conducted "only by Communists and a few agitated nationalist elements" and "that it is a given that it endangers our relationship with the German war power. Therefore it is the police's duty to prevent sabotage activity." [72] This caused the paper to comment "Had he only added "Jews," Hitler and Goebbels would have recognized him better as one of their true disciples."

The German intrusions into Danish economic and judicial life that Frit Danmark brought to light were symptomatic of a more fundamental problem - the national government's politics of accommodation. The traditional political parties had embraced a profound and growing paradox in their attempt to grapple with Denmark's situation: to defend national sovereignty and independence, to avoid harm to people and damage to property to the greatest extent possible, they decide they would continue to "govern" an occupied country. Governance, it turned out, was a pattern of bending before every German request and threat - at least to the point of satisfying them - and all the while maintaining the fiction that the locus of power in Denmark had not changed significantly. Frit Danmark's overriding task up to August, 1943, was to expose the policy of accommodation as wrong and weaken popular support for government itself.

Anti-Government Campaign

The first issue of the paper contained mixed messages about the government. On the one hand, Christmas Møller's programatic article on Frit Danmark's perspective stated that

> Our born enemies are German Nazism and its Danish offshoot... To all others we extend our hand.
>
> And that goes for the existing government's political representatives and for the Parliament. We have much to object to in the policy of appeasement which is carried out - and we will let the facts and those alone speak for what has happened.
>
> But we see nothing less than that the government takes leadership of the resistance which must and shall be taken against the German oppressors. We are not interested in which persons take leadership, but are only interested that the right policy is followed. [73]

But the article following this open invitation was a stern critique of the most pro-

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[72] Ibid. .

[73] Ibid., April, 1942.

German figure in the national government, the cynical Erik Scavenius who had come to symbolize all that was wrong with policy of appeasement. Scavenius had been appointed Foreign Minister in July, 1940 and he had introduced an eager, friendly tone into Danish-German relations. [74] His position as go-between the occupation authority and the Cabinet had him conveying German demands and threats and seeing that they were satisfied. Frit Danmark accused him of having the "goal of putting Denmark as completely as possible under German hegemony." [75] It was clear that the new resistance organization's outstretched hand didn't reach out as far as Scavenius.

The Foreign Minister provided "facts that spoke for themselves" for the May, 1942 issue. In a maneuver to mitigate the naming of a new Prime Minister viewed as anti-German (or insufficiently pro-German) by the occupation authorities, a petulant Scavenius insisted that a declaration committing the new government to the continuity of his pro-German policies accompany the action or he would quit. [76] After a long day of negotiations the Cabinet relented.

The declaration's tone was extremely servile and contained a number of points, that on their face seemed to place Denmark on Germany's side. [See document # 4] Frit Danmark accused the government of repeating Hitler's propaganda that the war was one against communism and siding with the Nazis at a time when the war was about to be decided on the eastern front. It declared that the economic portion of the declaration embraced Hitler's "New Order" and that the promise to continue implementation of anti-communist laws meant the arrest and punishment of people unwilling to submit to oppression. The paper concluded that "It is a humiliating gesture to honor that country that holds Denmark in its violent power and has broken all its promises to the Danish nation. It is a declaration that the vast majority of the Danish people distance themselves from." [77]

The government's knuckling under to Scavenius' pressure and issuing the declaration was enough for the paper to abandoned its shortlived and possibly only strategic position of calling for the government to move to resistance. The June, 1942 issue's front page "We hoped that it [the government] would cease the disgraceful yielding to German pressure. We hoped that it would adjust itself to act in harmony with the broadest wishes of the people. But we have been rebuffed." The article ended with a call for a "national people's front" and the slogan "Now is the time to strike." [78] This was followed by a list of actions people in various professions could take to impede Hitler's war effort and make life uncomfortable for the occupation army. All the recommended actions fell within what could be called passive resistance.

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[74]. Including helping to establish the Dansk-Tysk Forening [Danish-German Union] with the goal "To advance the centuries-old cooperation between Denmark and Germany... to create an organ which can take up solving the long series of tasks concerning the relationship between the two countries in business, technology, art, literature, scholarship and the social domain. Developments show that such an organ should have a structure and solidity to meet the tasks that stretch out from this extraordinary moment to the future, where Denmark and Germany can work side by side in the free conditions of peace." O. M. Olesen, "Den Dansk-Tysk Forening," in Danmark Under Besættelsen, ed. Vilhelm La Cour, København, 1947, vol. 2, p. 396.

[75]. Frit Danmark, April, 1942.

[76]. Erik Scavenius' account of this event and the full text of the declaration is reprinted in Forhandlingspolitiken under Besættelsen, København, Steen Hasselbachs Forlag, 1948, pp. 144-145. See Document 4 in the appendix.

[77]. Frit Danmark, May, 1942 .

The June, 1942 issue underscored the hardening of the paper's position to the government by including a lauditory article about the example set by a group of high-school kids in Aalborg who organized a sabotage group that pilfered German weapons, burned German cars, war material under transport, and office records. [79] The article concluded

> They responded promptly and forthrightly. In their youthful zeal they wanted to inflict the defeat of the Germans that all Danes and all free people in the world desire, hope and trust in. In other places it is grown men that commit sabotage and kill Germans. In Denmark it was eight under-age boys who led the way. [80]

The attack on government policy continued through the late summer and early fall in articles such as "The National Peoples Front's Position on the Government: Who is With us and Who is Against Us," which also noted that "while the Germans are in the country, even a new government would be a government that was approved by the Germans." [81] This comment, as well as two articles hailing Norway's resistance and her exiled King indicated that Frit Danmark desired the fall of the Denmark's government and "Norwegian conditions". But the paper issued no such demand directly. Why?

The paper's frequent assertion that a large majority of the Danish people disagreed with the government's course was a combination of wishful thinking and a propaganda ploy. Subsequent events show that a call for the end of the national government would have been perceived as much too extreme a position at this time and the paper no doubt refrained from it to avoid rejection and further isolation. But by early fall, 1942 Frit Danmark is clear that no Danish government could avoid becoming a creature of the German occupation power.

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[78] Ibid. June, 1942.

[79] The rather remarkable story of this group of boys and young men is contained in group- member Knud Pedersen's three volume Churchill-Klubben, København, Samlerens Forlag, 1977. Their exploits included filing their prison-window bars after their arrest and surreptitiously continuing sabotage actions at night and returning undetected to their cell by day until caught outside during an air-raid. The club had obvious propaganda value and a comic strip "The Boy Saboteurs" was run in American newspapers during the war, although Pedersen says that "the content didn't have much to do with reality." vol. 3, p. 7.

[80] Frit Danmark, June, 1942. The Churchill Club included eight schoolboys ranging in age from 14 to 17 and several slightly older friends. Contrary to the implication in the quote, the Club did not kill anyone.

[81] Ibid., August, 1942.

This realization no doubt led the paper to take a "Vote Blank" position to the national Parliamentary elections allowed by the Germans in March, 1943. Resistance groups and the B.B.C. Danish broadcast service were unable to work out a united position on the elections and ended up working at cross purposes and election results were ambiguous. [82] But it seems clear that at this point in the occupation the institutions, if not the policies, of national government still had the support of the Danish population.

Sabotage

In the wake of the March election, the editorial committee circulated a memorandum to Frit Danmark groups outlining what they saw as the paper's continuing objectives:

> a. To explain the significance of sabotage both as weakening the German war-machine and as a demonstration of our will for an independent fight for freedom.
> b. To point out those areas where the Germans are attempting to intensify exploitation of our country through the Scavenius-Best policies.
> c. To expose the formal character of German "accomodation."
> d. To continue exposing the German's Danish henchmen. [83]

The last three objectives correspond to what this paper has described as Frit Danmark's critique and publicizing of German intrusion in Danish economic life, intrusion into the judicial process and its anti-government campaign (although objective d. was clearly broader than this and encompassed Danish Nazis, economic opportunists, etc.). Together these three form the basis for a popular understanding of what was indeed wrong in the state of Denmark. The other (objective a.) is the task of developing a popular understanding and sympathy for the act of armed resistance and it was only in the spring of 1943 that events had made people receptive to this form of struggle.

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[82] A record 90% of the population voted and the cooperating parties gained 8 seats. "The election results could be interpreted and were interpreted in many ways. Berlin hailed them as a victory for Scavenius and his policies. The domestic interpretation and the free world construed it as a profession of democratic rule. But above all the interpretations lay one conclusive result: the definite defeat of Danish Nazism." Besættelsen 1940-1945,København, Politikens Forlag, 1979, p. 46. Even Frit Danmark's organization was not united on election strategy. The vote blank strategy was also promoted by the DKP, but was largely unsuccessful. Only 24,000 spoiled ballots were cast.

[83] Reproduced in Kilder til modstandsbevægelsens historie, eds. Jørgen Hæstrup, Ole Barfoed, Leif Rasmussen and Hans Snitker Petersen, København, Gyldendal, 1962, p. 26.

With the exception of the single report on the Churchill Club, active organized sabotage was not openly promoted in Frit Danmark's pages until the October, 1942 issue. That month the lead article reprinted and embraced Christmas Møller's September B.B.C. broadcast calling for sabotage against the German empire's transportation system. But this was not immediately followed up in subsequent issues. [84] This may be due to the negative reception Møller's exhortation received in most Danish circles at that time. [85] By the spring of 1943, however, circumstances had begun to alter. German military fortunes had turned, Danish police were less willing to clear up sabotage cases, some legal sectors were distancing themselves from the policy of appeasement (Conservative Party and Dansk Ungdomssamvirke) and growing workplace dissatisfaction all contributed to an increased receptivity to sabotage as a form of resistance. [86]

Børge Houmann, a leading DKP figure in both Frit Danmark and the Freedom Council described an additional reason for the development of sabotage at this particular point:

> But sabotage is fighting tactic in its own right. It doesn't just require the courage, daring and ingenuity of those that carry it out. It also requires a certain degree of maturity, of political understanding among the majority of the population. Sabotage entails the destruction of large amounts of goods, workers becoming unemployed- which at the time was synonymous with being sent to Germany to work - that the enemy is provoked and frequently driven to counter measures, which

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[84] November's issue did have a small notice of the Churchill Clubs continuing nighttime sabotage forays from jail and their second arrest. They had filed their cell's window bars and had gone out 19 times burning German vehicles, only to return undiscovered by dawn. The 20th time they were caught out in an air-raid and arrested. I.C. Lauritzen, Sabotagen i Danmarks Modstandskamp, København, Forlaget "Fremad", 1945, pp. 19-20.

[85] "It is against the background of this atmosphere - where the political solidarity against the Germans manifested itself time and again - that one must see the rejection and the unanimous condemnation of your sabotage speech in September, or was it the last part of August?

At that time one couldn't create the popular mood for sabotage. There were no fresh German intrusions here at home to arouse feelings. With that said, there can be no doubt that under different circumstances and at the right psychological time a feeling for sabotage can be created one way or another - but the situation was not ripe *then*." Microfilm Letter from Erling Foss to Christmas Møller: 2/15/43 Fra Passiv til Aktiv Modstand, København, Gyldendal, 1946, p. 147.

[86] This is Aage Trommer's assessment of the context for sabotage in 1943 in Jernbanesabotagen i Danmark under den anden verdenskrig, Odense, Odense University Press, 1971, p. 314.

> by their nature hit the larger part of the population and not just those who carry out the sabotage....
>
> If sabotage doesn't have the necessary resonance in the population it can cause the enemy large or small material damage, disrupt targeted organizations, delay various transports, etc. but this risks inhibiting the mobilization of a broad resistance movement because many will fall for the opposition's arguments about hooliganism, crime, violent mentality, etc. From this, although secondary, is the risk that being informed on increases and the work is made more difficult.
>
> This is the explanation for sabotage being taken up as a fighting tactic against the occupation power at a relatively late point. The population had to first, through their own experience, through the illegal press and through resistance on a lower level come to realize the necessity and importance of moving on to sabotage. [87]

The post-election April, 1943 issue of Frit Danmark illustrate this dynamic quite well. An article analyzing the elections results quoted the Minister of the Interior's statement attempting to link the election and a negative attitude toward the intensification of sabotage in the spring of 1943. [88] "...Sabotage actions... endanger the whole foundation that we have built our existence on and which the people have given its resounding support. Those that carry out these actions undermine the community and betray the unity of our people..." [89] In response, the paper devoted an article, "Once Again - Sabotage," to justify this tactic. It began by admitting that many good Danes had distanced themselves from Møller's September, 1942 sabotage speech, but that reports of the current rise in sabotage activity were being met with "joy and sympathy from almost all Danes." [90] The authorities and politicians attack sabotage as endangering our freedom, the article states, but the common citizen knows "our freedom has long since gone by the board and that it will not return without an Allied victory." This average citizen

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[87] Postscript to Børge Brandt and Kaj Christiansen, BOPA Sabotage: Brudstykker af en beretning fra kampen mod de tyske besættelsestropper, København, Sirius, 1962, p. 190.

[88] Sabotage actions in Denmark rose from 14 (2 using explosives) in January, 1943, to 29 (8 using explosives) in February, 60 (12 using explosives) in March and 82 (20 using explosive) in April. Besættelsens Hvem, Hvad, Hvor, København, Politikens Forlag, 1966, p. 333.

[89] Frit Danmark, April, 1943.

[90] This claim is considerably overstated for this period, especially for the provinces. Axel Holm, in his book on the Hvidsten arms drop and escape route group wrote that "At this point in time [March, 1943] not even 5% of Jutland's population would go along with this kind of fight against the Germans." Hvidsten Gruppen, Aarhus, Graver Andersens Forlag, 1945, p. 32. A poll conducted in the summer of 1943 by the underground organization Ringen, despite some fundamental and unavoidable design problems, indicated substantial support for sabotage:

> ...also knows that sabotage is a necessary direction in any war strategy and with the proportions this one has finally reached, that it plays a role in weakening Germany's military strength. And finally, more and more are realizing that the position our country will gain in the future freedom is to a great degree dependent on our own contributions during these years. Yes, even more so after Scavenius' prescription supporting the Nazis, so much the more will we be looked upon as the Axis power's accomplices. But if - instead of simply putting our trust in the Allied and other oppressed nations- **we ourselves fight toward our freedom by contributing to Germany's defeat**, then we have a chance to take our place at the side of Norway, Holland, Belgium and other countries when Europe's future arrangements are sketched out. [91]

The intensification of sabotage through the summer drew ever sharper lines between people impatient with the government and its policy of appeasement and the nominal and actual authorities in Denmark. Both July and August issues of the paper had full length articles documenting the effects of sabotage from the previous month, which the legal press was forbidden to report. [92]

In August a series of "people's strikes" (called Folkestrejker to distinguish their total character in contrast to typical general strikes that only include the organized working class) flared up in the cities of Esbjerg, Odense and Aalborg and in smaller provincial towns. These were followed by some spectacular examples of sabotage, 189 breaches of Jutland's railway tracks over two nights and the bombing and complete

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	Unconditiona support	conditional support	Oppose	Don't Know	
Men in Copenhagen	70%	23%	6%	1%	Women in
Copenhagen	50%	20%	15%	15%	
Men the Provinces	70%	12%	12%	6%	
Women in the Provinces	50%	20%	23%	7%	

Quoted in Frode Jacobsen's I Danmarks Frihedsråd, København, Gyldendal, 1975, vol. 1, p. 44.

[91] Frit Danmark, April 1943.

[92] Forbidden, that is , after a brief period in the spring they were encourage to cover it widely in a negative light. This approach backfired when these reports were received with a certain pride by many in the population. Sabotage stories were banned again.

destruction of the large Forum hall in Copenhagen. [93] While the government prattled on about law and order and appealed for a return to work, people overturned the sound trucks and burned the leaflets that tried to continue to sell them this policy. When Hitler ordered a crackdown on Denmark, including the introduction of the death penalty in Denmark's judicial process - the policy of appeasement was no longer tenable. The government did not have enough popular support to comply. It resigned and was not replaced for the duration of the war.

The pre-August, 1943 Frit Danmark and its four major themes (economic and judicial intrusions, anti-government campaign and advocacy of sabotage) were directed at influencing the domestic political balance. There is a discernible shift in the paper's content from strong, but still loyal opposition to an utter rejection of the most compromised section of the "system," the national government. The dynamic that played out between the organization and Danish authorities during this time - the legitimation of the illegal movement and concurrent undermining of the legal power - has some elements of a movement of social revolt. In the pressurized atmosphere of the occupation the disparate anti-system elements of the right and left could unite to attack and subvert the ethos of cautious opportunism and the power of the national government that tried to maintain it as circumstances changed. It was on the narrow ground of undermining the policy of appeasement and opposing the Nazi coercion that stood behind it, that cooperative resistance efforts like Frit Danmark and the Freedom Council could operate on.

Hitler had described the "art" of occupation rule as a combination of force and psychology:

> ...ruling people in the conquered regions is, I might say, of course a psychological problem. One cannot rule by force alone. True, force is decisive, but it is equally important to have this psychological something which the animal trainer also needs to be master of his beast. [94]

Up until August, 1943 the German occupation of Denmark had relied more heavily on the psychological factors of social control than on force. The continuity of Danish political authority had kept the familiar animal trainer form in place and masked the German ventriloquist.

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[93] J. Lindegaard Christensen, 29. August: Vendepunkt, København, Stig Vendelkærs Forlag, 1961, p. 174.

[94] Quoted in Politics on Nonviolent Action, Gene Sharp, Boston, Porter Sargent, 1973, p. 43.

Conclusion

Frit Danmark was an early and dominant voice in the illegal press that aimed to expose the moral and political dangers of the policy of appeasing the Germans and to subvert the obedience and popular quiescence that the German occupiers and domestic government depended on to carry out their policies. It did this by its very existence, the public example of its victimization by the domestic government, and through its commentary on and interpretation of occupation policy that helped develop the popular consciousness necessary to support the guerilla war strategy of sabotage.

This "united-front" voice of opposition initially lacked real organizational representation from any organized group except the DKP which, however, was instrumental for its development and success. It grew into its description of itself as a politically diverse organization at least to the extent that it was not merely the creature of the DKP as the Resistance moved towards the character of a mass movement. [95]

While Frit Danmark's task was promoting disaffection it simultaneously was building the apparatus of parallel power in Denmark's occupied society. This reached its culmination in the establishment and growing authority of the Freedom Council which fulfilled Frit Danmark's original conception of a united front of the Resistance movement. Again, this power rested on the narrow area of the proper relationship to the occupation power, for this is where agreement began and ended among the disparate elements cooperating in Denmark's Resistance. This, it seems, is part of the explanation of the apparent paradox of the Resistance movement being able to topple the official government, emerge as a real political power through the Freedom Council in the latter part of the occupation and then be swallowed up again by the pre-war system - a process some have called "putting a parentheses around the occupation." The only really common enemies were the Nazis and the policy of accommodation and without them, Resistance alliances lost their rationale.

National consensus historiography of Denmark's occupation period has represented the growth of the illegal press as the steady development of popular anti-occupation sentiment. The content of the early Frit Danmark suggests that the domestic government and its policies were at least an equally important target and a necessary one to move Danes to active resistance to German occupation. Further research of the pre-August, 1943 Danish illegal press will be undertaken to test this assertion.

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[95] Here I'm concurring with the occupation historian Hans Kirchhoff that the characterization of Frit Danmark as a "front organization" is both correct and false: Correct in so far as it advanced the general purposes of the DKP, had very significant DKP involvement at all levels, but false in so far as the editorial committee and local levels that successfully created politically diverse Frit Danmark groups were not controlled and managed by the party. Hans Snitker comes to a similar conclusion in saying that Frit Danmark "was not used for any particularly communist purpose, . the advancement of the fight for freedom." Det Illegale Frit Danmark: bladet og organisationen, Odense, Odense Universitets forlag, 1977, p. 163.

APPENDIX

Document # 1

From official Danish sources it is reported:

The 1st of February, 1943

As revealed in the official report of December 11, 1942, measures were taken against the illegal organization FRIT DANMARK. This organization was established by communists and aimed to win the population to unlawful purposes through the illegal paper FRIT DANMARK. That paper contains, among other things, a series of incitements for sabotage. Production and shipping expenses for the paper were primarily paid for by the communists. But to get as many people involved, the paper used a format which did not appear to be communist. In the same way, the leadership got people who were not communist-minded to interest themselves in the paper and in collaboration with the Communists to participate in the illegal work.

Participation in the illegal publication FRIT DANMARK

In addition to Professor Ole Chievitz, whose arrest and deposition to the Danish police was reported in the above-mentioned report, library director Thomas Marius Døssing and Appelate lawyer Rud. Prytz were arrested in connection with the case. They are now in Danish custody and will, like the rest implicated in the case, be held responsible before the Danish courts. In depositions to the Danish authorities they have confessed to having taken part in discussions about the paper. In addition, Prytz admitted to writing articles for it.

Furthermore, two other people were arrested in the case who have been released in the meantime.

Professor Fog and Editor Kiilerich Wanted By the Police

The investigation has further established that Professor Mogens Fog and editor Ole Kiilerich have significantly participated in FRIT DANMARK's illegal work and with intimate connections to Denmark's illegal Communist Party have advanced the goal of FRIT DANMARK. Professor Mogens Fog and editor Ole Kiilerich have evaded their responsibility by fleeing.

A 5,000 Kr. reward is offered for information leading to the arrest of either of the two last mentioned people. Information can be directed to the States Attorney for Special Affairs at police headquarters or to the nearest police` authority.

(Descriptions and data follow)

København, the 1st of February, 1943

Reprinted in FRIT DANMARKS HVIDBOG, København, Thanning & Appels Forlag, 1945, vol. 1, p. 144.

DOCUMENT # 2

Mogens Fog's Letter, Dec. 1942 on going underground

In my state of enforced idleness I have felt the need to write to some of my friends and acquaintances who presumably are thinking of me and are discussing my disappearance. We have, as everyone else has, often discussed D enmark's situation in the last few years, but only now can I freely state my point of view and attempt to state the reasons for my actions. Therefore these words.

I hope and trust that the last week's events have opened your eyes to the fact that we in this country are in the midst of complete lawlessness and incipient terror. Everyone should know that today the German police gets permission to arrest any Danish citizen they chose. They do not ask in advance whom they may come down on. One or two Danish officers have the opportunity to be present at the arrest. After that the sacrifice is not viewed by any Danes. And notice that this doesn't just hold true when the charges are for an attack on the German Wehrmacht. Any anti-Nazi conduct or agitation can bring Gestapo violence down on people. What happens in the interrogation offices we know nothing about. Reports from other countries enable us to guess.

Chievitz and other well known citizens will apparently be turned over to Danish legal proceedings. Do not be confused by this fact. Do not think that that this is evidence that the Scavenius government has any real power over the Germans. It is part of the Nazi tactics in this country: To attempt to keep the population passive it dangles our "own" government as as lesser evil. You must not entertain illusions with regards to Chievitz' fate: The moment the Nazis want him back they will get him turned over, whether it happens with the current government's consent or over its dead body.

The communists - the influential ones at any rate- the Germans are holding. They believe they can do it without arousing indignation because they depend on the "Bolshevik -scare" that runs in the blood of a large portion of the citizens. If it succeeds, it is evidence that the Nazi propaganda, in spite of its obvious crudeness has still managed to poison the country. Characteristically enough, one heard people say during the first days following Chievitz' arrest" "Yeah, but is he a communist then?" -

evidence that individual Danes have noticed that any anti-Nazi is a communist according to the German's book. No, Chievitz is not a communist. But he and fortunately many other people with various political opinions have realized that the front against the Nazism must be a united front, a gathering together of all the efforts that say: not that, above all not that! They do it secure in the knowledge that when the Nazi danger is defeated, then we can discuss the forms under which the country shall be governed in the future. And let me say this as strongly as I can: I do not want nor do I believe that anyone other than Danes should decide the country's future fate, without the help of foreign arms.

Yes," say some of them, " but why carry on anti-Nazi propaganda here at home? Why not stick your head in the sand and let the whole thing blow over. They're going to lose anyway." I also believe they will. But are we really so mean-spirited that we will let everyone else fight for what we regard as right? I grant that such an answer is more more emotional than rational. But people, thank God, are not mechanical rational beings - the heart has its reasons and they are not always in step with the intellect's.

"There is so little we can do" is another of the traditional remarks in drawing room discussions. Right, but if everyone had said that, Hitler's would rule the world today. I think about our anti-Nazi education and what our anti-German activity means. We create uncertainty among the occupation authorities. We establish a counterweight to the spiritual poisoning. We hold Nazism's methods and goals out in the daylight and we no doubt tie some more people up here than would be the case of complete subjugation. "Drops in the ocean." you say. Well, the ocean is made up of drops. In a movement such as ours there is nothing too small. Every straw we put in the Nazi's way is significant.

And so we come to the third consideration that claims to rely on the cool rationality: "What Danes do today has no significance for the country's future destiny." I thought the same thing, but that was in 1940. If the Danish government actually - trusting in the German promises - could have created a bulwark against any intrusion into our internal affairs, if the country's official leaders could actually demonstrate to the world that that they do not want any form of Nazi infection in our social life and do not support Germany in its war - yes, then I too believed the world would have understood our position and respected our country. But developments have shown how naive such hopes were. You yourself know all the stages on the road to subjugation during the past year. In our relation to the occupation power we have only been able to realize small profits and a large loss. Now we live in lawlessness and the terror begins.

With the sole aim to protect a kind of materially preferential position, our government has sacrificed all our earlier rights. At the same time it has created the basis for our agriculture, our industry, our trade and a large portion of our unemployed to become active units of the German war machine. If our populace does not openly show that it does not sanction the government's business dealings, that it it dares risk an effort for its ideals, the Allied powers may with justice view us as an enemy country - with the consequences that this can have with the conclusion of peace. Can't you hear the increasing coolness when Denmark's name is mentioned on the English radio- or not mentioned!

The ingenious sellout message of the "official statement" about Chievitz' arrest has Frit Danmark trying to set a large part of the Danish population against the government. No! Our struggle is not directed at the government, it is against Nazism and to the extent that the government is only 'steady under fire,' it actively supports our country's enemies.

Some words about the government. I do not doubt that many of the members even of the current government have the purest motives for their actions and believe they are serving their country by choosing "The policy of the lesser evil." But this is not the time to examine our Minister's private motives. That can play a role in our judgement of their character, but not for our judgement of the effects of their conduct. And that, in my opinion, is irreparable damage not just in our condemnation from abroad, but also by dividing and disorienting the population, disarming it in a spiritual sense and obscuring the true nature of our oppression.

"But what else can we do?" You can resist according to your ability. When no more is possible, back off. Time has taught us that it is preferable to survive and be flexible, on all the important points anyway. If you do that, we'll be ruled like the Norwegians, a government clearly obedient to the Germans. That would mean that the Danish people would become welded together in solid unity. And that would mean the disorganization of the country's administration, for a while at any rate. (Think of the people you have to work with?) It will mean reduced help for Hitler's war. "Just a drop" - but at the moment it is significant because we are near the rim of the cup.

Many of those who have chosen to make a contribution for the cause of a free Denmark are sitting in prison today- communists and non-communists. You must admit that our freedom of press, speech and assembly, our civil rights were illusions. But these people knew that when they acted. I doubt one of them regrets what they did, maybe only that they didn't have the opportunity to do more. I know they agree with what I've written and that Christmas Møller does as well. They would only express it more strongly than I myself. They would emphasize what I've said about the need for a united front. Now I ask my friends and acquaintances: read the signs of our fate. Do not think that we can avoid the nightmare under Nazi tyranny by being compliant. There is only one way. The primitive one. To resist.

In this work, remember that the individual cannot distinguish between the large and the small. Spurn the small and one does not achieve the large. If one says no to being a means, one has also denied the end.

In conclusion some personal remarks. Many of you will no doubt condemn my actions because through them I have brought sorrow and misfortune upon my unsuspecting family. But I know Elin understands and forgives me. I have not acted rashly. My loved ones have been in my thoughts. Their future has also been on my mind. From my earliest childhood I have thought everyone ought to have equal access to life's blessings - regardless of birth, regardless of spiritual and economic equipment, regardless of skin color or nationality - only that they contribute to social life and the common good according to their ability. My political convictions are a consequence of that outlook on life. Nazism goal is directly opposed to mine on all points. That is why I must fight it. I do not think anyone who knows me would characterize me as a fanatic. I have never been particularly interested in politics, much less active. The goals I've set for myself in this existence lay in areas of a more peaceful kind. But when the foundation of my spiritual existence is threatened, when others are fighting for my ideals, then I could not be a passive spectator. None of those I have worked together with expected anything different than what happened. We have not sought out a heroic pose, but only want to be soldiers in an army that faces the enemies of our culture.

I understand quite well that others may see this question differently than I, but I hope more and more will rally around the men who still can and dare to do this work.

With warm regards,
yours sincerely,
(signed) Mogens Fog

Reprinted in Mogens Fog's Efterskrift 1904-45, København, Gyldendal, 1976, pp. 99-101.

Document # 3

Illegal books published by Frit Danmark:

Billeder De ikke saa [Pictures You Didn't See], published jointly with "1944" 20 pp., illustrated. 3,000 copies.

Danmark's Frihedssang [Denmark's Song of Freedom], single page.

Danske Digte [Danish Poetry], København,1943, 31 pp., duplicated, 1,200 copies. Cost: 10 Kr.

Danske Flaades Kamp og Sænkning den 29.8.1943 [Danish Navy's Battle and Scuttling]. 1944, 15 pp., duplicated, cost: 2.50 Kr.

Faglig Orientering [Professional Information] published by Frit Danmark's architect group, 5 duplicated vols. from 1945 containing Problems of English Reconstruction (vol. 1), Architecture and Democracy (vol. 2), Værnemager [occupation word for those who profited from trade with the Wehrmacht] (vol.3), Collaborationists 1 (vol. 4), Collaborationists 2 (vol. 5). 600 copies.

5 Aars Krig. Billeder De ikke saa [5 Year War. Pictures you didn't see] jointly published with "1944". 1944, 24 pp., cost: 4 Kr.

Frihedskrigen. [War for Freedom] Written based on Gyllenbrook: Partisan War. Conceived as an instructional guide to partisan forces. Hillerød, 1944, duplicated, 17 pp.

Frit Danmark 1944 Nytaar 1945, printed in Gøteborg, Sweden, 1944, 32pp.

Den Gule Bog [The Gold Bog] list of anti-national elements of in Aalborg.

Hitlertysklands sidste Dage [Last Days of Hitler's Germany], 12 pp. duplicated.

Hvidbogen: En dokumetarisk Redegørelse vedrørende Begivenhederne omkring den 9. April. [White paper: documentary account of the events around April 9]. 55 pp.

Hvis vi vil vinde Freden, maa vi forberede den under Krigen: Naar Danmark Atter er frit! [If we want to win peace we must prepare for it during the war: When Denmark is free once again!] 8 pp.

Krigshumor, Hitlerhistorier, Anekdoter, Vittigheder, Humor. [War humor, Stories about Hitler, Anecdotes, Jokes, Humor]. Jan., 1944. 31 pp., cost: 5 Kr.

Munk, Kaj. Niels Ebbesen. Skuespil i 5 Akter [Kaj Munk. Niels Ebbesen. Drama in 5 Acts] published by Frit Danmark's North Jylland section. 26 pp.

Munk, Kaj. Tre Prædikener [Kaj Munk. Three Sermons], 8 pp.

Naar Danmark atter er frit [When Denmark is free once again] Frihedsraadet [The Freedom Council] views on postwar Denmark. 8 separate editions.

29. August 1943. Hvad der gik forud - hvad der fulgte efter. [August 29, 1943. What happened beforehand - What followed afterwards] Dec. 1943, 128 pp., printed, cost; 10 Kr., 14,000 copies.

Norge ved Aarskiftet [Norway at Newyears], 10 pp. duplicated.

Reiss-Andersen, Gunnar. Kampdikt fra Norge [Poems of Struggle from Norway], engineer group, 95 pp.

Sort Liste [Blacklist]. Aarhus, 74 pp.

Sprængningsteknik [Explosives Technology], 20 pp.

Studiekredsnoter til "Fagbevægelsens Vej" [Study Group Notes for "The Labor Movement's Road"], Summer, 1944, 6 pp.

Tjenestemænd og Demokratiet [Civil Servants and Democracy], published by Frit Danmark's Civil Servant Group, 1945, 32 pp.

Ungdommen og Fremtiden [Youth and the Future]. Published by Frit Danmark's Teachers group. 11 pp.

Source: Besættesestidens Illegale Blade og Bøger 1940-1945. eds. Leo Buschardt, Albert Fabritius and Helge Tønnesen, København, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, 1954.

Document # 4

May, 1942 Declaration of the newly constituted Danish Government

It is the government's intention to continue Stauning's policy on the basis of the existing political cooperation. This policy has been expressed first and foremost in the King's and the government's proclamations to the Danish people on April 9, 1940 and later in various declarations and decisions such as the Foreign Minister's declaration of July 8, 1940 along with the government's statements of June 26, 1941 and November 25, 1941.

The government's first task, therefore, will be to ensure the maintenance of order and calm in the nation and to effect the populace's correct, dignified and loyal behavior towards all who exercise authority. The successful implementation of that task is of fundamental and decisive import to successfully bring Denmark through these troubled times and protect our national values.

But this can only be achieved with good and neighborly relations with the German nation. To advance and improve cooperation for mutual benefit and advantage will remain a matter of urgency for the Danish government.

The desire to keep Denmark out of the fights of the large states has determined our policies through generations. Our traditional policy succeeded in getting us through the 1914-18 World War and neither are we a participant in the current large armed conflict. Yet we cannot remain indifferent with regard to it because the fight against communism concerns common European interests that affect all countries on the Continent. As far as precautions against communism in our own country are concerned, the policy is laid down with the law of August 22, 1941 and Denmark's entrance into the Anti-Comintern Pact. That policy will continue to be followed. In the area of economics there is a positive opportunity in the evolution that European nations are now in the midst of: to reach sensible cooperation between countries with deference to the individual state's economic situation. Germany occupies a central position here. Denmark has shown its willingness to assist in the solving of the practical tasks that are involved and remains prepared to take part in loyal and positive cooperation in this area.

Thanks partly to the occupation power's considerate behavior, partly to the population's sober-mindedness and understanding of the time's difficulties, it has been possible to carry out the policy laid down on April 9, 1940 and to come through these two years under conditions that have been more favorable than could have been anticipated. And even should difficulties increase in the coming period, we are justified in trusting the German promise to preserve Denmark's integrity and political independence that nourish hope that our Fatherland will continue to successfully find its way through in the end.

FOUR EAST EUROPEAN BROADCASTING SYSTEMS: THE FINAL DAYS

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FOUR EAST EUROPEAN BROADCASTING SYSTEMS: THE FINAL DAYS

By Milton Hollstein

The most visible remnant of the collapsed communist order in Warsaw is a grotesque, 3,288 room, 42-story white elephant called the Palace of Culture. It was built in Russian wedding-cake style and donated as a gift of friendship by Josef Stalin. An American businessman of Polish descent has signed an agreement to operate it as a self-financing trade center free of government subsidy. Nearby is a joint venture, the new swank 39-story skyscraper shared by LOT, the Polish airline, and the Marriott, the country's best and most expensive hotel.

In a way these buildings symbolize the great trends in social life and thus in the mass media of Eastern Europe, which for the past two years have been gravitating through an astonishing revolution. Something had to be done with the white elephants of the media, outmoded and discredited systems run by the communist party and its agencies. And ways have to be found to support new media being founded or envisioned for the market economies now emerging. Both tasks are daunting.

AN OVERVIEW

Until late l989, broadcasting in all countries of the bloc was rigidly centralized. It was technically government-owned but actually controlled by the whim of each country's communist central committee.

This paper is a look at broadcasting in four of those countries, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It examines the systems as they existed under communism, the changes in the revolutions of l989-90, and the new systems being brought into being in I991.

The regimes crumbled in late I989 under the weight of mass demonstrations in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia and gave way in Hungary. The transitional broadcasting systems began to speak with the voice of the people as new governments came in to pick up the pieces of the discredited governments in I990. Broadcasting in all four countries was in limbo, however, for all of the first year of the revolution and well into I991 awaiting the writing of broadcast laws, a situation almost without historical parallel. And broadcasting did not break cleanly with the past. In Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia the governments wanted to retain some control. "Legislatures involved are well aware of broadcasting's power, and some seem inclined to try to control it." ("Westernization," 1990) Furthermore, young faces were sparse among the mid-level managers of all media. Some westerners complained the companies retained too many old-line journalists with decision-making authority. (Sussman, I990)

The most likely scenario, however, is also the most sanguine, the emergence in all four countries by 1992 of free and divergent broadcasting, public service and private commercial corporations coexisting in a true dual system on the Western European model for the first time.

At the same time, the systems will continue to compete with foreign signals. All have for some years been saturated with radio and television spilling over from neighboring countries, propaganda and military stations and clandestine broadcasts. Outside, nonofficial broadcasting even has been credited with stimulating the revolutions:

> Television sparked the great wild surge toward a consumer economy, and television packaged brilliantly the actual rush. Why live by bread alone when there is peanut butter? Why endure as a Soviet satellite when the word "satellite" means cable television? The gains have been tremendous. Regimes of hideous stupidity, of corrupt despotism, of inefficiency beyond credence have been broken. ("Books: BB"; l990)

Can the gains can be consolidated? Can truly democratic societies emerge? It all depends on the resolution of a number of political and economic conundrums. Not the least of these is how well the countries adjust to a market economy to replace state planning and price controls and guaranteed employment (Meyer, 1990), for governments are not providing the necessary financial support, and advertising for the first time looms important. The privatization of formerly publicly owned industries is proceeding laggardly "mired in legal problems and bureaucratic bickering" even in Germany (Protzman, 1991), where the former East German economy has been massively supported by the West Germans. But all four of the new governments are inclining toward allowing some private broadcasting and foreign participation on at least a joint venture basis. Meanwhile inflation must be controlled and jobs created in the market economies painfully emerging.

After leading a five-member task force of State Department advisers to Budapest, Prague, Bucharest and East Berlin in spring, l990, Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan also noted that these countries were "desperate for better programming" and cited what she called an "absolute [domestic] spectrum mess."

> So even as they want to make changes -- they want to have privatizations, they want to have foreign investments -- first of all, their spectrum allocations have been under the Warsaw Pact and in most instances they don't even know what frequencies they've had. The Soviet military has made garbage of the frequencies for years.

("Eyewitness " I990)

HUNGARY

The TV company, Magyar Televizio, has two channels, one on the air daylong, the other in the evening, altogether about I33 hours a week. It devotes about 3 percent of air time to commercials and produces about three-fourths of its own programs. Magyar Radio, a separate company, has three national programs (pop, classical and information), plus seven regional broadcasts from two to three hours a day each. (Jakab, 1990)

The Communist Era

Hungarian broadcasting as the communist party became discredited and then defunct was a mirror image of the regime: debt-ridden, technically backward, undercapitalized and overstaffed. Until I989 all broadcasting was closely regulated by the central committee from a building close to the House of Parliament that was known derisively by the populace as the White House, after its color. "We got all our instructions and bans from there, though there were fewer instructions on what to do than what not to do," says radio's parliamentary correspondent. (Domany, I990). Yet the government of Janos Kadar, which came in after Soviet troops put down the I956 rebellion, was substantially milder than those of any of its neighbors, regarded as a benign autocracy.

Kadar was forced out in I987 after the economy of the mid-I980s soured and the successor governments lost public suport . As the nation's debt and price woes soared so did public debate, leading to the rise of a multiparty system and the writing of a new constitution.

Revolution and Transition

The communist regime was swept out in October, 1989, and the party was dissolved. That was on the 33rd anniversary of the 1956 uprising that was crushed by Soviet troops and tanks in two weeks of fighting.

The proclamation of a republic in late October 1989 led to a torrent of new opinion and reportage in the media. Television carried footage never before aired of the 1956 Soviet invasion and even an interview with Bela Kiraly, an associate of the former prime minister Imre Nagy, who was executed for treason after the 1956 revolution ("Uncontrolled News," 1989)

The Soviet Union largely allowed Hungary under Kadar to go its own way domestically as long as it followed the Soviet line internationally. In 1969 it introduced reforms that began to decentralize the economy, and unauthorized expression was more liberally dealt with. "If you printed a *samizdat* in the Soviet Union you were sent to a labor camp in Siberia. If you did the same in Hungary you were summoned to the police station and fined," says Domany.

"In the Kadar days I would say things for which I was attacked and criticized, although I was a party member. Radio played an important role in the preparation of democracy. We tried to do all we could under the party controls. We tried to go just to the wall, not through it. To break through we needed political changes."

Today and the Future

The new expression in Hungarian broadasting is nowhere better illustrated than by the most popular radio show, "Sunday Journal." It went on the air in November, 1987, heard from 6 to 8:30 Sunday mornings on

Radio Kossuth, the main information channel. With l.4 million listeners, it has a wider audience than the entire newspaper press. It deals with daring themes and one-time taboos, beginning with a piece on the oppression of the Hungarian minority in Transylvanian, the Romanian province. At the outset it dealt with the fate of World War II POWs and forced laborers in Russia, the l956 rebellion and the reprisals it brought, as well as with the horrors inflicted by the secret police. (Farkas, l989)

The broadcasting structure also began to change. More than 50 local cable systems mushroomed from l983 to l989, intended to be the mouthpiece of local communist party bosses. The party, however, never managed to control them completely. In l987, reception of satellite programs was allowed. Perhaps 700,000 homes can get satellite programs through cable, including such fare as America's Cable News Network. (Jakab, l990)

Two minor but historically important changes took place before the elections that brought in a noncommunist government. The first was creation of a breakfast TV program called "Sun" and aired four times a week from 5 to 9 a. m., time leased from the second channel. The program is owned by Hungarian shareholders, including *Mai Nap*, the boulevard newspaper which is half owned by Rupert Murdoch.

The other was a private radio and television company in the region of Lake Balaton, a resort area, in July, !989. The radio station originally broadcast in German, largely for tourists, but now has a Hungarian program as well. (Dennis, 1990)

In l990 the press law was modified to permit any citizen to get a license to launch a broadcast station. Then, in mid-l990, the new government slapped a moratorium on licenses. Anticipating that a new broadcast law would allow private stations, 56 applications for FM radio licenses and 46 for TV permits had piled up by then. It was anticipated that foreigners would be interested in a share of broadcasting. These include not only Murdoch but another multinational media magnate, Robert Maxwell, and Germany's *Springer Verlag*.

New legislation was logjammed in parliament through l990 and early l99l, though some anticipated that two new laws, one guaranteeing "first amendment" rights to the press, the other regulating electronic media, would be passed by autumn. (Szentivaniy, interview, l991)

EAST GERMANY

Among all the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, East Germany was the most heavily saturated by broadcasting signals. Listeners got not only the East German radio and television and spillover signals from neighboring nations but also the West German state and national programs. These included *Sender Freies Berlin*, the public service radio and TV station in West Berlin, which had a special responsibility under the ARD, the network of all the state (laender) companies, to broadcast to the East, and the ARD national network program, aired after 8 p. m. and broadcast from Berlin transmitters. The broadcasting fare has included programs from West German private stations, including the two big national companies, Satellite I from Hamburg and RTL Plus from Cologne, since l985, when private broadcasting was first permitted. Also, external political radio stations like West Germany's *Deutschlandfunk* from Cologne and Radio Free Europe from Munich were specifically targeted to the East.

As a practical necessity, the East German regime tolerated listening to foreign broadcasts, although passing information along was a criminal offense (Sanford, 1976)

The Communist Era

Though broadcasting was controlled by the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the communist Socialist Unity Party (SED) Central Committee, the sheer size of the system worked against minute party supervision.

The East German national TV system was called DDRI and DDR2 (for German Democratic Republic). In I989 it became known as *Deutscher Fernsehfunk* (German Television). The radio service was a separate company, *DRR Rundfunk*. DFF had two channels and about 8,000 employees. DDR Rundfunk had five services, all operated 24 hours a day, and a huge overlay of bureaucratic services and related activities, including 11 choirs and orchestras.

Although most of the journalists were party members (in the radio service perhaps 750 of the 800), and although many employees were members of the State Security Police, the "Stasi" (no one knows how many), the sheer size of the broadcasting companies made them difficult for the party and government to oversee.

"Ours was a schizophrenic society. Generally people did what the party wanted and then in private took refuge in a totally different life," says Klaus Ulrich Schmautz, the last assistant general superintendent of the radio services. "In radio, however, we had niches and pockets of camouflaged criticism" that aired "when the Politburo was sleeping."

(Schmautz, I990)

As a correspondent in Stockholm, for example, Schmautz did not have to report on East German domestic policies. "Abroad as a foreign correspondent I tried to present a realistic picture of Scandinavia. Of course, the stories were sometimes criticized for reporting a favorable picture of Swedish capitalist society." The foreign affairs department, he says, always had a high degree of realistic reporting despite the party's carping.

Censors had never been attached directly to the broadcast services, journalists following the "unwritten law" that the media would carry only what the government wanted aired. Ecological problems were, for example, swept under the rug because of a tacit agreement that the problems could not be resolved since, after all, the state did not have the money to deal with them. TV news headlines had to be submitted to the propaganda department, and on demand, the TV editors had to submit film for review. The editor-in-chief and chairman went to the central committee for instructions twice each week.

East German television news programs got less than I0 percent of the potential viewers, though the main news show *Aktuella Kamera* was shown simultaneously at 7:30 p. m. on the two channels and repeated at least once a day. News show were heavily freighted with statistics; quarterly, annual and seminannual reports on production had to be placed at the top of the show. They also dealt supremely with the activities of the party general secretary, Erich Honecker.

Revolution and Transition

When the Central Committee resigned in November, 1989, following massive protests that originated in Leipzig, and the Berlin Wall was breached, broadcasting changed very quickly. New general directors were appointed and the news services were overhauled. The first employees dismissed were the Stasis, though they were never identified publicly.

News shows became very popular, about 100 minutes a day being aired on radio. By November, 1989, the government was in such disarray that television journalists covered what they wanted to. The Leipzig riots were covered immediately. "Nobody told us we couldn't, and anyway, it was too late to prevent us from doing so," says Ulrich Makosch, one of the last deputy editors-in-chief at DFF. When on Nov. 4 a million protested in Berlin, the demonstrations were carried live.

One of the immediate changes after the fall of the government was the elimination of the "Black Channel," a program that aired every Monday between 9 and 9:20 p.m., just after German prime time. The program was conducted for many years by a celebrity named Karl Edward von Schnitzler. It used clips from Western broadcasts, either those that were labeled as propaganda or without comments to show the drawbacks of a capitalistic society. (Sanford, 1976) Makosch urged its demise in a speech at a public rally in East Berlin's main square, Alexanderplatz, in November, 1989.

In the transitional period, the broadcasting entities still were pressured from both right and left. Broadcasting executives were insistent that television and radio were no longer state entities but rather independent entities on their way to public status. But old attitudes die hard. In summer, 1990, in the waning days of the East German state, a government spokesperson vermently criticized the media for failing to be in tune with the government and frankly said that what the country needed was a press that supported the regime. (Melkel, 1990)

Today and the Future

At both the radio and television companies planners hoped to convert the systems in a decentralized, federal structure under public nongovernmental boards representing the pillars of society and similar to those in West Germany's ARD, the network of state systems. (All ARD companies have such boards, the largest the 50 members at Bavarian Radio-TV in Munich.) (Wagner-Grey, 1991)

There were many options as the two Germanys raced toward unification in late summer. One was simply to liquidate East German broadcasting, considering that an ARD station already existed in West Berlin. Another was to fuse radio and television to form the 10th state-based station of the ARD. Still another was to create new stations based on the five new laender. The media commission of the Christian Democratic Union, West Germany's largest political party, argued there was no future for a separate TV station serving the old East German states and advised DFF to work toward entering the ARD . (Tok, 1991)

Thus Article 36 of the treaty of unity that merged East Germany into West Germany on Oct. 3, l990, specified that both TV and radio were to be broken up and integrated into the West German federal structure by January 1, 1992. Broadcasting was to be separate from both the state and political parties. A round of unification negotations aimed at establishing "laender links" between radio and television stations began in November, l990 and continued into spring, l991. A broadcasting commissioner, Rudolf Muhlfenzel, came from Munich to head the transitional TV and radio companies and effect the changes.

Deprived of state subsidies and reliant on new but limited advertising and a listener fee (l5 deutschmarks or about $l0 a month for about 5 million radio and TV households), DFF rapidly shucked off employees and expected by the end of September, l991, to be down to 2,500. The staffs were cut initially by attribution as older workers took early retirement. A few found work at ZDF, but as one commentator observes, "People in the East would be horrified if they saw the same faces which used to spout the old Stalinist propaganda from the screens. So it will be young politically untainted and journalistically fresh talent that ZDF and other channels will be seeking as they extend their reporting and production networks eastward." (Andrew Fisher, 1991) Most of those let go will have little opportunity to get into broadcasting again in the immediate future. (Wagner-Grey, 1991)

DFF argued the slimmed-down work force was too sparse to maintain a quality program on two channels and correspondingly surrendered one channel to ZDF. (Burmester, 1991). DFF creates about half its own programs and has enough in stock to last to year's end. The frequency DFF retained became the interim DFF *laender programm* which served all of the former East Germany, which had been divided after unification into five laender. DFF also was providing regional programs for the ARD network, the joint program aired on all the first-program channels after 8 p. m. Meanwhile the radio service, *DDR Rundfunk*, was operating only three of the former five services. The international service, Radio Berlin International, was merged with *Deutschlandfunk*.

Should five new companies, combining radio and TV as in the other ARD systems, one company for each of the new provinces, be created? The ARD chairman, Friedrich Nowotty, was arguing against this notion in winter, l991, saying that although broadcasting always has been a state responsibility, five new companies, one for each of the new laender, each acting independently, would be impossible to finance. (Tok, 1991) The new state parliaments have essentially agreed.

A three-laender organization, called a *Mehrlaenderanstalt*, was formed by a treaty signed by Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringa in May, l991, to operate one amalgamated network for those areas, and came into being on July l. It is called *Mittledeutscher Rundfunk* (Middle German Broadcasting) and is headquartered in Leipzig, with several regional production centers.

The two other states, Brandenburg and Mecklenberg/Western Pomerania, will likely operate another jointly. The state parliaments, however, were still haggling over a host of problems in midsummer l991 even though the January 1 deadline was approaching so rapidly that it would be difficult to have a new company in place by then. The new company will likely be amalgamated with the West Berlin station SFB. The new director general could be housed there, but there is so much resistance to the idea of Berlin exerting leadership that the actual operating headquarters were expected to be in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam, in the precincts of the old film industry, DEFA. The several acres and dozen buildings that house DFF in the Aldersdorf area of eastern Berlin could be used as production facilities but also might be sold; all construction there was at a halt in summer 1991. (Burmester l991)

Some parliamentarians were urging that Mecklenberg/Western Pomerania join with *Nord German Rundunk*, the existing joint ARD company for three northwestern states. (Burmester, Wagner-Grey, 1991) One critic believes that the East German experience might encourage the small or "dwarf stations" in western German, like Radio Bremen and Radio Saarland, to integrate with their larger neighbors. (Tor, 1991)

In addition, without doubt the new provinces will also get private broadcasting, providing the former East regions with the same dual system (broadcasting under public law together with private stations) that has existed for the past 6 years in the West. (Grubitzsch, 1991) (The conservative party, the CDU, and its Bavarian counterpart, the CSU, had led the way for the entry of private broadcasting in Bavaria, and the liberal Social Democratic pareties in the other laender had followed suit.)

Althought overall viewership of the public service networks in Germany has been declining under the impact of the private stations, DFF says its ratings are holding up well Its showcase production is a biweekly newsmagzine *Prisma* which reflects problems in various areas . It claims an overall rating of about 15). (Burmester, 1991) SFB says its listenership in East Germany, based on its first comprehensive survey in l990, found only 29 percent of East Germans watched East German television, while almost 25 percent watched SFB and 22 percent ZDF, the West German national service, and 6 percent the SFB third program. (Lefkowitz, l990) DFF executives scoff that SFB has been of no importance except for Berlin. They believe their programs were as good as those on *ZDF*, and almost as good as those on the richer ARD (Makosch, 1990). Whatever, the cross fertilization of the two systems may be beneficial. For instance, in the view of one observer, "The strong cabaret tradition in the East could certainly help to make German TV less heavyweight and more inclined to amuse as well as inform." (Andrew Fisher, 1991)

POLAND

Radio broadcasts on four domestic channels, maintains one external service and has 17 regional stations, formerly on the air four hours a day and since July 1, 1990 from 5 to 9 a. m. and 4 p. m. to midnight. National television has two channels, one general interest and one a cultural channel devoted to film, drama, classical music and current affairs.

The Communist Era

Even before Solidarity, Poland saw occasional periods of liberalization over the past 44 years, particularly under the nascent government of the "nationalist communist" Wladyslaw Gomulka, in 1956, when it was feared the Soviet Union might see the country slipping out of its grasp and intervene as it did in Hungary. (Alexiev, 1980)

Yet censorship was more overt and rigid in Poland than in any of its neighboring countries. All media were controlled by the department of propaganda and ideology of the Polish United Workers, or communist, Party. It maintained a State Office of Censorship which had quarters in the television and radio main buildings, which were about 100 meters from one another in the Warsaw outskirts. Censorship was not formally abolished until April 12, 1990. Ideological quotas were imposed on television programs and were still in force until July 1, 1990, limiting the proportion of shows from capitalist countries that could be shown on TV. (Husarska, 1990). Censors were guided by 600 pages of directives and recommendations from the chief censor in Warsaw. The pope's visit to Poland from June 2 to 10, 1979

> "showed the Polish press and TV in its most grotesque light. Millions turned out to see him and the country was on an emotinal high for the four events . . . Polish TV cameramen and directors admitted that they had been directed to photograph the pope so that the vast crowds present wherever he went would be disguised by the camera angle." (Steven, 1982)

Not suprisingly, the populace despised the controlled television news, a nightly half-hour of propaganda, and not long after the imposition of martial law the "television walk," in which people went for walks to show that they were not watching television, became something of a national institution. (Dan Fisher, 1982)

Revolution and Transition

A huge underground culture began to grow in the mid-1970s and flourished in the 1980s, following the end of the liberalization of the early 1980s, the martial law that endured two years from Dec. 31, 1981, and the banning of the Solidarity labor movement until just before the elections of 1989. The underground included not only newspapers and cassettes but also political and civil rights activities, publication of almost as many books and pamphlets as produced by the official publishing houses, as well as exhibitions, cabarets, and theaters. (Wedel, 986) Many in the underground were arrested and jailed, though some, like Stefan Bratkowski, Poland's most famous newsman and now editor of a weekly allied to a Solidarity faction, eluded capture. Bratkowski circulated an audio cassette, familiarly known as "Bratkowski's Journal," which went hand-to-hand and was recopied and was played on Radio Free Europe. (Bratkowski, 1990)

Solidarity operated a clandestine radio station, Radio Solidarity, with an avid listernship for several months during martial law, the frequency and air time for which were circulated by word of mouth. (Wedel, 1986) The clandestine press also announced times and channels. The broadcasters were able to thwart continuous jamming by moving frequently. (Gray, 1989)

One of Solidarity's demands was greater access to the media and more balanced acocunts of its activities on television, including the televising of its first national convention in Gdansk in September, 1981 (Reaves, 1981). The government offered it two half-hour spots on prime time television, one including statements by Solidarity founder Lech Walesa and the other a news conference with other Solidarity leaders; but the party boss, Stanislaw Kania, insisted that the party would not relinquish control over the media: "The mass media cannot be apolitical. We will not allow any actions that could serve to paralyze the means of mass communication. (Darnton, 1981)

Yet the tottering economy, widespread strikes and other stresses ultimately forced the communists in early 1989 to yield their political monopoly and share power with Solidarity, which was legalized again. Semi-free elections in 1989 brought Solidarity candidates to 99 percent of the seats in the new Senate, the upper house of parliament, and 36 percent in the Sejm, the lower house. A Solidarity leader, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, became prime minister. The new government moved to reform the economy and create a market system against formidable odds. The Polish United Workers Party dissolved in January, 1990. The following December Walesa was elected the first noncommunist president in half a century.

Present and Future

The Poles remained suspicious of their state-run TV in early spring, l991, though broadcasting appeared to be moving toward appointment of program chiefs by an independent board rather than through politics (the director general is named by the prime minister.) In February 1991 producers of the *Obserwator* nightly news program struck to protests attempts by management to tighten both fiscal and content controls. Critics complain the government is using broadcasting for its own propaganda. Furthermore, Marian Terlecki, the head of Polish Television,

> articulated the conflicting feelings shared by his colleagues in a region that has no tradition of objective journalism. Mr. Terlecki communists were now trying to curry favor by producing one-sided programs that extolled the virtues of Solidarity or President Lech Walesa. Television and radio journalists, he insisted, should never be cheerleaders for the government. (Engleberg, 1991)

The state's monopoly of radio and TV was regulated under a l960 act, which was technically still in force in the transitional period. Early in 1990, however, parliament created a special l0-member commission on reforming radio and television, comprised of Ministry of Information representatives, first-line journalists from radio and TV, mass communication researchers, lawyers, and financial advisers. The commission offered a bill to restructure broadcasting along the lines of West European public service corporations and the Canadian but would depend for frequency regulation on an agency like the American FCC. Under the bill licensees would have transmitted their own programs. FM frequencies would have moved to the Western standard of 88 to l08 megacycles from the current 66 to 74 standard, but since frequencies on the lower end of the band are occupied by special services, allocations were to have been in the l00 to l04 range. (Jedrzejewski, 1990)

That bill, however, was set aside in March, l991, following the presidential elections. A restructured bill was to be introduced in parliament. It was expected that parliament would be at least until late summer enacting a broadcasting law, though its passage was termed a matter of first importance. (Majewsi, interview, l991)

The commission chairman, Stanislaw Jedrzejewski, a sociologist who also is program director of Polish Radio, called l990 "a very interesting and difficult period for us." In effect the commission became the directing agency for both radio and TV pending a new law. (The Ministry of Telecommunications merely maintains the transmitters and lines and deals with technical matters.) (Jedrzejewski, 1990).

A third television channel would have been authorized under the original bill but is not anticipated in any amended bill. The president of the second television service, Barbara Pietkiewicz, hoped to amalgamate the provincial stations into a network that would function as a third channel. There are about half a dozen regional stations in the larger cities. Three private experimental radio stations, are on the air in Warsaw, and one

"Radio Fun," was broadcasting from Krakow. An experimental private television station went on the air in l990 in Wroclaw, financed by Polish interests. About ll,000 workers are employed in broadcasting, including ancillary activities, a figure not only critics but many within broadcasting consider grossly inflated. (Jerzejewksi, l990)

Broadcasting is financed by both a minuscule monthly fee (9,000 zlotys or approximately $l) collected by the Post Office and by advertising. Since l988 advertising, of three to four minutes an hour on radio, about one percent of air time on television, has been permitted, in blocks.

The services are strapped for money and much need to upgrade equipment, however. A proposal to sell TV Channel 2 to foreign interests was floated in parliament, much to the distress of its staff (Harden, l990)

Meanwhile, some 350 applications for television licenses piled up in the Ministry of Telecommunication by March, 1991, with more coming every day. (Jezioranska, 1991) The original rewriting of the broadcasting bill envisioned limiting foreigners to 20 percent ownership, but some Poles consider that figure unrealistic, because no Polish interests, in the severely strapped Polish economy, has even 80 percent of the cost of a TV enterprise. It was anticipated, however, that some controls on imported programs would be enacted to keep Polish TV from being flooded with cheap non-Polish productions. (Jedrzejewski, 1991)

Ninety-eight percent of the households, or about ll million families have television, about a third have color, and about 20,000 homes have satellite dishes.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Radio had had a general 24-hour nationwide channel, Radio Hvezda; three other main channels, Radio Prague, which broadcast in Czech to Bohemia and Moravia and had a cultural program, Radio Vltava; and Radio Bratislava, which broadcast in Slovak. Slovak Radio, one of the oldest in Europe, dating to l927, became part of a unitary system headquartered in Prague after the communist takeover. Television also was headquartered in Prague and broadcast on two channels, with a third added after the l989 revolution.

Much of what is happening in Czechoslovak broadcasting must be read in the light of the traditional yearnings for national identities by the Czech and Slovak peoples and the Slovak fears of Czech dominance.

About a third of the country can get Soviet TV, three-fifths Austrian and German TV.

The Communist Era

Czechoslovakia had a liberal democratic government between World Wars I and II but succumbed to a communist dictatorship in l948. Broadcasting was the primary tool of spreading and enforcing the party ideology and all production and distribution was a state monopoly.

Prague Spring, a euphoric but abortive reform movement from February to August, l968 , was premised largely on the demand for freedom of expression and the argument of reformers like Alexander Dubcek, then the new, liberal party head, that open discussion and communism were not incompatible. The movement was put down by Warsaw Pact tanks. But it so shocked orthodox communists that Czechoslovakia became one of the most rigidly repressive of the East European nations. Dissidents who demanded respect for human rights were regarded as traitors and renegades and hounded out of their jobs . ("That Prague Spring," 1970) For instance, Jiri Kanturek, since March of 1990 the director general of Czech TV, was a general news TV editor in 1948 but from 1949 until November, 1989 was banned from working in broadcasting and was employed in building swimming pools. (Kanturek, 1991)

In the 1960s Czechoslovakia also had a flourishing theater, motion picture industry (with such directors as Milos Forman and Jan Kadar bringing out films that portrayed the plight of an individual against an unresponsive government) and literature (with major writers like Vaclav Havel and other intellectuals in the forefront of a reform movement).

In the 1970s the regime of Gustav Husak wrang the "quality and fervor" from the nation's cultural life by forbidding all the outstanding personalities from publishing or making films. (Paul, 1981) From 1968 onward there was no formal censorship but none was needed, for there was rather a rigid control over content through successive layers of authority in the broadcasting entities.

Revolution and Transition

Club-swinging policemen waded into 15,000 students demonstrating near Prague's Wenceslas Square on Nov. 17, 1989. In so doing they inflamed an incipient Czech Revolution into an incredible week of protests and strikes. These led to the overthrow of the regime and freedom of the broadcasting companies to report objectively for the first time in 42 years, except for the brief 1968 thaw.

The demonstrations led to creation of an umbrella reform movement, Civic Forum, and the elmination of the "leading role" of the Communist Party. Elections in June, 1990, brought Civic Forum to power in a coalition government, though the communists remained a force, the second-largest party in parliament. When students who had participated in the Nov. l7 march went to the radio station asking that reports of the attack be broadcast, an internal struggle erupted in the staff over whether the incident could be reported and how the reports ought to be modified. (Holman, 1990)

Foreign broadcasts, including CNN's satellite news service, were carrying news of the demonstrations from the outset. The first domestic reports aired were official dispatches from the government-controlled news agency, CTK. They simply said that some criminal elements that wanted to destablize the regime were responsible for the demonstrations, though the demonstrations were in fact organized spontaneously by students in one night.

After a weekend in which the demonstrations mushroomed, spurred first by actors from the Theater Arts Academy and theaters in Prague and Bratislava, an open struggle for power began in the radio authority. The following day students demonstrated in front of the Radio Czechoslovakia building, calling for the truth to be told. After a week of demonstrations, representatives of Civic Forum appeared and got an hour or air time.

Broadcasting officials did nothing because the communists were incapable of any action. All were used to getting instructions from the central committee, and none came. Radio's director general resigned, Civic Forum organized a meeting of employees proclaiming their independence, and the new government then appointed a director.

On Wednesday, television covered the demonstration of 250,000 people in Wenceslas Square, because TV workers threatened to strike unless they were permitted to air it. The coverage included interviews with demonstrators, though the broadcasts were halted temporarily because, an announcer said, some television employees did not agree with opinions expressed by inteviewees . ("200,000 Czechs," 1989)

Present and Future

In March, 1991, the federal assembly passed the first of two laws that will fundamentally alter broadcasting. The law permits each of the two republics, the Slovak Republic and Czech Republic, to set up their own the broadcasting systems. Each republic will have its own companies, each a public entity supposed to be essentially self-supporting and free of government control. They will be overseen by councils appointed by the parliaments and comprised of outstanding personalities from culture, education, churches and other groups.

The Czech radio and television companies, for Moravia and Bohemia, will continue to be based in Prague; the Slovak companies will broadcast for the Slovakrepublic and will be based in Bratislava. Federal radio television programs, largely news and information, also are planned. These third programs will use the Czech and Slovak channels during part of the day as a creature of the federal government, now called formally the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The federal channel will likely be managed by the Czech company and will contain both Czech and Slovak offerings.

The law is among federal accommodations to Slovaks nationlists who, since the end of communist rule, have been calling for the creation of an independent Slovak state and have viewed broadcasting as serving the interests chiefly of the Czech republic. (Simko, 1991) The Slovak parliament On May 24, 1991, passed legislation setting up Slovak TV and it began operating July 1 as an independent corporation. "But the process doesn't mean any separatist tendency," argues Vladimir Stefko, the head of Slovak Radio. "We simply want to cooperate as equal partners. Up to now we were subordinate, and a lot of complications were caused by this." (Stefko, 1991) Stefko is not keen on the federal radio channel, saying that because it will be headquartered in Prague, have commercial and technical advantages, and "be more a Prague than a Czech station," it poses a threat to Slovak broadcasting. Slovak Radio now maintains four channels, a middle-of-the-road entertainment and public affairs, one mainly arts and culture, a pop service and a regional channel, and prides itself on its strong drama and music tradition.

The sharing of time on the federal channels was under intense discussion between the two republics in summer, 1991.

Television in 1990 added a third or "open" channel, known in Bohemia and Moravia as OK3 and in Slovakia as Tatra 3 (after the Tatra Mountains). It uses the frequency of the former Soviet TV broadcasts in the country. So far managed by Czech TV, it can be heard by only about a third of the population and largely in the urban centers. It initially broadcast in evening hours but now is the only 24-hour TV service. It carries largely satellite-transmitted U. S., French, U.K. and Soviet programs, including CNN (equipment was provided by American and other foreign interests) in the original language us well as some independently produced programs, and sells ad time. The other two Czech TV channels also run commercials in two 10-minute blocks daily. (Ruzika, 1990)

Full implementation of the reforms awaits the passage of a second bill, an omnibus press and broadcasting act that will spell out broadcasting competencies, rights and obligations, delimit frequencies and , it is presumed, provide for private broadcasting. It was introduced in parliament in 1991 and was expected to be acted on before the fall. (Kopecky, Kanturek, Simko, 1991)

Private broadcasting actually began when, under a federal directive in 1990, eight experimental private FM stations also were set up under two-year permits to serve Prague. Now about 90 TV and 100 radio applications, including some from foreign interests, have piled up in a commission attached to the prime minister's office. Most, however, are in the view of one TV producer "no more than romantic dreams who have no imagining of how expensive the enterprise will be and no experience." (Heger, 1991)

One of the applicants for a TV license is a production company called Masseba TV, which started immediately after the revolution cracked the communist media monopoly. Started with a bank loan and now with 11 employees, it produces entertainment, public affairs and documentary programs as well as TV spots and advertising or both Czechoslovak and foreign outlets. Not much of its program material finds its way to the domestic TV outlets, however, because they cannot afford it. In the communist days at least 80 percent of TV production was done by the TV company itself, to assure control; only 5 percent came from Western sources. (Heger)

Meanwhile the massive government subsidies for broadcasting are being phased up and will be gone by early l992. Both TV channels are becoming reliant on advertising and a new television fee structure has been set up. Subscribers pay, however, only 50 crowns, or about $2.50, a month (recently raised from 20 crowns) and a part of the fees are taken by the post office for the collection service. About a thousand employees have been fired from Czech television as redundant and 1,500 from Slovak TV, leaving about 3,500 in each. The ending of subsidies is seen as a mixed blessing; Kanturek, for example, frankly says no television service can be politically free as a subsidized medium.

Top managerial posts in broadcasting are now occupied by people who were persecuted in l968 for political reasons. However, the communist party is still an important political force, with 47 seats in parliament, second only to the movements that ousted the communist regime. Except at the higher echelons, no workers lost their jobs because they were party members and some maintain membership. "I did not lay off all the former party members. We did not want a repeat purge. We were not talking about revenge. I came herewith the idea of transforming radio, not destroying it," says Slovak Radio's Stefko.

The government-owned stations need a heavy infusion of capital for improvements. Radio Prague is in a particularly dilapidated building in downtown Prague, where tape is cut by scissors and single computer serves the entire editorial operation. Two recent devaluations of the crown have cut the companies' ability to buy foreign equipment and they can afford to replace little of the gear that is becoming obsolescent.

While virtually all newspapers in Czechslovakia are allied with political parties, including the communist (which maintains the largest circulation paper, *Rude Pravo)* , television is supposed under government policies to be politically neutral. Yet a watchdog commission set up to ensure free and fair coverage of the elections found that TV programs had flagrantly favored Civic Forum and another pro-democracy umbrella group, the Public Against Violence, over smaller parties. It ordered television to give I0 additional minutes of air time to each of 20 other political parties and movements and four hours for a live television debate between all 22 parties. ("Just How Free," I990)

Broadcasting in the transitional period is essentially free of direct government intervention and orders, however. Kanturek says the office of President Vaclav Havel does not interfere at all. "There are problems with members of parliament, who are grumbling all the time because they are unsatisifed and see TV as biased." All the parties and political movements in Czechoslovakia, says Kanturek, "strive to be seen on the screen. It is an arena of fierce battle. It is more than a man can stand to remain unbaised."

News programs have become open. "Also the program setup has been changed thoroughly. The slowest rate of change is in fiction/drama, though a number of dramatic works were thrown away [by the directors] because they served the erstwhile ideology." (Kanturek, 1991)

SUMMARY

In four East European nations in which the communist regimes were overthrown in late I989, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the old broadcasting systems will in I991 be fundamentally altered by new broadcasting laws. Under the communists, the radio and television systems were controlled by the central committees and all were repressed, though the severity of censorship varied from nation to nation. They began to speak independently with the upheavals of 1989. The systems still are technically backward and underfunded, however.

Expected under the new laws are dual systems, public service broadcasting corporations speaking for all groups in the society and coexisting with private stations. The treaties that merged the two Germanys mandated that East German radio and television were to be broken up and integrated into the West German systems. In the five new German provinces of the East, now a part of a unified Germany, three have joined in one public service system based in Leipzig and two likely will join in another, based in Potsdam. These will affiliate with West German state-based broadcasting companies operating under the ARD umbrella. In the other countries, the public broadcasting systems will be modeled on West European counterparts. Czechoslovakia has a special problems because of the rise of Slovak nationalism; its system will be tripartite, providing for nationwide broadcasting by Czech, Slovak and federal systems, in addition to private companies. In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary some foreign participation will be needed to finance private systems and will be permitted under the laws; private entrepreneurs, including foreigners, are lining up for licenses. Meanwhile, these systems have developed greater autonomy, freedom, and responsibility, though they are still struggling to be truly impartial politically. # # #

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INFORMATION FLOWS, POWER, AND A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS

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"Participation" is a goal for many development projects but much work still rests on one-way communication flows. Information flows are an expression of power. This article discusses why development projects do not better support power-sharing and proposes introducing sense-making methodology into the planning and evaluation stages.

Sense-making interviewing methods are in many ways a cross between closed-ended surveys and completely open-ended interviews. They are designed to minimize researchers' worldviews and maximize those of the people being interviewed.

One reason that participation has been difficult to operationalize is that the communication models used in development are based on the transmission model of communication in which information is envisioned as a thing external to the people communicating and communication is the movement of that information from the source to the audience. Even when feedback and feedforward mechanisms are included, they provide ways to clear up anticipated "noise" that would interfere with the understanding of the message and to determine ways to package that information so it will be most congruent with the audience.

Sense-making methodology is based on a constructing model of communication in which,information is not external to people but is the result of their observing and communicating activity. Communication is a constructing process. And the "audience" is not the target for messages but active participants in creating information.

Sense-making methodology can help overcome problems with language difficulties, cross-cultural problems and foster two-way flows of information and power.

INFORMATION FLOWS, POWER, AND A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS

Although academics, researchers and practitioners[1] in the development communication field emphasize "participation" as a key ingredient to development, much of our work still rests on one-way information flows. Why?[2] Partly, perhaps a large part, is that we work in a field where theories must be applied in political, economic, social and cultural realities that often mitigate against our efforts. Information flows are an expression of power and those with power are often loathe to share. Those with power include the funding agencies; the government and private organizations that sponsor the projects; and the experts who plan, execute and evaluate those efforts -- or in other words, us.

My purpose here is not so much to suggest how to change the realities in which we work, but to discuss possible reasons why our work does not better support power-sharing and propose a methodology for our work which can foster power-sharing. Sense-making methodology[3] is by no means a panacea for all the problems in development, but if incorporated into our "toolbox" these methods could move us more towards encouraging two-way vertical flows of communication[4]. I propose that we begin to use sense-making methods to help plan and evaluate the development projects we work on.

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[1] These are not mutually exclusive categories.

[2] This question, "Why is there no participation in spite of the advocacy for it?" has also been asked by Robert Agunga (1990, p. 138). Both our answers include consciously instituting mechanisms into development projects which would promote participation. Although the mechanisms we suggest are different, they are not mutually exclusive.

[3] Brenda Dervin and her colleagues have been developing the sense-making methodology for about two decades. Later in this article I will briefly describe sense-making, but for the moment, let it suffice that these methods are ways of tapping into the worldview of the people participating in the study and minimizing the worldview of the researchers.

This article includes a discussion of how our work in theory and practice is still strongly influenced by one-way flow communication models, a brief description of sense-making methodology, and how by using sense-making methods we can begin to foster more equitable knowledge sharing.[5]

DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS: FROM ONE WAY FLOWS TO PARTICIPATION?

In the 1950s and 1960s modernization theory was the theoretical basis for projects promoting development in Third World countries. Development was defined in several ways, but generally included an increase in gross national product (GNP) and per capita incomes, increased use of technology and manufactured inputs in agriculture, introduction or expansion of industrialization, and growing urbanization. (See for example, Rostow, 1960; O'Connell, 1976). Poverty in Third World countries was believed to be caused by deficits within those countries and their people -- not enough saving and investing in the industrial plant, the lack of entrepreneurship, lack of educated and skilled populations to work in a modern labor force, and the presence of attitudes and beliefs antithetical to modernization, such as familism, fatalism, low empathy (or ability to imagine themselves elsewhere doing things not possible in their villages), and limited aspirations. (See, for example, Hagen, 1962; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Lerner, 1958; Rogers, 1969; Schramm, 1964.)

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[4] We also need to consider ways to encourage horizontal flows of communication, but that is not within the scope of this paper.

[5] Several articles I have recently read has inspired these thoughts. They deal with information and communications, power and control, and the role of communications scholars. They include Lana Rakow's (1989) discussion of information campaigns and how much effort and resources are put into collecting information about individuals for the benefit of organizations, but not the other way around; Dan Schiller's (1986) discussion of news and information as a commodity; and Rohan Samarajiva and Peter Shields' (1990) discussion of communication, power and control in the area of telecommunications and development.

Development practitioners geared the communication components of their projects toward changing individuals by exposing target audiences to modern ideas, increasing their empathy, and giving them the knowledge they would need to use modern techniques of farming, to work in a factory, and to use Western health practices.

In the early 1960s a theoretical communication model began to help shape much of the development policy making and project design. Everett Rogers (1962)[6] developed the diffusion of innovations model from studies of attempts after World War II to induce U.S. farmers to use high input agricultural technologies. This model was exported virtually wholecloth to Third World countries by experts working for U.S. funded agencies and Third World nationals who had studied in the United States. In its essence, the early renditions of the diffusion of innovations model examined the most influential forms of communication in the process of an organization or social change agency persuading a group of people to adopt a new innovation. For example, the mass media are considered influential in introducing an idea or innovation to a community, while interpersonal communications are more influential in getting people to decide to use that new practice. Assumptions of the early forms of this model include that the innovations are good and if people are given appropriate knowledge in terms of the innovations' benefits and how to use them, they will eventually adopt the new practices.

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[6] Rogers has since critiqued (1976) and reworked (1983) this model. I will be referring to these works later in this article.

Since the late 1960s modernization theory of development has been severely criticized and many researchers now emphasize other questions such as: where Third World countries fit into the world system of capitalism, the functional role of poverty in the Third World for maintaining the economic and political status quo, equity in development as opposed to the "trickle-down theory," and the role of changing structures on a country-, region- or world-basis as opposed to a focus on changing individuals. The roles of communications have also been examined in terms of how the mass media and other forms of communication can be used to support development (Hornik, 1980; McAnany, 1980) or have been used to support the status quo and the industrial countries' interests (H. Schiller, 1971; Dorfman, 1983), as well as the importance of grassroots education and communication to promote democratic participation (Freire, 1984).

Presently, several veins of discussion among development communication scholars and practitioners have focused on the ideas of "participation," "participatory communications," "popular participation," and "participatory development." These terms are often used interchangeably.

The goal of participatory development and the role of participatory communications are reflected in the phrase "knowledge sharing." It assumes that Third World peoples -- villagers, peasants and the poor -- already know a lot about their situations and what needs to be done to improve their lot. Participatory communication tries to enable the poor to share their knowledge with the research institutes, extension agents, or other government or non-government organizations with the assumption that this knowledge will help guide development projects. For example, local people make up La Feria Educativa, a performance troupe in Ecuador's Chimborazo Province, and the performances are in the Indian language Quechua rather than Spanish. "Realizing that campesinos generally know what needs to be accomplished, even though they may be unclear as to exactly how it can be done, the Feria focuses its work on strategies more than on specific goals" (Kleymeyer and Moreno, 1988, pp. 37-38).

According to Thomas Jacobson (1989) another goal of participatory communication projects is to "engender self-reliant decision-making about all matters concerning the population" rather than informing people of procedures necessary for achieving pre-determined goals (p. 12). In communication strategies developed under modernization theory, Jacobson points out, political participation was an end goal, often measured by whether people voted. In newer development theories and communication strategies, participation is seen as an on-going process rather than an end-goal and involves decision-making far beyond the limits of just voting.

The idea of participation as process rather than goal is also expressed by the authors of "Beyond the Flipchart," a publication by the Academy for Educational Development (1985). They explain that participatory communication methods stress community cooperation and personal growth as central organizing principles. The information that someone learns is not paramount, but rather the "experience of participating as an equal in a shared process" (p. 9).

Advocates of "development support communications" also incorporate the idea of participation. Notice for example these titles: "From Top-down to Co-equal Communication: Popular Participation in Development Decision-Making" (Ascroft and Masilela, 1989) and "Development support communication and popular participation in development projects" (Agunga, 1990).

Joseph Ascroft and his colleagues have been prime movers in the push for "development support communications." This term implies "advocacy of horizontal knowledge-sharing between benefactors and beneficiaries;" operation at the grassroots rather than the national or international level; a supportive role on "development projects funded and managed by such hard sciences as agriculture and health" rather than independently financed and managed communication projects; and a mix of small media including video, filmstrips, traditional theater, group and interpersonal techniques involving extension agents (Ascroft and Masilela, 1989, p. 16). The key idea behind development support communications is that someone trained in communications should be an integral part of development projects in order to facilitate communications and understanding between "benefactors and beneficiaries" (Ascroft and Masilela, 1989).

Participation became a popular notion in development funding institutions when, in 1973, then President of the World Bank Robert McNamara announced the bank had adopted a "new direction" in rural development policy with popular participation as a key element. (McNamara, 1975, cited in Agunga, 1990). The two necessary ingredients for this change included large sums of money and local, popular participation. The first came relatively easily; the second was more difficult (Agunga, 1990).

SENSE-MAKING METHODS IN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTING PARTICIPATORY COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

So how has a two-decade discussion by development and communication experts about participation, knowledge sharing and co-equality affected development projects in the field? Operationalizing these ideas has been difficult and has met with little success. Many reasons help explain this failure; perhaps one of the strongest is the power context in which these projects are implemented. Jeremiah O'Sullivan-Ryan and Mario Kaplun (1978), in their UNESCO report on 24 projects in 10 Latin American countries, conclude that promoting grassroots participation at a social level is difficult if participation is denied at a political level. Similarly, governments often support projects whose strategies put national integration before regional and local expression and identity and which exclude the possibility of criticism of the government. My proposal to introduce sense-making methodology into the way we conduct planning and evaluation research will do little to help with these impediments to popular participation.

A second important problem inherent in many development projects, and another one which sense-making methods do not directly influence, is planners have not taken into account multiple forms of oppression found in a society, such as gender, race and class (Steeves and Arbogast, 1987). Therefore, many of the projects have been geared toward people already relatively privileged, thus increasing inequities or creating new ones.[7]

However, sense-making methodology can address some of the problems hindering popular participation, including language problems and perpetuating inequalities by the assumptions underlying our methods and techniques. But before I broach these areas, I will briefly describe sense-making.

Description of sense-making methods

Brenda Dervin and her colleagues have been developing sense-making methodology since at least 1972. Sense-making methods are based on the proposition that as people move through their lives their journey includes gaps -- times when people must make a decision or when their physical or mental movement is blocked in some way. There are many kinds of gaps. For example, a gap may be a decision point where more than one alternative is possible for the person and she or he must choose. Another may be that the "road" apparently stops, or there is only one "road" which does not look inviting and the person "has to figure out how to bear with it" (Dervin, personal communication, Dec. 14, 1988). A gap might be as simple as what to wear or as complex as how to care for your sick baby.

According to Dervin, in order to understand communication behavior we need to know more about what people do as they face these gaps. Observing people will not tell the researcher what the individuals are thinking. We have to ask them and the sense-making methods are ways of asking for this information.

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[7] Classic examples are the African agricultural projects whose primary audiences were men, even though 80 percent of food on that continent is raised by women. While before men and women both had tasks in regard to raising food for the family, the push of men toward cash crops increased the work load of women in regard to raising foods for their families. The women's work loads were also increased when men were encouraged to provide migrant employment in the cities.

In practice then, researchers formulate questions to elicit the worldviews of the people being interviewed rather than having the participants try to match the researchers' worldviews. An example of the difference can be illustrated by comparing surveys with sense-making interviews. During closed-ended surveys people are asked to classify responses into predetermined categories and to express ideas on pre-determined topics. In a sense-making interview[8], people are asked to talk about situations that they faced, describing them in their own terms, and discussing gaps from their perspectives. In many ways, sense-making interviewing methods are a cross between close-ended surveys and completely open-ended interviews.

For example, in a study of Wisconsin organic farmers (Brendlinger, 1984) I asked farmers to describe the aspects of their farming which made it organic.[9] The farmers defined the term "organic" and decided how their farming practices fit that definition. After they described a situation involving organic practices I asked them where they got that idea, how they went about learning more about it, and if they thought it was successful. Thus the farmers also defined key terms such as success of practice, methods of learning, and obstacles to learning.

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[8] Several methods are included in sense-making methodology, but for the purposes of this paper I am concentrating on an interviewing method called the micro-moment time-line interview and its variants.

[9] Although I did not use sense-making methods directly in this research (because I did not know about them yet), the form of questioning I used was quite similar. Perhaps that is why I have been so attracted to sense-making interviewing methods.

More recently, I compared a traditional telephone survey with a sense-making interview project in the context of a Texas Department of Health project designed to help the department plan an education campaign about AIDS (Brendlinger, 1990). During the sense-making interviews we asked respondents to describe a situation in which they had learned or heard something about AIDS. Because I was particularly interested in finding out about how they sought information and what they considered to be obstacles in that process, we asked the respondents to identify questions they had asked themselves or others when they were in that situation, if and how they sought answers, and what problems they had finding answers. The respondents were able to define key terms such as what it means to learn something, what is a question, what does it mean to look for answers, and what would constitute a problem.[10]

Next, let's consider how sense-making methods could help alleviate problems in the planning and evaluation of development projects related to language, power, and cross-cultural difficulties.

Language problems

Several development experts have identified language problems, and their attendant problems of pro-literacy and numeracy biases, as one of the constraints working against participatory development. For example, in the O'Sullivan-Ryan and Kaplun (1978) Unesco report of Latin American projects the authors mention as problems the use of the dominant rather than the local language and the high rate of illiteracy among the poor.

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[10] For more information about the theory behind, the mechanics of and applications to date of sense-making methodology see Dervin (Ed.), forthcoming, and Dervin, 1989 and 1983.

Supporters of development support communications also provide evidence of language difficulties and literacy and numeracy biases. In arguing for communication experts to be included on development projects, Ascroft and Masilela (1989) say, "On the one hand, the peasants lacked the necessary education-based communication skills to engage their industrialized benefactors in useful discussion. Benefactors on the other hand seemed to lack interest in mastering the tradition-based communication systems of those they sought to help. The result was an impasse, a stalemate in which neither side could move for want of a common language of communication" (p. 14).

Srinivas Melkote and colleagues have provided empirical evidence of this gap in an Indian context, by examining the content of agricultural messages from extension projects in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka and measuring message comprehension by the intended receivers.

> "Messages were laced with names of weights and measures unfamiliar to a majority of farmers: milliliters, liters, meters, square meters, centimeters, inches, percentages, kilograms, hectares, tonnes, etc. Names of months were usually in the unfamiliar Christian calendar rather than in the Hindu calendar.....The farmer had to confront a host of unfamiliar names of pesticides, chemicals, fertilizers, seed varieties, etc., and complex instructions on a variety of crop cultivation techniques using terms in the unfamiliar English language" (Melkote and Vallath, 1990, pp. 15-16).

Melkote and Vallath's (1990) evaluation of how much of these messages the farmers comprehended showed that formal education level of farmers had positive, statistically significant relationships with at least three of five comprehension scales used in the study, also suggesting that familiarity with literacy and numeracy improved comprehension of messages.

Language problems may affect not only communication between change agents (such as extension agents) and their clients, but also the change agents and the research institutes and organizations for which they work. Paul Mundy (1986) documents the constraints between research and extension personnel in Indonesia. One of several reasons for poor communications between these groups is that scientists who work at the research institutes find the "scientific" style of writing more comfortable. In addition, civil service rules place promotion on the number of scientific articles published, leaving little incentive to write or develop other forms of communications with extension agents. Scientific publications also increase the prestige and visibility of the institute and thus are more likely to attract funds.

But, to be politically useful, we must be able to communicate with all of the people participating in the development projects -- policy makers, researchers, change agents and the poor. So our reports must reflect the concerns of the people we interviewed and be in language that is easily grasped by our audiences.

Sense-making methods, by gathering information in the language of the poor, embedded in contexts relevant to them, make it easier (when compared to survey research, for example) to overcome our own socialization as scholars and experts when working with this information -- for example, when presenting our results to the people we interviewed, policy makers and development workers in order to help plan the next step, and also when developing ways to communicate messages among our various audiences.

Power as expressed in communication models

Most importantly, however, is that sense-making methodology moves us away from the communication models we presently employ which encourage one-way flows of communications.

Most of the research and work in development communications has been based on the transmission model of communication. These models share two basic ideas: 1) information is envisioned as an objective thing external to the source and receiver and 2) communication is the movement of that information or knowledge from the source to the audience. Diffusion of innovations is one such model. Feedback mechanisms are often included in these models, but their purpose is to help the source determine if the messages were received in a form acceptable to the source and how the receiver has responded to that message. More recently, in the re-worked diffusion of innovation model (Rogers, 1983) and social marketing techniques (see for example Foote et al., 1985; Ray et al., 1986; Rogers, 1983) feedforward mechanisms are also included to help clear up anticipated "noise" that would interfere with the delivery or understanding of the message and to determine ways to package that information so it will be most congruent with the audience.

This underlying model and its resultant hierarchical, one-way flows of information are reflected even in the literature advocating popular participation in development projects. The following examples are not meant to be condemnations of the project themselves or the intentions of the people participating in these projects. Quite the contrary, many of these people have been able to accomplish much good. Rather, these examples are only a few which point out just how deeply the transmission model of communication pervades our thoughts and therefore our actions.

One example comes from the project manual for a recent agricultural project sponsored by the Academy for Education, named the Communication for Technology Transfer in Agriculture Project (CTTA). The authors of the manual explain that the farmer "is not simply a receptacle into which new agricultural technologies are poured. In this context, communication is a link between the farmers and the researcher, planner and extension agent -- not simply a link to the farmer." (Ray et al., 1986, p. III-1). This statement obviously supports knowledge sharing. But later, the authors discuss concept testing, focus group interviews, behavioral trials and intercept interviews as ways to identify hidden constraints farmers may encounter in trying a new innovation, to help choose vocabulary which the farmers can understand, and to integrate the innovation into the farmers' own views of their problems and needs. The messages will be "personalized, segmented and directed" at farmers based on their differences rather than their similarities. (Ray et al., 1986). This concept of information clearly mirrors the idea that information is something external to the farmers which the project experts have and which they must try to find ways to most effectively pass on.

Agunga (1990) and Ascroft and Masilela (1989) use the terms "benefactors" to refer to development project planners and "beneficiaries" to refer to the people whom the project is designed to help. This also implies a one-way flow, not only of communications but also of benefits. I would argue that all parties are likely to benefit from successful development projects, including not only the poor, but also in the long run the country and the funding agency.

Perhaps the most famous practitioner of participatory communication and development is Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1984). But even his attitude is elitist as Peter Berger points out and is discussed by Steeves and Arbogast (1987).

> "Peter Berger (1974, p. 116) critiques this concept (consciousness raising of oppressed people as advocated by Freire) arguing instead for a 'postulate of the equality of all empirically available worlds of consciousness,'.... He agrees that it is important to share information (to the extent that it is needed or desired) and critical resources, but to deliberately set out with the idea that either a capitalist or socialist 'consciousness' is higher than that of peasants is ethnocentric and unethical" (Steeves and Arbogast, 1987, p. 35).

Sense-making methods are not based on a transmission model of communication. Rather, Dervin (1981) bases the methodology on a model which conceptualizes communication as a construction process rather than a transmission activity. Thus, information is not something external to people but is a product of their observing and communicating activity. In addition, the "audience" is not a target for our messages but rather an active participant in creating information or shared knowledge.

As a result, sense-making methods are more conducive to participation and empowerment, and on several levels.

Power and empowerment

People interviewed with sense-making methods can be empowered in at least three ways. First, they help construct the interview by defining concepts as they see them and explaining their world in their own terms. In addition, someone listens to them and lets them explain things as they choose. These two attributes can help the respondents understand or clarify the issues for themselves.

For example, in a project (Ferrante and Brendlinger, 1985) which included interviewing women who had participated in the International Women's Conference in Nairobi in 1985, one of the interviewees said that each day she would read the newspapers and be surprised that what the reporters had thought important had not been the same things that she had thought important. She was frustrated because she thought she had misinterpreted what happened at the conference. But as she talked during the sense-making interview about this experience, she decided that the porters missed the important points and her point of view was valid as theirs.

Secondly, the people interviewed with sense-making methods can be empowered by the results. These results are less likely to reflect the worldviews of the researchers or agency for which the research was done and more likely to address the concerns of the interviewees themselves. In order to use the results of sense-making interviews most effectively the organizations must be willing and able to make major, rather than cosmetic, changes. In other words, to make best use of sense-making methods, the policy makers must be willing to make the changes that serve their constituents over those that serve the organization. (Of course, constituent and organizational needs are not necessarily mutually exclusive.)

Thirdly, the people who conduct the sense-making interviews are likely to gain respect for the people they are interviewing. In the Texas AIDS study (Brendlinger, 1990) the five people conducting the sense-making interviews said they had more respect for the respondents during the sense-making interview than during the survey. The interviewers said that when asking questions during the interviews, especially those designed to tap into knowledge about AIDS and AIDS prevention methods, they felt like they were giving a test, and often the respondents did not know much in comparison to what the health department wanted them to know. In the sense-making interviews, however, the respondents talked about what they did know and as a result the interviewers said they had more respect for the intelligence of the people they were talking with.

Sense-making can also empower the interviewers as well as the respondents. During sense-making interviews, the interviewers must suspend their own prejudices and beliefs as much as possible and try to enter in the world of the people they are talking with. This allows the interviewers to increase their own understanding of the process being discussed. They also have an understanding of the purposes and methods of the research and are less of a tool and more of a participant in the process. For example, the five interviewers in the Texas AIDS study said that while they worked for the Texas Department of Health survey they felt like "one more hired hand" while in the sense-making interview project they felt more like "junior research partners." (Brendlinger, 1990, p. 103).

Therefore, if one included people working on proposed development projects, such as extension workers, agricultural researchers, and representatives of the farmers, they could increase their understanding of the processes and needs of the people.

Power and objectivity

Sense-making methodology also moves us from the perspective of objectivity in our research and acknowledges that our actions have direct effects on the people we research. Objectivity, in this context, refers to an attitude that the researcher is separate from what she or he is studying. But as Barbara Du Bois (1983) points out about social science research:

> "Our work requires that we see things in context, that we understand and explain our eventful, complex reality within and as part of its matrix. It is only within its matrix that experience, reality, can be known. And this matrix includes the knower (p. 111, Du Bois' emphasis).

Within the context of planning a development project this issue may not seem important. After all, the reason the project is being considered is to effect change, not to just neutrally observe. With sense-making, however, by concentrating on the reality as expressed by the people we are working with, we are helping to minimize our influence on the results and maximize theirs, although we cannot ignore our own influence.

Within the context of evaluating a development project, however, the issue of objectivity becomes more important. Traditionally, we try to minimize our influence on people's responses to questions so that we can better understand the effects of the project. But we and the evaluation process are an integral part of that project and sense-making helps us to keep that clearly in mind and gives us a framework that helps us to openly evaluate those effects.

Cross-Cultural Challenges

Perhaps one of the more important advantages of sense-making methodology in development project planning and evaluation, from the perspective of the development worker, is that cross-cultural problems may be diminished.

While living in Senegal and Indonesia, I was often confounded in my attempts to get feedback from my colleagues when I tried to evaluate my work. Sometimes it was simply a language problem, but more often it was the problem of trying to bridge two or more cultures. Sometimes, I worked with people who simply considered it impolite to offer criticism. Other times, they followed their cultural training by telling me what they thought I wanted to hear. Sometimes I simply could not understand what they were telling me because the way I expected to get the answers were not the way they were used to thinking about the process.

These same frustrations plague development workers throughout the world -- and this doesn't apply only to people working in countries other than their own. Often times the development worker may be from that country, but working with people from a different ethnic background, with different cultures and languages. Other times the development worker may be working within their own language and culture, but still manage to miss some vital connections because of gender or other subcultural differences.

Two mechanisms in sense-making help to overcome these difficulties. The first is the information is collected so that the viewpoint of the respondent is maximized. For example, in the Texas AIDS study I found that some Hispanics envisioned AIDS as threatening the family unit while Anglos tended to think of AIDS in more individualistic terms. My Hispanic colleagues confirmed that this was typical of Mexican and Mexican-American culture, but I, with limited knowledge of Mexican culture, was not aware of that point before the interviews began.

The second, and perhaps more important mechanism, is that sense-making looks at gaps rather than individuals as the major unit of analysis. This helps us to move away from individual blame and thinking of projects which will change people rather than the situations in which they live. By focusing the interview on a situation that the respondent experienced and collecting information about how the respondent perceived that situation and the respondent's behavior, data can be analyzed on situational characteristics as well as individual ones. For example, a study with women who had stopped using birth control methods in Zambia and Kenya showed that a woman's relationship with her husband had much influence on her decision to end using birth control provided by family planning projects, as opposed to individual characteristics such as education and age (Hirstio-Snellman, 1989).

Another advantage to sense-making methodology and one which is enhanced by being able to analyze the gaps, or situations, as well as individuals, is the ability to discover the unexpected. When project planning and evaluation method look at what the planners expect to find, they will probably not find much else. By rooting the sense-making interview in a situation which the respondent experienced, the preconceptions of the researchers and planners are minimized and the unexpected can be tapped. For example, the Texas AIDS study (Brendlinger, 1990) found that some people knew the government stance on how one could contact the HIV virus but simply did not believe it. They either felt that the government was lying to forestall panic or they did not understand how the government experts could be so sure that the HIV virus could not be passed by casual means, such as using the same toilets or drinking from public water fountains. If I had chosen to do a survey rather than a sense-making interview, and I did not already suspect this attitude existed among the population, I would not have been able to program it into the survey questionnaire.

Form of Data

And finally, another advantage of sense-making methods over most open-ended questioning methods is that they collect information in qualitative form which can be relatively easily quantified. Thus for the price of one research project you can have both qualitative and quantitative data.

In addition, because coding schemes are not determined until after the data are collected, they are sensitive to the respondents' views of reality. (See Brendlinger, 1990, or contact the author for a more in-depth discussion of advantages and problems in the coding and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data in sense-making research.)

THE MODEST PROPOSAL

Sense-making will not eliminate all the problems associated with participatory development projects. Limitations are still imposed by political, economic, historical and cultural realities. What sense-making methods can do is, within those parameters, treat the people with respect, give high priority to the way they experience their lives, provide a method to tap into their wisdom and experience, and foster cooperative knowledge sharing among the poor and the change agents, researchers and government agencies which are trying to help.

Sense-making methods can be used in several stages of development projects. The earlier it is used, the more powerful it could be. If used in the planning stages of a project, or better, the pre-planning stages before project goals are developed, the respondents will be able to effect the most change and have the most input in the direction and implementation of any projects that would come out of this exercise. The usefulness, of course, depends on the flexibility of the powers-that-be and their willingness or ability to incorporate the ideas that may, in fact, challenge power relationships as they exist.

In projects already fielded, or for those projects where political flexibility is less evident, sense-making methods could be useful in the evaluation stages in terms of understanding how the projects worked from the perspective of those participating in them and identifying obstacles and strengths for future projects. This obviously reflects more the dominant paradigm of development where participation is used primarily to make messages more acceptable to the intended public.

I would be naive to assume that these methods could not be used to help reinforce existing inequities. However, if that is the intent of a project, if empowerment is a dangerous concept and one not to be aroused, other methods are less likely to foment discontent and would be more efficient for this purpose. For those who seriously want and can promote participation within the empirical parameters they face, sense-making could be a powerful tool.

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WILL ALL THE CENSORS OF NIGERIAN PRESS PLEASE STAND UP?

BY

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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the armed forces and the African press is one that will continue to be of interest to mass communication scholars. The frequent intervention of the military in the politics of African countries even heightens this interest. In less than a quarter of a century Africa witnessed about 70 coups, the first being in Egypt in 1952. Within seven months between 1965 and 1966 for example, there were at least nine military coups in Africa, and the trend continues, making the list of countries under military rule read like the list of member-states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

On June 19, 1965, in Algeria, Col. Houari Boumedienne deposed President Ben Bella and on Oct. 18 that year, soldiers in Burundi staged an abortive coup d'etat. On Nov. 25, 1965, Gen. Joseph Mobutu, head of the army in the then Congo Leopoldville (now Zaire), ousted President Joseph Kasavubu in a bloodless coup. Four days later (Nov. 29, 1965), Sorou Apithy, the civilian ruler of former Dahomey (now Republic of Benin), was deposed by Gen. Christophe Soglo who had once taken over power in 1962 from President Hubert Maga. On Jan. 1, 1966, Col. Jean Bedel Bokassa toppled President David Dacko in the Central African Republic. That coup was quickly followed by the army takeover in Upper Volta where Lt. Col. Sangoule Lamizana sacked President Yameogo on Jan. 4, 1966. About seven weeks later (Feb. 24, 1966), Gen. Ankarah deposed President Kwame Nkrkumah in Ghana. The Ghanaian coup was

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preceded by the Jan. 15, 1966 coup in Nigeria where Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was toppled in a bloody army revolt.

Since the Jan. 15, 1966 coup, Nigeria, Africa's most populous country has witnessed four other military takeovers and several abortive coups, three of which were officially made known.[1] The country has been ruled by five military administrations.

The relationship between the five military administrations and the press will be the focus of this paper. What institutional instruments did each regime utilize to control the dissemination of information and ideas in the press - the electronic and print media? This is the main research question that this paper will attempt to answer.

What were the results of the enforcement of these institutional control measures? Which regime was most tolerant of press freedom? And which regime suppressed freedom of the press the most? These are the secondary research questions that this paper will attempt to answer.

The interest to undertake this study was fired by the fact that no known study has compared freedom of the press among the military regimes that have ruled Nigeria. As the military prepares to hand over power to a democratically elected government in 1992, it will be worthwhile to take stock of military-press confrontations in 21 years, and then compare the five administrations on a continuum of press freedom.

Since Nigeria gained independence[2] from Britain on Oct. 1, 1960, the armed forces have dominated the nation's center of power, ruling for 21 of the 30 years of political independence. The country has been ruled by the following military administrations- - i) Aguiyi-Ironsi regime, Jan. 15, 1966 - July 29, 1966; ii) Yakubu Gowon regime, July 29, 1966 - July 29, 1975; iii) Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo regime, July 29, 1975 - Oct. 1, 1979; iv) Muhammadu Buhari regime, Dec. 31, 1983 - Sept. 27, 1985 and v) Ibrahim Babangida regime, Sept. 27, 1985 - Oct. 1, 1992?

THE TERM, "FREEDOM OF THE PRESS"

Since one of the objectives of this paper is to find out which regime was most tolerant of freedom of the press, it will be necessary to give an operational definition of the concept of "freedom of the press." In this paper, "freedom of the press" will be understood within the theoretical framework defined by the following scholars and institutions.

At its quinquennial conference held in 1965, the Commonwealth Press Union noted that:

> ...freedom of the press is not a special privilege of newspapers but derives from the fundamental right of every person to have full and free access to the facts in all matters that directly or indirectly concern him, and from his equal right to express and publish his opinion thereon; and to hear and read opinions of others. In protection of these fundamental human rights, it is essential that the press should be free to gather news without obstruction, to publish the news and to comment thereon.[3]

Raymond Nixon began his definition of press freedom by accepting the International Press Institute's definition of an "authoritarian regime" -- one characterized by "a permanent censorship or a constant and general control of the press," either by the government or political group in power.[4] Nixon contended that a free press is one marked by the absence of such a permanent censorship or constant and general control. It is one in which private owners and independent journalists are free to supply news and opinion to the general public under statutes of libel and decency. The main criterion for Nixon is the degree of control exercised by any official agency which has the power to interfere with the dissemination of information. Ralph Lowenstein defined press freedom by examining a "free" and a "controlled" press. He argued that:

> A completely free press is one in which newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, books, radio and television have absolute independence and critical ability, except for minimal libel and obscenity laws. The press has no concentrated ownership, marginal economic units or organized self-regulation.
>
> A completely controlled press is one with no independence or critical ability. Under it, newspapers, periodicals, books, news agencies, radio and television are completely controlled directly or indirectly by government, self-regulatory bodies or concentrated ownership.[5]

Freedom of the press, said Atkey, is "the absence of prior governmental censorship, and following publication no prosecution for free expression other than on widely accepted principles of the general law of jurisdiction, and the guarantee of non-interference with lawful circulation."[6] Wei argued that freedom of the press is: i) the prohibition of governmental interference with the press in the form of censorship and similar previous restraints; ii) the principle that any restrictions on the press must be applied or subject to review by the courts.[7] David Weaver defined press freedom in three ways -- i) as the relative absence of governmental restraints on the media; ii) as the relative absence of governmental and all other restraints on the media, and iii) as not only the absence of restraints on the media but also the presence of those conditions necessary to insure the dissemination of a diversity of ideas and opinions to a relatively large audience.[8] Wilbur Schramm summarized the above definitions, and said:

> In general, countries in Western democratic traditions believe that there should be a minimum of control on the press, and that such control as there is should rest with ownership, which we hope will be enlightened, and with the courts, which we hope will limit their attention to such offenses as libel, obscenity, and sedition presenting a clear and present danger.[9]

The Anglo-American laws of libel, obscenity and sedition that Schramm talked about have been analyzed by Lahav,[10] Gilmor and Barron[11] and Nelson.[12]

Freedom of the press, John Merrill said, is basically press autonomy i.e. freedom from outside control in the professional activities of the news media. He said press autonomy would apply most directly to the individual media units of the press, although it does and should apply to the individual journalist as well. As far as Merrill is concerned, "maximum journalistic autonomy is the imperative of journalism."[13]

An African journalist - Hillary Ng'weno from Kenya - noted that press freedom to a working journalist is simply freedom to cover, report and comment upon such events as s(he) considers of interest to the public. In Ng'weno's view, press freedom is the freedom of the editor of a newspaper to publish such material in his newspaper as s(he) deems of interest to the public.[14] Another African journalist, Tony Momoh of Nigeria, said that press freedom is the right of the people to know. He said this has three phases - access to information without censorship in any form, and distribution of the end product through sale of the newspaper or magazine, or broadcast of the material without let or hinderance.[15]

The Inter-American Press Association noted that press freedom is related to democracy. In a statement issued at the end of its four-day meeting in Panama in March 1985, the Association said that: "The emergence of democratic governments in Latin America has raised hopes for wider freedom of expression in the hemisphere."[16] The statement added that: "The democratic winds of change gusting through Latin America have rekindled hopes that freedom of expression will become the rule rather than the exception throughout the hemisphere."[17]

The link between press freedom and democracy, has been copiously analyzed by Emerson who said that the right of freedom of expression is justified by the right of the individual purely in his capacity as an individual. "Achievement of self-realization starts with development of the mind. Hence, suppression of believe, opinion and expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature,"[18] said Emerson in his analysis of freedom of expression. In another work Emerson reiterated the relationship between press freedom and democracy. He wrote:

> ... freedom of expression is essential to provide participation in decision making by all members of society. This is particularly significant for political decisions. Once one accepts the premise of the Declaration of Independence--that governments 'derive their just powers from the consent of the governed'--it follows that the governed must, in order to exercise their right of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming individual judgements and in forming the common judgement.[19]

This point was simplified in Justice Blackstone's commentary that: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state....Every free man has an undoubtable right to what sentiments he pleases before the public....[20] The relationship between press freedom and democracy was also pointed out by one-time Prime Minister of India, Pandit Nehru, who once reminded the All India Newspaper Editors' Conference that: "The freedom of the press is not just a slogan....It is an essential attribute of the democratic process."[21] Gastil summed up this point when he said that: "Civil liberties generally imply independent news media. This may mean private control of the press or radio, but more importantly, it means freedom from any of the various forms of censorship."[22]

In his study of the rise and decline of government control of the press during three hundred years of English history, Fred Siebert found the evolution of press freedom to spring from three major trends, namely, i) the political changes caused by revolution ii) the desire to engage in the pursuit of wealth iii) freedom of the mind to explore and discuss all sorts of problems, including social and political questions. He then stated two propositions which he said are generally applicable in the formulation of a comprehensive statement of the principles of freedom of the press.

In the first proposition, he argued that the extent of government control of the press depends on the nature of the relationship between the government and the governed. In its simplest form, the proposition states that the more direct the accountability of the governors to the governed, the greater the freedom of the press. In the second, he stated that the area of freedom contracts, and the enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and the structure of society increase.[23] In its simplest form, the second proposition states that the more secure the existing government, the less restraint is imposed on freedom of the press.

The second proposition has been tested by some scholars, including Fisher,[24] Shaw and Brauer,[25] Stevens,[26] Belbase[27] and Montgomery.[28] While Shaw and Brauer, Stevens and Fisher found support for the proposition in their study in U.S.A., Belbase and Montgomery, who tested the proposition in Nepal and Mexico respectively, reached conclusions that did not support the proposition.

The same conclusion led Belbase and Murphy[29] to suggest the need for more studies on the proposition especially in the developing countries. However, a study of government-press relations in Nigeria by Ogunade,[30] found support for the proposition. Ogunade concluded that: "The Nigerian authorities repeatedly invoked emergency powers and curtailed freedom, particularly that of the press, whenever the stress on the stability of the government and structure of society increased."[31]

In a different study, Stevens made some generalizations about freedom of expression, and added two more propositions to Siebert's. In the first, Stevens argued that the more heterogenous a society is, the more freedom of expression it will tolerate. In the second proposition, he argued that the more developed a society, the more subtle controls it will exert on expression.[32]

In an effort to compare governments on a scale of press freedom, Merrill,[33] Nixon[34] and Lowenstein,[35] have set forth certain criteria by which press freedom can be quantified. Lowenstein's 23-point PICA Scale will be used to determine how free the Nigerian press was under each of the five military governments. The scale includes the following items: 1) Legal controls on the press, not including libel and obscenity laws 2) Extra-legal controls (threats, violence, imprisonment, confiscation) 3) Libel laws 4) Organized self-regulation (press councils, courts of honor) 5) News and editorial personnel (all media) subject to government licensing, certification and appointment 6) Favoritism in release of government news 7) Media allowed to utilize services of foreign news agencies 8) Control over domestic news agencies 9) Print media subject to government licensing 10) Government control of circulation and distribution, not including postal service. 11) Degree of press criticism of local and regional governments and officials within the country 12) Degree of press criticism by national government and national officials within the country 13) Government or "government party" ownership of media (including radio, television and domestic news agencies) 14) Publications by opposition political parties banned 15) Broadcasting and press units owned by networks and chains (concentrated ownership) 16) Government control of newsprint 17) Government control of foreign exchange and/or purchase of equipment 18) Government subsidies and/or bribes to press and newsmen 19) Government loans to media. 20) Media dependency on government advertising 21) Tax rate on press (either higher or lower) as compared to other businesses 22) Pressure from labor unions (to influence editorial policy, to suspend publication 23) Number of marginal (economically insecure) press units. The PICA Scale is used because it combines most of the criteria of press freedom developed by other scholars, including Nam,[36] Kent[37] and Textor and Banks.[38]

MILITARY GOVERNMENTS AND THE PRESS

Nigeria became an independent nation on Oct. 1, 1960, after a century of British colonial rule. Since then, the country has been governed by two civilian administrations (1960 - 1966 and 1979 - 1983) and five military regimes. The present regime has promised to return the country to a democracy in 1992.

Aguiyi-Ironsi regime (Jan. 15, 1966 - July 29, 1966)

When the Ironsi regime came to power in the wake of the premier coup, it enacted the following laws which affected the dissemination of information in the press:

i) The State of Emergency Decree, 1966. This law gave the military regime power to detain anyone without warrant for undisclosed reasons. The law immediately superseded Section 25(1) of the 1963 Constitution which provided that: "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference."

ii) Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree no. 1, 1966. This law suspended and modified certain sections of the federal and regional constitutions to suit the authoritarian nature of the military. Section 1(i) of the law provided that: "The provisions of the Constitution of the Federation mentioned in Schedule 1 of this Decree are hereby suspended." Section 2 (9) stated that: "The provisions of the Constitution of each region which are mentioned in schedule 3 of this Decree are hereby suspended."[39] Section 3 of the decree ousted the courts from entertaining any question as to the law's validity. Professor Dudley observed that this was the decree that transferred full executive powers of the State to Maj. Gen. Ironsi.[40]

iii) The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree no. 3 of 1966.[41] This law gave the junta the power to detain for up to six months, anyone suspected to be a risk to state security.

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Professor Ohonbamu noted that in conformity with this decree, many other State Security (Detention of Persons) decrees were subsequently enacted.[42] For example, the military governor of the Eastern provinces, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, enacted a similar law on Feb. 7, 1966.[43]

iv) Defamatory Offensive Publications Decree no. 44 of 1966. This law criminalized the publication or broadcasting of words or sounds likely to provoke any section of the community.[44] It provided a maximum fine of fifty (British) pounds or three months imprisonment or both. It also provided for the confiscation of the offending publication.

Yakubu Gowon regime (July 29, 1966 - July 29, 1975)

Like the Ironsi regime, the Gowon administration -- the longest of the military regimes -- also enacted some laws to restrict the dissemination of information and opinions in the mass media, which included:

i) Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, 1967. This law suspended and modified the federal and regional constitutions, and transferred the legislative and executive powers of government to the Supreme Military COuncil which took the place of the Federal Parliament. The law provided that:

> The provisions of the Constitution of the Federation mentioned in Schedule 1 of this Decree are hereby suspended. Subject to this and any other Decree the provisions of the Constitution of the Federation which are not suspended by Schedule (1) above shall have effect subject to the modifications specified in Schedule 2 of this Decree....The provisions of the constitution of

> Region which are mentioned in Schedule 3 of this Decree are hereby suspended....[45]

ii) State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree no. 11 of 1967. This law empowered the Supreme Military Council to arrest and detain anyone for breaches of "discipline," and provided that:

> The persons named in the Schedule to this Decree shall be detained for a period not exceeding six months from the date of its commencement, in such a place or places as the Supreme Military Council may from time to time direct either generally or specially; and the persons so detained shall be liable to be removed to and be detained there under conditions as to confinement, including the like conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline...."[46]

What was formidable about this law is that under an authoritarian and despotic government such as a military regime, almost any publisher or critic could be arrested for "indiscipline" in what could well be a matter of expression of an opinion.

iii) Newspapers (Prohibition of Circulation) Decree no. 17 of 1967. This law empowered the military junta to ban the circulation of newspapers considered detrimental to national interests. The law provided for a fine of up to a hundred (British) pounds or a prison term of up to a year. It stated that:

> Where the Head of the Federal Military Government is satisfied that the unrestricted circulation in Nigeria of a newspaper is or may be detrimental to the interest of the Federation or any State thereof, he may by order published in the Gazette prohibit the circulation in the Federation or in any State thereof as the case may require, of any newspaper....[47]

iv) Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree no. 24 of 1967. The most formidable instrument utilized by the Gowon regime to control expression in the media, this law gave junta officials the power to arrest and detain persons without warrant in the interest of State Security. Section 3 of the law gave wide powers of arrest to the Inspector-General of Police. Sections 1 and 2 of the decree provided that:

> Any police officer or member of the armed forces may, during the continuance of the emergency, without warrant arrest -- 1) any person who in his presence commits any offence or b) any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds of having committed any offence. Any police officer above the rank of inspector, or any member of the armed forces who by virtue of this Decree has the powers of an inspector of police, may during the continuance of the emergency, and without a warrant, at any time enter and search any premises in which he has reasonable cause to believe that there is, or likely to -- a) a person who has committed or is suspected of having committed any offence....[4]"

v) Trade Dispute Decree, no. 53. This law made it an offence for "anyone to publish in a newspaper, or television or by any other means of mass communication, any matter which by reason of dramatization or other defects in the manner of its presentation, is likely to cause public alarm or industrial unrest." The decree provided for as many as three years of imprisonment for offenders.

Muhammed-Obasanjo regime (July 29, 1975 - October 1, 1979)

The administrations of Gen. Murtala Muhammed and Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo are treated as one regime in this paper because after the assassination of Murtala Muhammed in the abortive coup of Feb. 13, 1976, Obasanjo, who was next in command, continued the policies started by Muhammed. Among the laws enacted by the regime to control the dissemination of ideas and opinions in the press were:

i) Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree no. 11 of 1976. Enacted on May 11, 1976 by Obasanjo, the law was made to deal with newspaper publications that falsely accused public service employees of wrong-doings. The law took a retroactive effect from July 29, 1975, and provided that:

> Any person who publishes or reproduces in any form, whether written or otherwise, any statement, rumor or report alleging or intended to be understood as alleging that a public officer has in any manner corruptly enriched himself or any other person, being a statement, rumor or report which is false, in any material particular, shall be guilty of an offence under this decree and liable on conviction to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, without the option of fine.[49]

ii) Newspaper (Prohibition of Circulation) (Validation) Decree no. 12, 1978. Commenced on June 14, 1978, this law was enacted to formalize the Federal government's ban on the circulation of some issues of the Newbreed magazine. The law provided that:

> Notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment or law, the prohibition of circulation in Nigeria by the appropriate authority of the mid-January 1977 and mid-March 1977 issues of the newspaper known as Newbreed and published by the New Breed Organization Limited shall be deemed to have been validly done and, accordingly all the copies of the said publications caused to be impounded by the appropriate authority are hereby forfeited to the Federal Military Government and shall be disposed of in such manner as the appropriate authority may direct.[50]

iii) Daily Times of Nigeria Limited (Transfer of Certain Shares) Decree no. 101 of 1979. This law commenced on Sept. 1, 1975, and regularized the transfer of part of the share-holdings of some persons in the Daily Times of Nigeria to the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria. The law was enacted to validate the Federal Military Government's takeover of 60 percent equity shares in the then privately owned Daily Times. It provided that:

> Notwithstanding the provisions of the Companies Decree 1968 or any other enactment, all the shares of whatever description and however held by certain persons in the Daily Times of Nigeria Limited acquired on or about 1st September 1975, and in respect of which payment has been made, by the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria shall be deemed to have been validly acquired by the Corporation and shall as from the aforementioned date vest in the Corporation without further assurance than this Decree.[51]

Muhammadu Buhari regime (Dec. 31, 1983 - Sept. 27, 1985)

Like his predecessors, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari adopted some measures to control the Nigerian press. Buhari made known his intentions to suppress the dissemination of information in the media during his first interview with the press when he said that press freedom provisions in the 1979 Constitution would be revised to check the "excesses" of the press.[52] Buhari's dictatorship enacted the following measures to control expression in the mass media:

i) Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree no. 1 of 1984. The law did not only suspend press freedom provisions in the 1979 Constitution, it also give the junta the power "to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria....[53] Section 5 of the decree ousted the courts from ruling on the validity of the law or any other decrees made by the junta.

ii) State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree no. 2 of 1984. The law took a retroactive effect from Dec. 31, and empowered the dictatorship to detain anyone for acts considered to be prejudicial to state security. The law provided that:

> If the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters is satisfied that any person is or recently has been concerned in acts prejudicial to state security or has contributed to the economic adversity of the nation...he may by order in writing direct that the person be detained in a civil prison or police cell or such other place specified by him....[54]

Section 4 (i) of the decree shielded the detaining officer from any legal proceedings.

iii) Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree no. 4 of 1984. This law was drafted to shield the Federal Military Government and its officers from false accusation of improprieties. The rationales and factors that helped shape the law have been analyzed in some studies.[55] The law's most dreaded section provided that:

> Any person who publishes in any form, whether written or otherwise, any message, rumor, report or statement, being a message, rumor, statement or report which is false in any material particular or which brings or is calculated to bring the Federal Military Government or the Government of a State or public officer to ridicule or disrepute, shall be guilty of an offence under this Decree....
>
> It shall be an offence under this Decree for a newspaper or wireless telegraphy station in Nigeria to publish or transmit any message, rumor, report or statement which is false in any material particular stating that any public officer has in any manner been engaged in corrupt practices or has in any manner corruptly enriched himself or any other person.[56]

This law also empowered the head of the junta to prohibit the circulation of newspapers and to revoke the licenses of wireless telegraphy stations if the circulation of any newspaper or operation of any station was "detrimental to the interest of the federation or of any part thereof. The law provided for up to two years of imprisonment without the option of a fine for an offending journalist, and N10,000 (about $13,000) in the case of a newspaper or radio/television corporation.

iv) Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement Powers) Decree no. 13 of 1984. This law which took effect from May 17, 1984, was drafted to legitimize all decrees and edicts enacted by the military junta. It provided that all decrees made by the junta were supreme to the 1979 Constitution, and it invalidated any legal suits in the court that questioned the procedures taken to enforce the provisions of Decree no. 2 of 1984 under which politicians and journalists were jailed for months without trial.

Ibrahim Babangida regime (1985-1992?)

Gen. Ibrahim Babangida who has played a part in most coups in Nigeria, master-minded the coup that toppled his friend and associate, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari on Aug. 27, 1985. In his maiden broadcast to the nation, Babangida wittingly played on the emotions of Nigerians, promising to restore basic human freedoms such as freedom of expression that had been severely curtailed during the Buhari administration. In that broadcast he said:

> As we do not intend to lead a country while individuals are under the fear of expressing themselves, the Public Officers Protection Against False Accusation Decree Number 4 of 1984 is hereby repealed with immediate effect. All journalists who have been in detention under this decree are hereby unconditionally released. The responsibility of the media to disseminate information shall be exercised without undue hinderance....[57]

Ironically enough, however, Gen. Babangida failed to make good his promise of allowing freedom of expression. In addition to the State Security (Detention of Persons) and the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decrees which remained in effect, Babangida enacted a press law that prohibited the circulation of Nigeria's top news magazine, Newswatch. The press law simply known as "Newswatch Decree of 1987," empowered security agents of the junta to prohibit the circulation of the Newswatch, and to seal up the premises of the company that published the magazine for six months. In part, it provided that:

> Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution... Or in any other enactment or law, the Weekly News magazine known as "Newswatch: and published by the Newswatch Communications Limited is hereby proscribed from being published and prohibited from circulation in Nigeria in any part thereof.
>
> The premises of where the Weekly News magazine referred to in Section 1 of this Decree is published shall be sealed up by the Inspector-General of police....[58]

The magazine was banned because it published what the junta described as "classified information" on the report of the Political Bureau, a commission that was set up by the military government to deliberate over the issues concerning the return of power to civilians in 1992. Newswatch obtained a copy of the report and subsequently published it. A government statement later explained that the magazine was banned because of the "illegal and irresponsible action" of its management in publishing leaked information on the contents of the commission's report.[59]

That Gen. Babangida enacted only one press law -- the Newswatch Decree -- does not mean that he was more tolerant of freedom of expression or more benevolent than his predecessors. When his regime came to power, it inherited a number of laws made by Buhari to control expression, including the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree and the State (Security Detention of Persons) Decree whose provisions, when broadly interpreted, were even sufficient to muzzle the press.

The official explanations for the enactment of these laws are that the laws were necessary to make the Nigerian press responsible, to check the excesses of the press, to instill objectivity and fairness in the press and to check expression that might be prejudicial to national security, national unity and individual rights.

The above rationales, however, do not address the fundamental reasons why the military enacted these laws. There are more objective rationales behind the introduction of these laws. For one thing, the military regimes in Nigeria were imposed by force on the Nigerian people, and therefore lacked legitimacy. As such they relied on repression and suppression of ideas and criticisms as a principal mechanism for staying in power.

Each regime came to power on the claim that it would cleanse the society. But unfortunately enough, the regimes were as corrupt as the civilians they overthrew. As a fraction of the dependent bourgeoisie class in Nigeria, the military too accumulates private capital by manipulating state apparatus, playing a compradorial role for foreign enterprises and plundering the nation's treasury. Bribery, corruption and outright day-light embezzlement constitute its principal strategies for capital accumulation. A free and truly altruistic press that zealously engages in uncovering illegitimate sources of capital accumulation cannot be tolerated by a ruling class whose wealth is gotten through illegitimate means. For example, when Mohammed came to power and launched a nation-wide fight to wipe out corruption in the public and private sectors, the African Spark accused him of being corrupt, and advised that the military General should first of all wash clean his own corrupt hands before handling the sword in his fight against corruption. The news magazine said:

> But for an effective cleansing operation, we of this paper appeal to Brigadier Murtala Mohammed to let charity begin from home. If he should take the initiative by declaring his own assets and passing the one he can't account for to the state, then the war against corruption is half won.
>
> The present nation-wide whispering campaign being waged against him about his own alleged property in Kano and his fleet of vehicles must have been crushed before damage is done to his image and regime. After him, all his associates must follow suit; then none of us can hide under the slogan - "physician, heal thyself."[60]

It was to forestall this type of press criticism and crusade against corruption, embezzlement and ill-gotten wealth by government officials that the government enacted decree no. 11 of 1976. It was also to forestall press criticisms of his alleged involvement in the embezzlement of N2.8 (about $4 billion) reportedly missing when he was Federal Minister for Petroleum, that Buhari drafted decree no. 4 of 1984. These are the two major reasons why the military governments enacted laws to control the press.

Results of the Enforcement of these Laws

The enforcement of these laws by the military administrations, frequently chilled expression in the press. The enforcement of the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decrees, for example, resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of political commentators and journalists, especially under the Aguiyi-Ironsi and Muhammadu Buhari regimes. Prominent among the politicians imprisoned by the Aguiyi-Ironsi regime were Samuel Ayodele Adebanjo, executive member of the Action Group Youth Wing; Remi Kayode, former deputy premier and minister of agriculture in the Western region; Ogbonna Ukelonu, former permanent secretary in the Eastern Nigeria ministry of works and Bob Ogbuagu, secretary of the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation.[61]

Scores of politicians, including state governors and federal cabinet officers were also arrested and imprisoned when the Buhari regime came to power. The Ironsi and Buhari regimes were particularly noted for detaining politicians. This was because they were the two regimes that seized power directly from civilians, and the detention of politicians was a measure adopted to secure the regimes in power.

The enforcement of these laws also resulted in the detention and imprisonment of several journalists. For example, the Ironsi regime on June 3, 1966, arrested and imprisoned the editor of the

West African Pilot, Stephen Iweanya, for publishing an editorial cartoon. The cartoon's artist, Kofo Lasekan, a lecturer at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, was arrested the next day. Both spent a month in jail without trial.[62]

Under the Yakubu Gowon regime, the editor of the Nigerian Tribune, Lateef Jakande, was arrested and imprisoned for publishing an editorial that called for a return to civil rule.[63] Among other journalists who were arbitrarily arrested and detained during the Gowon regime were Minere Amakiri of the Nigerian Observer who was given 24 lashes of the cane across his bare back before being detained; Stephen Okorie of the New Nigerian who was imprisoned for reporting the resignation of a commissioner in the then East Central State; David Atalasie of the New Nigerian who was arrested for reporting that prisoners had escaped from a local prison; Chinaka Fynecountry of the Daily Times, arrested in connection with a crime story about a "marijuana peddler" in the country and Henry Onyedike and Agwu Opanku of the former Renaissance. Both were imprisoned for criticizing the federal government's re-naming of the Bight of Biafra to Bight of Bonny, a criticism that the government interpreted as a revivalist idea of Biafra, the one-time secessionist enclave.

Among the journalists arrested under the Muhammadu Buhari regime were Tai Solarin, Haroun Adamu of the Punch, Lade Bonuola and Femi Kusa of the Guardian, Rufai Ibrahim, Duro Onabule, Niyi Ontigoro and Idowu Odeyemi, publisher and editor of a local paper in Oyo State. Others included A.B. Ahmed, editor of the New

Nigerian and S.G. Ikoku, author of Nigeria's Fourth Coup d'etat, who was arrested for advancing complex ideas to save Nigeria from dictatorship.

Most prominent among the journalists imprisoned by the Buhari regime were Tunde Thompson and Nduda Irabor of the Guardian. Both were specially prosecuted and imprisoned by a military tribunal.

Under the Ibrahim Babangida regime, three editors of the Newswatch - Ray Ekpu, Dan Agbese and Yakukbu Mohammed - were arrested and detained for questioning after their news magazine had been shut down by the military junta. Tony Ukpong of the Weekly Metropolitan spent nearly a year in jail without trial.[64] When journalists were not detained, they were invited to security offices for "chats" with officials of the Babangida administration. One of such journalists was Chris Ikolie, editor of the once banned, and now revived Newbreed, whom junta officials invited several times for "chats."[65] Others included Lade Bonuola, editor of The Guardian, Sina Odugbemi and Mbadiwe Emelumba, acting editor of the Daily Times and Nojeem Jimoh, editor of The Punch.[66] In 1989, the police once went to arrest Paxton Idowu, editor of The Republic. When they failed to locate the editor, his wife, Florence, was picked up instead, and held in police custody.[67] There were several cases of arbitrary arrests of journalists that went unreported under the Babangida regime. The editor-in-chief of the Newswatch, Ray Ekpu, once spoke of such unreported cases, saying:

> ...until late last year it was not known to the public that security agencies were routinely picking up journalists from their desks and subjecting them to long 'chats' and asking them to cool their feet for a few days in detention. These incidents were known

only to close friends and colleagues of the victims but they never got into the newspapers....In the last year more than a dozen journalists had been questioned - Newswatch alone had been invited for questioning five times.[68]

Under the Babangida regime, journalists were not only imprisoned without trial, but one editor, Dele Giwa, of the Newswatch was murdered with a parcel bomb.[69] It was that style of brutality against the press that starkly distinguishes the Babangida regime from all others.

The enforcement of the press laws by each military government also resulted in the closure or confiscation of newspapers and magazines. Under the Aguiyi-Ironsi regime, for example, two newspapers in Ibadan - the Sunday Star and Imole-Owuro, were shut down by the order of the Western military government.[70]

Under the Gowon regime, several newspapers were also shut down. The Mid-West government, for example, banned the publication and circulation of the Aba-based Ika Ibo Newsletter.[71] The Federal Military Government in May 1967, banned the circulation of the Nigerian Outlook,[72] and on May 31 that year, it banned telecommunications services to the three eastern states.[73] Following the Federal Military Government's ban, the Mid-West government, shut down the office of the Nigerian Outlook in Benin City and confiscated several copies of the paper at Asaba.[74] The Eastern Nigerian government took a similar action, and on June 17, 1967, it prohibited the circulation of the Morning Post and Daily Times in the eastern region.[75] In November 1969, the Daily Times was shut down for six days by the Federal Military Government, and in 1970, the military governor of Cross River State, Brig. U.J. Esuene, closed down the provincial Nigerian Daily Standard.[76]

The Murtala Muhammed-Olusegun Obasanjo regime what was not characterized with arrests and detentions of journalists as such, was at least known for banning the circulation of the fortnightly news magazine, the Newbreed. In May 1977, the Federal Military Government confiscated 50,000 copies of the Newbreed news magazine.[77] The mid-June 1978 issue of the magazine was also confiscated by the junta, and its editor-in-chief, Chris Okolie, arrested.[78] Following the government's action, it proceeded and enacted the Newspaper (Prohibition of Circulation) (Validation) Decree no. 12 of 1978 to formalize the two-year ban of the magazine.

Under the Buhari regime, the Nigerian Statesman published in Owerri was ordered closed for two months and its editor, Pip Iwuagwu and two reporters, were dismissed. Under the Babangida regime, the Newswatch magazine was shut down for six months and its April 1987 issue, confiscated. Under the Babangida regime also, the launching of a new monthly features magazine, Focus, was twice postponed because officials of the junta wanted more time to scrutinize it before it was printed, according to a Newswatch report on June 13, 1988.

The enforcement of the press laws enacted by the various military regimes also resulted in the deportation of foreign journalists. The National Military Government of Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi deported at least three foreign correspondents. They were

Dennis Neal of the Associated Press who had flown into Lagos a few days after the Jan. 15 coup to cover the army takeover. The junta explained that the AP correspondent was deported because he "violated the ethics of journalism."[79] The other was David Leslie Ivor Loshak of the London Sunday Telegraph whom the government described as a "prohibited immigrant," and expelled on June 13, 1966 for "false stories about Nigeria."[80] On June 22, 1966, the government deported Walter Schwarz, a free lance journalist for the BBC and three British newspapers - the Observer, the Economist and the Guardian. He was deported along with Major Alastair David Forbes Boyle whom the government also described as a "prohibited immigrant."[81]

Among the foreign correspondents arrested and detained during the Yakubu Gowon regime were Bridget Bloom, a British journalist who worked for the weekly West Africa magazine. She was arrested on Jan. 20, 1967 by the order of the military government of the Eastern region.[82] On July 5, 1967, the government of the Eastern region also arrested and jailed Walter Schwarz who had been once deported.[83]

Under the Murtala Mohammed-Olusegun Obasanjo regime, the office of the Reuters news agency was ordered closed. This was followed by the detention of three correspondents of the London-based news agency.[84] The government action which came three days after the Feb. 13, 1976 abortive coup, was said to be in connection with Reuters' handling of reports of the abortive coup in which Gen. Murtala Mohammed was assassinated. The Obasanjo administration also arrested John Darnton, the New York Times West African correspondent in Lagos. He was deported on March 12, 1977 because his dispatches "put Nigeria in a bad light."[85] The Buhari and Babangida regimes did not deport foreign journalists. However, Buhari's regime was notorious for its uncompromising attitude and iron-grip on the Nigerian press, and Babangida's for its silent brutality of journalists.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Using Lowenstein's 23-point scale of quantifying press freedom, this study concludes that the Aguiyi-Ironsi regime was the least restrictive of freedom of the press. It enacted fewer press laws, and did not vigorously enforce them. For example, while the Yakubu Gowon, Mohammed-Obasanjo, Muhammadu Buhari and Ibrahim Babangida regimes drafted laws that banned or restricted newspaper or magazine circulation, the Ironsi regime did not enact such a law. Rather, it distinctively took steps to encourage the circulation of newspapers by drafting Decree no. 2 of 1966 which lifted the ban on newspaper circulation. The decree provided that:

> Any provision made before the coming into force of this Decree by a local government, a city or town council or any other municipal authority which prohibits or restricts the distribution or general sale of any newspaper in any part of Nigeria shall cease to have effect on the coming into force of this decree."[86]

The decree provided for up to three years of imprisonment for offenders. The Ironsi government's action in lifting a previous ban on newspaper circulation, helped achieve one of the factors that David Weaver argued is essential for press freedom i.e. the presence of those conditions necessary to insure the dissemination of a diversity of ideas and opinions to a relatively large audience.

Further, the Ironsi regime did not witness the height of detention of journalists that characterized other regimes. It was the spate of arrests and detention of journalists by the other regimes that led Babatunde Jose to conclude that almost every editor of a newspaper with national circulation had seen the walls of police cells or military orderly rooms.[87]

The Buhari administration imprisoned more journalists than any other regime. Unlike the other regimes also, the Buhari government utterly and distinctively utilized military tribunal for the trials of journalists. Even though the Mohammed-Obasanjo administration drafted Decree no. 11 of 1976 whose provisions were similar to the provisions of no. 4 of 1984 drafted by the Buhari regime, the former did not set up a military tribunal as the Buhari regime did for the trials of journalists.

All the regimes except Buhari's and Babangida's deported foreign journalists and although the Babangida regime repealed Nigeria's most dreaded press law, Decree no. 4 of 1984, his government's alleged involvement in the murder of Dele Giwa of the Newswatch, and detention of scores of journalists seriously raises questions about his human rights policy. Further, his government's failure to decisively clear itself from alleged involvement in the murder of Giwa has led many citizens to believe that it had a hand in the assassination of the journalist, a method of clamping down on the press that did not characterize other regimes.

Another conclusion of this paper is that the degree to which a regime enacted and enforced press control laws and other extra-legal measures, partially accounted for the limits of freedom of expression under that regime. Therefore, the more press control laws each regime drafted, and the more willing it was to enforce the laws and other extra legal instruments, the less favorable it weighed on Lowenstein's 23-point scale of press freedom.

This paper also concludes that the greater the freedom given to the judiciary under each regime, or rather, the more assertive the judiciary was of its independence (from junta dictatorship), the more freedom the press enjoyed. Therefore, the regimes that promulgated decrees ousting the judiciary from adjudicating the constitutionality of the institutional measures drafted to limit expression in the media, as well as the validity of the steps taken to enforce them, also weighed less favorable on Lowenstein's 23-point scale.

This was one of the factors that created a relatively less favorable climate of press freedom under the Buhari regime, when compared with other regimes, especially its predecessors. For example, when the Minere Amakiri case went to the court during the Gowon regime, the Rivers State Chief Justice, Ambrose Alagoa, asserting judicial independence, entered judgement in favor of the journalist - a victory for the Nigerian press. But probably more significant was Justice Alagoa's courtroom lecture to junta officials and Nigerians which reminded them of the existence of certain inalienable rights. Justice Alagoa said:

> The plaintiff should never have been flagged.... In the circumstances of this case...it might serve as a reminder to all concerned that, although there is a military government in power, and some democratic provisions of the Constitution were subsequently suspended, the fundamental rights touching personal liberty, freedom of movement, right to property and freedom of conscience are still provided for in the Constitution."[88]

When another journalist, Peter Ajayi, editor of the *Nigerian Herald*, took a case to the court during the Gowon regime, for unlawful dismissal from his job by the government, the court asserted its independence. In that case, a Kwara State court entered judgement against the government, and awarded costs in favor of the editor.

But under the Buhari regime, when the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) brought a case on behalf of Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor, challenging the constitutionality of Decree no. 4, and praying for an injunction to restrain the Federal Attorney-General as "the chief law enforcement officer of the Federal Military Government...from implementing...the entire decree,"[89] a Lagos court refused to grant the NUJ its prayer. Unlike *Amakiri* and *Ajayi*, the court in this case failed to assert its independence. Rather, it obediently complied with the provisions of Decree no. 4 which ousted it from adjudicating the constitutionality of the decree.

Similarly, the press lost a case brought by Olu Onagoruwa, Gani Fawehinmi and the NUJ, challenging the constitutionality of the Newswatch Decree during the Babangida regime.[90] In that case, an intimidated Lagos court, failed to assert its independence from junta dictatorship.

Therefore, the failure of the Nigerian judiciary to assert its independence under the Buhari and Babangida regimes, help explain why the Nigerian press under these two regimes was not as free as it was under the Ironsi, Gowon and Mohammed/Ogasanjo regimes.

ENDNOTES

1. The three coup attempts officially made known to the public were-- i) that staged on Feb. 13, 1976 by Lt. Col. Buka Suka Dimka in which the head of the Federal Military Government, Gen. Murtala Muhammed, was assassinated; ii) that staged by Mamman Jiya Vasta in 1985 which resulted in Vasta's execution; and iii) that staged on April 22, 1990.

2. It must be noted that Nigeria only gained political independence from Britain. The country is still economically dependent on Britain and the West.

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4. Raymond Nixon, "Factors related to freedom in national press systems," _Journalism Quarterly_, vol. 37, 1960, p. 17.

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13. J.C. Merrill. *The imperative of freedom*. New York: Hastings House, 1974, p. 26.

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16. *IAPA News*, April 1985, p. 1.

17. Ibid. p. 3.

18. T.I. Emerson. "Toward a general theory of the first amendment," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 72, 1963, p. 877.

19. T.I. Emerson, *The system of freedom of expression*. New York: Random House, 1970, p. 71.

20. Ibid.

21. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Annual report on freedom of information, 1962-63, p. 37.

22. R.D. Gastil, "The comparative survey of freedom," *Freedom at Issue*, January - February, 1978, p. 4.

23. F.S. Siebert. *Freedom of the press in England, 1476 - 1776*. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1952, p. 10.

24. Harold A. Fisher, "Treatment of the press in two "democracies": An analysis," paper presented at the 13th Third World Studies Conference, Omaha, Nebraska, Oct. 4-6, 1990.

25. D.L. Shaw and S.W. Brauer. "Press freedom and war constraints: Case testing Siebert's proposition," *Journalism Quarterly*, vol. 46, 1969, pp. 243-254.

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28. L.F. Montgomery, "Stress on government and press criticism of government leaders: Mexico 1951-1980," *Gazette*, vol. 34, 1984, pp. 163-173.

29. S. Belbase and J.E. Murphy. "Press performance in Nepal during two political climates," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 60, 1983, pp. 61-66.

30. E.A. Ogunade. Freedom of the press: Government-press relations in Nigeria, 1900-1966. Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 1981.

31. Ibid, p. 270.

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45. Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary, Federal Republic of Nigeria, March 17, 1967, p. 99.

46. Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary, Federal Republic of Nigeria, May 12, 1967, p. 99.

47. Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary, Federal Republic of Nigeria, May 30, 1967, p. 111. For details of the law's provision, see also Daily Times, June 1, 1967, p. 16.

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72. Daily Times, May 31, 1967, p. 16.

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80. Daily Times, June 14, 1966, p. 3.

81. Daily Times, June 23, 1966, p. 16.

82. Daily Times, Jan. 21, 1967, pp. 1 & 2.

83. Daily Times, July 19, 1967, pp. 1 & 4.

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SOVIET LIFE MAGAZINE AND SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE

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SOVIET LIFE MAGAZINE AND SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE

Abstract

Soviet Life magazine originated in the diplomatic warming between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s and has been circulated in the United States for more than three decades. This study examines *Soviet Life* magazine and its relationship to American and Soviet leadership and policy actions. It focuses primarily on the magazine's shifting editorial emphasis on Soviet-American relationships during the several periods of superpower detente between the 1959 and 1988 and how the editorial content of the magazine changed with the shifting winds of diplomacy. Although the pattern is complex and is tied to historicized events, there is evidence of a direct relationship between general periods of detente and the magazine's coverage of Soviet-American relationships. It appears the Soviets were willing to advance specific editorial initiatives about superpower relations in designated periods of detente, but fell silent about the relationship when political diplomacy was strained.

Soviet Life Magazine and Soviet-American Detente

Introduction

Soviet Life magazine originated in 1956 as a result of Nikita Krushchev's initiative for "peaceful coexistence" between the superpowers. The publication was distributed directly to the population of the United States, ostensibly for the sake of international goodwill. "The purpose of [this] magazine is to spread truthful information about the life of the Soviet people, thus contributing to better understanding between our countries," wrote Khrushchev (January 1960, inside cover).

Soviet Life, and its corresponding American magazine, *America*, have drawn little scholarly interest. Few direct references to the magazines exist in scholarly publications and periodicals, in spite of their potential for revealing policy initiatives between the superpowers.

Anita Mallinckrodt Dasbach (1966) examined the magazines in terms of their propaganda themes and techniques and how well their cold war objectives were being accomplished. With the passing of the paradigm, these publications have been considered, somewhat unfairly, as irrelevant to contemporary policy analysis. As the present study seeks to verify, *Soviet Life's* editorial content reveals important changes in direction by the Kremlin's leadership.

Soviet Information Policy

Among the writers who have sought to understand Soviet news policies, Raymond H. Anderson (1984) noted that the Soviet leadership disliked undertaking any significant or controversial action without first having prepared public opinion and that the Soviet media are a key indicator of forthcoming foreign policy . Angus Roxburgh (1987) found *Pravda*, in particular, defined the thought processes behind Soviet policymaking and impending changes. Dina Spechler (1982) claimed a careful examination of

Soviet media content can reveal current and future Soviet policy directions.[1]

If the domestic Soviet media can provide clues to Soviet policies to come, it is possible that *Soviet Life*, intended expressly for American consumption, acted as a preparatory vehicle to make the road smoother and pave the way for new Soviet policy initiatives and actions. It is proposed here that significant changes in editorial coverage of Soviet-American relations have occurred since 1956 and that a relationship exists between detente and the editorial content of *Soviet Life* magazine.

This study traces the editorial development of *Soviet Life* magazine and its relationship to American and Soviet leadership and policy actions. It focuses primarily on the magazine's shifting editorial emphasis on Soviet-American relationships during four periods of detente between the 1959 and 1988 and how the editorial content of the magazine changed with the shifting winds of diplomacy.

Mark Hopkins in *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* (1970) and David Mackenzie and Michael W. Curran in *A History of the Soviet Union* (1986) suggest that although not exempt from the Soviet media's traditional servitude to the Communist Party apparatus, *Soviet Life* is in many respects unique and differs from Soviet media produced for domestic audiences.

While domestic Soviet media, such as *Pravda* and *Izvestia* were often vitriolic and accusatory toward American foreign policies, the editorial sentiment is considerably more subtle in *Soviet Life*. For example, in 1987 *Pravda* described Americans as "neoglobalist cowboys" with "wolf's fangs".[2] In contrast, *Soviet Life* referred to negative aspects of the American way of life in articles not specifically on the subject of the United States. A 1963 issue describes the American love affair with automobiles and then makes a transition to their faults ("space eaters", pollution and parking problems) while extolling the virtues of Soviet public transport ("Let's Talk Cars," *Soviet Life*, January 1963).

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[1] Spechler examined *Novy mir* ("New World"), the Soviet literary publication which has experienced cycles of "liberal" content (or "permitted dissent"), most notably under Krushchev. She noted that the freer content of the publication (freedom to criticize certain aspects of Stalinism) was an indication of the Kremlin's attitude toward improved relations with the West as well as Krushchev's struggle to gain and maintain power.

[2] V. Gan, *Pravda*, January 16, 1987 and A. Lyuty, *Pravda*, April 19, 1989.

Mackenzie and Curran point out that while *Soviet Life* published some overtly ideological reports of the socialist system typical of most domestic Soviet media-- happy factory workers, inevitable progress of the socialist system, etc.), it would also occasionally make indirect references to failings in the American political system. A January, 1981, *Soviet Life* article engaged selective statistics to argue that the Soviet economy was developing much faster than the American economy: "It is not necessary to be a statistician to draw (such) a conclusion. The economic growth of our country has made great strides...." (Mackenzie and Curran, 1970: 430).

Generally, however, the publication offered Americans a view that the Soviet Union was a stable and humane society with warm people who view their contacts and relations with Americans in a positive light. Hopkins regarded such a perspective in *Soviet Life* as a public relations ploy for the Soviet government.[3] This view represents a "deideologized" perspective that has also been applied to other forms of domestic Soviet media. Certainly, the magazine published some overtly ideological information, such as reports of Communist Party congresses, ideological anniversaries of Lenin's birth, etc., and excerpts from political speeches. However, *Soviet Life*'s tone was softer than the editorial material produced for Soviet audiences

The suspicion deeply embedded among many American conservatives is that the Soviets have been engaged in calculated manipulation of American public opinion. Nicholas Daniloff, a former Moscow news correspondent, described the general Soviet press system as deeply rooted in political ideals: "Lenin viewed the press as one of the tools of government. The role of the press was to be a handmaiden in constructing socialism and, eventually, communism" (Daniloff, 1988: 5).

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[3] Philip Gaunt (1987) wrote of the striking way the Soviet media resemble "a major institutional or corporate public relations department" in which information is channeled from the top down in accordance with current policy.

Soviet Life attributed its contents in October 1961 to Novosti and announced occasional changes in agency leadership. In 1964, Novosti was characterized as the public relations agency for Communism and seemed ill-prepared to engage in an open discussion of Soviet-American diplomacy. In 1965, the editors of *Soviet Life* addressed directly the question of propaganda in the magazine. They used the elliptical logic in asserting: "Sometimes...we are told that the magazine is nothing but a piece of propaganda. The criticism misses the point.... We are aware that it is not easy for an American reader to understanding everything in our thinking and our way of life...." (Jan. 1965: 3).

Dennis Kux (1985), an information analyst for the U.S. State Department, argued that the Soviets have taken an extremely long-term view of their information programs. "The Soviets do not necessarily seek immediate gains and are not looking for a major impact from every effort. They are satisfied that the cumulative effect of periodic successes outweighs failures...and makes their considerable investment of people and money worthwhile" (Kux, 1985: 15).

The editorial offices for *Soviet Life* are maintained in both Moscow and Washington. While available by subscription and in most public libraries in the U.S., *Soviet Life* is not usually sold on news stands. That the Soviets are anxious to increase American readership of their periodicals is apparent by their stepped-up advertising campaigns in the United States, including prominent ads for *Soviet Life* subscriptions in the *New York Times* (June 1, 1990).[4]

Novosti Press Agency (APN)

Administrative control of *Soviet Life* is through Novosti Press Agency (also known by the acronym APN) -- a combination feature news agency and publishing house. Novosti was created in the early 1960s to supplement the official news and information issued by *TASS*, the main Soviet government news agency. APN provides information abroad on a large scale, such as Soviet films, travel guides to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, an annual yearbook of Soviet information (demographic statistics), last published in 1983, an illustrated history of the Soviet Union (1982), and an array of pamphlets and brochures on diverse subjects such as Soviet engineering feats, education, *glasnost* and U.S.-Soviet summits -- each with political overtones.[5] Among its recent activities, APN was co-host of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church-sponsored "International Education Conference" exchange for Soviet students (*New York Times*, November 14, 1990).[6]

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[4] A recent issue of *Soviet Life* offered a toll-free number for a free issue of *Literaturnaya gazeta*, a popular Soviet literary newspaper.

In the organizational ladder of the Soviet media, APN, formed in 1978, was an arm of the International Information Department (or Agitprop Department) of the Communist Party Central Committee. Soviet analysts Richard Shultz and Roy Godson (1984) believe APN operates on propagandistic motives and has used KGB officers as writers/journalists. They report that in the 1970s, APN operated on a $500 million annual budget and that it exchanged information with 101 international and national agencies, 120 publishing firms, more than 100 radio and television companies, and more than 7,000 of the world's largest magazines and newspapers. In addition, APN provided editorial material, articles and photographs, for 52 Soviet newspapers and magazines (including *Soviet Life*) and 119 press bulletins published abroad (Shultz and Godson, 1984: 22, 28-34).

Hopkins suggested that APN, with representatives in 56 countries was charged with the primary objective of disseminating information about the U.S.S.R., and functioned much like the United

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[5] *The Illustrated History of the USSR* is divided into three eras: feudalism, capitalism and socialism, however the text heavily favors the feats of socialism vs. the woes of imperialism/capitalism. A 1989 APN pamphlet encourages world acceptance of the recent Soviet policy of *glasnost*.

[6] This Soviet-U.S. exchange offered Soviet students an all-expenses paid trip to the United States, where they were immersed in Unification theology.

States Information Agency (USIA) (Hopkins, 269).[7] Although Hopkins concedes that *Soviet Life*'s primary objective was to obtain "good press" for the Soviet government, he considers it to be a public relations piece containing "some of the best photography and most stimulating articles among the Soviet mass media" and notes that compared with other traditionally bland Soviet media, APN's products are "free of ponderous, official journalism" (Hopkins, 1970: 294).

The *Glasnost* era

Since the development of *glasnost* it has become increasingly difficult to discern the ideological focus in Soviet print and electronic media. After comparing hundreds of hours of Soviet and American television programs from Konstantin Chernenko to Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet media analyst Ellen Mickiewicz (1988) concluded that the Soviet media have become more relaxed under *glasnost* and have become Western in style and content, featuring discussion and criticism of formerly taboo subjects and a new focus on timeliness and spontaneity. Rather than publishing dull, prepared texts and lengthy speeches by politicians, Soviet broadcasters have recently adopted Western techniques of impromptu interviews and live debates--now with foreigners as well as Soviet citizens--and Soviet programming is generally livelier and more geared to attracting and sustaining audience interest than in the past (Mickiewicz, 1988: 285). This appears to be true of print media such as *Moskovskiye novosti* ("Moscow News"), *Ogonyok* ("Flame), and *Soviet Life* as well.[8]

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[7] In 1979, *U.S. News & World Report* reported that the U.S. International Communication Agency employed a staff of 8,748 in 126 countries, published 12 magazines in 22 languages, produced more than 90 films a year and broadcast more than 800 hours a week through the Voice of America in 37 languages to an estimated 75 million listeners at a cost of $433 million per year. The purpose of this far-reaching effort, the magazine reported, is to "give foreign peoples the best possible understanding of U.S. policies and intentions".

[8] The changes in format and content reflect what prominent Soviet sociologist G. T. Zhuravlev, a widely-known communication theorist, considers to be a movement within the Communist Party toward a reconceptualization of both doctrine and practice. Mickiewicz notes that in this view, political doctrine or ideology continues to be pre-eminent, but that its normative character is now separated from practical strategy or method. According to Zhuravlev, political

Editorial Content Shifts

The original *Soviet Life* (then *USSR*) painted a generally rosy picture of life in the Soviet Union, with official policy news (eg. reports about Party congresses) and an abundance of feature stories about Soviet lifestyles (eg. fashions, hobbies, etc.), "socialist hero" stories (eg. successful factory workers, scientists or teachers who demonstrated exemplary work ethics and loyalty to the Party) and brief stories with photographs of Soviet-American exchanges in sports, the arts, science and education. The magazine's cover often featured illustrations and retouched photos of idyllic scenes, such as pastoral Soviet meadows and folk art.

Cover titles in early editions in the late 1950s offered: "All Kinds of Laughter"; "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trailblazer"; "Safeguarding Worker Interest"; "Baltic Theater Festival"; and "Church Doors are Now Open".

Most articles covered items of curiosity to Westerners ("A College Education in the USSR"; "What Soviet Children Read") and some issues contained a question-and-answer column addressing queries such as: "What does it cost to rent an apartment?"; "How is housing distributed?"; "Do Soviet college students pay tuition?"; "Is divorce permitted in the Soviet Union?" Originally, each issue had a specific theme inscribed on the cover ("Exchange Programs Improve Understanding"; "Public Schools in the Soviet Union"), a practice that was discontinued in January, 1962. Most issues featured an article about the customs and traditions peculiar to a particular Soviet region, territory or republic (eg. Georgia, the Crimea, etc.).

The magazine went to considerable effort in its early years to portray a solid Soviet-U.S. relationship. The cover of a 1958 issue portrayed a jovial Krushchev clasping hands with a young American boy with a broad smile. On examination, it is evident the photograph is a composite with an illustration of the boy added by artists, leading the reader to wonder if such a meeting ever occurred, as the

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doctrine is devoid of method. Currently, it appears that the Soviet media are reforming due to concern that the official Soviet message be assimilated (Mickiewicz, 1988: 197 -201).

cover suggests. Overall, the magazine feigned a purposefully positive Soviet-U.S. relationship, even in times of strained relations between the two nations.

Format Changes

In 1989, *Soviet Life* changed its format, from an original *Life* magazine format to the standard U.S. magazine (8.5 X 11.5 ins.); from a predominantly black and white interior, to a glossy, full-color appearance. The cover, which had been a paint-brushed color illustration, became generally an improved professional color photograph. A noticeable trend in terms of content is the magazine's consistency in reporting on various exchanges and meetings between Soviet and American citizens and leaders. The magazine continued to publish bulletins and photographs of Soviet exhibits touring the United States and American exhibits in the Soviet Union and details of various scientific and educational exchanges. Another trend was the magazine's deemphasis on ideology; that is, its reduction in overtly political stories about the superiority of Communism. Current issues rarely mention the Communist Party and instead, describe the tenets of "humane socialism".

Research Method

The central question addressed here is how sensitive was *Soviet Life* to the ebb and flow of international diplomacy? Did the publication reflect the periods of detente in superpower relations?

Detente has been used, somewhat vaguely, to describe relaxation of tensions. Theodore Draper, in discussing the vagueness of the term detente, suggests its meaning is misleading. He suggests it is more analogous to an accordion because these periods are narrow or stretched (Stevenson, 1985). Other writers base their understanding of detente on broad definitions. Bell (1977) stated detente is a "mode of management of adversary power" (Bell, 1977: 1). Roy Bennett (1985) described the pattern of U.S.-Soviet relations in terms of multiple periods of "breakthroughs." He observed that each tentative return to detente was stronger than the one which preceded it, and the return to cold war was also sharper.

For their part, the Soviets considered detente to be a form of "peaceful coexistence," at least since the death of Stalin. Jurii Prenkov, vice president of the Soviet Peace Committee, stated that the three main focuses of the Soviet definition were the creation of pacts that provide solutions to conflicts, the creation of treaties concerning the arms race, and the creation of policies which insure peace (Frei, 1981).

Detente periods were defined based on major bilateral agreements signed between the two nations and the existence of official foreign policies intended to achieve warm relations (eg. peaceful coexistence, detente, *glasnost*). These periods were labelled on a timeline detailing specific Soviet and American and foreign policy actions and agreements.

Second, the frequencies of articles on Soviet-American relations were tabled. The editorial index in *Soviet Life* magazine categorizes articles in *Soviet Life* from 1956 to 1988. From this index, articles on Soviet-American relations was isolated and their frequency was tabled and superimposed on the timeline depicting periods of detente.

Third, the frequencies relative to periods of detente were analyzed for a correlation. "Detente" was defined as the relaxation of international tension, particularly between the Communist East and the capitalist West. Although there is disagreement about the precise meaning of detente and evidence that the Soviet and American purposes for detente have differed, both governments have nonetheless engaged in various foreign policy actions (eg. reciprocal trade agreements and treaties) that demonstrate their mutual interest in friendlier bilateral relations.

For the purposes of this study, detente refers to any period of relations since 1956 in which Soviet and American governments have responded favorably to one another by meeting for summits and/or engaging in joint agreements, policies or activities of an official, political nature.

Cycles of Detente. Periods of *detente* in this study include the following:

__Period 1: Prelude to Detente 1957-59__ During this period, the word detente was not in the Soviet or American vocabulary as yet, however the term "peaceful coexistence" was introduced by Nikita Krushchev, who shocked Soviet society with his anti-Stalin tirades. Although purists may call detente and peaceful coexistence two separate policy initiatives, this study regards peaceful coexistence more appropriately as a prelude to detente. Krushchev was the first Soviet leader to visit the United States and he rocked the West with his suggestion that the Soviets wanted East and West to live side by side without military confrontation.

This period, also known as "the Krushchev thaw," was characterized by Krushchev's increasing popularity at home and abroad due to his relaxed policies allowing publication of anti-Stalinist methods, closing down many labor camps and setting various political prisoners free, as well as his informal "barnstorming" and trips abroad. This detente period was temporarily interrupted by the American discovery of Soviet missiles based in Cuba aimed at the United States, leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion under President John F. Kennedy.

Period 2: 1963-64: A second warming period emerged as the United States and the Soviets signed a treaty to stop testing of nuclear weapons. This was Krushchev's last feat before he deposed by Leonid Brezhnev, who continued Krushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States by announcing the need for detente -- which he described as a normalization of relations between the superpowers.

Meanwhile, the Brezhnev-instituted practice of psychiatric "treatment" for dissidents and the emergence of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" --- the Soviets' self-declared right to militarily interfere anywhere in the world to preserve socialism -- cut off this period of detente. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 confirmed Western suspicions about Soviet "peaceful" aims and resulted in a lull in Soviet-American relations for the following four years.

Period 3: 1973-79: A third period of *detente* emerged in 1972, when the SALT I treaty was signed by Brezhnev and Richard Nixon. A year earlier, President Nixon had formally introduced detente into the American political lexicon as a necessity for a reduced Soviet nuclear threat. Also under Brezhnev, the Helsinki Final Accords were initiated, U.S.-Soviet grain agreements were reached and SALT II was signed by Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter.

This period of warming lasted until late 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. In retaliation, the United States led a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. While Soviet-U.S. relations until this time had been generally positive, the writing of Soviet dissidents smuggled out of the Soviet Union, or by others who had defected or were placed in forced exile, led to Americans discovering for the first time the harsh nature of Communist repression.

Period 4: 1984-88: The fourth period of *detente* addressed in this study began in 1983, when the Soviet Union called for renewed disarmament talks and ways to deal with President Ronald Reagan's Space Defense Initiative (SDI). During this period, the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, including several Americans, resulting in increased hostility between the Soviet Union and United States. In the midst of an atmosphere of recrimination and hostility, Samantha Smith, a young girl from Maine, wrote to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov asking for world peace. Upon receipt of her letter, the Soviets took the opportunity to invite the girl to visit the Soviet Union; meanwhile, the Soviets emphasized their peaceful nature in increased pleas for disarmament. Eventually, Mikhail Gorbachev, the current leader, encouraged the United States to sign further disarmament treaties and meet in additional summits, which were staged in Iceland in 1987 and in Malta in 1988.

During this period of "the new detente", the Soviets introduced new policies including *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring), which have aided them in their renewed plea for improved bilateral relations.[9] These policies have given the Soviet people a new opportunity to voice their objections to the stagnation in Soviet society and other problems in an unprecedented way. The newly permitted expression of social and political criticisms, which previously had been forbidden, the freeing of political prisoners, new emphasis on cooperatives and privatization and other market reforms have all had a profound effect in stirring up Soviet society and improving American perception of Soviet intentions. While some have called these changes "within the system reform", others have referred to the current detente as a revolutionary period. This period of *detente* has not yet ended, however, the data studied ended in 1988.

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[9] Wojtek Lamentowicz wrote in *East European Reporter* in 1987 that for a new detente to be successful, it would need to be based on "reciprocity of hopes" rather than a balance of fear; if political actions were founded on moral principles, it would last. These concepts have been evident in Gorbachev's economic policies, which have exposed Americans to the vast, almost unlimited Russian market and resulted in renewed interest in detente.

One of the limitations of this study is the underlying assumption that what Americans and Soviets consider to be "detente" is similar. In addition, no explanation accompanies the *Soviet Life* index of articles categorized by subject. A limitation arises here in that the authors are uncertain what to the Soviets constitutes Soviet-American relations: a piece specifically on the subject of Soviet-U.S. relations or a mere mention of the United States in articles on Soviet-U.S. exchanges. It appears that the *Soviet Life* index includes all mentions of the United States in this category.

Results

During the 29-year time frame studied, the most frequently appearing articles dealing directly with Soviet-American relationships were about :

- Cultural, educational and artistic exchanges between nations (40%)
- Scientific and technical exchanges (18%)
- Political, peace and friendship themes (12%)
- Business, agriculture and trade (10%)
- Diplomatic initiatives and visits (10%)
- Historical perspectives (8%)
- Sports and athletic competition, including the Olympics (5%)
- Literature and literary reviews (3%)
- Miscellaneous (4%).

Based on a visual comparison, there appears to be a substantial direct relationship between the editorial practices of *Soviet Life* and the fluctuation in Soviet-American relations. (See accompanying charts). While defying a simple explanation, the pattern of detente seems to correspond to the rise of the number of articles on Soviet-American relations in the magazine.

The difficulty of analysis of these results is underscored by the periodic changes in leadership in both countries and the specific events which were catalysts for diplomatic tension. For instance, two particular promotional events, the 1980 Olympics and Samantha Smith's trip to the U.S.S.R. in 1983 during Andropov's tenure, caused an aberrant number of articles. These events removed, there is a remarkable and consistent change over the past three decades in editorial content as reflected in this study.

In general, these results seem to augur with Ellen Mickiewicz's study of the Soviet broadcast media, which showed that in the current new detente, particularly since Chernenko and during Gorbachev, there has been a significant increase in coverage by the Soviet media of the United States and its NATO allies (Mickiewicz, 1988: 134).[10]

However, simple discovery that *Soviet Life* has published articles on Soviet-American relations during periods of desired detente does not irrefutably confirm the link to a deliberate policy initiative, nor does it suggest detente was successful solely because of the increased attention paid to the United States in the magazine. Recent opinion polls indicate that Americans view the Soviets highly favorably, moreso now than during any other period of *detente*.[11] If it is true that a build-up of consistent messages over time is effective in the long run, then *Soviet Life* has been a remarkable tool in helping to further Soviet aims and foster improved Soviet-American relations.

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[10] Mickiewicz wrote that Soviet news coverage of the U.S. and NATO rose from 15 per cent of the total number of news stories broadcast in the Chernenko period to 22 percent in the Gorbachev period.

[11] In 1981, Gallup reported that 80 percent of Americans polled felt the Soviet Union financed and trained international terrorists. In 1987 the percentage of Americans who considered the Soviet Union as "enemy" dropped 15 percent (from 54 to 39%).

Chart No. 1

Articles on Soviet-American relationships
in Soviet Life Magazine 1959-1988

1959	76
1960	19
1961	32
1962	27
1963	37
1964	0
1965	32
1966	12
1967	6
1968	19
1969	23
1970	35
1971	22
1972	35
1973	67
1974	78
1975	64
1976	56
1977	42
1978	42
1979	66
1980	28
1981	37
1982	30
1983	66
1984	39
1985	50
1986	57
1987	38
1988	64

Chart No. 2
Articles on Soviet-American Relationships by Period of Detente, Leader and Events



Chart No. 3

Soviet-American Detente in *Soviet Life*



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The Impact of the Home Video Cassette Recorder on Egyptian Film and Television Consumption Patterns

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Abstract

This study examines the contemporary media situation in Egypt, with specific reference to the impact home video cassette recorders (VCR) have had on both television and cinema consumption patterns. The study first reviews both Egyptian cinema production and exhibition. Egypt has a long and distinguished history of film production; the country is the film capital of the Middle East. The film exhibition business in Egypt has undergone drastic changes during the past decade, but especially since the mid-1970s. These changes are noted. Second, the powerful television industry is examined. Egypt was the first country in the Arab world--in fact, one of the first developing states--to construct a comprehensive national television system to help promote development, especially to promote Gamal Abdul Nasser's own political view of the Middle East. Noted also is the impact that Egyptian television has had on the rest of the Arab world. Finally, VCRs are discussed within the Egyptian context with particular regard to their impact on audience use of other visual media. The writers use survey data, personal observation, and their own experience with VCRs in Egypt, concluding that VCRs have had an impact on both film and broadcast television consumption.

The Impact of the Home Video Cassette Recorder on Egyptian Film and Television Consumption Patterns

As the home video cassette recorder (VCR) approaches 15 years of existence in the developing world, it is widely believed that the medium has had a profound impact on world-wide media consumption. There are many reasons that consumers in the Third World are attracted to the VCR, but the main motivation to purchase a machine is freedom of viewing. The VCR owner can, in effect, be his/her own television station program director. The two main uses for the machine are time-shifting (recording a program to be viewed at a later time) and viewing rented or purchased feature films or television programs on tape.

In the affluent industrialized world, VCRs spread quickly as the machines became a popular addition to the home entertainment center. As prices dropped and ownership increased, the recorders diffused to the point that they penetrated homes in the U.S. and Britain, for example, more rapidly than did television sets in the 1950s. In the developing world, the situation is different. Boyd and Straubhaar (1985) conclude that there are several factors that influence people to purchase video recorders there: (1) price, (2) government restrictions, (3) income distribution, and (4) broadcast television content. However, dissatisfaction with the content of broadcast television--determined for the most part by Third World governments--is the main reason to purchase a VCR. In economic terms, VCRs are diffused more rapidly where television viewers feel they are not well served by what is broadcast, in short, where the `marginal utility' of VCRs for adding diversity is high (Straubhaar and Boyd, 1988, p. 166).

Third World VCR penetration is uneven. In Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, VCR ownership is low. Asia presents a mixed picture, depending on the economic conditions, political system, and media structure of each country. The Middle East is also mixed, but the affluent Gulf States constitute a virtual video tape world. Although estimates vary, it is given that every family in pre-invasion Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the U.A.E., and Oman who desires a VCR has one. In the less affluent countries such as the Sudan and Egypt, penetration is much lower than in the Gulf. Yet, in Egypt there is a thriving industry that sells and repairs machines, duplicates both Egyptian and Western films and television programming, and distributes tapes through rental outlets.

The number of VCR homes in Egypt is unknown. VCR manufacturers have commissioned several surveys of cassette recorder penetration in the affluent Gulf states; data on poorer countries is apparently less important for obvious economic reasons. Boyd and Straubhaar estimate that in 1986 about 4% of Egyptian television homes had VCRs. In 1990, for the first time, the British Broadcasting Corporation included VCR data in its world-wide television and radio receiver survey. The BBC estimates that Egypt has 3 VCRs for every 100 people, or about 1,680,000 home video recorders (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1990). However, video consumption patterns in the Middle East should not be examined in a Western context. Similar to the use of radio and television receivers in the Arab world, there is a large amount of group VCR viewing by friends and extended family members. Not sharing one's media with others runs counter to Arab hospitality.

This study concerns both the importance of video in Egyptian society and the impact that tapes--virtually all pirated--have had on the Egyptian film production and exhibition industry. This examination of VCR developments in Egypt may provide the basis for future comparative studies concerning the impact cassette recorders are having on other developing countries, such as India, where the machines appear to be influencing media consumption patterns.

Egyptian Media Environment: Film

Egypt is a media-rich country that has had an active film industry since the late 1920s, was an early radio broadcaster, and had the first highly developed television system in the Middle East. This situation stems from the fact that Egypt, even with the enormous political, economic, and social changes that have taken place since the early 1950s, remains the preeminent Arab world religious, cultural, literary, education, and media center.

The Egyptian film industry provided the basis for the development of both radio and television. Egypt has made feature films since the 1920s; since the 1950s this prolific industry has annually produced more than one hundred films that have become a significant financial and cultural export. Before the electronic media became an important entertainment force, the Egyptian feature film was the primary means by which speakers of Arabic in the Middle East became familiar with Egyptian writers, actors, and musicians. Most importantly, film provided the basis for the acceptance of the Cairene dialect, used later in television programs. During the presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser following the 1952 Egyptian revolution, most film studios were nationalized, and a government ministry provided guidance for film content. Severely curtailed was the expression of political ideas at variance with Nasserite Arab socialist policy (Dajani, 1980). This situation did not, however, decrease the popularity of Egyptian-made films, although some Gulf states restricted films they believed were anti-royalist or featured themes inconsistent with conservative Islamic theology.

After the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli War, and with then-President Sadat's "Open Door" policy, both film and television program sales to other states increased dramatically, especially to the newly affluent Gulf. Egypt's only viable Arab world film production competitor is Lebanon, but the long-running civil war there effectively stopped further film production industry development after 1976.

Egyptian Cinema

Often called the seventh art, the cinema in Egypt began in 1896. The growth of the industry in Egypt can be divided into phases: the Pioneer Period (1931-1939), the War Period (1940-1944), the Post-War Cinema (1945-1951), and finally the Modern Era. Each of these phases has its own special character and represents its own point of view, reflecting the changing Egyptian culture.

Historians of the cinema differ concerning the most important date in the cinema industry in Egypt, but there is general agreement that the birth date of the Egyptian film industry was November 16, 1927, when the first Egyptian film, Laila, was shown at Cairo Cinema (Saad, 1977).

Egyptian Dominance of the Arabic Film Market

For over half a century, the Egyptian cinema has supplied the whole of the Arab World with its films. Even in the middle of political differences and the Arab boycott of Egypt, cinema and television in most Arab countries continued to show Egyptian films.

Egyptian films are a significant entertainment force not only throughout the Arab World, but also internationally. In general, the popularity of Egyptian films in Arab markets is not strongly affected by politics, and only 25% of the films made over the past ten years are political in orientation (Jobbins, 1982). Most Arab countries--most notably Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen--refuse politically oriented Egyptian films and also impose strict censorship on violence and sex in the cinema.

As the earliest film producer in the region, Egypt has cultivated a large number of film artists; other Arab countries lack well trained talent. While most Arab countries do import films from the West, Egyptian films have managed to compete by virtue of the fact that they are in Arabic. The profit motive was a major factor in Egypt's expansion of the film export industry. It is estimated that during the 1970s revenues from the foreign distribution of films covered from 40-60% and sometimes more of the cost of film production. Cinema was also seen as an important means of spreading information about the Egyptian culture and people.

Censorship is one of the main problems hindering the progress of the cinema, not only in Egypt, but throughout the Arab World. Producers put pressure on film makers to restrict their artistic talents primarily to safe subjects and to be constantly aware of the censors' stringent requirements. Such a move has served to put yet another restraint on the Arabic film industry. It is impossible to give free rein to artistic thought and interpretation when shackled by such restrictions.

The Egyptian film industry has been undergoing an economic crisis as there is a severe shortage of cinema houses in the country. According to Middle East Magazine ("An interview with," 1987), the number of cinemas in Egypt has declined to a meager 440. This decline is chiefly due to investors, freed under the economic "Open Door" policy, who purchase cinemas to turn them into car parks, auction rooms, and luxury leisure centers. This state of affairs means that the producer can wait a year or more for a film to be publicly screened--usually in some remote cinema--before beginning to see any financial return.

A second aspect of the industry's economic problems came to light with the growth of the region's video market. There are many people making illicit profits while film makers themselves often have not been able to cover their basic costs. Another economic problem threatening the industry is rising production costs, including escalating salary levels demanded by actors. A leading Egyptian actor can expect to earn $38,000 per film. To keep costs down, the director is often forced to complete the film at record speed, not having sufficient time to reach even minimum professional standards. Much of the sound, developing, and editing equipment is dated; this has resulted in films with poor quality cinematography and sound.

Another problem, common to film industries throughout the world, is the emergence of television as a threat to films. While the industry in other countries, notably the United States, Britain, and France, has been able to meet the challenge by adapting production and exhibition to the new medium, the Egyptian industry has taken an indecisive attitude.

A more immediate problem is the video boom, which has reduced demand in both the motion picture and television markets. The industry must reorganize if it is to survive the competition.

Radio and Television

Egyptians enjoy a variety of radio and television services. Radio dates from a short-lived experiment with private commercial transmission in the 1920s when some amateur stations attempted to sell advertising time (Metwally, n.d.). It was during the Nasser years, especially between 1953 and 1967, that the domestic and international radio services became a major developmental and political force. Cairo Radio, a term used to refer to several Egyptian radio services, was quite effective in disseminating Nasser's Arab Socialist philosophy via both short- and medium-wave. By the late 1980s, seven radio networks provided national, regional, and some local service (Egyptian Radio and TV Union in Brief, 1987). Even in the changing contemporary political climate of the Middle East, surveys show both Egyptian domestic and international services remain popular in other Arab countries (Asi & Boyd, 1989; United States Information Service, 1987).

Despite the Ministry of Information's desire in the 1980s to allow some regional electronic media, Egyptian television, founded by and rapidly developed under Nasser, still serves as a model for Third World government-run, top-down, developmentally and politically oriented television. The visual medium benefitted from the large talent pool developed in film and radio; Egypt--unlike the Gulf states--has a rich literary tradition and abundant talent to produce indigenous programs. Egyptian television has influenced the rest of the Arab World through direct placement of its programming and because Egyptian television personnel either have trained others or have worked in other countries.

Originally there was one national channel; then a second was added. For a period of time before the 1967 war, a third channel operated in the capital. Stopped for economic reasons after 1967, that channel was resurrected in the 1980s. By the late 1970s the old U.S.-installed RCA monochrome system was converted to SECAM color, thereby making more attractive the export of popular television series and soap operas (Boyd, 1982).

It is difficult to obtain accurate radio, television, and VCR ownership figures in developing countries. However, British Broadcasting Corporation data show that for a developing country, Egyptian citizens are relatively well equipped: 17 million radio receivers; 7 million television sets (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1990).

The Arab World VCR Revolution

The impact of the VCR on the Arab states is well documented (Abuzinada, 1988; Boyd, 1882; Boyd & Straubhaar, 1985; Straubhaar & Boyd, 1989; Boyd, 1985; Boyd, Straubhaar, & Lent, 1989). The basis for the large number of machines in the Middle East is the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli War. Not only did the resultant quadrupling of oil prices bring vast riches to the Gulf states; these riches attracted both skilled and unskilled labor from Egypt and other countries to the Gulf. Returning Egyptians brought back much-needed hard currency, radio and television receivers, and videocassette recorders that are available in the Gulf at low tax-free prices. Although VCR penetration exceeds 80% in most Gulf states, it remains modest in Egypt. One factor that influences the number of sets in Egypt is the number of people served per machine; extended families and traditional Arab hospitality make it unusual to consume media in small family groups, as is the general practice in the West.

Egyptian VCR Software Economics

Hindsight suggests that before the late 1980s Egypt's economy was stymied by the economic policies of former presidents Nasser and Sadat. In essence, the country was unable to compete internationally because its currency was not "hard," i.e., it was a viable medium of exchange only in Egypt. As state subsidies for food and other necessities gradually disappeared and the one market-based exchange rate replaced several imposed by the government, consumer prices rose to at least approximate market levels. Before the late 1980s, however, there was an active black market for a variety of goods and services, including the exchange of foreign currency. In order to understand the economics of the VCR in Egypt, one must remember that Egypt is a developing country with a large, growing population residing on a small area of fertile land. Rural to urban migration has made Cairo one of the world's most crowded cities. There is both unemployment and underemployment in Egypt. In Cairo, for example, it is possible to sustain oneself by working for tips gained from wiping dust from the windows automobiles stopped at traffic lights. The video cassette industry is a part of the Egyptian underground economy, although rental and other forms of distribution take place with government knowledge.

The Role of VCRs in Egypt

Mass media in Egypt often have been overemphasized in the national development process. Since the 1950s, Egyptian leaders have put large amounts of funding into media development. For example, former President Gamal Abdul Nasser dedicated considerable amounts of money to media development, particularly film production, to promote both Egyptian development and his own brand of nationalism throughout the Middle East (Boyd, 1975). Until the late 1970s, cinemas were a well established and respectable place for family entertainment. At that time, there were few Egyptians who had yet to experience seeing a film in a movie theater. Unfortunately, the number of people who have never experienced the cinema has increased drastically over the past ten or twelve years due to economic and cultural reasons, television viewing habits, and the introduction of video cassette recorders.

Economic Factors Affecting VCR Popularity

It has become economically difficult in recent years for a middle-class family to attend an urban cinema. By Egyptian standards, tickets are expensive, ranging between $1.36 and $2.85 in urban areas such as Cairo and Alexandria; a family of four can expect to pay between $5.60 and $12.00 for one cinema outing.[1] Given that the per capita gross national product (GNP) in Egypt in 1990 was approximately $684, one trip to the cinema could consume somewhere between 9% to 20% of a family's monthly income of $57. Because of lost income, the physical condition of Egyptian cinemas has deteriorated; most older movie houses are unkempt, uncomfortable, and therefore less attractive.

VCRs in Egypt

VCRs seem ideally suited to Egypt and other Arab states for several reasons. Arab culture in general fosters extremely strong family ties, and entertainment is family-oriented. In addition, electronic gadgets are status symbols as in this highly status-conscious society there is limited entertainment diversity, and media receiver hardware is shared.

Young married Egyptian couples often live with a spouse's parents until they are sufficiently well-off to afford a place of their own. The degree to which Egyptians seek entertainment outside the home varies; the financially better-off urbanites occasionally visit restaurants, the newer movie theaters, night clubs, and, most recently in Cairo, the opera. The less-privileged, low-income strata enjoy the simple life; they go to the few parks available, walk along the Nile, or gather on bridges to catch a breeze and have a better view of the river. Those in rural areas usually congregate in youth and community centers. Most entertaining, however, is home-based and most often involves the extended family. In addition, the image of Egyptian males sitting in coffee houses playing cards and backgammon, smoking water pipes, talking and listening to the radio or watching television broadcasts or video tape is still a reality in many parts of Egypt.

Egypt is also a very consumption-oriented, status-conscious society where, among the financially better-off, the acquisition of consumer items, whether the latest car or electronic device, is a valued status symbol. The electronic items both contribute to family home entertainment and are highly visible; they are evidence of economic achievement for visitors to admire. Another factor influencing the popularity of home entertainment in Egypt is that the work day is short; official working hours in Egypt are traditionally 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., leaving abundant time for leisure.

Motivations for Video Cassette Ownership

There are several reasons that VCRs are popular in attracting viewers from Egyptian television.

Television advertisements: The reaction of the public to television advertising is not always positive. In Egypt, advertisements are inserted in groups before or after rather than during a program. According to several surveys done on the impact of television on Egyptian audiences, most people who watch television complain that there are too many commercial advertisements on television and that they sometimes last for almost an hour (Amin, 1990). They state that the duration of the advertisements irritates them and engenders a feeling that television has become a commercial institution rather than providing them entertainment and information.

Table 1 notes the various motivations for having a VCR in Egypt.

Place Table 1 about here

Controlled television news and entertainment: Where governments or public corporations present heavily controlled news and entertainment, viewers have acquired VCRs in an attempt to gain control of what they see. In Egypt, all television news is strictly controlled to ensure that government policies are followed. Entertainment programming is closely censored in order not to violate predominant local cultural, religious, or political precepts, e.g., the banning of American prime-time soap operas, such as *Dallas*, *Dynasty*, and others for cultural and moral reasons. However, viewers manage to get tapes of these programs from large Egyptian video clubs such as Arab Contractors, Inc., and watch them in groups. In addition, many Egyptian popular soap operas, such as *El Raya El Bayda*, *Layalee El Helmeya*, and *Refaat El Haqan*, are also censored, but primarily for political reasons.

Affluence: Countries with a high per capita GNP have high rates of VCR ownership. As one might expect, pre-invasion Kuwait, with a 1987 annual per capita GNP of US $14,610, has a much higher rate of VCR penetration than does Egypt, with a 1987 annual per capita GNP of US$ 684 (World Bank, 1989). Egypt does, however, have an affluent upper class and a large number of citizens of modest economic means who have brought television sets and VCRs home from working in the Gulf states.

Suppression of political activity: In countries where political expression on television is limited, VCRs are a means of communicating political and religious points of view. For example, video tape of former President Sadat's 1981 assassination from various foreign networks circulated throughout Egypt and many VCR homes managed to see them. Though video tape of the assassination was broadcast on Egyptian television, viewers were not certain that it was uncensored and wanted to see more than one version of what really took place.

Studies (Al Fawal, 1987) have shown that there are other motives for purchasing a VCR--the perception of the VCR as a necessity for a modern home; pressure from children to purchase one; the desire to record popular programs, especially soccer games; the poor physical conditions of Egyptian cinemas; accessibility; the availability of a wide variety of films on video tape; and the existence of hundreds of video rental stores in the cities, towns, and villages.

Sources of Video Cassettes

Results of field research carried out in Egypt (Al Hadidy and Ali, 1985) indicate that, similar to patterns in the West, video viewers depend heavily on renting cassettes from video clubs. The main factor behind this trend is economic; the purchase price of a pre-recorded cassette is around $1.40 to $15.20, while the rental cost is from $.76 to $1.14. Moreover, research indicates that viewers use VCRs as a means of entertainment and not for recording or accumulating home video libraries. Hence, viewers do not usually buy pre-recorded cassettes (El Fawal, 1987).

Sources from which Egyptians Obtain Video Cassettes

- Rentals from video clubs
- Rentals from shops with video sections
- Borrowing from friends and exchanging tapes with them
- Borrowing from relatives

- Buying pre-recorded tapes either from abroad or from Egyptian markets
- Borrowing and/or renting from coffee shops or small stores that stock a few tapes

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Place Table 2 about here

Official reports recorded more than two hundred video clubs in the country in 1984, but the number of unregistered clubs exceeded 500 or more (Sorour, 1984). The number of clubs may well have quadrupled by 1990. Small video rental shops have also appeared in rural areas to supply material for VCRs. There are more than 40 video-producing and distributing companies in Egypt. The number of imported foreign films that are copied onto video cassettes increased from 544 in 1981 to nearly 800 in 1984 (Sorour, 1984).

There are several types of establishments from which people in Egypt may acquire video-taped material. More specifically, our research reveals three types of retail video businesses.

Type A: Large video clubs. These demand a membership fee (usually $76 to $114 a year) as well as a small fee for renting the video cassettes ($.95 to $1.14) for 24-48 hours. For late return, there is an additional penalty that is equal to the actual rental fee. These large, prestigious clubs have a wide variety of current foreign films.

Type B: Medium-size video clubs. These clubs demand a membership fee (usually between $19 to $38 per year) as well as a rental charge ranging from $.57 to $.76. They have a wide variety of Arabic and foreign, especially Indian, films of technical quality acceptable by Egyptian standards.

Type C: Small-size video clubs. These clubs are becoming increasingly popular. They exist as small shops in entrances to apartment buildings and businesses. Membership is not usually required or at a token fee of $3.80 to $9.50 per year, and the rental fee is likewise very small, as little as $.38.

There is, however, a very limited variety of videotapes of very poor technical quality.

Place Table 3 about here

Conclusion

1. It seems from the preceding discussion that video cassette recorders in Egypt have a major economic advantage. Once a VCR has been purchased, Egyptians tend to rent video cassettes rather than going to the movie theaters.

2. The cultural dimension plays an important role in favoring VCRs. The Arab culture in general fosters extremely strong family ties, and entertainment is family oriented. Egyptian families in general do not go to the cinema unless a strong motive for doing so exists.

3. VCR owners have control over the choice of content and the time of viewing. In the case of Egypt, because of the strict control over news and entertainment, viewers tend to find video the only viable alternative to government-operated television.

4. The strong correlation between the VCR and cinema varies, positively for marketing videos of Egyptian films and negatively due to piracy.

5. Poor television broadcast programming and scheduling drive audiences away from television and motivate them to rent videos.

6. Censorship and suppression of political expression on television have led VCRs to be a means of communicating political and religious messages.

7. Egyptian cinema to a large extent dictates video content not only in Egypt but also throughout the Arab world. The Egyptian cinema and video industries will soon face a major problem: an increase in film production is needed to satisfy future demand in Egypt and throughout the Arab world.

8. VCR diffusion in Egypt will continue expanding rapidly. The number of video cassette rental stores will continue to increase both in the cities and rural areas.

Notes

[1] During the time of this research, the Egyptian pound (LE) was worth about 40 U.S. cents.

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Table 1

Motives for Purchasing VCRs

	Frequency	Percentage
As a necessity of a modern home	189	33.3
Pressure exerted by children on parents	84	14.8
As gifts from Egyptian expatriates	40	7
As status symbols	37	6.5
Other	218	38.4
Total	568	100

Source: El Hadidy (1985)

Table 2

Sources of Video Cassettes

	Frequency	Percentage
Rental from video clubs	480	58.9
Borrowing from others	242	29.7
Buying from abroad	48	5.9
Buying from Egypt	38	4.7
Other sources	7	0.8
Total	815	100

Source: El-Hadidy (1985)

Table 3

Professions of Activities/ Sources	Civil Servants	Trades and Workers	Student	Unem-ployed	Total	%
Rental from video clubs	224	86	75	95	480	58.9
Borrowing from others	135	29	33	45	242	29.7
Buying from abroad	20	4	6	18	48	59
Buying from Egypt	17	5	6	10	38	47
Other sources	6	1	-	-	7	0.8
Total	402	125	120	168	815	100

Source: El-Hadidy (1985)

Political Issues and Visual Rhetoric: Television Advertising in Hungary's First Free Election

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Political Issues and Visual Rhetoric:
Television Advertising in Hungary's First Free Election

by Shay Sayre

> "A new form of political communication has appeared, one that depends on high technology and big dollars and that may be turning elections and campaigns into a kind of spectator sport, a television entertainment, something to watch and enjoy but not necessarily to participate in by voting." *The Spot*,, p.vii

In the United States, with its technically sophisticated use of the media in political campaigns, the power of imagery is said to have replaced presentations about issues in the political process. Critics contend that television ads fail to provide the voters with meaningful information, and ads emphasize image-making while ignoring political issues (Patterson & McClure, 1976). Joslyn (1984) contends that campaign communications which characterize the contemporary electoral process do more to entertain than enlighten. In their preoccupation with the debate between issues, rhetoric, and candidate images, perhaps critics have minimized the role visual imagery plays in presenting complex issues to voters during political campaigns.

For insights on the role of imagery, the investigator looks to Hungary. In a country relatively backward in its media technology and marketing expertise, politicians were called upon to present issues of national importance to voters during the country's first free election after 43 years of communist rule. Campaign architects recognized that, with over 20 parties entering candidates for March and April 1990 elections to Parliament, citizens must have intelligible, relevant and genuinely different alternatives. They selected television as the best medium to provide alternatives to voters. The choice was made in spite of evidence from the U.S. and Britain which proves that, after five decades of a television commercial genre, the value and impact of the political spot remains largely unknown (Shyles, 1986).

This paper presents a content analysis of Hungarian political advertising to gain insight into the role images play in helping voters to understand issues, and suggests that visual images are appropriate for delivering issues-oriented political messages on television.

Advertising Literature

This treatment of political campaigns turns to the literature of advertising research that uses a meaning-seeking approach to content analysis. Presenting an argument against analyzing only rhetorical or verbal components of political ads, Nimmo & Felsberg (1986) analyzed symbols and visual analogies to ascertain how political advertising reflects party aspirations and ideologies. Linda Scott (1990) made a strong case for employing visual rhetoric as an effective communication tool. Kaplan (1990) found that visual metaphors in advertising text played a crucial role in communicating values. Elder and Cobb (1983) claim that, by expressing substantive concerns of government, visual symbols become the currency of political communication.

Politics, according to Edelman (1967, p.5) is a "passing parade of abstract symbols." Symbols can be investigated from a semiotic perspective. Sapir (1934) typed symbols as *referential* which allude to something else, and *condensation* which evoke emotions associated with a situation. Most powerful of the two, condensation symbols pack patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories and promises of future greatness into a single symbolic act, sign or event (p.493). Condensation symbols, also known as *public* (Firth, 1973) symbols, designate collectively attributable meaning. Significant research exists to show that symbolic formats are useful for presenting issues in televised political spot advertisements (Shyles, 1986).

In this study, a detailed analysis of the form and content of Hungarian political advertising is made for possible evidence to support the notions that issues can be presented through visual imagery as well as rhetoric, and that political advertising is useful for transmitting ideology and meaning to voters.

HUNGARY 1990

The Political System

An overview of the nature of the electoral system and the political parties is an essential preamble to analysis. The March and April election process was a complicated one. Voting procedures to elect the 384 member Parliament consisted of two round of balloting held in 185 single and multiple member districts. In single member districts, first round candidates were required to receive 50% of the vote or to be among the top three vote recipients to qualify for round two. Those victorious in the second round received a seat in Parliament. Candidates in districts with proportionate representation had to make the Party list of candidates which was determined by party members during regional voting. Budapest, for instance, had 32 districts and nine parties.

Forty-two national parties[1] ran candidates for the March election; only five emerged with significant victories for a chance at the April contest. In spite of the plethora of commercials produced and aired during the two month period, only 48% of the voting public participated in the April election. The Democratic Forum captured 43% of the total vote, gaining substantially after the March elections and emerging as the victorious party. The Free Democrats received 24%; Socialists gained 11%; and the Young Democrats trailed with 8.9%.

An overview of four parties[2] and their logos provides a basic introduction to the visual symbols used in campaign communications. Party logos contain symbols derived from culturally significant signs of past and present concerns, and are graphic reflections of their individual ideologies. Parties are presented in the order of percentages of votes received in the April election, most to least.

Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), moderate-right, had strength in provincial cities, and is somewhat tolerant of leading reform Communists. This populist party has been moderate in its approach to change, and tapped into strong currents of prevailing nationalism and patriotism. A triad of signs, the MDF logo combines a stylized folk-art tulip with a bird in flight and a heart to signify spiritual unity. The tulip, a feminine sign, is red; wings of the legendary bird which is said to have led Hungarians from the East to the site of their country, and a representation of the heart, masculine signs, are green. The logo has a white border to complete the national colors, red, white and green. A popular musician designed the logo which was featured prominently in posters and television ads.

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[1] Party is defined here as any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect government office holders under a given label (Epstein 1967, p.25)

[2] The fifth party, Independent Smallholders, was a single issue party insisting on the return of state land to their original owners in 1949. The old-time Agrarians gained 11% of the vote the first time around, and used a wheat shaft to represent agriculture's link to the past and to tie the people and their livelihood. Because they produced no significant commercials, the Smallholder's Party is not included in this analysis.

Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) is a Budapest-based group of former dissidents with their origins in the human rights movement who were eager to embrace Western Europe. These liberal intellectuals (moderate left) formed the core of a party which whose membership included renown writer Gyorgy Konrad, publisher Gabor Demszky and architect Laszlo Rajk. A logo of three birds in flight, each in one of the national colors, acts as symbols of past legends and future freedom.

Hungarian Socialist Party, the reformed right wing of the Communist Party, relied on workers to support their socialist platform. A red carnation, previously symbolic of Party officials, adorns Party candidates in video commercials and appears as a stylized graphic in print media.

Fidesz, or **Young Democratic Party,** attracted right wingers between 24 and 35 years of age arguing for the future through capitalism. Referred to by sociologists as Hungarian "yuppies," this pro-Western group embraced the orange as its logo to symbolically mimic a past edict that Hungary was to become self-sustaining by growing its own produce. Fidesz views Western idealism as the solution to economic and social ills in the country. (See Appendix A for logo graphics.)

Hungarian Video

Magyar Television provides subscription programming on two state-owned and controlled channels to 93% of the population. Since early 1990, satellite dishes and cable networks with Western European programming have been affordable for apartment and collective housing dwellers through cost-sharing; single residence occupants, however, must rely upon the national broadcast network for their news and entertainment. Although Magyar TV does not allow commercially sponsored programming, it does permit advertisers to buy broadcast time during breaks between programs. Air time is sold up to one year in advance; the cost of the ad has no direct relationship to program audiences.

During the election, political advertisers were allotted two :30 spots per day for broadcast free of charge on during scheduled advertising segments. Commercial production costs were paid for by individual parties, but low-cost production was made available to all parties by the network studio. Viewers often preferred commercials over regular programs such as American sitcom reruns from the Seventies, and foreign language operas.

Election Issues

Prior to the election, Hungarian citizens were accustomed to receiving information from Party controlled newspapers and state controlled electronic media. Skeptical of bias and propaganda, voters shunned journalistic editorial, relying on posters and commercials for clues to each party's stand on national issues. Issues are defined here as "current topics linked to the national interest " (Hofstetter, 1976, p. 12). Acting as architects of the new order, officials from the major parties considered the following issues to be the most important matters to be decided in the election.[1]

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[1] Personal interviews with party officials from MDF, SZDSZ, Fidesz and the Socialist parties were conducted in Budapest and Szeged during the month of July, 1990. Special thanks to Dr. Levay Bela, candidate of the Free Democrats and professor at Etvos

1. Whether to implement a socialistic or a capitalist form of democracy.
2. The importance of nationalism and the idea of the "pure Hungarian" for policymaking.
3. The degree of separation from communism and past politics.
4. The relationship between group demographics and new leadership.
5. Hungary's role in a United Europe.

U.S. political consultants traveled to Hungary to advise leaders of the Free Democrats and Democratic Forum Parties on how to present election issues in advertising; they found little understanding of the campaign process. *Time Magazine* Correspondent Walter Shapiro reported that despite the expertise offered by consultants, campaign advertising was ultimately conceived and produced by Hungarian artists and writers who volunteered their services.[1] U.S political consultant Fred Martin (whose Bancroft Group assisted the Free Democratic Party) told the *New York Times* that none of his group's ideas for message and/or strategy were actually incorporated into the finished commercials.

METHODOLOGY

A quantitative content and visual image analyses was made of Hungarian political commercials aired during the general elections held in March and April. Since the best analysis of political advertising can be performed when all ads of a particular form of expressions are included (Leymour 1975), this study used the universe of political commercial aired on Magyar television during the 1990 election campaign.

University in Budapest for his analysis of the Hungarian political election system and interpretation of the television commercials produced by the major parties.

[1] Shapiro's Assessment was received during a phone interview to his New York office on June 15, 1990.

Content Analysis Methods

The research reported here has as its purpose to describe the visual imagery of televised political commercials and then to analyze the relationship between such content and the presence of issues identified as important. Ad formats for each commercial were coded and variations noted, i.e., one spot with seven variations was coded as one spot. Content analysis was performed according to Frank's (1977) method to count concrete data and to discover metaphors, symbols and visual imagery.

A. Mechanical.

Concrete and quantifiable data were recorded for each commercial to assess mechanical factors of the ad using a coding form using the following three coding categories:

1. **Ad elements**: presence and speaking of a candidate, spokesperson or celebrity; appearance of logo at beginning or end of the spot; party affiliation; number of commercial variations, if any.

2. **Special audio or visual effects:** use of voice-over, music, illustration, animation or camera angles.

3. **Ad format**: presence of a dramatization, visual comparison, rhetorical argument presented by spokesperson or celebrity and the use of party comparison.

B. Substance.

A qualitative analysis of content material was made of the techniques used to convey meaning and substance . Linking elements, issues presented rhetorically, and values were interpreted by coders.

1. **Linking elements**:

a. **Metaphor**, the use of visual elements to represent something else. Visual metaphors always use a concrete form to represent the abstract idea that is being communicated (Morgan & Welton, 1986, pp.92-95). Metaphors were clustered into six categories: freedom (to choose and from persecution), change (from the past and present), unity (one mind, acting together), intellect (educated class), hope (new beginning) and re-birth (return to former customs and values).

b. **Logical argument** as presented through the use of rhetoric by a spokesperson.

c. **Emotional appeal,** the use of symbols to persuade. Symbols were coded into 18 categories of meaning as: rebellion, freedom, communism, socialism, repression, health, nature, nationalism, progress, government or leadership, hope, change, heritage, tradition, repression, rebirth, religion, and safety. Objects used as condensation symbols were identified and coded for their role in creating meaning for the viewer.

2. **Political Issues:** Presentation in the commercial of one or more of the five political issues described above.

3. **Values**: Expression of political values or themes of freedom and equality (see Rokeach, 1973). From an exhaustive list of visual images featured in the commercials, nine value categories as defined by Rokeach were coded: equality, fairness, unity, change, freedom, tradition, youth, heritage, religion.

Two coders were used. The average intercoder reliability score calculated on a pretest of five commercials was .94. Discrepancies in issue and image categories were discovered early in the process, and special attention was given in consideration of these elements for coding.

Results of the Content Analysis

Mechanical Factors

Eighteen political parties produced 98 **political spots** for airing on Hungarian television, offering voters over 47 minutes of unduplicated party-oriented commercial messages. Sixty-six versions of 98 commercials were coded; spots of four major parties were analyzed separately and the remainder grouped as "all others."[1] Table 1 reports the number of spots make by each party.

Table 1
Number of Commercial Versions Produced for Television by Political Party

Political Party	Number	Percent of Total
MDF	16	24.2
Socialists	16	24.2
SZDSZ	7	10.6
Fidesz	5	7.6
All Others	22	33.3

Logos were used for recognition and recall during some portion of all spots produced. Fidesz's orange remained on the screen throughout most of their spots. In 26 spots, party logos appeared at the beginning of the commercials; logos appeared at the end of 60 spots; Almost half of the spots (32) featured logos at the beginning and the end.

Either **voices or music or a combination** were audible in all of the ads. A voice-over or unseen announcer was used in 38 spots (58%). Candidates, celebrities and spokesperson were present in 11 spots, and music was used in all but two of the spots. Among the types of music featured to enhance the visual message were patriotic music, used in 21 spots (32%); and classical and popular music, which were each played in 9 spots (14%) for a total of 18.

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[1] Parties categorized as "all others" include: Partja Vallalkozok, Hazafias, Christian Democrats, Agrakszovetseg, Szocdemek SZDP, Fuggetlen Kisgazdapart, Bort Buzat, Bekesseget, Isten, Agrale, Kikusage, KDN, Demisz, Magyar Neppart, and Magyar Szakszervezetek Szovetsege.

Special video effects were used by four of the five major parties. Vignettes, defined as a series of short scenes or images used to tell a story, were used by the Socialists to contrast the old party with the new one. Animation and illustration were used by MDF and SZDSZ to enhance message delivery, and documentary film was invoked to show contrast between the past and the present in numerous spots produced by MDF and "other" parties.

Dramatizations, or stories developed to deliver messages or ideas, were used in 24 spots (36.4%); MDF was the heaviest user of this technique. Visual Comparisons were featured in 14 spots (21.2%); past and present were differentiated in nine spots, and bad was juxtaposed against good in five spots.

Candidates were sometimes featured, but only spoke in 3 spots. Three of four **spokespersons** shown spoke, and all five **celebrities** gave testimonies in MDF commercials. Table 5 shows the number of spots in which candidates, spokespersons and celebrities are seen and speak in the commercials.

Table 2
Presence and Speaking Role of Candidate, Spokesperson and Celebrity

Format	yes	%	no	%
Candidate shown	15	22.7	51	77.3
Candidate speaks	3	4.5	63	95.9
Spokesperson shown	4	6.1	62	93.9
Spokesperson speaks	3	4.5	63	95.9
Celebrity shown	5	7.6	61	92.4
Celebrity speaks	5	7.6	61	92.4

Candidates were shown in 38% of the Socialist Party spots and 25% of the spots by the Free Democrats, but no candidate spoke in either party's commercials. MDF featured candidates in one third of its spots and half of the candidates presented spoke on camera; celebrities were featured and spoke in one third of their commercials. Fidesz used speaking persons in 66% of their spots, but the remaining major and other parties featured spokespersons in only 15% of their spots.

Substantive Factors

Rhetoric presented by spokespersons or voice-overs dominated in 27 (40.9%) of the spots; messages were delivered by celebrities in five spots (7.6%). MDF's used celebrities to present arguments or issues in over one quarter of their commercials. **Visual metaphors** of freedom (4), change (2), and one each of intellect, hope and rebirth were present. SZDSZ was most prolific in their use of metaphor to communicate.

An **emotional appeal** was made to the voter in 41 commercials. Emotions evoking the spirit of heritage and change were predominant, appearing in over half of the commercials.

Commercials revealed associations of parties with specific **values** which acted as agents to communicate party philosophy. While most parties focused on a single value, MDF embraced three values to include issues identified as most important to voters in their commercial content. Rokeach advocated using freedom and change values to determine political ideology, arguing that values analysis contributes to an understanding of party ideology and issue presentation. To that end, values were tabulated and ranked; Table 3 shows how parties prioritized six values in their commercial campaigns.

Table 3
Rank Order of Values Presented in Political Commercials by Party

VALUE	MDF	SZDSZ	FIDESZ	SOCIALIST	OTHER
Freedom	2	1	1	3	5
Change	1	2	2	1	2
Heritage	3	4	3	4	6
Equality	4	5	6	2	4
Tradition	5	3	4	6	1
Religion	6	6	5	5	3

Condensation **symbols** were used to signify meaning to voters in this election. Most parties used public symbols like statues and barbed wire to evoke emotion. Fidesz' logo acted as a referential symbol for "rebellion." Visual symbols pictorialized party stands on issues, and correlated directly with party philosophy. Visual images and the meanings signified by symbols found in the commercials are best presented in the Discussion section.

Commercials were coded for the **style of presentation of a national issue** as rhetorical or visual images. In these commercials, visual images were used two out of three times to present issues. Issues were addressed with rhetoric in 23% of the commercials and with visual images in 61%. The remaining 16% of the ads presented candidates rather than issues.

Summary

Election winners and losers alike prioritized visual over verbal treatment of issues. MDF, election party winner, presented issues visually in about two thirds of its commercials, while losers used visual presentations for over the three quarters of their issues messages. One exception is SZDSZ which featured visually treated issues in all of its commercials. Table 4 summarizes these findings by number and percentage of spots between winner and losers.

Table 4

Party	Issues presented visually	Issues presented verbally
MDF	11 (69%)	05 (31%)
Losers	39 (78%)	11 (22%)
Total	50 (76%)	16 (24%)

Mechanical data confirm that less than one quarter of Hungarian political commercials featured candidates or spokespersons, resulting in an issues-oriented campaign. Music, found in all but two spots, was used to add drama and emotion to visual messages. Documentary footage and vignettes played a key role in presenting party ideology and issues to voters.

Substantive data revealed that metaphors and symbols were important for communicating party values to voters in this election. While types of values crossed party lines, the values of freedom and heritage dominated election media. Visual images were the locomotion of campaign advertising in Hungary, indicating that voters were expected to decide on parliamentarians by making the connection between video images and party ideology.

DISCUSSION

While quantifiable data is useful for making comparisons and generating an overview of campaign tactics, it cannot provide an understanding of how the formats and techniques deliver political messages to commercial viewers. Only meaningful inquiry serves to uncover the dynamics of the political continuity and change occurred during the campaign in Hungary.

The findings of this study, which indicate that presentation formats of political commercials are directly related to symbolic content, are consistent with semiotic theory which links communication to signification.[1] The semiotic link provides valuable insight into the use of signs, symbols and metaphors for meaning transfer in these commercials, and can be useful for understanding the importance of visual images for issues presentation in television political advertising. Building upon the framework provided from coding data, the author and Hungarian politician Bela Levay deconstructed the commercials for an in-depth analysis of campaign media.To illuminate meaning, nine commercials are discussed here in terms of their methods of transferring information on issues to voters through visual elements of communication. Table 5 outlines the discussion.

Table 5

Party	Commercial	Issue (s) Number	Presentation Format
MDF	Ticket to Ride	4	Freedom Metaphor
SZDSZ	Tom & Jerry	3	Overthrow Metaphor
Fidesz	Blacksmith	1, 4	Change Metaphor
Socialists	Blooming	1, 4	Change Metaphor
Socialists	New Equality	3	Symbols of the Past
MDF	Linking	4	Symbols of Unity
SZDSZ	Music Lesson	4	Symbols of the Elite
MDF	Recital	2, 4	Symbols of Heritage
Fidesz	Listen to Your Heart	1, 3, 4	Symbols of Youth, the West

Issues and Visual Metaphors

For the leading parties, logos were metaphors of their values and philosophy: the folk tulip, heart and historic bird espoused the nationality and free aspirations of MDF; birds of freedom became SZDSZ; the red carnation, flower of reform, was socialism; and Fidesz's orange and Solidarity typestyle served to communicate rebellious mockery and capitalism.

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[1] See Thomas A. Sebeok, ed. *A Profusion of Signs*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977, for a wide range of essays on the application of semiotic theory to various aspects of analysis.

The metaphor of freedom was used to address Issue 4 (leadership philosophy) in the MDF commercial, ***Ticket to Ride***. Four variations of a scenario at the Budapest train station where passengers of various demographics (old woman, young couple, businessman) purchase tickets were produced. In all versions, the stamp placed on the ticket bares the initials MDF. Actually the MDF stamp is a travel validation with the same letters, but the party uses this stamping action to declare that voting for MDF is like purchasing a ticket to travel, to venture forth, to be free. The validation and implied travel is a visual metaphor for party leadership philosophy which prioritizes individual freedom. As the transaction between ticket purchaser and seller guarantees travel for payment, the transaction between voter and party is an exchange of freedom for a vote. The commercial resonates with the message: the action of a stamper's "thud" on a ticket, MDF letters, organ music, and images of the station clock tower are elements of symbolic expression for MDF.

A overthrow metaphor addressing the Issue 3 (degree of separation from Communism) is pictorialized in the SZDSZ ***Tom and Jerry*** cartoon. In this clip from the American comic, Tom cat's role as the predator is reversed when an inflated Tom is deflated by mouse Jerry's needle as a balloon loses air when punctured. While Tom shrinks, Jerry becomes more bold, and we see a triumphant mouse chasing the powerless cat with a fly swatter right out of the cartoon. The natural predator/prey metaphor here shows Hungary, the small mouse, deflating the big Communist cat and chasing it out with a vengeance. One of the most popular commercials of the campaign, Tom & Jerry appealed to activists and party elites who were most vehement about the removal of Communists from government.

Freedom and change images dramatized the leadership philosophy of Fidesz. In ***Blacksmith***, a young contemporary blacksmith forges metal as a metaphor for party plans to forge a new society. The spot features symbols of youth, promise and change in the craftsman, the Western music, and the anvil. Underlying entrepreneurialism implies pro-capitalism, addresses Issue 1. Emotion is evoked through the combination of the popular music theme song and rebellious activity: taking a bite out of the symbolic orange. Acting purely as a situational symbol, the orange as campaign-logo mocks of the establishment; by taking a bite, the party signifies its willingness to devour the old regime for a Western-style of governance. Oranges rain down on the blacksmith, symbolizing the storm of youths who will forge a new society for Hungary.

Socialists used a visual metaphor for *change* to convey their leadership philosophy with images of pruning dead branches, and the ***Blooming*** of buds. As the Communist Party is dead wood, so the new Socialist philosophy is new growth. Nature images combine to presents a visual comparison between past and present in an effort to separate itself from the old regime. Accompanied by patriotic music Socialists uses animation to convey transformation and revitalization of the party and the country.

Issues and Political Symbols

Emotional appeals in commercials were visually developed through a typology of political symbols characteristic of Hungary's situation to connect voters with party ideology. Community symbols of flags and hero monuments were found in many advertisements. Public situational symbols relevant to current authorities, non-governmental political actors, and political issues prevailed in the forms of Communists, celebrities, and flying birds.

The Socialists presented Issue 3, breaking from Communist governance, with symbols of the past. In ***New Equality,*** black and white documentary films of famine and other travesties are seen through a mirror to symbolize the past. The culmination is the mirror shattering, breaking all connections with the past. Images in bright colors are presented to signify the future. A patriotic theme song accompanies three variations of this dramatized comparison between past tyranny and the Socialists' vision of the future. Vignettes of visual images are packed with symbolic overtones and significations of former tyranny.

MDF also used old film footage to contrast past with present. Unity and strength are visualized in ***Linking*** through color images of Hungarians forming a human chain across the Chain Bridge over the Danube, linking the old city (Buda) to the new city (Pest). This symbolic linking is dramatized with classical music and a show of strength; situational symbols convey themes of "power to the people" and "united we stand." Religious and community symbols set the tone and make the connection between the populist party philosophy and the voters in this commercial.

SZDSZ approached Issue 4 in ***Music Lesson*** with a symbols of the cultural elite and aristocracy. In this commercial, a piano student practices her lessons while a tutor makes reprimands for playing the incorrect notes. The notes she misplays are the party initials, which are repeated as the teacher corrects the student: "Not NDS, SDS." The clever student winks at us after she masters this classical music interpretation.

Once again, party letters are substituted for another meaning in a play on letters similar to MDF advertisement. But the reference here is one of social class rather than political freedom, and this issue is whether or not to elect the social elite to government. As SDS is the correct party, SDS are also the correct notes. SDS signifies a proper classical education and being on key as opposed to being out of tune with alternatives. Here a visual comparison is made between "good and bad", between "us and them" for SZDSZ. Images of the piano teacher and his forceful striving for excellence convey leadership philosophy by symbolically linking the party's ideology to an elite constituency.

MDF used several literary and artistic celebrities as symbols of the nation's cultural heritage in party advertising. In ***Recital,*** audiences light candles and cheer as a famous poet recites his nationalistic verse. Here, historical rhetoric and images of moved masses evoke emotional responses from voters who share the nationalistic dream. One party, one people, one history---a theme developed by personifying the spirit of moderate Hungary through a popular artist. Both nationalist and leadership issues are referenced symbolically by the eternal flames which signify MDF's promise to retain Hungary's Finao-Uralic heritage.

Fidesz emotionally charged most of its commercials with the soundtrack of a popular American song, "***Listen to Your Heart.***." Symbolizing the style of Western democracy and capitalism, a rock concert's images and lyrics are presented in a format typical of Music TV. Fidesz's orange and blue logo (which uses typography reminiscent of Poland's *Solidarity* party) is prominent throughout the commercial. Lights, sounds, and a cheering crowd signify a new kind of life for Hungary, a life attainable by voting for a young leadership. In this commercial, lyrical text expands the imagery by telling voters, "Sometimes you wonder if the fight is worth while . . . If you don't know where you're going and you don't know why. . . Just listen to your heart." Although most young Hungarians understand English, the lyrics in this spot are subordinate to the fashion, style and economics of the West which signify the party's ideology.

Limitations and Future Research

This analyses of the visual images and methods of presenting issues in political commercials was conducted within certain limits. Challenging the critics' assertion that commercials emphasize candidate imagery rather at the expense of political issues, this study reports that issues were presented visually in 76% of the total spots produced, and visually in 69% of the commercials by the winning party. Findings support the view that visual images can communicate political issues and can do so effectively enough to win an election.

However, the nature of this election precluded the use of visual images for party ideology rather than candidate positioning, and may not be typical of U.S. election issue content. Operational definitions and language unfamiliarity may have caused coders to prioritize format designations of rhetoric over visual imagery when candidates were featured. Candidate imagery was not categorized in this study and does not address the controversy between candidates and issues in U.S commercials.

There is an obvious limitation of generalizability to all political commercials. However, this study challenges the notion that candidate image phenomena, more than campaign issue phenomena, reside in the video portion of political commercials. Future research can assess the application of visual images to the presentation of important issues to U.S. voters in national political campaigns.

Conclusion

If, as Leymour (1975, p. 140) suggests, "all advertising is reducible to a system of symbols, designed to mobilize a system of values," then the Hungarian election is reducible to images which signify change, freedom, and heritage. Unlike most historically significant events, this campaign will be remembered not for its great rhetoric but for its great images. SZDSZ intellectuals turned from the pen the camera to communicate their radical departure from Communism; Socialists pleaded their case for change using documentary film and vivid images of the past; Fidesz's graphics spoke to the youth of Hungary; and MDF reached the masses by personifying their logo and their heritage on television.

What is perhaps most important is whether or not voters who were targeted by televised political advertising were indeed provided with enough information to make educated decisions for selecting party candidates. While it was not the intention here to respond to that question, the low voter turnout rate is certainly cause for debate on the effectiveness of campaign media. Research proves that studies of the effects of commercials on audiences are not much help in determining the persuasion power of image versus rhetoric in political advertising. Perhaps by diversifying their approaches to both the content and the effects of televised political ads, advertisers can improve their understanding of the power of visual imagery for presenting campaign issues.

APPENDIX A

PARTY LOGOS




Szabad Demokraták
de




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